







A
HISTORY OF GREECE;

FROM THE
EARLIEST PERIOD TO THE CLOSE OF THE GENERATION
CONTEMPORARY WITH ALEXANDER THE GREAT.

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FOURTH EDITION.

IN TEN VOLUMES.

VOL. IV.

RMS1256452

WITH PORTRAIT, MAPS, AND PLANS.

Departamento di Teoria dello Stato Facoltà Scienze Politiche
Inv. 5874
Coll. D. S. II B 129 (4)

LONDON:
JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET.
1872.

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LONDON:

PRINTED BY WILLIAM CLOWES AND SONS, STAMFORD STREET,
AND CHURCH LANE.

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The Epidamnians apply for aid in their distress to Korkyra—they are refused—the Corinthians send aid to the place	536	They begin to stir up revolt among the Athenian allies—Potidæa, a colony of Corinth, but ally of Athens	552
The Korkyræans attack Epidamnus		Relations of Athens with Perdikkas, king of Macedonia, his intrigues along with Corinth against her—he induces the Chalkidians to revolt from her—increase of Olynthus	553
		Revolt of Potidæa—armament sent thither from Athens	554
		Combat near Potidæa between the Athenian force and the allied Corinthians, Potidæans, and Chalkidians. Victory of the Athenians	557
		Potidæa placed in blockade by the Athenians	558

HISTORY OF GREECE.

PART II.

CONTINUATION OF HISTORICAL GREECE.

CHAPTER XXXVI.

FROM IONIC REVOLT TO BATTLE OF MARATHON.

IN the preceding chapter, I indicated the point of confluence between the European and Asiatic streams of Grecian history—the commencement of a decided Persian intention to conquer Attica ; manifested first in the form of a threat by Artaphernês the satrap, when he enjoined the Athenians to take back Hippias as the only condition of safety, and afterwards converted into a passion in the bosom of Darius in consequence of the burning of Sardis. From this time forward, therefore, the affairs of Greece and Persia come to be in direct relation one with the other, and capable of being embodied, much more than before, into one continuous narrative.

The reconquest of Ionia being thoroughly completed, Artaphernês proceeded to organise the future government of it, with a degree of prudence and forethought not often visible in Persian proceedings.

Proceedings of the satrap Artaphernês after the reconquest of Ionia.

Convoking deputies from all the different cities, he compelled them to enter into a permanent convention for the amicable settlement of disputes, so as to prevent all employment of force by any one against the others. Moreover, he caused the territory of each city to be measured by parasangs (each parasang was equal to thirty stadia, or about three miles and a half), and arranged the assessments of tribute according to this measurement ; without any material departure, how-

ever, from the sums which had been paid before the revolt.¹ Unfortunately, Herodotus is unusually brief in his allusion to this proceeding, which it would have been highly interesting to be able to comprehend perfectly. We may however assume it as certain, that both the population and the territory of many among the Ionic cities, if not of all, were materially altered in consequence of the preceding revolt, and still more in consequence of the cruelties with which the suppression of the revolt had been accompanied. In regard to Milêtus, Herodotus tells us that the Persians retained for themselves the city with its circumjacent plain, but gave the mountain-portion of the Milesian territory to the Karians of Pêdasa.² Such a proceeding would naturally call for fresh measurement and assessment of tribute; and there may have been similar transfers of land elsewhere. I have already observed that the statements which we find in Herodotus, of utter depopulation and destruction falling upon the cities, cannot be credited in their full extent; for these cities are all peopled, and all Hellenic, afterwards. Yet there can be no doubt that they are partially true, and that the miseries of those days, as stated in the work of Hekataëus as well as by contemporary informants with whom Herodotus had probably conversed, must have been extreme. New inhabitants would probably be admitted in many of them, to supply the loss sustained; and such infusion of fresh blood would strengthen the necessity for the organization introduced by Artaphernês, in order to determine clearly the obligations due from the cities both to the Persian government and towards each other. Herodotus considers that the arrangement was extremely beneficial to the Ionians, and so it must unquestionably have appeared, coming as it did immediately after so much previous suffering. He farther adds that the tribute then fixed remained unaltered until his own day—a statement requiring some comment, which I reserve until the time arrives for describing the condition of the Asiatic Greeks after the repulse of Xerxês from Greece Proper.

Meanwhile the intentions of Darius for the conquest of Greece were now effectively manifested. Mardonius invested with the supreme command, at the head of a large force, was

¹ Herodot. vi. 42.

² Herodot. vi. 20.

sent down in the ensuing spring for the purpose. Having reached Kilikia in the course of the march, he himself got on ship-board and went by sea to Ionia, while his army marched across Asia Minor to the Hellespont. His proceeding in Ionia surprises us, and seems to have appeared surprising as well to Herodotus himself as to his readers. Mardonius deposed the despots throughout the various Greek cities;¹ leaving the people of each to govern themselves, subject to Persian dominion and tribute. This was a complete reversal of the former policy of Persia, and must be ascribed to a new conviction, doubtless wise and well-founded, which had recently grown up among the Persian leaders, that on the whole their unpopularity was aggravated more than their strength was increased, by employing these despots as instruments. The phenomena of the late Ionic revolt were well calculated to teach such a lesson; but we shall not often find the Persians profiting by experience, throughout the course of this history.

Mardonius comes with an army into Ionia—he puts down the despots in the Greek cities.

Mardonius did not remain long in Ionia, but passed on with his fleet to the Hellespont, where the land-force had already arrived. He transported it across into Europe, and began his march through Thrace; all of which had already been reduced by Megabazus, and does not seem to have participated in the Ionic revolt. The island of Thasus surrendered to the fleet without resistance, and the land-force was conveyed across the Strymon to the Greek city of Akanthus, on the western coast of the Strymonic Gulf. From hence Mardonius marched into Macedonia, and subdued a considerable portion of its inhabitants—perhaps some of those not comprised in the dominion of Amyntas, since that

He marches into Thrace and Macedonia—his fleet destroyed by a terrible storm near Mount Athos—he returns into Asia.

¹ Herodot. vi. 43. In recounting this deposition of the despots by Mardonius, Herodotus reasons from it as an analogy for the purpose of vindicating the correctness of another of his statements, which (he acquaints us) many persons disputed; namely, the discussion which he reports to have taken place among the seven conspirators, after the death of the Median Smerdis, whether they should establish a monarchy, an oligarchy, or a democracy—ἐνθαῦτα μέγιστον θάυμα ἱρὶν τοῖσι μὴ ἀποδεκόμε-

νοισι τῶν Ἑλλήνων, Περσέων τοῖσι ἔπειτα Ὅτ' ἀνεὰ γνώμην ἀποδίδεσθαι, ὥς χρεὶν εἴη δημοκρατίεσθαι Πέρσας τοὺς γὰρ τυράννους τῶν Ἰόνων καταπαύσας πάντας ὁ Μαρδόνιος, δημοκρατίας κατίστα ἐς τὰς πόλεις. Such passages as this let us into the controversies of the time and prove that Herodotus found many objectors to his story about the discussion on theories of government among the seven Persian conspirators (iii. 80-82).

prince had before submitted to Megabazus. Meanwhile he sent his fleet to double the promontory of Mount Athos, and to join the land-force again at the Gulf of Therma, with a view of conquering as much of Greece as he could, and even of prosecuting the march as far as Athens and Eretria;¹ so that the expedition afterwards accomplished by Xerxès would have been tried at least by Mardonius, twelve or thirteen years earlier, had not a terrible storm completely disabled the fleet. The sea near Athos was then, and is now, full of peril to navigators. One of the hurricanes so frequent in its neighbourhood overtook the Persian fleet, destroyed three hundred ships, and drowned or cast ashore not less than twenty thousand men. Of those who reached the shore, many died of cold, or were devoured by the wild beasts on that inhospitable tongue of land. This disaster checked altogether the farther progress of Mardonius, who also sustained considerable loss with his land-army, and was himself wounded in a night attack made upon him by the tribe of Thracians called Brygi. Though strong enough to repel and avenge this attack, and to subdue the Brygi, he was yet in no condition to advance farther. Both the land-force and the fleet were conveyed back to the Hellespont, and from thence across to Asia, with so much shame of failure, that Mardonius was never again employed by Darius; though we cannot make out that the fault was imputable to him.² We shall hear of him again under Xerxès.

The ill-success of Mardonius seems to have inspired the Thasians, so recently subdued, with the idea of revolting. At least their conduct provoked the suspicion of Darius; for they made active preparations for defence, both by building war-ships, and by strengthening their fortifications. The Thasians were at this time in great opulence, chiefly from gold and silver mines, both in their island and in their mainland territory opposite. The mines at Skaptê Hylê in Thrace yielded to them an annual income of eighty talents; their total surplus revenue—after defraying all the expenses of government so that the

Island of
Thasos—
prepares to
revolt from
the Persians
—forced to
submit.

¹ Herodot. vi. 43, 44. ἐπεὶ οὐκ ἔστι
ἐν τῇ Ἐρετρίας καὶ Ἀθήνας.

² Herodot. vi. 44-94. Charon of
Lampsakus had noticed the storm near

Mount Athos, and the destruction of
the fleet of Mardonius (Charon's
Fragment. 3, ed. Didot; Athenæ. ix.
p. 394).

inhabitants were entirely untaxed—was two hundred talents (46,000*l.*, if Attic talents; more, if either Euboic or Æginæan). With such large means, they were enabled soon to make preparations which excited notice among their neighbours; many of whom were doubtless jealous of their prosperity, and perhaps inclined to dispute with them possession of the profitable mines of Skaptê Hylê. As in other cases, so in this: the jealousies among subject neighbours often procured revelations to the superior power. The proceedings of the Thasians were made known, and they were forced to raze their fortifications as well as to surrender all their ships to the Persians at Abdêra.¹

Though dissatisfied with Mardonius, Darius was only the more eagerly bent on his project of conquering Greece. Hippias was at his side to keep alive his wrath against the Athenians.² Orders were despatched to the maritime cities of his empire to equip both ships of war and horse-transport for a renewed attempt. His intentions were probably known in Greece itself by this time, from the recent march of his army to Macedonia. Nevertheless, he now thought it advisable to send heralds round to most of the Grecian cities, in order to require from each the formal token of submission—earth and water; and thus to ascertain what extent of resistance his projected expedition was likely to experience. The answers received were to a high degree favourable. Many of the continental Greeks sent their submission, as well as all those islanders to whom application was made. Among the former we are probably to reckon the Thebans and Thesalians, though Herodotus does not particularize them. Among the latter Naxos, Eubœa, and some of the smaller islands, are not included: but Ægina, at that time the first maritime power of Greece, is expressly included.³

Preparations of Darius for invading Greece—he sends heralds round the Grecian towns to demand earth and water—many of them submit.

Nothing marks so clearly the imminent peril in which the liberties of Greece were now placed, and the terror inspired by the Persians after their reconquest of Ionia, as this abasement on the part of the Æginetans, whose commerce with

¹ Herodot. vi. 46-48. See a similar case of disclosure arising from jealousy between Tenedos and Lesbos (Thucyd. iii. 2).

² Herodot. vi. 94.

³ Herodot. vi. 48, 49; viii. 46.

the Asiatic islands and continent doubtless impressed them strongly with the melancholy consequences of unsuccessful resistance to the Great King. But on the present occasion their conduct was dictated as much by antipathy to Athens as by fear, so that Greece was thus threatened with the intrusion of the Persian arm as ally and arbiter in her internal contests—a contingency which, if it had occurred now in the dispute between Ægina and Athens, would have led to the certain enslavement of Greece, though when it did occur nearly a century afterwards, towards the close of the Peloponnesian war and in consequence of the prolonged struggle between Lacedæmon and Athens, Greece had become strong enough in her own force to endure it without the loss of substantial independence.

The war between Thebes and Ægina on one side, and Athens on the other—begun several years before, and growing out of the connexion between Athens and Platea—had never yet been terminated. The Æginetans had taken part in that war from gratuitous feeling, either of friendship for Thebes or of enmity to Athens, without any direct ground of quarrel,¹ and they had begun the war even without the formality of notice. Though a period apparently not less than fourteen years (from about 506-492 B.C.) had elapsed, the state of hostility still continued; and we may readily conceive that Hippias, the great instigator of Persian attack upon Greece, would not fail to enforce upon all the enemies of Athens the prudence of seconding, or at least of not opposing, the efforts of the Persian to reinstate him in that city. It was partly under this feeling, combined with genuine alarm, that both Thebes and Ægina manifested submissive dispositions towards the heralds of Darius.

Among these heralds, some had gone both to Athens and to Sparta, for the same purpose of demanding earth and water. The reception given to them at both places was angry in the extreme. The Athenians cast the herald into the pit called the Barathrum,²

Heralds from Darius are put to death both at Athens and Sparta.

¹ Herodot. v. 81-89. See above, chapter xxxi. The legendary story there given as the provocation of Ægina to the war is evidently not to be treated as a real and historical cause of war: a state of quarrel causes all such stories

to be raked up, and some probably to be invented. It is like the old alleged quarrel between the Athenians and the Pelasgi of Lemnos (vi. 137-140).

² It is to this treatment of the herald that the story in Plutarch's *Life of*

into which they sometimes precipitated public criminals : the Spartans threw the herald who came to them into a well, desiring the unfortunate messenger to take earth and water from thence to the king. The inviolability of heralds was so ancient and undisputed in Greece, from the Homeric times downward, that nothing short of the fiercest excitement could have instigated any Grecian community to such an outrage. But to the Lacedæmonians, now accustomed to regard themselves as the first of all Grecian states, and to be addressed always in the character of superiors, the demand appeared so gross an insult as to banish from their minds for the time all recollection of established obligations. They came subsequently, however, to repent of the act as highly criminal, and to look upon it as the cause of misfortunes which overtook them thirty or forty years afterwards. How they tried at that time to expiate it, I shall hereafter recount.¹

But if, on the one hand, the wounded dignity of the Spartans hurried them into the commission of this wrong, it was on the other hand of signal use to the general liberties of Greece, by rousing them out of their apathy as to the coming invader, and placing them with regard to him in the same state of inexpiable hostility as Athens and Eretria. We see at once the bonds drawn closer between Athens and Sparta. The Athenians,

Effects of this act in throwing Sparta into a state of hostility against Persia.

Themistoklés must allude, if that story indeed be true; for the Persian king was not likely to send a second herald, after such treatment of the first. An interpreter accompanied the herald, speaking Greek as well as his own native language. Themistoklés proposed and carried a vote that he should be put to death for having employed the Greek language as medium for barbaric diatation. (Plutarch, Themist. c. 6.) We should be glad to know from whom Plutarch copied this story.

Pausanias states that it was Miltiadés who proposed the putting to death of the heralds at Athens (iii. 12, 6); and that the divine judgement fell upon his family in consequence of it. From whom Pausanias copied this statement I do not know: certainly not from Herodotus, who does not mention Miltiadés in the case, and expressly says that he does not know in what

manner the divine judgement overtook the Athenians for the crime—"except (says he) that their city and country was afterwards laid waste by Xerxés; but I do not think that this happened on account of the outrage on the herald" (Herodot. vii. 133).

The belief that there must have been a divine judgement of some sort or other, presented a strong stimulus to invent or twist some historical fact to correspond with it. Herodotus has sufficient regard for truth to resist this stimulus and to confess his ignorance; a circumstance which goes, along with others, to strengthen our confidence in his general authority. His silence weakens the credibility, but does not refute the allegation, of Pausanias with regard to Miltiadés—which is certainly not intrinsically improbable.

¹ Herodot. vii. 133.

for the first time, prefer a complaint at Sparta against the Æginetans for having given earth and water to Darius—accusing them of having done this with views of enmity to Athens, and in order to invade Attica conjointly with the Persian. This they represented “as treason to Hellas,” calling upon Sparta, as head of Greece, to interfere. In consequence of their appeal, Kleomenés king of Sparta went over to Ægina, to take measures against the authors of the late proceeding, “for the general benefit of Hellas.”¹

The proceeding now before us is of very great importance in the progress of Grecian history. It is the first direct and positive historical manifestation of Hellas as an aggregate body, with Sparta as its chief, and obligations of a certain sort on the part of its members, the neglect or violation of which constitutes a species of treason. I have already pointed out several earlier incidents, showing how the Greek political mind, beginning from entire severance of states, became gradually prepared for this idea of a permanent league with mutual obligations and power of enforcement vested in a permanent chief—an idea never fully carried into practice, but now distinctly manifest and partially operative. First, the great acquired power and territory of Sparta, her military training, her undisturbed political traditions, create an unconscious deference towards her such as was not felt towards any other state. Next, she is seen (in the proceedings against Athens after the expulsion of Hippias) as summoning and conducting to war a cluster of self-obliged Peloponnesian allies, with certain formalities which give to the alliance an imposing permanence and solemnity. Thirdly, her position becomes recognised as first power or president of Greece, both by foreigners who invite alliance (Crœsus) or by Greeks who seek help, such as the Plataeans against Thebes or the Ionians against Persia. But

¹ Herodot. vi. 49. Ποίησας δὲ σφί (Αἰγινήταις) ταῦτα, ἰδέως Ἀθηναῖοι ἐπεκρίνατο, δοκίοντες ἐπὶ σφίσι ἔχοντας τοὺς Αἰγινήτας δεδωκέναι (γῆν καὶ ὕδωρ), ὥς ἄμα τῷ Πέρσῃ ἐπὶ σφίας στρατεύονται. Καὶ ἔσμενοι προφάσιος ἐπελάβοντο· φοιτούντες τε ἐς τὴν Σπάρτην, κατηγόρεον τῶν Αἰγινήτεων τὰ πε-

ποιήκοιεν, προσδόντες τὴν Ἑλλάδα. Compare viii. 144, ix. 7. τὴν Ἑλλάδα δεινὸν ποιοῦμενοι προσδόναι—a new and very important phrase.

vii. 61. Τότε δὲ τὸν Κλεομένηα, ἔδοντα ἐν τῇ Αἰγίῳ, καὶ κοινὰ τῇ Ἑλλάδι ἀγαθὰ προσεργαζόμενον, &c.

Sparta has not been hitherto found willing to take on herself the performance of this duty of Protector general. She refused the Ionians and the Samian Mæandrius, as well as the Plataeans, in spite of their entreaties founded on common Hellenic lineage: the expedition which she undertook against Polykratês of Samos was founded upon private motives for displeasure, even in the estimation of the Lacedæmonians themselves: moreover, even if all these requests had been granted, she might have seemed to be rather obeying a generous sympathy than performing a duty incumbent upon her as superior. But in the case now before us, of Athens against Ægina, the latter consideration stands distinctly prominent. Athens is not a member of the cluster of Spartan allies, nor does she claim the compassion of Sparta, as defenceless against an overpowering Grecian neighbour. She complains of a Pan-Hellenic obligation as having been contravened by the Æginetans to her detriment and danger, and calls upon Sparta to enforce upon the delinquents respect to these obligations. For the first time in Grecian history, such a call is made; for the first time in Grecian history, it is effectively answered. We may well doubt whether it would have been thus answered—considering the tardy, unimpressible, and home-keeping, character of the Spartans, with their general insensibility to distant dangers¹—if the adventure of the Persian herald had not occurred to gall their pride beyond endurance—to drive them into unpardonable hostility with the Great King—and to cast them into the same boat with Athens for keeping off an enemy who threatened the common liberties of Hellas.

From this time, then, we may consider that there exists a recognised political union of Greece against the Persian²—or at least something as near to a political union as Grecian temper will permit—with Sparta as its head for the present. To such a pre-eminence of Sparta, Grecian history had been gradually tending. But the final event which placed it beyond dispute, and which humbled for the time her ancient and only rival—Argos—is now to be noticed.

One condition of recognised Spartan leadership was—the extreme weakness of Argos at this moment.

¹ Thucyd. i. 70-118. ἄκοροι πρὸς θμῆς (i. e. the Spartans) μελλήτας καὶ ἀποδημηταὶ πρὸς ἐνδημοτάτους.

² Herodot. vii. 145-148. Οἱ συνωμόται Ἑλλήνων ἐπὶ τῷ Πέρσῃ.

It was about three or four years before the arrival of these Persian heralds in Greece, and nearly at the time when Milētus was besieged by the Persian generals, that a war broke out between Sparta and Argos¹—on what grounds Herodotus does not inform us. Kleomenēs, encouraged by a promise of the oracle that he should take Argos, led the Lacedæmonian troops to the banks of the Erasinus, the border river of the Argeian territory. But the sacrifices, without which no river could be crossed, were so unfavourable, that he altered his course, extorted some vessels from Ægina and Sikyon,² and carried his troops by sea to Nauplia, the seaport belonging to Argos, and to the territory of Tiryns. The Argeians having marched their forces down to resist him, the two armies joined battle at Sêpeia near Tiryns. Kleomenēs, by a piece of simplicity on the part of his enemies which we find it difficult to credit in Herodotus, was enabled to attack them unprepared, and obtained a decisive victory. For the Argeians (the historian states) were so afraid of being over-reached by stratagem, in the post which their army occupied over against the enemy, that they listened for the commands proclaimed aloud by the Lacedæmonian herald, and performed with their own army the same order which they thus heard given. This came to the knowledge of Kleomenēs, who communicated private notice to his soldiers, that when the herald proclaimed orders to go to dinner, they should not obey, but immediately stand to their arms. We are to presume that the Argeian camp was sufficiently near to that of the Lacedæmonians to enable them to hear the voice of the herald—yet not within sight, from the nature

Victorious
war of Sparta
against
Argos.

¹ That which marks the siege of Milētus, and the defeat of the Argeians by Kleomenēs, as contemporaneous, or nearly so, is—the common oracular dictum delivered in reference to both: in the same prophecy of the Pythia, one half alludes to the sufferings of Milētus, the other half to those of Argos (Herodot. vi. 19-77).

Χρῆμένειοις γὰρ Ἀργείοις ἐν Δελφοῖσι περὶ σωτηρίας τῆς πόλεως τῆς σφετέρης, τὸ μὲν ἐς αὐτοὺς τοὺς Ἀργείους φέρον, τὴν δὲ παρεθήκην ἔχρησε ἐς Μιλησίους.

I consider this evidence of date to be better than the statement of Pausanias. That author places the enterprise against Argos immediately (ἀπὸ τῆς—Paus. iii. 4, 1) after the accession of Kleomenēs, who, as he was king when Mæandrius came from Samos (Herodot. iii. 148), must have come to the throne not later than 518 or 517 B.C. This would be thirty-seven years prior to 480 B.C.; a date much too early for the war between Kleomenēs and the Argeians, as we may see by Herodotus (vii. 149).

² Herodot. vi. 92.

of the ground. Accordingly, so soon as the Argeians heard the herald in the enemy's camp proclaim the word to go to dinner,¹ they went to dinner themselves. In this disorderly condition they were attacked and overthrown by the Spartans. Many of them perished in the field, while the fugitives took refuge in a thick grove consecrated to their eponymous hero Argus. Kleomenés, having enclosed them therein, yet thinking it safer to employ deceit rather than force, ascertained from deserters the names of the chief Argeians thus shut up, and then invited them out successively by means of a herald—pretending that he had received their ransom, and that they were released. As fast as each man came out, he was put to death; the fate of these unhappy sufferers being concealed from their comrades within the grove by the thickness of the foliage, until some one climbing to the top of a tree detected and proclaimed the destruction going on—after about fifty of the victims had perished. Unable to entice any more of the Argeians from their consecrated refuge, which they still vainly hoped would protect them—Kleomenés set fire to the grove, and burnt it to the ground. The persons within it appear to have been destroyed either by fire or by sword.² After the conflagration had begun, he inquired for the first time to whom the grove belonged, and learnt that it belonged to the hero Argus. Not less than six thousand citizens, the flower and strength of Argos, perished in this disastrous battle and retreat. So completely was the city prostrated, that Kleomenés might easily have taken it, had he chosen to march thither forthwith and attack it with vigour. If we are to believe later historians whom Pausanias, Polyænus, and Plutarch have copied, he did march thither and attack it, but was repulsed by the valour of the Argeian women; who, in the dearth of warriors occasioned by the recent defeat, took arms along with the slaves, headed by the poetess Telesilla, and gallantly defended the walls.³ This is probably a mythe,

*Destruction
of the
Argeians by
Kleomenés
in the grove
of the hero
Argus.*

¹ Herodot. vi. 78; compare Xenophon, Rep. Laced. xii. 6. Orders for evolutions in the field, in the Lacedæmonian military service, were not proclaimed by the herald, but transmitted through the various gradations of officers (Thucyd. v. 66).

² Herodot. vi. 79, 80.

³ Pausan. ii. 20, 7; Polyæn. viii. 33; Plutarch, De Virtut. Mulier. p. 245; Suidas, v. Τηλέσιλλα.

Plutarch cites the historian Sokratés of Argos for this story about Telesilla; an historian, or perhaps composer of a

generated by a desire to embody in detail the dictum of the oracle a little before, about "the female conquering the male."¹ Without meaning to deny that the Argeian women might have been capable of achieving so patriotic a deed, if Kleomenés had actually marched to the attack of their city—we are compelled by the distinct statement of Herodotus to affirm that he never did attack it. Immediately after the burning of the sacred grove of Argos, he dismissed the bulk of his army to Sparta, retaining only one thousand choice troops—with whom he marched up to the Hêræum, or great temple of Hêrê, between Argos and Mykênæ, to offer sacrifice. The priest in attendance forbade him to enter, saying that no stranger was allowed to offer sacrifice in the temple. But Kleomenés had once already forced his way into the sanctuary of Athênê on the Athenian acropolis, in spite of the priestess and her interdict—and he now acted still more brutally towards the Argeian priest, for he directed his helots to drag him from the altar and scourge him. Having offered sacrifice, Kleomenés returned with his remaining force to Sparta.²

But the army whom he had sent home returned with a full persuasion that Argos might easily have been taken—that the king alone was to blame for having missed the opportunity.

As soon as he himself returned, his enemies (perhaps his colleague Demaratus) brought him to trial before the ephors on a charge of having been bribed, against which he defended himself as follows. He had invaded the hostile territory on the faith of an assurance from the oracle that he should take Argos; but so soon as he had burnt down the sacred grove of the hero Argus (without

He is tried
—his pec-
uliar mode
of defence—
acquitted.

περίηγησις Ἀργους, of unknown date: compare Diogen. Laërt. ii. 5, 47, and Plutarch, Question. Romaic. p. 270-277. According to his representation, Kleomenés and Demaratus jointly assaulted the town of Argos, and Demaratus, after having penetrated into the town and become master of the Pamphyliakon, was driven out again by the women. Now Herodotus informs us that Kleomenés and Demaratus were never employed upon the same expedition, after the disagreement in their march to Attica (v. 75, vi. 64).

¹ Herodot. vi. 77.

Ἄλλ' ὅταν ἡ θεοὶ τὸν ἄρσενά νικῶσιν.
Ἐξήλθῃ, καὶ αὐτὸς ἐν Ἀργείοισιν ἄρται, &c.

If this prophecy can be said to have any distinct meaning, it probably refers to Hêrê, as protectress of Argos, repulsing the Spartans.

Pausanias (ii. 20, 7) might reasonably doubt whether Herodotus understood this oracle in the same sense as he did: it is plain that Herodotus could not have so understood it.

² Herodot. vi. 80, 81: compare v. 72.

knowing to whom it belonged), he became at once sensible that this was all that the god meant by *taking Argos*, and therefore that the divine promise had been fully realized. Accordingly, he did not think himself at liberty to commence any fresh attack, until he had ascertained whether the gods would approve it and would grant him success. It was with this view that he sacrificed in the Hēræum. There, though his sacrifice was favourable, he observed that the flame kindled on the altar flashed back from the bosom of the statue of Hērê, and not from her head. If the flame had flashed from her head, he would have known at once that the gods intended him to take the city by storm;¹ but the flash from her bosom plainly indicated that the topmost success was out of his reach, and that he had already reaped all the glories which they intended for him. We may see that Herodotus, though he refrains from criticising this story, suspects it to be a fabrication. Not so the Spartan ephors. To them it appeared not less true as a story than triumphant as a defence, ensuring to Kleomenês an honourable acquittal.²

Though this Spartan king lost the opportunity of taking Argos, his victories already gained had inflicted upon her a blow such as she did not recover for a generation, putting her for a time out of all condition to dispute the primacy of Greece with Lacedæmon. I have already mentioned that both in legend and in earliest history, Argos stands forth as the

¹ Herodot. vi. 82. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἐκ τῆς κεφαλῆς τοῦ ἀγάλματος ἐξέλαμψε, αἰρέειν ἂν κατ' ἀκρῆς τὴν πόλιν· ἐκ τῶν στήθεων δὲ λάμψαντος, πᾶν οἱ πεποιοῦσθαι ὅσον ὁ θεὸς ἤθελε.

For the expression αἰρέειν κατ' ἀκρῆς, compare Herodot. vi. 21 and Damm. Lex. Homer. v. ἀκρός. In this expression as generally used, the last words κατ' ἀκρῆς have lost their primitive and special sense, and do little more than intensify the simple αἰρέειν—equivalent to something like “de fond en comble:” for Kleomenês is accused by his enemies—φάμενοι μιν δουροδοκῆσαντα, οὐκ ἔλκειν τὸ Ἄργος, παρὶον εὐπετίους μιν ἔλκειν. But in the story recounted by Kleomenês, the words κατ' ἀκρῆς come back to their primitive meaning, and serve as the foundation for his religious inference, from type to thing typified: if the light had shone from the head or top of the

statue, this would have intimated that the gods meant him to take the city “from top to bottom.”

In regard to this very illustrative story—which there seems no reason for mistrusting—the contrast between the point of view of Herodotus and that of the Spartan ephors deserves notice. Herodotus, while he affirms distinctly that it was the real story told by Kleomenês, suspects its truth, and utters as much of scepticism as his pious fear will permit him: the ephors find it in complete harmony both with their canon of belief and with their religious feeling—Κλεομένης δὲ σφί ἔλεξε, οὐτε εἰ ψευδέμενος οὐτε εἰ ἀληθὲς λέγων, ἔχω σπουδαίως εἶπαι· ἔλεξε δ' ὅν. . . . Τότε καὶ λέγων, πιστά τε καὶ οἴκοιτα ἰδοίμεν ἀπατήρησι λέγειν, καὶ ἀπέφυγε πάλιν τοὺς διώκοντας.

² Compare Pausanias, ii. 228.



first power in Greece, with legendary claims to headship, and decidedly above Lacedæmon; who gradually usurps from her, first the reality of superior power, next the recognition of pre-eminence—and is now, at the period which we have reached, taking upon herself both the rights and the duties of a presiding state over a body of allies who are bound both to her and to each other. Her title to this honour, however, was never admitted at Argos, and it is very probable that the war just described grew in some way or other out of the increasing presidential power which circumstances were tending to throw into her hands. Now the complete temporary prostration of Argos was one essential condition to the quiet acquisition of this power by Sparta. Occurring as it did two or three years before the above-recounted adventure of the heralds, it removed the only rival at that time both willing and able to compete with Sparta—a rival who might well have prevented any effective union under another chief, though she could no longer have secured any Pan-Hellenic ascendancy for herself—a rival who would have seconded Ægina in her submission to the Persians, and would thus have lamed incurably the defensive force of Greece. The ships which Kleomenēs had obtained from the Æginetans as well as from the Sikyonians, against their own will, for landing his troops at Nauplia, brought upon both these cities the enmity of Argos, which the Sikyonians compromised by paying a sum of money, while the Æginetans refused to do so.¹ The circumstances of the Kleomenic war had thus the effect not only of enfeebling Argos, but of alienating her from her natural allies and supporters, and clearing the ground for undisputed Spartan primacy.

Argos
unable to
interfere
with Sparta
in the affair
of Ægina
and in her
presidential
power.

Kleomenēs
goes to
Ægina to
seize the
medising
leaders—
resistance
made to him,
at the insti-
gation of his
colleague
Demaratus.

Returning now to the complaint preferred by Athens to the Spartans against the traitorous submission of Ægina to Darius, we find that king Kleomenēs passed immediately over to that island for the purpose of inquiry and punishment. He was proceeding to seize and carry away as prisoners several of the leading Æginetans, when Krius and some others among them opposed to him a menacing resistance,

¹ Herodot. vi. 92.

telling him that he came without any regular warrant from Sparta and under the influence of Athenian bribes—that in order to carry authority, both the Spartan kings ought to come together. It was not of their own accord that the Æginetans ventured to adopt so dangerous a course. Demaratus, the colleague of Kleomenês in the junior or Prokleid line of kings, had suggested to them the step, and promised to carry them through it safely.¹ Dissension between the two co-ordinate kings was no new phænomenon at Sparta. But in the case of Demaratus and Kleomenês, it had broken out some years previously on the occasion of the march against Attica. Hence Demaratus, hating his colleague more than ever, entered into the present intrigue with the Æginetans with the deliberate purpose of frustrating his intervention. He succeeded, so that Kleomenês was compelled to return to Sparta; not without unequivocal menace against Krius and the other Æginetans who had repelled him,² and not without a thorough determination to depose Demaratus.

It appears that suspicions had always attached to the legitimacy of Demaratus's birth. His reputed father Aristo, having had no offspring by two successive wives, at last became enamoured of the wife of his friend Agêtus—a woman of surpassing beauty—and entrapped him into an agreement, whereby each solemnly bound himself to surrender anything belonging to him which the other might ask for. That which Agêtus asked from Aristo was at once given. In return, the latter demanded to have the wife of Agêtus, who was thunderstruck at the request and indignantly complained of having been cheated into a sacrifice of all others the most painful: nevertheless, the oath was peremptory, and he was forced to comply. The birth of Demaratus took place so soon after this change of husbands, that when it was first made known to Aristo, as he sat upon a bench along with the ephors, he counted on his fingers the number of months since his marriage, and exclaimed with an oath—"The child cannot be mine." He soon, however, retracted his opinion, and acknowledged the child, who grew up without any question being publicly raised as to his

¹ Herodot. vi. 50. Κρίος—ἔλεγε δὲ ταῦτα ἐξ ἐπιστολῆς τῆς Δημαρήτου. Compare Pausan. iii. 4. 3.

² Herodot. vi. 50-61, 64. Δημάρητοι—φθόνῳ καὶ ἄγῃ χρωόμενοι.

birth, and succeeded his father on the throne. But the original words of Aristo had never been forgotten, and private suspicions were still cherished that Demaratus was really the son of his mother's first husband.¹

Of these suspicions Kleomenés now resolved to avail himself, exciting Leotychidés, the next heir in the Prokleid line of kings, to impugn publicly the legitimacy of Demaratus—engaging to second him with all his influence as next in order for the crown—and exacting in return a promise that he would support the intervention against Ægina. Leotychidés was animated not merely by ambition, but also by private enmity against Demaratus, who had disappointed him of his intended bride. He warmly entered into the scheme, arraigned Demaratus as no true Herakleid, and produced evidence to prove the original doubts expressed by Aristo. A serious dispute was thus raised at Sparta, wherein Kleomenés, espousing the pretensions of Leotychidés, recommended that the question as to the legitimacy of Demaratus should be decided by reference to the Delphian oracle. Through the influence of Kôbon, a powerful native of Delphi, he procured from the Pythian priestess an answer pronouncing that Demaratus was not the son of Aristo.² Leotychidés thus became king of the Prokleid line, while Demaratus descended into a private station, and was elected at the ensuing solemnity of the Gymnopædia to an official function. The new king, unable to repress a burst of triumphant spite, sent an attendant to ask him in the public theatre, how he felt as an officer after having once been a king. Stung with this insult, Demaratus replied that he himself had tried them both, and that Leotychidés might in time come to try them both also; the question (he added) shall bear its fruit—great evil, or great good, to Sparta. So saying, he covered his face, and retired home from the theatre—offered a solemn farewell sacrifice at the altar of Zeus Herkeios, and

¹ Herodot. vi. 61, 62, 63.

² Herodot. vi. 65, 66. In an analogous case afterwards, where the succession was disputed between Agesilaus the brother, and Leotychidés the reputed son, of the deceased king Agis, the Lacedæmonians appear to have taken upon themselves to pronounce Leotychidés illegitimate; or rather to assume

tacitly such illegitimacy by choosing Agesilaus in preference, without the aid of the oracle (Xenophon, Hellen. iii. 3, 1.4; Plutarch. Agesilaus, c. 3). The previous oracles from Delphi, however, *φωδῆσθαι τὴν χαλὴν βασιλείαν*, was cited on the occasion, and the question was, in what manner it should be interpreted.

solemnly adjured his mother to declare to him who his real father was—then at once quitted Sparta for Elis, under pretence of going to consult the Delphian oracle.¹

Demaratus was well known to be a high-spirited and ambitious man—noted, among other things, as the only Lacedæmonian king down to the time of Herodotus who had ever gained a chariot victory at Olympia. Hence Kleomenēs and Leotychidēs became alarmed at the mischief which he might do them in exile. By the law of Sparta, no Herakleid was allowed to establish his residence out of the country, on pain of death. This marks the sentiment of the Lacedæmonians, and Demaratus was not the less likely to give trouble because they had pronounced him illegitimate.² Accordingly they sent in pursuit of him, and seized him in the island of Zakynthus. But the Zakynthians would not consent to surrender him, so that he passed unobstructed into Asia, where he presented himself to Darius, and was received with abundant favours and presents.³ We shall hereafter find him the companion of Xerxēs, giving to that monarch advice such as, if it had been acted upon, would have proved the ruin of Grecian independence; to which, however, he would have been even more dangerous if he had remained at home as king of Sparta.

Meanwhile Kleomenēs, having obtained a consentient colleague in Leotychidēs, went with him over to Ægina, eager to revenge himself for the affront which had been put upon him. To the requisition and presence of the two kings jointly, the Æginetans did not dare to oppose any resistance. Kleomenēs made choice of ten citizens eminent for wealth, station, and influence, among whom were Krius and another person named Kasambus, the two most powerful men in the island. Conveying them away to Athens, he deposited them as hostages in the hands of the Athenians.⁴

It was in this state that the affairs of Athens and of Greece

¹ Herodot. vi. 68, 69. The answer made by the mother to this appeal—in-forming Demaratus that he is the son either of King Aristo, or of the hero Astrobakus—is extremely interesting as an evidence of Grecian manners and feeling.

² Plutarch, Agis, c. 11. κατὰ δὲ τινὰ νόμον παλαιὸν, ὃς οὐκ ἐφ' τὸν Ἡρακλείδην ἐκ γυναικὸς Ἀλλοδαπῆς τεκνοῦσθαι, τὸν δ' ἀπελθόντα τῆς Σπάρτης ἐπὶ μετοικισμῷ πρὸς ἑτέρους ἀποθήσκειν κελεύει.

³ Herodot. vi. 70.

⁴ Herodot. vi. 73.

generally were found by the Persian armament which landed at Marathon, the progress of which we are now about to follow. And the events just recounted were of material importance, considered in their indirect bearing upon the success of that armament. Sparta had now, on the invitation of Athens, assumed to herself for the first time a formal Pan-Hellenic primacy, her ancient rival Argos being too much broken to contest it—her two kings, at this juncture unanimous, employ their presiding interference in coercing Ægina, and placing Æginetan hostages in the hands of Athens. The Æginetans would not have been unwilling to purchase victory over a neighbour and rival at the cost of submission to Persia, and it was the Spartan interference only which restrained them from assailing Athens conjointly with the Persian invaders; thus leaving the hands of the Athenians free, and their courage undiminished for the coming trial.

Meanwhile a vast Persian force, brought together in consequence of the preparation made during the last two years in every part of the empire, had assembled in the Alerian plain of Kilikia near the sea. A fleet of six hundred armed triremes, together with many transports both for men and horses, was brought hither for their embarkation: the troops were put on board and sailed along the coast to Samos in Ionia. The Ionic and Æolic Greeks constituted an important part of this armament, while the Athenian exile Hippias was on board as guide and auxiliary in the attack of Attica. The generals were Datis, a Median¹—and Artaphernês, son of the satrap of Sardis so named, and nephew of Darius. We may remark that Datis is the first person of Median lineage who is mentioned as appointed to high command after the accession of Darius, which had been preceded and marked, as I have noticed in a former chapter, by an outbreak of hostile nationality between the Medes and Persians. Their instructions were, generally, to reduce to subjection and tribute all such Greeks as had not already given earth and water. But Darius directed them

¹ Herodot. vi. 94. Δατίς τε, ἰδὺντα Μηδὸν γένος, &c.

Cornelius Nepos (Life of Pausanias, c. 1) calls Mardonius a Mede; which

cannot be true, since he was the son of Gobryas, one of the seven Persian conspirators (Herodot. vi. 43).

most particularly to conquer Eretria and Athens, and to bring the inhabitants as slaves into his presence.¹ These orders were literally meant, and probably neither the generals nor the soldiers of this vast armament doubted that they would be literally executed; and that before the end of the year, the wives, or rather the widows, of men like Themistoklēs and Aristeidēs would be seen among a mournful train of Athenian prisoners on the road from Sardis to Susa, thus accomplishing the wish expressed by queen Atossa at the instance of Dēmokêdēs.

The recent terrific storm near Mount Athos deterred the Persians from following the example of Mardonius, and taking their course by the Hellespont and Thrace. It was resolved to strike straight across the Ægean² (the mode of attack which intelligent Greeks like Themistoklēs most feared, even after the repulse of Xerxēs) from Samos to Eubœa, attacking the intermediate islands in the way. Among those islands was Naxos, which ten years before had stood a long siege, and gallantly repelled the Persian Megabatēs with the Milesian Aristagoras. It was one of the main objects of Datis to efface this stain on the Persian arms and to take a signal revenge on the Naxians.³ Crossing from Samos to Naxos, he landed his army on the island, which he found an easier prize than he had expected. The terrified citizens, abandoning their town, fled with their families to the highest summits of their mountains; while the Persians, seizing as slaves a few who had been dilatory in flight, burnt the undefended town with its edifices sacred and profane.

Immense indeed was the difference in Grecian sentiment towards the Persians created by the terror-striking reconquest of Ionia, and by the exhibition of a large Phœnician fleet in the Ægean. The strength of Naxos was the same now as it had been before the Ionic revolt, and the successful resistance then made might have been supposed likely to nerve the

He crosses
the Ægean
—carries the
island of
Naxos
without re-
sistance—re-
spects Delos.

¹ Herodot. vi. 94. ἐντειλόμενος δὲ ἀνέμικτος, ἐξανδραποδίσαντας Ἐρετρίαν καὶ Ἀθήνας, ἀγειν ἐκὼν εἰς δψιν τὰ ἀνδράποδα.

According to the Menæxenus of Plato (c. 17, p. 245), Darius ordered Datis to fulfil this order on peril of his own

head: no such harshness appears in Herodotus.

² Thucyd. i. 93.

³ Herodot. vi. 95, 96. εἰπὶ ταύτην (Naxos) γὰρ δὴ πρῶτην ἐπέϊχον στρατεύεσθαι οἱ Πέρσαι, μεμνημένοι τῶν πρότερον.

courage of its inhabitants. Yet such is the fear now inspired by a Persian armament, that the eight thousand Naxian hoplites abandon their towns and their gods without striking a blow,¹ and think of nothing but personal safety for themselves and their families. A sad augury for Athens and Eretria!

From Naxos Datis despatched his fleet round the other Cyclades islands, requiring from each, hostages for fidelity and a contingent to increase his army. With the sacred island of Delos, however, he dealt tenderly and respectfully. The Delians had fled before his approach to Tênos, but Datis sent a herald to invite them back again, promised to preserve their persons and property inviolate, and proclaimed that he had received express orders from the Great King to reverence the island in which Apollo and Artemis were born. His acts corresponded with this language; for the fleet was not allowed to touch the island, and he himself, landing with only a few attendants, offered a magnificent sacrifice at the altar. As a large portion of his armament consisted of Ionic Greeks, such pronounced respect to the island of Delos may probably be ascribed to the desire of satisfying their religious feelings; for in their days of early freedom, this island had been the scene of their solemn periodical festivals, as I have already more than once remarked.

Pursuing his course without resistance along the islands, and demanding reinforcements as well as hostages from each, Datis at length touched the southernmost portion of Eubœa—the town of Karystus and its territory.² The Karystians at first refused either to give hostages or to furnish reinforcements against their friends and neighbours. But they were speedily compelled to submission by the aggressive devastation of the invaders. This was the first taste of resistance which Datis had yet experienced; and the facility with which it was overcome gave him a promising omen as to his success against Eretria, whither he soon arrived.

The destination of the armament was no secret to the inhabitants of this fated city, among whom consternation,

¹ The historians of Naxos affirmed that Datis had been repulsed from the island. We find this statement in Plutarch, *De Malign.* Herodot. c. 36, p. 869, among his violent and unfounded contradictions of Herodotus.

² Herodot. vi. 99.

aggravated by intestine differences, was the reigning sentiment. They made application to Athens for aid, which was readily and conveniently afforded to them by means of those four thousand kleruchs or out-citizens whom the Athenians had planted sixteen years before in the neighbouring territory of Chalkis. Notwithstanding such reinforcement, however, many of them despaired of defending the city, and thought only of seeking shelter on the unassailable summits of the island, as the more numerous and powerful Naxians had already done before them; while another party, treacherously seeking their own profit out of the public calamity, lay in wait for an opportunity of betraying the city to the Persians.¹ Though a public resolution was taken to defend the city, yet so manifest was the absence of that stoutness of heart which could alone avail to save it, that a leading Eretrian named Æschinês was not ashamed to forewarn the four thousand Athenian allies of the coming treason, and urge them to save themselves before it was too late. They followed his advice and passed over to Attica by way of Orôpus; while the Persians disembarked their troops, and even their horses, in expectation that the Eretrians would come out and fight, at Tamynæ and other places in the territory. As the Eretrians did not come out, they proceeded to lay siege to the city, and for some days met with a brave resistance, so that the loss on both sides was considerable. At length two of the leading citizens, Euphorbus and Philagrus, with others, betrayed Eretria to the besiegers; its temples were burnt, and its inhabitants dragged into slavery.² It is impossible to credit the exaggerated statement of Plato, which is applied by him to the Persians at Eretria as it had been before applied by Herodotus to the Persians at Chios

He reaches
Eubœa—
siege and
capture of
Eretria.

¹ Herodot. vi. 100. *Τῶν δὲ Ἐρετριέων ἦν ἄρα οὐδὲν ὄντως βοόλευμα, οἱ μεταπέμ-
ποντο μὲν Ἀθηναίους, ἐφρόνεον δὲ διφα-
σίας ἰδέας· οἱ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν ἐβουλευόντο
ἐκλιπεῖν τὴν πόλιν εἰς τὰ ἄκρα τῆς Εὐ-
βοίης, ἄλλοι δὲ αὐτῶν ὅτι κέρθια προσ-
δεκόμενοι παρὰ τοῦ Πέρσων σίστασθαι προ-
βοήσιν ἐσκευάζοντο.*

Allusion to this treason among the Eretrians is to be found in a saying of Themistoklēs (Plutarch, Themist. c. 11).

The story told by Hērakleïdēs Pon-

ticus (ap. Athenæ. xii. p. 536), of an earlier Persian armament which had assailed Eretria and failed, cannot be at all understood; it rather looks like a myth to explain the origin of the great wealth possessed by the family of Kallias at Athens—the *Λακκόπλουτοι*. There is another story, having the same explanatory object, in Plutarch, Aristeidēs, c. 5.

² Herodot. vi. 101, 102.

and Samos—that they swept the territory clean of inhabitants by joining hands and forming a line across its whole breadth.¹ Evidently this is an idea, illustrating the possible effects of numbers and ruinous conquest, which has been woven into the tissue of historical statements, like so many other illustrative ideas in the writings of Greek authors. That a large proportion of the inhabitants were carried away as prisoners, there can be no doubt. But the traitors who betrayed the town were spared and rewarded by the Persians,² and we see plainly that either some of the inhabitants must have been left, or new settlers introduced, when we find the Eretrians reckoned ten years afterwards among the opponents of Xerxēs.

Datis had thus accomplished with little or no resistance one of the two express objects commanded by Darius, and his army were elated with the confident hope of soon completing the other. After halting a few days at Eretria, and depositing in the neighbouring islet of Ægilia the prisoners recently captured, he re-embarked his army to cross over to Attica, and landed in the memorable bay of Marathon on the eastern coast—the spot indicated by the despot Hippias, who now landed along with the Persians, twenty years after his expulsion from the government. Forty-seven years had elapsed since he had made as a young man this same passage, from Eretria to Marathon, in conjunction with his father Peisistratus, on the occasion of the second restoration of the latter. On that previous occasion, the force accompanying the father had been immeasurably inferior to that which now seconded the son. Yet it had been found

¹ Plato, Legg. iii. p. 698, and Menexen. c. 10, p. 240; Diogen. Laërt. iii. 33; Herodot. vi. 31; compare Strabo, x. p. 446, who ascribes to Herodotus the statement of Plato about the *κατακρήνισις* of Eretria. Plato says nothing about the betrayal of the city.

It is to be remarked, that in the passage of the Treatise de Legibus, Plato mentions this story (about the Persians having swept the territory of Eretria clean of its inhabitants) with some doubt as to its truth, and as if it were a rumour intentionally circulated by Datis with a view to frighten the

Athenians. But in the Menexenus, the story is given as if it were an authentic historical fact.

² Plutarch, De Garrulitate, c. 15, p. 510. The descendants of Gongylus the Eretrian, who passed over to the Persians on this occasion, are found nearly a century afterwards in possession of a town and district in Mysia, which the Persian king had bestowed upon their ancestor. Herodotus does not mention Gongylus (Xenoph. Hellen. iii. 1, 6).

This surrender to the Persians drew upon the Eretrians bitter remarks at the time of the battle of Salamis (Plutarch, Themistoklēs, c. 11).

amply sufficient to carry him in triumph to Athens, with feeble opposition from citizens alike irresolute and disunited. And the march of Hippias from Marathon to Athens would now have been equally easy, as it was doubtless conceived to be by himself, both in his waking hopes and in the dream which Herodotus mentions—had not the Athenians whom he found been men radically different from those whom he had left.

To that great renewal of the Athenian character, under the democratical institutions which had subsisted since the dispossession of Hippias, I have already pointed attention in a former chapter. The modifications introduced by Kleisthenês in the constitution had now existed eighteen or nineteen years, without any attempt to overthrow them by violence. The Ten Tribes, each with its constituent demes, had become a part of the established habits of the country; the citizens had become accustomed to exercise a genuine and self-determined decision, in their assemblies political as well as judicial; while even the senate of Areopagus, renovated by the nine annual archons successively chosen who passed into it after their year of office, had also become identified in feeling with the constitution of Kleisthenês. Individual citizens doubtless remained, partisans in secret, and perhaps correspondents, of Hippias. But the mass of citizens, in every scale of life, could look upon his return with nothing but terror and aversion. With what degree of newly-acquired energy the democratical Athenians could act in defence of their country and institutions, has already been related in a former chapter. But unfortunately we possess few particulars of Athenian history, during the decade preceding 490 B.C., nor can we follow in detail the working of the government. The new form however which Athenian politics had assumed becomes partially manifest when we observe the three leaders who stand prominent at this important epoch—Miltiadês, Themistoklês, and Aristeidês.

Existing
condition
and char-
acter of the
Athenians.

The first of the three had returned to Athens three or four years before the approach of Datis, after six or seven years' absence in the Chersonesus of Thrace, whither he had been originally sent by Hippias about the year 517-516 B.C., to inherit the property as well as the supremacy of his uncle

the ækist Miltiadês. As despot of the Chersonese, and as one of the subjects of Persia, he had been among the Ionians who accompanied Darius to the Danube in his Scythian expedition. He had been the author of that memorable recommendation which Histiaëus and the other despots did not think it their interest to follow—of destroying the bridge and leaving the Persian king to perish. Subsequently he had been unable to remain permanently in the Chersonese, for reasons which have before been noticed; but he seems to have occupied it during the period of the Ionic revolt.¹ What part he took in that revolt, we do not know. He availed himself, however, of the period while the Persian satraps were employed in suppressing it, and deprived of the mastery of the sea, to expel, in conjunction with forces from Athens, both the Persian garrison and the Pelasgic inhabitants from the islands of Lemnos and Imbros. But the extinction of the Ionic revolt threatened him with ruin. When the Phenician fleet, in the summer following the capture of Milêtus, made its conquering appearance in the Hellespont, he was forced to escape rapidly to Athens with his immediate friends and property, and with a small squadron of five ships. One of these ships, commanded by his son Metiochus, was actually captured between the Chersonese and Imbros; and the Phenicians were most eager to capture Miltiadês himself,² inasmuch as he was personally odious to Darius from his strenuous recommendation to destroy the bridge over the Danube. On arriving at Athens, after his escape from the Phenician fleet, he was brought to trial before the judicial popular assembly for alleged misgovernment in the Chersonese, or for what Herodotus calls "his despotism" there exercised.³ Probably the Athenian citizens settled in that peninsula may have had good reason to complain of him,—the more so as he had carried out with him the maxims of government prevalent at Athens under the Peisistratids, and

Miltiadês—
his adventures—
chosen one
of the ten
generals in
the year in
which the
Persians
landed at
Marathon.

¹ The chapter of Herodotus (iv. 40) relating to the adventures of Miltiadês is extremely perplexing, as I have already remarked in a former note; and Wesseling considers that it involves chronological difficulties which our

present MSS. do not enable us to clear up. Neither Schweighäuser, nor the explanation cited in Bähr's note, is satisfactory.

² Herodot. vi. 43-104.

³ Herodot. vi. 39-104.

had in his pay a body of Thracian mercenaries. However the people at Athens honourably acquitted him, probably in part from the reputation which he had obtained as conqueror of Lemnos;¹ and he was one of the ten annually elected generals of the republic, during the year of this Persian expedition—chosen at the beginning of the Attic year, shortly after the summer solstice, at a time when Datis and Hippias had actually sailed, and were known to be approaching.

The character of Miltiadēs is one of great bravery and decision—qualities pre-eminently useful to his country on the present crisis, and the more useful as he was under the strongest motive to put them forth, from the personal hostility of Darius towards him. Yet he does not peculiarly belong to the democracy of Kleisthenēs, like his younger contemporaries Themistoklēs and Aristeidēs. The two latter are specimens of a class of men new at Athens since the expulsion of Hippias, and contrasting forcibly with Peisistratus, Lykurgus, and Megaklēs, the political leaders of the preceding generation. Themistoklēs and Aristeidēs, different as they were in disposition, agree in being politicians of the democratical stamp, exercising ascendancy by and through the people—devoting their time to the discharge of public duties, and to the frequent discussions in the political and judicial meetings of the people—manifesting those combined powers of action, comprehension, and persuasive speech, which gradually accustomed the citizens to look to them as advisers as well as leaders—but always subject to criticism and accusation from unfriendly rivals, and exercising such rivalry towards each other with an asperity constantly increasing. Instead of Attica disunited and torn into armed factions, as it had been forty years before—the Diakrii under one man, and the Parali and Pedieis under others—we have now Attica one and indivisible; regimented into a body of orderly hearers in the Pnyx, appointing and holding to accountability the magistrates, and open to be addressed by Themistoklēs, Aristeidēs, or any other citizen who can engage their attention.

Neither Themistoklēs nor Aristeidēs could boast a lineage of gods and heroes, like the Æakid Miltiadēs.² Both were of

¹ Herodot. vi. 132. *Μιλτιάδης, καὶ πρότερον εὐδοκίμων—i. e.* before the battle of Marathon. How much his reputation had been heightened by the conquest of Lemnos, see Herodot. vi. 136.

² Herodot. vi. 35.

middling station and circumstances. Aristeidēs, son of Lysimachus, was on both sides of pure Athenian blood; but the wife of Neoklēs, father of Themistoklēs, was a foreign woman of Thrace or of Karia: and such an alliance is the less surprising, since Themistoklēs must have been born during the dynasty of the Peisistratids, when the status of an Athenian citizen had not yet acquired its political value. There was a marked contrast between these two eminent men—those points which stood most conspicuous in the one being comparatively deficient in the other. In the description of Themistoklēs, which we have the advantage of finding briefly sketched by Thucydidēs, the circumstance most emphatically brought out is, his immense force of spontaneous invention and apprehension, without any previous aid either from teaching or gradual practice. The might of unassisted nature¹ was never so strikingly exhibited as in him. He conceived the complications of a present embarrassment, and divined the chances of a mysterious future, with equal sagacity and equal quickness. The right expedient seemed to flash upon his mind extempore, even in the most perplexing contingencies, without the least necessity for premeditation. He was not less distinguished for daring and resource in action: when engaged on any joint affairs, his superior competence marked him out as the leader for others to follow, and no business, however foreign to his experience, ever took him by surprise, or came wholly amiss to him. Such is the remarkable picture which Thucydidēs draws of a countryman whose death nearly coincided in time with his own birth. The untutored readiness and universality of Themistoklēs probably formed in his mind a contrast to the more elaborate discipline, and careful preliminary study, with which the statesmen of his own day—and Periklēs especially, the greatest of them—approached the consideration and discussion of public affairs.

¹ Thucyd. i. 38. ἦν γὰρ ὁ Θεμιστοκλῆς βεβαίωτατα δὴ φύσεως ἰσχυρὸν δηλώσας καὶ διαφερόντως τι ἐς αὐτὸ μᾶλλον ἰτέρων ἄξιος θαυμάσαι· οἰκεία γὰρ συνέσει καὶ οὕτε προμαθὼν ἐς αὐτὴν οὐδὲν οὕτ' ἐπιμαθὼν, τῶν τε παραχρῆμα δι' ἐλαχίστης βουλῆς κράτιστος γνῶμων, καὶ τῶν μελλόντων ἐπὶ πλείστον τοῦ γερησομένου ὁμιστος εἰκα-

στής. Καὶ ἂ μὲν μετὰ χεῖρας ἔχοι, καὶ ἐξηγήσασθαι οἷός τε· ὣν δὲ ἄπειρος εἴη, κρίναι ἱκανῶς οὐκ ἀπῆλλακτο. Τό τε ἄμεινον ἢ χεῖρον ἐν τῷ ἀφανεῖ ἔτι προσιώρα μάλιστα· καὶ τὸ ξύμπαν εἰπεῖν, φύσεως μὲν δύναμει μελέτης δὲ βραχύτητι, κράτιστος δὲ οὗτος αὐτοσχεδιδάξειν τὰ δέοντα ἐγένετο.

Themistoklēs had received no teaching from philosophers, sophists, and rhetors, who were the instructors of well-born youth in the days of Thucydidēs, and whom Aristophanēs, the contemporary of the latter, so unmercifully derides—treating such instruction as worse than nothing, and extolling, in comparison with it, the unlettered courage, with mere gymnastic accomplishments, of the victors at Marathon.¹ There is no evidence in the mind of Thucydidēs of any such undue contempt towards his own age. The same terms of contrast are tacitly present to his mind, but he seems to treat the great capacity of Themistoklēs as the more a matter of wonder, since it sprung up without that preliminary cultivation which had gone to the making of Periklēs.

The general character given by Plutarch,² though many of his anecdotes are both trifling and apocryphal, is quite consistent with the brief sketch just cited from Thucydidēs. Themistoklēs had an unbounded passion—not merely for glory, insomuch that the laurels of Miltiadēs acquired at Marathon deprived him of rest—but also for display of every kind. He was eager to vie with men richer than himself in showy exhibition—one great source, though not the only source of popularity at Athens—nor was he at all scrupulous in procuring the means of doing so. Besides being assiduous in attendance at the Ekklesia and the Dikastery, he knew most of the citizens by name, and was always ready with advice to them in their private affairs. Moreover he possessed all the tactics of an expert party-man in conciliating political friends and in defeating political enemies. And though he was in the early part of his life sincerely bent upon the upholding and aggrandisement of his country, and was on some most critical occasions of unspeakable value to it, yet on the whole his morality was as reckless as his intelligence was eminent. He will be found grossly corrupt in the exercise of power, and employing tortuous means, sometimes indeed for ends in themselves honourable and patriotic, but sometimes also merely for enriching himself. He ended a glorious life by

¹ See the contrast of the old and new education, as set forth in Aristophanēs, *Nubes*, 957-1003; also *Ranæ*, 1067.

About the training of Themistoklēs, compared with that of the contempo-

raries of Periklēs, see also Plutarch, *Themistokl.* c. 2.

² Plutarch, *Themistoklēs*, c. 3, 4, 5; Cornelius Nepos, *Themist.* c. 1.

years of deep disgrace, with the forfeiture of all Hellenic esteem and brotherhood—a rich man, an exile, a traitor, and a pensioner of the Great King, pledged to undo his own previous work of liberation accomplished at the victory of Salamis.

Of Aristeidēs we possess unfortunately no description from the hand of Thucydidēs. Yet his character is so simple and consistent, that we may safely accept the brief but unqualified encomium of Herodotus and Plato, expanded as it is in the biography of Plutarch and Cornelius Nepos,¹ however little the details of the latter can be trusted. Aristeidēs was inferior to Themistoklēs in resource, quickness, flexibility, and power of coping with difficulties; but incomparably superior to him, as well as to other rivals and contemporaries, in integrity public as well as private; inaccessible to pecuniary temptations as well as to other seductive influences, and deserving as well as enjoying the highest measure of personal confidence. He is described as the peculiar friend of Kleisthenēs, the first founder of the democracy²—as pursuing a straight and a single-handed course in political life, with no solicitude for party-ties, and with little care either to conciliate friends or to offend enemies—as unflinching in the exposure of corrupt practices, by whomsoever committed or upheld—as earning for himself the lofty surname of the Just, not less by his judicial decisions in the capacity of archon, than by his equity in private arbitrations and even his candour in political dispute—and as manifesting, throughout a long public life full of tempting opportunities, an uprightness without flaw and beyond all suspicion, recognised equally by his bitter contemporary the poet Timokreon³ and by the allies of Athens upon whom he first assessed the tribute. Few of the leading men in any part of Greece were without some taint on their reputation, deserved or undeserved, in regard to pecuniary probity. But whoever became notoriously recognised as possessing this vital quality, acquired by means of it a firmer hold on the public esteem than even eminent talents could confer. Thucy-

¹ Herodot. viii. 79; Plato, Gorgias, c. 172. *ἀριστον ἄνδρα ἐν Ἀθήνῃσι καὶ δικάζοντα.*

² Plutarch (Aristeidēs, c. 1-4; Themistoklēs, c. 3; *An Seni sit gerenda*

respublica, c. 12, p. 790; *Præcepta Reip. Gerend.* c. ii. p. 805).

³ Timokreon ap. Plutarch, Themistoklēs, c. 21.

didēs ranks conspicuous probity among the first of the many ascendent qualities possessed by Periklēs;¹ while Nikias, equal to him in this respect, though immeasurably inferior in every other, owed to it a still larger proportion of that exaggerated confidence which the Athenian people continued so long to repose in him. The abilities of Aristeidēs—though apparently adequate to every occasion on which he was engaged, and only inferior when we compare him with so remarkable a man as Themistoklēs—were put in the shade by this incorruptible probity; which procured for him, however, along with the general esteem, no inconsiderable amount of private enmity from jobbers whom he exposed, and even some jealousy from persons who heard it proclaimed with offensive ostentation. We are told that a rustic and unlettered citizen gave his ostracising vote and expressed his dislike against Aristeidēs,² on the simple ground that he was tired of hearing him always called the Just. Now the purity of the most honourable man will not bear to be so boastfully talked of as if he were the only honourable man in the country. The less it is obtruded, the more deeply and cordially will it be felt: and the story just alluded to, whether true or false, illustrates that natural reaction of feeling produced by absurd encomiasts, or perhaps by insidious enemies under the mask of encomiasts, who trumpeted forth Aristeidēs as *The* Just man of Attica, so as to wound the legitimate dignity of every one else. Neither indiscreet friends nor artful enemies, however, could rob him of the lasting esteem of his countrymen; which he enjoyed, though with intervals of their displeasure, to the end of his life. He was ostracised during a part of the period between the battles of Marathon and Salamis, at a time when the rivalry between him and Themistoklēs was so violent that both could not remain at Athens without peril; but the dangers of Athens during the invasion of Xerxēs brought him back before the ten years of exile were expired. His fortune, originally very moderate, was still farther diminished during the course of his life, so that he died very poor, and the state was obliged to lend aid to his children.

Such were the characters of Themistoklēs and Aristeidēs, the two earliest leaders thrown up by the Athenian democracy.

¹ Thucyd. ii. 65.

² Plutarch, Aristeidēs, c. 7.

Half a century before, Themistoklēs would have been an active partisan in the faction of the Parali or the Pedieis, while Aristeidēs would probably have remained an unnoticed citizen. At the present period of Athenian history, the characters of soldier, magistrate, and orator, were intimately blended together in a citizen who stood forward for eminence, though they tended more and more to divide themselves during the ensuing century and a half. Aristeidēs and Miltiadēs were both elected among the ten generals, each for his respective tribe, in the year of the expedition of Datis across the Ægean, and probably even after that expedition was known to be on its voyage. Moreover we are led to suspect from a

Miltiadēs, Aristeidēs, and perhaps Themistoklēs were among the ten Stratēgi in 490 B.C.

passage in Plutarch, that Themistoklēs also was general of his tribe on the same occasion,¹ though this is doubtful; but it is certain that he fought at Marathon. The ten generals had jointly the command of the army, each of them taking his turn to exercise it for a day. In addition to the ten, the third archon or polemarch was considered as eleventh in the military council. The polemarch of this year was Kallimachus of Aphidnæ.²

Such were the chiefs of the military force, and to a great degree the administrators of foreign affairs, at the time when the four thousand Athenian kleruchs or settlers planted in Eubœa—escaping from Eretria, now invested by the Persians—brought word to their countrymen at home that the fall of that city was impending. It was obvious that the Persian host would proceed from Eretria forthwith against Athens. A few days afterwards Hippias disembarked them at Marathon.

Of the feeling which now prevailed at Athens we have no details. But doubtless the alarm was hardly inferior to that which had been felt at Eretria. Opinions were not unanimous as to the proper steps to be taken, nor were suspicions of treason wanting. Pheidippidēs the courier was sent to Sparta immediately to solicit assistance; and such was his prodigious activity, that he performed this journey of 150 miles, on foot, in forty-eight hours.³

The Athenians ask aid from Sparta—delay of the Spartans.

¹ Plutarch, Aristeidēs, c. 5.

² Herodot. vi. 109, 110.

³ Mr. Kinneir remarks that the Persian Cassids, or foot-messengers, will

travel for several days successively at the rate of sixty or seventy miles a day (Geographical Memoir of Persia, p. 44).

Revealing to the ephors that Eretria was already enslaved, he entreated their assistance to avert the same fate from Athens, the most ancient city in Greece. The Spartan authorities readily promised their aid, but unfortunately it was now the ninth day of the moon. Ancient law or custom forbade them to march, in this month at least, during the last quarter before the full moon; but after the full, they engaged to march without delay. Five days' delay at this critical moment might prove the utter ruin of the endangered city; yet the reason assigned seems to have been no pretence on the part of the Spartans. It was mere blind tenacity of ancient habit, which we shall find to abate, though never to disappear, as we advance in their history.¹ Indeed their delay in marching to rescue Attica from Mardonius, eleven years afterwards, at the imminent hazard of alienating Athens and ruining the Hellenic cause, marks the same selfish dulness. But the reason now given certainly looked very like a pretence, so that the Athenians could indulge no certain assurance that the Spartan troops would start even when the full moon arrived.

In this respect the answer brought by Pheidippidēs was mischievous, as it tended to increase that uncertainty and indecision which already prevailed among the ten generals, as to the proper steps for meeting the invaders. Partly, perhaps, in reliance on this expected Spartan help, five out of the ten generals were decidedly averse to an immediate engagement with the Persians; while Miltiadēs with the remaining four strenuously urged that not a moment should be lost in bringing the enemy to action, without leaving time to the timid and the treacherous to establish correspondence with Hippias and to take some active step for paralysing all united action on the part of the citizens. This most momentous debate, upon which the fate of Athens hung, is represented by Herodotus to have occurred at Marathon, after the army had marched out and taken post there within sight of the Persians; while Cornelius Nepos describes it as having been raised before the army quitted the city—upon the question, whether it was prudent to meet the enemy at all in the field, or to confine the defence to the city and the sacred rock.

Difference of opinion among the ten generals—five of them recommend an immediate battle, the other five are adverse to it.

¹ Herodot. ix. 7-10.

Inaccurate as this latter author generally is, his statement seems more probable here than that of Herodotus. For the ten generals would scarcely march out of Athens to Marathon without having previously resolved to fight: moreover, the question between fighting in the field or resisting behind the walls, which had already been raised at Eretria, seems the natural point on which the five mistrustful generals would take their stand. And probably indeed Miltiadês himself, if debarred from immediate action, would have preferred to hold possession of Athens, and prevent any treacherous movement from breaking out there, rather than to remain inactive on the hills, watching the Persians at Marathon, with the chance of a detachment from their numerous fleet sailing round to Phalêrum, and thus distracting by a double attack both the city and the camp.

However this may be, the equal division of opinion among the ten generals, whether manifested at Marathon or at Athens, is certain. Miltiadês had to await the casting vote of the polemarch Kallimachus. To him he represented emphatically

Urgent instances of Miltiadês in favour of an immediate battle—casting vote of the polemarch determines it.

the danger of delay, with the chance of some traitorous intrigue occurring to excite disunion and aggravate the alarms of the citizens. Nothing could prevent such treason from breaking out, with all its terrific consequences of enslavement to the Persians and to Hippias, except a bold, decisive, and immediate attack—the success of which he (Miltiadês) was prepared to guarantee. Fortunately for Athens, the polemarch embraced the opinion of Miltiadês; while the seditious movements which were preparing did not show themselves until after the battle had been gained. Aristeidês and Themistoklês are both recorded to have seconded Miltiadês warmly in this proposal, while all the other generals agreed in surrendering to Miltiadês their days of command, so as to make him as much as they could the sole leader of the army. It is said that the latter awaited the day of his own regular turn before he fought the battle.¹ Yet considering the eagerness which he displayed to bring on an immediate and decisive action, we cannot suppose that he would have admitted any serious postponement upon such a punctilio.

¹ Herodot. vi. 110.

While the army were mustered on the ground sacred to Hēraklēs near Marathon, with the Persians and their fleet occupying the plain and shore beneath, and in preparation for immediate action—they were joined by the whole force of the little town of Plataea, consisting of about 1000 hoplites, who had marched directly from their own city to the spot, along the southern range of Kithærôn, and passing through Dekelcia. We are not told that they had ever been invited. Very probably the Athenians had never thought of summoning aid from this unimportant neighbour, in whose behalf they had taken upon themselves a lasting feud with Thebes and the Bœotian league.¹ Their coming on this important occasion seems to have been a spontaneous effort of gratitude, which ought not to be the less commended because their interests were really wrapped up in those of Athens—since if the latter had been conquered, nothing could have saved Plataea from being subdued by the Thebans. Yet many a Grecian town would have disregarded both generous impulse and rational calculation, in the fear of provoking a new and terrific enemy. If we summon up to our imaginations all the circumstances of the case—which it requires some effort to do, because our authorities come from the subsequent generations, after Greece had ceased to fear the Persians—we shall be sensible that this volunteer march of the whole Plataean force to Marathon is one of the most affecting incidents of all Grecian history. Upon Athens generally it produced an indelible impression, commemorated ever afterwards in the public prayers of the Athenian herald,² and repaid by a grant to the Plataeans of the full civil rights (seemingly without the political rights) of Athenian citizens. Upon the Athenians then marshalled at Marathon its effect must have been unspeakably powerful and encouraging, as a proof that they were not altogether isolated from Greece, and as an unexpected countervailing stimulus under circumstances so full of hazard.

Of the two opposing armies at Marathon, we are told that the Athenians were 10,000 hoplites, either including, or besides, the 1000 who came from Plataea.³ This

March of the Athenians to Marathon—the Plataeans spontaneously join them there.

¹ Herodot. vi. 108-112.

² Thucyd. iii. 55.

³ Justin states 10,000 Athenians, be-

sides 1000 Plataeans. Cornelius Nepos, Pausanias and Plutarch give 10,000 as the sum total of both. Justin, ii. 9;

statement is no way improbable, though it does not come from Herodotus, who is our only really valuable authority on the case, and who mentions no numerical total. Indeed the number named may seem smaller than we should have expected, considering that no less than 4000 kleruchs or out-settled citizens had just come over from Eubœa. A sufficient force of citizens must of course have been left behind to defend the city. The numbers of the Persians we cannot be said to know at all, nor is there anything certain except that they were greatly superior to the Greeks. We hear from Herodotus that their armament originally consisted of six hundred ships of war, but we are not told how many separate transports there were; moreover, reinforcements had been procured as they came across the Ægean from the islands successively conquered. The aggregate crews on board of all their ships must have been between 150,000 and 200,000 men. Yet what proportion of these were fighting-men, or how many actually did fight at Marathon, we have no means of determining.¹ There were a certain proportion of cavalry, and some transports expressly prepared for the

Corn. Nep. Miltiad. c. 4; Pausan. iv. 25, 5; x. 20, 2; compare also Suidas, v. 'Iwvias.

Heeren (De Fontibus Trogi Pompeii, Dissertat. ii. 7) affirms that Trogorus or Justin follows Herodotus in matters concerning the Persian invasions of Greece. He cannot have compared the two very attentively; for Justin not only states several matters which are not to be found in Herodotus, but is at variance with the latter on some particulars not unimportant.

¹ Justin (ii. 9) says that the total of the Persian army was 600,000, and that 200,000 perished. Plato (Menexen. p. 240) and Lysias (Orat. Funer. c. 7) speak of the Persian total as 500,000 men. Valerius Maximus (v. 3), Pausanias (iv. 25), and Plutarch (Parallel. Græc. ad init.), give 300,000 men. Cornelius Nepos (Miltiadês, c. 5) gives the more moderate total of 110,000 men.

See the observations on the battle of Marathon made both by Colonel Leake and by Mr. Finlay, who have examined and described the locality: Leake on the Demi of Attica, in Trans-

actions of the Royal Society of Literature, vol. ii. p. 160 *seq.*; and Finlay on the Battle of Marathon, in the same Transactions, vol. iii. p. 360-380, &c.

Both have given remarks on the probable numbers of the armies assembled; but there are really no materials, even for a probable guess, in respect to the Persians. The silence of Herodotus (whom we shall find hereafter very circumstantial as to the numbers of the army under Xerxês) seems to show that he had no information which he could trust. His account of the battle of Marathon presents him in honourable contrast with the loose and boastful assertors who followed him. For though he does not tell us much, and falls lamentably short of what we should like to know, yet all that he does say is reasonable and probable as to the proceedings of both armies; and the little which he states becomes more trustworthy on that very account—because it is so little—showing that he keeps strictly within his authorities.

There is nothing in the account of Herodotus to make us believe that he had ever visited the ground of Marathon.

conveyance of horses. Moreover, Herodotus tells us that Hippias selected the plain of Marathon for a landing-place, because it was the most convenient spot in Attica for cavalry movements—though it is singular, that in the battle the cavalry are not mentioned.

Marathon, situated near to a bay on the eastern coast of Attica, and in a direction E.N.E. from Athens, is divided by the high ridge of Mount Pentelikus from the city, with which it communicated by two roads, one to ^{Locality of Marathon.} the north, another to the south of that mountain. Of these two roads, the northern, at once the shortest and the most difficult, is twenty-two miles in length: the southern—longer but more easy, and the only one practicable for chariots—is twenty-six miles in length, or about six and a half hours of computed march. It passed between Mounts Pentelikus and Hymettus, through the ancient demes of Gargëttus and Pal-lênê, and was the road by which Peisistratus and Hippias, when they landed at Marathon, forty-seven years before, had marched to Athens. The bay of Marathon, sheltered by a projecting cape from the northward, affords both deep water and a shore convenient for landing; while "its plain (says a careful modern observer¹) extends in a perfect level along this fine bay and is in length about six miles, in breadth

¹ See Mr. Finlay on the Battle of Marathon, *Transactions*, &c., vol. iii. pp. 364, 368, 383, *ut suprà*: compare Hobhouse (*Lord Broughton*), *Journey in Albania*, i. p. 432.

Colonel Leake thinks that the ancient town of Marathon was not on the exact site of the modern Marathon, but at a place called Vraná, a little to the south of Marathon (Leake on the *Demi of Attica*, in the *Transactions of the Royal Society of Literature*, 1829, vol. ii. p. 166).

"Below these two points," he observes, "(the tumuli of Vraná and the hill of Kotróni) the plain of Marathon expands to the shore of the bay, which is near two miles distant from the opening of the valley of Vraná. It is moderately well cultivated with corn, and is one of the most fertile spots in Attica, though rather inconveniently subject to inundations from the two torrents which cross it, particularly that of Marathóna. From Lucian (in *Icaro-Menippo*) it appears that the parts about Enoë were

noted for their fertility, and an Egyptian poet of the fifth century has celebrated the vines and olives of Marathon. It is natural to suppose that the vineyards occupied the rising grounds; and it is probable that the olive-trees were chiefly situated in the two valleys, where some are still growing: for as to the plain itself, the circumstances of the battle incline one to believe that it was anciently as destitute of trees as it is at the present day." (Leake, on the *Demi of Attica*, *Trans. of Roy. Soc. of Literature*, vol. ii. p. 162).

Colonel Leake farther says, respecting the fitness of the Marathonian ground for cavalry movements: "As I rode across the plain of Marathon with a peasant of Vraná, he remarked to me that it was a fine place for cavalry to fight in. None of the modern Marathonii were above the rank of labourers: they have heard that a great battle was once fought there, but that is all they know." (Leake, *ut sup.*, ii. p. 175).

never less than about one mile and a half. Two marshes bound the extremities of the plain: the southern is not very large, and is almost dry at the conclusion of the great heats; but the northern, which generally covers considerably more than a square mile, offers several parts which are at all seasons impassable. Both however leave a broad, firm, sandy beach between them and the sea. The uninterrupted flatness of the plain is hardly relieved by a single tree; and an amphitheatre of rocky hills and rugged mountains separates it from the rest of Attica, over the lower ridges of which some steep and difficult paths communicate with the districts of the interior."

The position occupied by Miltiadēs before the battle, identified as it was to all subsequent Athenians by the sacred grove of Hēraklēs near Marathon, was probably on some portion of the high ground above this plain. Cornelius Nepos tells us that he protected it from the attacks of the Persian cavalry by felled trees obstructing the approach. The Persians occupied a position on the plain; their fleet was ranged along the beach, and Hippias himself marshalled them for the battle.¹ The native Persians and Sakæ, the best troops in the whole army, were placed in the centre, which they considered as the post of honour,² and which was occupied by the Persian king himself, when present at a battle. The right wing was so regarded by the Greeks, and the polemarch Kallimachus had the command of it. The hoplites were arranged in the order of their respective tribes from right to left, and at the extreme left stood the Plateans. It was necessary for Miltiadēs to present a front equal or nearly equal to that of the more numerous Persian host, in order to guard himself from being taken in flank. With this view

¹ Herodot. vi. 107.

² Plutarch, *Symposiac.* i. 3, p. 619; Xenophon, *Anab.* i. 8, 21; Arrian, ii. 8, 18; iii. 11, 16.

We may compare, with this established battle-array of the Persian armies, that of the Turkish armies, adopted and constantly followed ever since the victorious battle of Ikonium in 1386, gained by Amurath I. over the Karamanians. The European troops (or those of Rum) occupy the left wing: the Asiatic troops (or those of Anatoli) the right wing: the Janissaries are in the centre. The

Sultan, or the Grand Visir, surrounded by the national cavalry or Spahis, is in the central point of all (Von Hammer, *Geschichte des Osmanischen Reichs*, book v. vol. i. p. 199).

About the honour of occupying the right wing in a Grecian army, see in particular the animated dispute between the Athenians and the Tegeates before the battle of Platæa (Herodot. ix. 27). It is the post assigned to the heroic kings of legendary warfare (Eurip. *Supplices*, 657).

he drew up the central tribes, including the Leontis and Antiochis, in shallow files and occupying a large breadth of ground ; while each of the wings was in stronger and deeper order, so as to make his attack efficient on both sides. His whole army consisted of hoplites, with some slaves as unarmed or light-armed attendants, but without either bowmen or cavalry. Nor could the Persians have been very strong in this latter force, seeing that their horses had to be transported across the Ægean : but the elevated position of Miltiadēs enabled them to take some measure of the numbers under his command, and the entire absence of cavalry in his army could not but confirm the confidence with which a long career of uninterrupted victory had impressed their generals.

At length the sacrifices in the Greek camp were favourable for battle. Miltiadēs, who had everything to gain by coming immediately to close quarters, ordered his army to advance at a running step over the interval of one mile which separated the two armies. This rapid forward movement, accompanied by the war-cry or pæan which always animated the charge of the Greek soldier, astounded the Persian army. They construed it as an act of desperate courage little short of insanity, in a body not only small but destitute of cavalry or archers—but they at the same time felt their conscious superiority sink within them. It seems to have been long remembered also among the Greeks as the peculiar characteristic of the battle of Marathon, and Herodotus tells us that the Athenians were the first Greeks who ever charged at a run.¹ It doubtless operated

Battle of
Marathon—
rapid charge
of Miltiadēs
—defeat of
the Persians.

¹ Herodot. vi. 112. Πρώτοι μὲν γὰρ Ἕλλησιν πάντων τῶν ἡμεῖς ἴδμεν, δρόμῳ διὰ πολέμους ἐχρήσαντο.

The running pace of the charge was obviously one of the most remarkable events connected with the battle. Colonel Leake and Mr. Finlay seem disposed to reduce the run to a quick march ; partly on the ground that the troops must have been disordered and out of breath by running a mile. The probability is, that they really were so, and that such was the great reason of the defeat of the centre. It is very probable that a part of the mile run over consisted of declivity. I accept the account of Herodotus literally, though whether the distance be exactly stated, we cannot cer-

tainly say : indeed the fact is, that it required some steadiness of discipline to prevent the step of hoplites, when charging, from becoming accelerated into a run. See the narrative of the battle of Kunaxa in Xenoph. Anab. i. 8, 18 ; Diodor. xiv. 23 ; compare Polyæn. ii. 2, 3. The passage of Diodorus here referred to contrasts the advantages with the disadvantages of the running charge.

Both Colonel Leake and Mr. Finlay try to point out the exact ground occupied by the two armies : they differ in the spot chosen, and I cannot think that there is sufficient evidence to be had in favour of any spot. Leake thinks that the Persian commanders were encamped

beneficially in rendering the Persian cavalry and archers comparatively innocuous, but we may reasonably suppose that it also disordered the Athenian ranks, and that when they reached the Persian front, they were both out of breath and unsteady in that line of presented spears and shields which constituted their force. On the two wings, where the files were deep, such disorder produced no mischievous effect: the Persians, after a certain resistance, were overborne and driven back. But in the centre, where the files were shallow, and where moreover the native Persians and other choice troops of the army were posted, the breathless and disordered Athenian hoplites found themselves in far greater difficulties. The tribes Leontis and Antiochis, with Themistoklês and Aristeidês among them, were actually defeated, broken, driven back, and pursued by the Persians and Sakæ.¹ Miltiadês seems to have foreseen the possibility of such a check when he found himself compelled to diminish so materially the depth of his centre. For his wings, having routed the enemies opposed to them, were stayed from pursuit until the centre was extricated, and the Persians and Sakæ put to flight along with the rest. The pursuit then became general, and the Persians were chased to their ships ranged in line along the shore. Some of them became involved in the impassable marsh and there perished.² The Athenians tried to set the ships on fire, but the defence here was both vigorous and successful—several of the forward warriors of Athens were slain, and only seven ships out of the numerous fleet destroyed.³ This part of the battle terminated to the advantage of the Persians. They repulsed the Athenians from the sea-shore, so as to secure a safe re-embarkation; leaving few or no prisoners, but a rich spoil of tents and equipments which had been disembarked and could not be carried away.

Herodotus estimates the number of those who fell on the Persian side in this memorable action at 6400 men. The

in the plain of Tricorythos, separated from that of Marathon by the great marsh, and communicating with it only by means of a causeway (Leake, Transact. ii. p. 170).

¹ Herodot. vi. 113. Κατὰ τοῦτο μὲν δὴ, ἐνίκων οἱ Πέρσαιοι, καὶ ῥήξαντες, ἐδίωκον ἐς τὴν μεσόγειον.

Herodotus here tells us the whole truth without disguise; Plutarch (Aristeidês, c. 3) only says that the Persian centre made a longer resistance, and gave the tribes in the Grecian centre more trouble to overthrow.

² Pausan. i. 32, 6.

³ Herodot. vi. 113-115.

number of Athenian dead is accurately known, since all were collected for the last solemn obsequies—they were 192. How many were wounded we do not hear. Loss on both sides.

The brave Kallimachus the polemarch, and Stesilaus one of the ten generals, were among the slain; together with Kynegirus son of Euph Orion, who, in laying hold on the poop-staff of one of the vessels, had his hand cut off by an axe,¹ and died of the wound. He was brother of the poet Æchylus, himself present at the fight; to whose imagination this battle at the ships must have emphatically recalled the fifteenth book of the Iliad. Both the slain Athenian generals are said to have perished in the assault of the ships, apparently the hottest part of the combat. The statement of the Persian loss as given by Herodotus appears moderate and reasonable,² but he does not specify any distinguished individuals as having fallen.

But the Persians, though thus defeated and compelled to abandon the position of Marathon, were not yet disposed to relinquish altogether their chances against Attica. Their fleet was observed to take the direction of Cape Sunium—a portion being sent to take up the Eretrian prisoners and the stores which had been left in the island of Ægilia. At the same time a shield, discernible from its polished surface afar off, was seen held aloft upon some high point of Attica³—perhaps on the summit of Mount Pentelikus, as Colonel Leake supposes with much plausibility. The Athenians doubtless saw it as well as the Persians; and

Ulterior plans of the Persians against Athens—party in Attica favourable to them.

¹ Herodot. vi. 114. This is the statement of Herodotus respecting Kynegirus. How creditably does his character as an historian contrast with that of the subsequent romancers! Justin tells us that Kynegirus first seized the vessel with his right hand: that was cut off, and he held the vessel with his left: when he had lost that also, he seized the ship with his teeth "like a wild beast" (Justin, ii. 9)—Justin seems to have found this statement in many different authors: "Cynegiri militis virtus, multis scriptorum laudibus celebrata."

² For the exaggerated stories of the numbers of Persian slain, see Xenophon. Anab. iii. 2, 12; Plutarch, De Malign. Herodot. c. 26, p. 862; Justin, ii. 9;

and Suidas, v. Πουκίλη.

In the account of Ktésias, Datis was represented as having been killed in the battle, and it was further said that the Athenians refused to give up his body for interment; which was one of the grounds whereupon Xerxes afterwards invaded Greece. It is evident that in the authorities which Ktésias followed, the alleged death of Datis at Marathon was rather emphatically dwelt upon. See Ktésias, Persica, c. 18-21, with the note of Bähr, who is inclined to defend the statement against Herodotus.

³ Herodot. vi. 124. Ἀνεδείχθη μὲν γὰρ ἄσπις, καὶ τοῦτο οὐκ ἔστι ἕλλως εἰπεῖν ἐγένετο γὰρ δι' αὐτοῦ ἦν ὁ ἀναδείξας οὐκ ἔχω τὸ πρωτότερον εἰπεῖν αὐτόν.

Miltiadês did not fail to put the right interpretation upon it, taken in conjunction with the course of the departing fleet. The shield was a signal put up by partisans in the country, to invite the Persians round to Athens by sea, while the Marathonian army was absent. Miltiadês saw through the plot, and lost not a moment in returning to Athens. On the very

Rapid march
of Miltiadês
back to
Athens on
the day of
the battle

day of battle, the Athenian army marched back with the utmost speed from the precinct of Hêraklês at Marathon to the precinct of the same god at Kynosarges close to Athens, which they reached before the arrival of the Persian fleet.¹ Datis soon came off the port of Phalêrum; but the partisans of Hippias had been so dis-

The Per-
sians aban-
don the en-
terprise, and
return home.

mayed by the rapid return of the Marathonian army, that he did not find those aids and facilities which he had anticipated for a fresh disembarkation in the immediate neighbourhood of Athens. Though too late however, it seems that he was not much too late. The Marathonian army had only just completed their forced return-march. A little less quickness on the part of Miltiadês in deciphering the treasonable signal, and giving the instant order of march—a little less energy on the part of the Athenian citizens in superadding a fatiguing march to a no less fatiguing combat—and the Persians with the partisans of Hippias might have been found in possession of Athens. As the facts turned out, Datis, finding at Phalêrum no friendly movement to encourage him, but, on the contrary, the unexpected presence of the soldiers who had already vanquished him at Marathon—made no attempt again to disembark in Attica, but sailed away, after a short delay, to the Cyclades.

Thus was Athens rescued, for this time at least, from a danger not less terrible than imminent. Nothing could have rescued her except that decisive and instantaneous attack which Miltiadês so emphatically urged. The running step on the field of Marathon might cause some disorder in the ranks of the

Athens res-
cued by the
speedy battle
brought on
by Milti-
adês.

¹ Herodot. vi. 116. Οἷτοι μὲν δὴ περιπλῶον Σούνιον. Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ, ὡς ποδῶν εἶχον, τὰ χιῶντα ἐβόησαν ἐς τὸ ἄστυ καὶ ἐφθασάν τε ἀπικόμενοι, πρὶν ἢ τοὺς βαρβάρους ἤκειν, καὶ ἐστρατοπεδεύσαντο ἀπικόμενοι ἐξ Ἡρακλίου τοῦ ἐν Μαραθῶνι ἐς ἄλλο Ἡρακλῆϊον τὸ ἐν

Κυνοςάργει.

Plutarch (Bellone an Pace clariores fuerint Athenienses, c. 8, p. 350) represents Miltiadês as returning to Athens on the day after the battle: it must have been on the same afternoon, according to the account of Herodotus.

hoplites ; but extreme haste in bringing on the combat was the only means of preventing disunion and distraction in the minds of the citizens. Imperfect as the account is which Herodotus gives of this most interesting crisis, we see plainly that the partisans of Hippias had actually organized a conspiracy, and that it only failed by coming a little too late. The bright shield uplifted on Mount Pentelikus, apprising the Persians that matters were prepared for them at Athens, was intended to have come to their view before any action had taken place at Marathon, and while the Athenian army were yet detained there ; so that Datis might have sent a portion of his fleet round to Phalêrum, retaining the rest for combat with the enemy before him. If it had once become known to the Marathonian army that a Persian detachment had landed at Phalêrum¹—where there was a good plain for cavalry to act in, prior to the building of the Phalêric wall, as had been seen in the defeat of the Spartan Anchimolius by the Thesalian cavalry, in 510 B.C.—that it had been joined by timid or treacherous Athenians, and had perhaps even got possession of the city—their minds would have been so distracted by the double danger, and by fears for their absent wives and children, that they would have been disqualified for any unanimous execution of military orders. Generals as well as soldiers would have become incurably divided in opinion—perhaps even mistrustful of each other. The citizen-soldier of Greece generally, and especially of Athens, possessed in a high degree both personal bravery and attachment to order and discipline. But his bravery was not of that equal, imperturbable, uninquiring character, which belonged to the battalions of Wellington or Napoleon. It was fitful, exalted or depressed by casual occurrences, and often more sensitive to dangers absent and unseen, than to enemies immediately in his front. Hence the advantage, so unspeakable in the case before us, and so well appreciated by Miltiadês, of having one undivided Athenian army—with one hostile army, and only one, to meet in the field. When we come to the battle of Salamis, ten years later, it will be seen that the Greeks of that day enjoyed the same advantage. But the wisest advisers of Xerxês impressed upon him the prudence of

¹ Herodot. v. 62, 63.

dividing his large force, and of sending detachments to assail separate Greek states—which would infallibly produce the effect of breaking up the combined Grecian host, and leaving no central or co-operating force for the defence of Greece generally. Fortunately for the Greeks, the childish insolence of Xerxēs led him to despise all such advice, as implying conscious weakness. Not so Datis and Hippias. Sensible of the prudence of distracting the attention of the Athenians by a double attack, they laid a scheme, while the main army was at Marathon, for rallying the partisans of Hippias, with a force to assist them in the neighbourhood of Athens, and the signal was upheld by these partisans as soon as their measures were taken. But the rapidity of Miltiadēs so precipitated the battle, that this signal came too late, and was only given “when the Persians were already in their ships,”¹ after the Marathonian defeat. Even then it might have proved dangerous, had not the movements of Miltiadēs been as rapid after the victory as before it. If time had been allowed for the Persian movement on Athens before the battle of Marathon had been fought, the triumph of the Athenians might well have been exchanged for a calamitous servitude. To Miltiadēs belongs the credit of having comprehended the emergency from the beginning, and overruled the irresolution of his colleagues by his own single-hearted energy. The chances all turned out in his favour—for the unexpected junction of the Plateæans in the very encampment of Marathon must have wrought up the courage of his army to the highest pitch. Not only did he thus escape all the depressing and distracting accidents, but he was fortunate enough to find this extraneous encouragement immediately preceding the battle, from a source on which he could not have calculated.

I have already observed that the phase of Grecian history best known to us, and amidst which the great authors from whom we draw our information lived, was one of contempt for the Persians in the field. It requires some effort of imagination to call back previous feelings after the circumstances have been altogether reversed. Perhaps even Æschylus the poet, at the

Change of
Grecian
feeling as to
the Persians
—terror
which the
latter in-
spired at the
time of the
battle of Ma-
rathon.

¹ Herodot. vi. 115. Τοῖσι Πέρσῃσι ἀναδελῆαι ἀσπίδα, εἰοῦσι ἡδὴ ἐν τῇσι
νεύσει.

time when he composed his tragedy of the Persæ to celebrate the disgraceful flight of the invader Xerxēs, may have forgotten the emotions with which he and his brother Kynegēirus must have marched out from Athens fifteen years before, on the eve of the battle of Marathon. Again, therefore, the fact must be brought to view, that down to the time when Datis landed in the bay of Marathon, the tide of Persian success had never yet been interrupted, and that especially during the ten years immediately preceding, the high-handed and cruel extinction of the Ionic revolt had aggravated to the highest pitch the alarm of the Greeks. To this must be added the successes of Datis himself, and the calamities of Eretria, coming with all the freshness of novelty as an apparent sentence of death to Athens. The extreme effort of courage required in the Athenians, to encounter such invaders, is attested by the division of opinion among the ten generals. Putting all the circumstances together, it is without a parallel in Grecian history. It surpasses even the combat of Thermopylæ, as will appear when I come to describe that memorable event. And the admirable conduct of the five dissentient generals, when outvoted by the decision of the polemarch against them, in co-operating heartily for the success of a policy which they deprecated—proves how much the feelings of a constitutional democracy, and that entire acceptance of the pronounced decision of the majority on which it rests, had worked themselves into the Athenian mind. The combat of Marathon was by no means a very decisive defeat, but it was a defeat—the first which the Persians had ever received from Greeks in the field. If the battle of Salamis, ten years afterwards, could be treated by Themistoklēs as a hair-breadth escape for Greece, much more is this true of the battle of Marathon;¹ which first afforded reasonable proof, even to discerning and resolute Greeks, that the Persians might be effectually repelled, and the independence of European Greece maintained against them—a conviction of incalculable value in reference to the formidable trials destined to follow.

Upon the Athenians themselves, the first to face in the

¹ Herodot. viii. 108. ἡμεῖς δὲ, εὖρημα γὰρ εὐρήκαμεν ἡμῶς τε καὶ τῇ Ἑλλάδι, νέφος τοσούτων ἀνθρώπων ἀνωσάμενοι.

field successfully the terrific look of a Persian army, the effect of the victory was yet more stirring and profound.¹ It supplied them with resolution for the far greater actual sacrifices which they cheerfully underwent ten years afterwards, at the invasion of Xerxès, without faltering in their Pan-Hellenic fidelity. It strengthened them at home by swelling the tide of common sentiment and patriotic fraternity in the bosom of every individual citizen. It was the exploit of Athenians alone, but of all Athenians without dissent or exception—the boast of orators, repeated until it almost degenerated into commonplace, though the people seem never to have become weary of allusions to their single-handed victory over a host of forty-six nations.² It had been purchased without a drop of intestine bloodshed—for even the unknown traitors who raised the signal shield on Mount Pentelikus, took care not to betray themselves by want of apparent sympathy with the triumph. Lastly, it was the final guarantee of their democracy, barring all chance of restoration of Hippias for the future. Themistoklès³ is said to have been robbed of his sleep by the trophies of Miltiadès, and this is cited in proof of his ambitious temperament. Yet without supposing either jealousy or personal love of glory, the rapid transit from extreme danger to unparalleled triumph might well deprive of rest even the most sober-minded Athenian.

Who it was that raised the treacherous signal shield, to attract the Persians to Athens, was never ascertained. Very probably, in the full exultation of success, no investigation was made. Of course, however, the public belief would not

¹ Pausanias, i. 14, 4; Thucyd. i. 73. *φαμέν γάρ Μαραθῶνι τε μόνοι προκινδυνεύσαι τῷ βαρβάρῳ, &c.*

Herodot. vi. 112. *πρῶτοι τε ἀνίσχοντο ἰσθμῇ τε Μηδικῇν ὁρίοντες, καὶ ἄνδρας ταύτην ἰσθημένους· τίως δὲ ἦν τοῖσι Ἕλλησι καὶ τὸ ὄνομα τὸ Μήδων φόβος ἀκούσαι.*

It is not unworthy of remark, that the memorable oath in the oration of Demosthenès, de Coronâ, wherein he adjoins the warriors of Marathon, copies the phrase of Thucydides—*οὐ μὰ τοὺς ἐν Μαραθῶνι προκινδυνεύσαντας τῶν προγόνων, &c.* (Demosthen. de Coronâ, c. 60).

² So the computation stands in the language of Athenian orators (Herodot. ix. 27). It would be unfair to examine it critically.

³ Plutarch, Themistoklès, c. 3. According to Cicero (Epist. ad Attic. ix. 10) and Justin (ii. 9), Hippias was killed at Marathon. Suidas (v. Ἰππίας) says that he died afterwards at Lemnos. Neither of these statements seems probable. Hippias would hardly go to Lemnos, which was an Athenian possession; and had he been slain in the battle, Herodotus would have been likely to mention it.

be satisfied without singling out some persons as the authors of such a treason. The information received by Herodotus (probably about 450-440 B.C., forty or fifty years after the Marathonian victory) ascribed the deed to the Alkmæônids. He does not notice any other reported authors, though he rejects the allegation against the Alkmæônids upon very sufficient grounds. They were a race religiously tainted, ever since the Kylonian sacrilege, and were therefore convenient persons to brand with the odium of an anonymous crime; while party feud, if it did not originally invent, would at least be active in spreading and certifying such rumours. At the time when Herodotus knew Athens, the political enmity between Periklēs son of Xanthippos, and Kimon son of Miltiadēs, was at its height. Periklēs belonged by his mother's side to the Alkmæônid race, and we know that such lineage was made subservient to political manœuvres against him by his enemies.¹ Moreover the enmity between Kimon and Periklēs had been inherited by both from their fathers; for we shall find Xanthippos, not long after the battle of Marathon, the prominent accuser of Miltiadēs. Though Xanthippos was not an Alkmæônid, his marriage with Agaristē connected himself indirectly, and his son Periklēs directly, with that race. And we may trace in this standing political feud a probable origin for the false reports as to the treason of the Alkmæônids, on that great occasion which founded the glory of Miltiadēs; for that the reports were false, the intrinsic probabilities of the case, supported by the judgement of Herodotus, afford ample ground for believing.

When the Athenian army made its sudden return-march from Marathon to Athens, Aristeidēs with his tribe was left to guard the field and the spoil; but the speedy retirement of Datis from Attica left the Athenians at full liberty to revisit the scene, and discharge the last duties to the dead. A tumulus was erected on the field² (such distinction was never conferred by Athens except in this case only) to the one hundred and ninety-two Athenian citizens who had been slain. Their names were inscribed on ten pillars erected at the spot, one for each tribe: there was also a second tumulus

Who were the traitors that invited the Persians after the battle—false imputation on the Alkmæônids.

¹ Thucyd. i. 126.

² Thucyd. ii. 34.

for the slain Platæans, a third for the slaves, and a separate funeral monument to Miltiadês himself. Six hundred years after the battle, Pausanias saw the tumulus, and could still read on the pillars the names of the immortalised warriors.¹ Even now a conspicuous tumulus exists about half a mile from the sea-shore, which Colonel Leake believes to be the same.² The inhabitants of the deme of Marathon worshipped these slain warriors as heroes, along with their own eponymus, and with Hêraklês.

So splendid a victory had not been achieved, in the belief of the Athenians without marked supernatural aid. The god Pan had met the courier Pheidippidês on his hasty route from Athens to Sparta, and had told him that he was much hurt that the Athenians had as yet neglected to worship him;³ in spite of which neglect, however, he promised them effective aid at Marathon. The promise of Pan having been faithfully executed, the Athenians repaid it by a temple with annual worship and sacrifice. Moreover, the hero Theseus was seen strenuously assisting in the battle; while an unknown warrior, in rustic garb and armed only with a ploughshare, dealt destruction among the Persian ranks: after the battle he could not be found, and the Athenians, on asking at Delphi who he was, were directed to worship the hero Echêtlus.⁴ Even in the time of Pausanias, this memorable battle-field was heard to resound every night with the noise of combatants and the snorting of horses. "It is dangerous (observes that pious author) to go to the spot with the express purpose of seeing what is passing; but if a man finds himself there by accident, without having heard anything about the matter, the gods will not be angry with him." The gods (it seems) could not pardon the inquisitive mortal who deliberately pryed into their secrets. Amidst the ornaments with which Athens was decorated during the free working of her democracy, the glories of Marathon of course occupied a conspicuous place. The battle was painted on one of the compartments of the portico called Pœkilê,

¹ Pausan. i. 32, 3. Compare the elegy of Kritias ap. Athenæ. i. p. 28.

² The tumulus now existing is about thirty feet high, and two hundred yards in circumference. (Leake on the Demi

of Attica; Transactions of Royal Soc. of Literat. ii. p. 171.)

³ Herodot. vi. 105; Pausan. i. 28, 4.

⁴ Plutarch, Theseus, c. 24; Pausan. i. 32, 4.

wherein, amidst several figures of gods and heroes—Athênê, Hêraklêś, Theseus, Echelus, and the local patron Marathon—were seen honoured and prominent the polemarch Kallimachus and the general Miltiadês, while the Platæans were distinguished by their Boeotian leather casques.¹ The sixth of the month Boëdromion, the anniversary of the battle, was commemorated by an annual ceremony even down to the time of Plutarch.²

¹ Pausan. i. 15, 4; Dêmosthen. cont. Nêcr. c. 25.

² Herodot. vi. 120; Plutarch, Camill. c. 19; De Malignit. Herodoti, c. 26, p. 862; and De Gloriâ Atheniensium, c. 7.

Boëdromion was the third month of the Attic year, which year began shortly after the summer solstice. The first three Attic months, Hekatombæon, Metageitnion, Boëdromion, correspond (speaking in a loose manner) nearly to our July, August, September.

From the fact that the courier Pheidippidês reached Sparta on the ninth day of the moon, and that the 2000 Spartans arrived in Attica on the third day after the full moon, during which interval the battle took place—we see that the sixth day of Boëdromion could not be the sixth day of the moon. The Attic months, though professedly lunar months, did not at this time therefore accurately correspond with the course of the moon. See Mr. Clinton, Fast. Hellen. ad an. 490 B.C. Plutarch (in the Treatise De Malign. Herodoti, above referred to) appears to have no conception of this discrepancy between the Attic month and the course of the moon. A portion of the censure which he casts on Herodotus is grounded on the assumption that the two must coincide.

Mr. Boeckh, following Fréret and Larcher, contests the statement of Plutarch, that the battle was fought on the sixth of the month Boëdromion, but upon reasons which appear to me insufficient. His chief argument rests upon another statement of Plutarch (derived from some lost verses of Æschylus), that the tribe Æantis had the right wing or post of honour at the battle; and that the public vote, pursuant to which the Army was led out of Athens, was passed during the prytany of the tribe Æantis. He assumes, that the reason why this tribe was posted on the right

wing, must have been, that it had drawn by lot the first prytany in that particular year: if this be granted, then the vote for drawing out the army must have been passed in the first prytany, or within the first thirty-five or thirty-six days of the Attic year, during the space between the first of Hekatombæon and the fifth or sixth of Metageitnion. But it is certain that the interval, which took place between the army leaving the city and the battle, was much less than one month—we may even say less than one week. The battle, therefore (Boeckh contends) must have been fought between the sixth and tenth of Metageitnion. (Plutarch, Symposiac. i. 10, 3, and Ideler, Handbuch der Chronologie, vol. i. p. 291.) Herodotus (vi. 111) says that the tribes were arranged in line *ἐς ἡριθμόν*—"as they were numbered"—which is contended to mean necessarily the arrangement between them, determined by lot for the prytanies of that particular year. "In acie instruendâ (says Boeckh, Comment. ad Corp. Inscriptt. p. 299) Athenienses non constantem, sed variabilem secundum prytanias, ordinem secutos esse, ita ut tribus ex hoc ordine inde a dextro cornu disponentur, docui in Commemoratione de pugna Marathonîâ." Proemia Lect. Univ. Berolin. æstiv. a. 1816.

The Proemia here referred to I have not been able to consult, and they may therefore contain additional reasons to prove the point advanced, viz. that the order of the ten tribes in line of battle, beginning from the right wing, was conformable to their order in prytanising, as drawn by lot for the year; but I think the passages of Herodotus and Plutarch now before us insufficient to establish this point. From the fact that the tribe Æantis had the right wing at the battle of Marathon, we are by no means warranted in inferring that that tribe had drawn by lot the earliest pry-

Two thousand Spartans started from their city immediately after the full moon, and reached the frontier of Attica on the

tany in the year. Other reasons, in my judgement equally probable, may be assigned in explanation of the circumstance: one reason, I think, decidedly *more* probable. This reason is, that the battle was fought during the prytany of the tribe *Æantis*, which may be concluded from the statement of Plutarch, that the vote for marching out the army from Athens was passed during the prytany of that tribe; for the interval, between the march of the army out of the city and the battle, must have been only very few days. Moreover, the deme Marathon belonged to the tribe *Æantis* (see Boeckh, *ad. Inscript. No. 172, p. 309*): the battle being fought in their deme, the Marathonians may perhaps have claimed on this express ground the post of honour for their tribe: just as we see that at the first battle of Mantinea against the Lacedæmonians, the Mantineians were allowed to occupy the right wing or post of honour, "because the battle was fought in their territory" (Thucyd. v. 67). Lastly, the deme Aphidnæ also belonged to the tribe *Æantis* (see Boeckh, l. c.): now the polemarch Kallimachus was an Aphidnæan (Herodot. vi. 109), and Herodotus expressly tells us, "the law or custom *then* stood among the Athenians, that the polemarch should have the right wing"—*ὁ γὰρ νόμος τότε εἶχε οὕτω τοῖσι Ἀθηναίοισι, τὸν πολέμαρχον εἶχει κίρας τὸ δεξιόν* (vi. 111). Where the polemarch stood, there his tribe would be likely to stand: and the language of Herodotus indeed seems directly to imply that he identifies the tribe of the polemarch with the polemarch himself—*ἡγεομένου δὲ τούτου, ἐξεβέκοντο ὡς ἀριθμούντο αἱ φυλαί, ἐχόμεναι ἀλλήλων*—meaning that the order of tribes began by that of the polemarch being in the leading position, and was then "taken up" by the rest "in numerical sequence"—i. e. in the order of their prytanising sequence for the year.

Here are a concurrence of reasons to explain why the tribe *Æantis* had the right wing at the battle of Marathon, even though it may not have been first in the order of prytanising tribes for the year. Boeckh therefore is not warranted in inferring the second of these two facts from the first.

The concurrence of these three reasons, all in favour of the same conclusion, and all independent of the reason supposed by Boeckh, appears to me to have great weight; but I regard the first of the three, even singly taken, as more probable than his reason. If my view of the case be correct, the sixth day of Boëdromion, the day of battle as given by Plutarch, is not to be called in question. That day comes in the second prytany of the year, which begins about the sixth of Metageitnion, and ends about the twelfth of Boëdromion, and which must in this year have fallen to the lot of the tribe *Æantis*. On the first or second day of Boëdromion, the vote for marching out the army may have passed; on the sixth the battle was fought; both during the prytany of this tribe.

I am not prepared to carry these reasons farther than the particular case of the battle of Marathon, and the vindication of the day of that battle as stated by Plutarch; nor would I apply them to later periods, such as the Peloponnesian war. It is certain that the army regulations of Athens were considerably modified between the battle of Marathon and the Peloponnesian war, as well in other matters as in what regards the polemarch; and we have not sufficient information to enable us to determine whether in that later period the Athenians followed any known or perpetual rule in the battle order of the tribes. Military considerations, connected with the state of the particular army serving, must have prevented the constant observance of any rule. Thus we can hardly imagine that Nikias, commanding the army before Syracuse, could have been tied down to any invariable order of battle among the tribes to which his hoplites belonged. Moreover, the expedition against Syracuse lasted more than one Attic year; can it be believed that Nikias, on receiving information from Athens of the sequence in which the prytanies of the tribes had been drawn by lot during the second year of his expedition, would be compelled to marshal his army in a new battle order conformably to it? As the military operations of the Athenians became more extensive, they would find

third day of their march—a surprising effort, when we consider that the total distance from Sparta to Athens was about one hundred and fifty miles. They did not arrive, however, until the battle had been fought and the Persians departed. Curiosity led them to the field of Marathon to behold the dead bodies of the Persians; after which they returned home, bestowing well-merited praise on the victors.

Datis and Artaphernēs returned across the Ægean with their Eretrian prisoners to Asia; stopping for a short time at the island of Mykonos, where discovery was made of a gilt image of Apollo carried off as booty in a Phœnician ship. Datis went himself to restore it to Dêlos, requesting the Delians to carry it back to the Delium or temple of Apollo on the eastern coast of Bœotia: the Delians however chose to keep the statue until it was reclaimed from them twenty years afterwards by the Thebans. On reaching Asia, the Persian generals conducted their prisoners up to the court of Susa and into the presence of

Return of
Datis to
Asia—fate of
the Eretrian
captives.

it necessary to leave such dispositions more and more to the general serving in every particular campaign. It may well be doubted whether during the Peloponnesian war any established rule was observed in marshalling the tribes for battle.

One great motive which induces critics to maintain that the battle was fought in the Athenian month *Metageitnion*, is, that that month coincides with the Spartan month *Karneius*, so that the refusal of the Spartans to march before the full moon is construed to apply only to the peculiar sanctity of this last-mentioned month, instead of being a constant rule for the whole year. I perfectly agree with these critics, that the answer given by the Spartans to the courier *Pheidippidēs* cannot be held to prove a regular, invariable Spartan maxim, applicable throughout the whole year, not to begin a march in the second quarter of the moon: very possibly, as Boeckh remarks, there may have been some festival impending during the particular month in question, upon which the Spartan refusal to march was founded. But no inference can be deduced from hence to disprove the sixth of *Boëdromion* as the day of the battle of Marathon: for though the months of every Grecian city were professedly

lunar, yet they never coincided with each other exactly or long together, because the systems of intercalation adopted in different cities were different: there was great irregularity and confusion (*Plutarch*, *Aristeidēs*, c. 19; *Aristoxenus*, *Harmon.* ii. p. 30; compare also K. F. Hermann, *Ueber die Griechische Monatskunde*, p. 26, 27, Göttingen, 1844: and Boeckh, *ad Corp. Inscript.* T. i. p. 734).

Granting therefore that the answer given by the Spartans to *Pheidippidēs* is to be construed, not as a general rule applicable to the whole year, but as referring to the particular month in which it was given—no inference can be drawn from hence as to the day of the battle of Marathon, because either of the two following suppositions is possible:—1. The Spartans may have had solemnities on the day of the full moon, or on the day before it, in other months besides *Karneius*; 2. or the full moon of the Spartan *Karneius* may actually have fallen, in the year 490 B.C., on the fifth or sixth of the Attic month *Boëdromion*.

Dr. Thirlwall appears to adopt the view of Boeckh, but does not add anything material to the reasons in its favour (*Hist. of Gr.* vol. ii. Append. III., p. 488).

Darius. Though he had been vehemently incensed against them yet when he saw them in his power, his wrath abated, and he manifested no desire to kill or harm them. They were planted at a spot called Arderikka, in the Kissian territory, one of the resting-places on the road from Sardis to Susa, and about twenty-six miles distant from the latter place. Herodotus seems himself to have seen their descendants there on his journey between the two capitals, and to have had the satisfaction of talking to them in Greek—which we may easily conceive to have made some impression upon him, at a spot distant by nearly three months' journey from the coast of Ionia.¹

Happy would it have been for Miltiadēs if he had shared the honourable death of the polemarch Kallimachus—"animam exhalasset opimam"—in seeking to fire the ships of the defeated Persians at Marathon. The short sequel of his history will be found in melancholy contrast with the Marathonian heroism.

His reputation had been great before the battle, and after it the admiration and confidence of his countrymen knew no bounds. These feelings reached such a pitch that his head was turned, and he lost both his patriotism and his prudence. He proposed to his countrymen to incur the cost of equipping an armament of seventy ships with an adequate armed force, and to place it altogether at his discretion; giving them no intimation whither he intended to go, but merely assuring them that if they would follow him, he would conduct them to a land where gold was abundant, and thus enrich them. Such a promise, from the lips of the recent

¹ Herodot. vi. 119. Darius—σφάας τῆς Κισσίνης χώρας κατοίκησε ἐν σταθμῷ αὐτοῦ τῷ ὀνόματι Ἀρδερικκα—ἐνθαῦτα τοὺς Ἐρετρίους κατοίκησε Δαρείος, οἱ καὶ μέχρι ἡμῶν εἶχον τὴν χώραν ταύτην, φυλάσσοντες τὴν ἀρχαίην γλῶσσαν. The meaning of the word σταθμὸς is explained by Herodot. v. 52. σταθμὸς αὐτοῦ is the same as σταθμὸς βασιλῆως: the particulars which Herodotus recounts about Arderikka, and its remarkable well or pit of bitumen, salt, and oil, give every reason to believe that he had himself stopped there.

Strabo places the captive Eretrians in

Gordyênê, which would be considerably higher up the Tigris; upon whose authority we do not know (Strabo, xv. 747).

The many particulars which are given respecting the descendants of these Eretrians in Kissia, by Philostratus in his Life of Apollonius of Tyana, as they are alleged to have stood even in the first century of the Christian æra, cannot be safely quoted. With all the fiction there contained, some truth may perhaps be mingled; but we cannot discriminate it (Philostratus, Vit. Apollon. i. c. 24-30).

victor of Marathon, was sufficient. The armament was granted, no man except Miltiadês knowing what was its destination. He sailed immediately to the island of Paros, laid siege to the town, and sent in a herald to require from the inhabitants a contribution of one hundred talents, on pain of entire destruction. His pretence for this attack was, that the Parians had furnished a trireme to Datis for the Persian fleet at Marathon; but his real motive (so Herodotus assures us¹) was vindictive animosity against a Parian citizen named Lysagoras, who had exasperated the Persian general Hydarnês against him. The Parians amused him at first with evasions, until they had procured a little delay to repair the defective portions of their wall, after which they set him at defiance. In vain did Miltiadês prosecute hostilities against them for the space of twenty-six days: he ravaged the island, but his attacks made no impression upon the town.² Beginning to despair of success in his military operations, he entered into some negotiation (such at least was the tale of the Parians themselves) with a Parian woman named Timô, priestess or attendant in the temple of Dêmêtêr near the town-gates. This woman, promising to reveal to him a secret which would place Paros in his power, induced him to visit by night a temple to which no male person was admissible. Having leaped the exterior fence, he approached the sanctuary; but on coming near, he was seized with a panic terror and ran away, almost out of his senses. On leaping the same fence to get back, he strained or bruised his thigh badly, and became utterly disabled. In this melancholy state he was placed on shipboard; the siege being raised, and the whole armament returning to Athens.

Vehement was the indignation both of the armament and of the remaining Athenians against Miltiadês on his return.³

¹ Herodot. vi. 132. ἔπειτα ἐπὶ Πάρον, πρόσφασιν ἔχον ὡς οἱ Πάριοι ὑπερῆσαν πρότεροι στρατευόμενοι τριηρεῖ ἐς Μαραθῶνα ἅμα τῷ Πέρσῃ. Τοῦτο μὲν δὴ πρόσχημα τοῦ λόγου ἦν ἅπαρ τινα καὶ ἔγκοτον εἶχε τοῖσι Παρίοις διὰ Ἀσπαγόρεα τὸν Τισίεω, ἰόντα γένος Πάριον, διαβαλόντα μιν πρὸς Τῶάρρεα τὸν Πέρσῃ.

² Ephorus (Fragm. 107, ed. Didot; ap. Stephan. Byz. v. Πάρος) gave an account of this expedition in several

points different from Herodotus, which latter I here follow. The authority of Herodotus is preferable in every respect; the more so, since Ephorus gives his narrative as a sort of explanation of the peculiar phrase ἀσπαγίδεω. Explanatory narratives of that sort are usually little worthy of attention.

³ Herodot. vi. 136. Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ ἐκ Πάρου Μιλτιάδεα ἀποροστήσαντα ἔσχον ἐν στόμασι, οἱ τε ἄλλοι, καὶ μάλιστα Ἑάρ-

Of this feeling Xanthippus, father of the great Periklēs, became the spokesman. He impeached Miltiadēs before the popular judicature, as having been guilty of deceiving the people and as having deserved the penalty of death. The accused himself, disabled by his injured thigh, which even began to show symptoms of gangrene, was unable to stand or to say a word in his own defence. He lay on his couch before the assembled judges, while his friends made the best case they could in his behalf. Defence, it appears, there was none: all they could do was to appeal to his previous services: they reminded the people largely and emphatically of the inestimable exploit of Marathon, coming in addition to his previous conquest of Lemnos. The assembled dikasts or jurors showed their sense of such powerful appeals by rejecting the proposition of his accuser to condemn him to death; but they imposed on him the penalty of fifty talents "for his iniquity." Cornelius Nepos affirms that these fifty talents represented the expenses incurred by the state in fitting out the armament. But we may more probably believe, looking to the practice of the Athenian dikastery in criminal cases, that fifty talents was the minor penalty actually proposed by the defenders of Miltiadēs themselves, as a substitute for the punishment of death.

In those penal cases at Athens, where the punishment was not fixed beforehand by the terms of the law, if the person accused was found guilty, it was customary to submit to the

θίππος δ' Ἀρίφρονος· δε θανάτου ὑπαγαγὼν ὑπὸ τὸν δῆμον Μιλτιάδεα, εἰδὼκε τῆς Ἀθηναίων ἀπάτης εἰσέκεν. Μιλτιάδης δὲ, αὐτὸς μὲν παρῶν, οὐκ ἀπελογέτο· ἦν γὰρ ἀδύνατος, ὥστε σηπομένου τοῦ μηροῦ. Προκειμένου δὲ αὐτοῦ ἐν κλίνῃ, ὑπερασπολογέοντο οἱ φίλοι, τῆς μάχης τε τῆς ἐν Μαραθῶνι γενομένης πολλὰ ἐπιμεμνημένοι, καὶ τὴν Ἀθήμων αἵρεσιν ὡς ἐλὼν Ἀθημόν τε καὶ τισάμενος τοῦ Πελασγοῦ, παρέδωκε Ἀθηναίοισι. Προσγενομένου δὲ τοῦ δήμου αὐτῷ κατὰ τὴν ἀπόλυσιν τοῦ θανάτου, ζημιώσαντος δὲ κατὰ τὴν ἀδικίην πενήτηκοντα τάλαντοισι, Μιλτιάδης μὲν μετὰ ταῦτα, σφακελίσαντός τε τοῦ μηροῦ καὶ σπέντος, τελευτῶ· τὰ δὲ πενήτηκοντα τάλαντα ἐξέτισεν ὁ πᾶσι αὐτοῦ Κίμων.

Plato (*Gorgias*, c. 153, p. 516) says that the Athenians passed a vote to cast

Miltiadēs into the barathrum (*ἐμβαλεῖν ἐψηφίσαντο*), and that he would have been actually thrown in, if it had not been for the Prytanis, *i. e.* the president, by turn for that day, of the prytanisising senators and of the Ekklesia. The Prytanis may perhaps have been among those who spoke to the dikastery on behalf of Miltiadēs, deprecating the proposition made by Xanthippus; but that he should have caused a vote once passed to be actually rescinded, is incredible. The Scholiast on Aristeidēs (cited by Valckenaer ad Herodot. vi. 136) reduces the exaggeration of Plato to something more reasonable—"Ὅτε γὰρ ἐκρίνετο Μιλτιάδης ἐπὶ τῇ Πάτρῃ, ἡθέλησαν αὐτὸν κατακρημνίσαι· ὁ δὲ πρύτανις εἰσελθὼν ἐξήτασεν αὐτόν.

jurors, subsequently and separately, the question as to amount of punishment: first, the accuser named the penalty which he thought suitable; next, the accused person was called upon to name an amount of penalty for himself, and the jurors were constrained to take their choice between these two—no third gradation of penalty being admissible for consideration.¹

¹ That this was the habitual course of Attic procedure in respect to public indictments, wherever a positive amount of penalty was not previously determined, appears certain. See Platner, *Prozess und Klagen bei den Attikern*, Abschn. vi. vol. I. p. 201; Heffter, *Die Athenäische Gerichtsverfassung*, p. 334. Meier and Schömann (*Der Attische Prozess*, b. iv. p. 725) maintain that any one of the dikasts might propose a third measure of penalty, distinct from that proposed by the accuser as well as the accused. In respect to public indictments, this opinion appears decidedly incorrect; but where the sentence to be pronounced involved a compensation for private wrong and an estimate of damages, we cannot so clearly determine whether there was not sometimes a greater latitude in originating propositions for the dikasts to vote upon. It is to be recollected that these dikasts were several hundred, sometimes even more, in number—that there was no discussion or deliberation among them—and that it was absolutely necessary for some distinct proposition to be laid before them to take a vote upon. In regard to some offences, the law expressly permitted what was called a *πρόστιμμα*; that is, after the dikasts had pronounced the full penalty demanded by the accuser, any other citizen, who thought the penalty so imposed insufficient, might call for a certain limited amount of additional penalty, and require the dikasts to vote upon it—ay or no. The votes of the dikasts were given by depositing pebbles in two casks, under certain arrangements of detail.

The *ἀγὼν τιμῆς*, *δίκη τιμῆς*, or trial including this separate admeasurement of penalty—as distinguished from the *δίκη ἀτιμίας*, or trial where the penalty was predetermined, and where there was no *τίμησις*, or vote of admeasurement of penalty—is an important line of distinction in the subject-matter of Attic procedure; and the

practice of calling on the accused party, after having been pronounced guilty, to impose upon himself a *counter-penalty* or *under-penalty* (*ἀντιπῶσθαι* or *ἐνδοπιῶσθαι*) in contrast with that named by the accuser, was a convenient expedient for bringing the question to a substantive vote of the dikasts. Sometimes accused persons found it convenient to name very large penalties on themselves, in order to escape a capital sentence invoked by the accuser (see *Dēmosten. cont. Timokrat. c. 34*, p. 743 R.). Nor was there any fear (as Platner imagines) that in the generality of cases the dikasts would be left under the necessity of choosing between an extravagant penalty and something merely nominal; for the interest of the accused party himself would prevent this from happening. Sometimes we see him endeavouring by entreaties to prevail upon the accuser voluntarily to abate something of the penalty which he had at first named. The accuser might probably do this, if he saw that the dikasts were not likely to go along with that first proposition.

In one particular case, of immortal memory, that which Platner contemplates actually did happen; and the death of Sokratēs was the effect of it. Sokratēs, having been found guilty, only by a small majority of votes among the dikasts, was called upon to name a penalty upon himself, in opposition to that of death urged by Meletus. He was in vain entreated by his friends to name a fine of some tolerable amount, which they would at once have paid in his behalf; but he would hardly be prevailed upon to name any penalty at all, affirming that he had deserved honour rather than punishment: at last he named a fine so small in amount, as to be really tantamount to an acquittal. Indeed, Xenophon states that he would not name any counter-penalty at all; and in the speech ascribed to him, he contended that he had even merited the signal honour of a public maintenance in the Prytaneum (Plato,

Of course, under such circumstances, it was the interest of the accused party to name, even in his own case, some real and serious penalty—something which the jurors might be likely to deem not wholly inadequate to his crime just proved ; for if he proposed some penalty only trifling, he drove them to prefer the heavier sentence recommended by his opponent. Accordingly, in the case of Miltiadês, his friends, desirous of inducing the jurors to refuse their assent to the punishment of death, proposed a fine of fifty talents as the self-assessed penalty of the defendant ; and perhaps they may have stated, as an argument in the case, that such a sum would suffice to defray the costs of the expedition. The fine was imposed, but Miltiadês did not live to pay it : his injured limb mortified, and he died, leaving the fine to be paid by his son Kimon.

According to Cornelius Nepos, Diodorus, and Plutarch, he was put in prison after having been fined, and there died.¹ But Herodotus does not mention this imprisonment, nor does the fact appear to me probable : he would hardly have omitted to notice it had it come to his knowledge. Immediate imprisonment of a person fined by the dikastery, until his fine was paid, was not the natural and ordinary course of Athenian procedure, though there were particular cases in which such aggravation was added. Usually a certain time was

Apol. Sok. c. 27 ; Xenoph. Apol. Sok. 23 ; Diogen. Laërt. ii. 41). Plato and Xenophon do not agree ; but taking the two together, it would seem that he must have named a very small fine. There can be little doubt that this circumstance, together with the lenor of his defence, caused the dikasts to vote for the proposition of Melêtus.

¹ Cornelius Nepos, Miltiadês, c. 7 ; and Kimon, c. 1 ; Plutarch, Kimon, c. 4 ; Diodorus, Fragment. lib. x. All these authors probably drew from the same original fountain ; perhaps Ephorus (see Marx ad Ephori Fragmenta, p. 212) ; but we have no means of determining. Respecting the alleged imprisonment of Kimon, however, they must have copied from different authorities, for their statements are all different. Diodorus states, that Kimon put himself voluntarily into prison after his father had died there, because he was

not permitted on any other condition to obtain the body of his deceased father for burial. Cornelius Nepos affirms that he was imprisoned, as being legally liable to the state for the unpaid fine of his father. Lastly, Plutarch does not represent him as having been put into prison at all. Many of the Latin writers follow the statement of Diodorus : see the citations in Bos's note on the above passage of Cornelius Nepos.

There can be no hesitation in adopting the account of Plutarch as the true one. Kimon neither was, nor could be, in prison, by the Attic law, for an unpaid fine of his father ; but after his father's death, he became liable for the fine, in the sense—that he remained disfranchised (*ἀνιστός*) and excluded from his rights as a citizen, until the fine was paid : see Dêmôsthen. cont. Timokrat. c. 46, p. 762 R.

allowed for payment,¹ before absolute execution was resorted to; though the person under sentence became disfranchised and excluded from all political rights, from the very instant of his condemnation as a public debtor, until the fine was paid. Now in the instance of Miltiadês, the lamentable condition of his wounded thigh rendered escape impossible—so that there would be no special motive for departing from the usual practice, and imprisoning him forthwith: moreover if he was not imprisoned forthwith, he would not be imprisoned at all, since he cannot have lived many days after his trial.² To carry away the suffering general in his couch, incapable of raising himself even to plead for his own life, from the presence of the dikasts to a prison—would not only have been a needless severity, but could hardly have failed to imprint itself on the sympathies and the memory of all the beholders; so that Herodotus would have been likely to hear and mention it, if it had really occurred. I incline to believe therefore that Miltiadês died at home. All accounts concur in stating that he died of the mortal bodily hurt which already disabled him even at the moment of his trial, and that his son Kimon paid the fifty talents after his death. If *he* could pay them, probably his father could have paid them also. This is an additional reason for believing that there was no imprisonment—for nothing but non-payment could have sent him to prison; and to rescue the suffering Miltiadês from being sent thither, would have been the first and strongest desire of all sympathizing friends.

Thus closed the life of the conqueror of Marathon. The last act of it produces an impression so mournful, and even shocking—his descent, from the pinnacle of glory, to defeat,

¹ See Boeckh, *Public Economy of Athens*, b. iii. ch. 13, p. 390 Eng. Transl. (vol. i. p. 420 Germ.); Meier und Schömann, *Attisch. Prozess*, p. 744. Dr. Thirlwall takes a different view of this point, with which I cannot concur (*Hist. Gr.* vol. iii. Append II. p. 488); though his general remarks on the trial of Miltiadês are just and appropriate (ch. xiv. p. 273).

Cornelius Nepos (Miltiadês, c. 8; Kimon, c. 3) says that the misconduct connected with Paros was only a pretence with the Athenians for punishing Miltiadês; their real motive (he affirms)

was envy and fear, the same feelings which dictated the ostracism of Kimon. How little there is to justify this fancy, may be seen even from the nature of the punishment inflicted. Fear would have prompted them to send away or put to death Miltiadês, not to fine him. The ostracism, which was dictated by fear, was a temporary banishment.

² The interval between his trial and his decease is expressed in Herodotus (vi. 136) by the difference between the present participle *σηπομένου* and the past participle *σπεύτος τοῦ μηροῦ*.

mean tampering with a temple-servant, mortal bodily hurt, undefended ignominy, and death under a sentence of heavy fine, is so abrupt and unprepared—that readers, ancient and modern, have not been satisfied without finding some one to blame for it; we must except Herodotus, our original authority, who recounts the transaction without dropping a hint of blame against any one. To speak ill of the people, as Machiavel has long ago observed,¹ is a strain in which every one at all times, even under a democratical government, indulges with impunity and without provoking any opponent to reply. In this instance, the hard fate of Miltiadês has been imputed to the vices of the Athenians and their democracy—it has been cited in proof, partly of their fickleness, partly of their ingratitude. But however such blame may serve to lighten the mental sadness arising from a series of painful facts, it will not be found justified if we apply to those facts a reasonable criticism.

What is called the fickleness of the Athenians on this occasion is nothing more than a rapid and decisive change in their estimation of Miltiadês; unbounded admiration passing at once into extreme wrath. To censure them for fickleness is here an abuse of terms; such a change in their opinion was the unavoidable result of his conduct. His behaviour in the expedition of Paros was as reprehensible as at Marathon it had been meritorious, and the one succeeded immediately after the other; what else could ensue except an entire revolution in the Athenian feelings? He had employed his prodigious ascendancy over their minds to induce them to follow him without knowing whither, in the confidence of an unknown booty: he had exposed their lives and wasted their substance in wreaking a private grudge: in addition to the shame of an unprincipled project, comes the constructive shame of not having succeeded in it. Without doubt, such behaviour, coming from a man whom they admired to excess, must have produced a violent and painful revulsion in the feelings of his countrymen. The idea of having lavished

Reflections
on the clos-
ing adven-
tures of the
life of
Miltiadês.

Fickleness
and ingrati-
tude im-
puted to the
Athenians—
how far they
deserve the
charge.

¹ Machiavel, Discorsi sopra Tito Livio, cap. 85. "L'opinione contro ai popoli nasce, perchè dei popoli ciascun dice male senza paura, e liberamente ancora mentre che regnano: dei principi si parla sempre con mille timori e mille rispetti."

praise and confidence upon a person who forthwith turns it to an unworthy purpose, is one of the greatest torments of the human bosom; and we may easily understand that the intensity of the subsequent displeasure would be aggravated by this reactionary sentiment without accusing the Athenians of fickleness. If an officer, whose conduct had been such as to merit the highest encomiums, comes on a sudden to betray his trust, and manifests cowardice or treachery in a new and important undertaking confided to him, are we to treat the general in command as fickle, because his opinion as well as his conduct undergoes an instantaneous revolution—which will be all the more vehement in proportion to his previous esteem? The question to be determined is, whether there be sufficient ground for such a change; and in the case of Miltiadès, that question must be answered in the affirmative.

In regard to the charge of ingratitude against the Athenians, this last-mentioned point—sufficiency of reason—stands tacitly admitted. It is conceded that Miltiadès deserved punishment for his conduct in reference to the Parian expedition, but it is nevertheless maintained that gratitude for his previous services at Marathon ought to have exempted him from punishment. But the sentiment, upon which, after all, this exculpation rests, will not bear to be drawn out and stated in the form of a cogent or justifying reason. For will any one really contend, that a man who has rendered great services to the public, is to receive in return a licence of unpunished misconduct for the future? Is the general who has earned applause by eminent skill and important victories, to be recompensed by being allowed the liberty of betraying his trust afterwards, and exposing his country to peril, without censure or penalty? This is what no one intends to vindicate deliberately; yet a man must be prepared to vindicate it when he blames the Athenians for ingratitude towards Miltiadès. For if all that is meant be, that gratitude for previous services ought to pass, not as a receipt in full for subsequent crime, but as an extenuating circumstance in the measurement of the penalty, the answer is, that it was so reckoned in the Athenian treatment of Miltiadès.¹ His

¹ Machiavel will not even admit so much as *this*, in the clear and forcible statement which he gives of the ques-
tion here alluded to: he contends that the man who has rendered services ought to be recompensed for them, but

friends had nothing whatever to urge, against the extreme penalty proposed by his accuser, except these previous services—which influenced the dikasts sufficiently to induce them to inflict the lighter punishment instead of the heavier. Now the whole amount of punishment inflicted consisted in a fine which certainly was not beyond his reasonable means of paying, or of prevailing upon friends to pay for him—since his son Kimon actually did pay it. Those who blame the Athenians for ingratitude, unless they are prepared to maintain the doctrine, that previous services are to pass as full acquittal for future crime, have no other ground left, except to say that the fine was too high; that instead of being fifty talents, it ought to have been no more than forty, thirty, twenty, or ten talents. Whether they are right in this, I will not take upon me to pronounce: if the amount was named on behalf of the accused party, the dikastery had no legal power of diminishing it; but it is within such narrow limits that the question actually lies, when transferred from the province of sentiment to that of reason. It will be recollected that the death of Miltiadês arose neither from his trial nor his fine, but from the hurt in his thigh.

The charge of ingratitude against the Athenian popular juries really amounts to this—that in trying a person accused of present crime or fault, they were apt to confine themselves too strictly and exclusively to the particular matter

that he ought to be punished for subsequent crime just as if the previous services had not been rendered. He lays down this position in discussing the conduct of the Romans towards the victorious survivor of the three Horatii, after the battle with the Curiatii—“Erano stati i meriti di Orazio grandissimi, avendo con la sua virtù vinti i Curiatii. Era stato il fallo suo atroce, avendo morto la sorella. Nondimeno dispiacque tanto tale omicidio ai Romani, che lo condussero a disputare della vita, non ostante che gli meriti suoi fossero tanto grandi e si freschi. La qual cosa, a chi superficialmente la considerasse, parrebbe uno esempio d'ingratitude popolare. Nondimeno chi lo esaminerà meglio, e con migliore considerazione ricercherà quali debbono essere gli ordini delle repubbliche, biasimerà quel popolo piuttosto per averlo

assoluto, che per averlo voluto condannare: e la ragione è questa, che nessuna repubblica bene ordinata, non mai cancellò i demeriti con gli meriti dei suoi cittadini: ma avendo ordinati i premi ad una buona opera, e le pene ad una cattiva, ed avendo premiato uno per aver bene operato, se quel medesimo opera dipoi male, lo castiga senza avere riguardo alcuno alle sue buone opere. E quando questi ordini sono bene osservati, una città vive libera molto tempo: altrimenti sempre rovinerà presto. Perchè se, ad un cittadino che abbia fatto qualche egregia opera per la città, si aggiunge oltre alla riputazione, che quella cosa gli arreca, una audacia e confidenza di potere senza temer pena, far qualche opera non buona, diventerà in breve tempo tanto insolente, che si risolverà ogni civiltà.”—Machiavel, Discorsi sop. Tit. Livio, c. 24.

of charge, either forgetting, or making too little account of, past services which he might have rendered. Whoever imagines that such was the habit of Athenian dikasts, must have studied the orators to very little purpose. Their real defect was the very opposite: they were too much disposed to wander from the special issue before them, and to be affected by appeals to previous services and conduct.¹ That which an accused person at Athens usually strives to produce is, an impression in the minds of the dikasts favourable to his general character and behaviour: of course he meets the particular allegation of his accuser as well as he can, but he never fails also to remind them emphatically, how well he has performed his general duties of a citizen—how many times he has served in military expeditions—how many trierarchies and liturgies he has performed, and performed with splendid efficiency. In fact, the claim of an accused person to acquittal is made to rest too much on his prior services, and too little upon innocence or justifying matter as to the particular indictment. When we come down to the time of the orators, I shall be prepared to show that such indisposition to confine themselves to a special issue was one of the most serious defects of the assembled dikasts at Athens. It is one which we should naturally expect from a body of private non-professional citizens assembled for the occasion—and which belongs more or less to the system of jury-trial everywhere; but it is the direct reverse of that ingratitude, or habitual insensibility to prior services, for which they have been so often denounced.

The fate of Miltiadês, then, so far from illustrating either the fickleness or the ingratitude of his countrymen, attests their just appreciation of deserts. It also illustrates another moral, of no small importance to the right comprehension

¹ Machiavel, in the twenty-ninth chapter of his *Discorsi sopra T. Livio*, examines the question, "Which of the two is more open to the charge of being ungrateful—a popular government or a king?" he thinks that the latter is more open to it. Compare chap. 59 of the same work, where he again supports a similar opinion.

M. Sismondi also observes, in speaking of the long attachment of the city of

Pisa to the cause of the Emperors and to the Ghibelin party—"Pise montra dans plus d'une occasion, par sa constance à supporter la cause des empereurs au milieu des revers, combien la reconnaissance lie un peuple libre d'une manière plus puissante et plus durable qu'elle ne sauroit lier le peuple gouverné par un seul homme." (*Histoire des Republ. Italiennes*, ch. xiii. tom. ii. p. 302).

Usual temper of the Athenian dikasts in estimating previous services.

of Grecian affairs;—it teaches us the painful lesson, how perfectly maddening were the effects of a copious draught of glory on the temperament of an enterprising and ambitious Greek. There can be no doubt, that the rapid transition, in the course of about one week, from Athenian terror before the battle to Athenian exultation after it, must have produced demonstrations towards Miltiadês such as were never paid towards any other man in the whole history of the commonwealth. Such unmeasured admiration unscathed his rational judgement. His mind became abandoned to the reckless impulses of insolence, and antipathy, and rapacity;—that distempered state, for which (according to Grecian morality) the retributive Nemesis was ever on the watch, and which in his case she visited with a judgement startling in its rapidity as well as terrible in its amount. Had Miltiadês been the same man before the battle of Marathon as he became after it, the battle might probably have turned out a defeat instead of a victory. Dêmosthênês indeed,¹ in speaking of the wealth and luxury of political leaders in his own time, and the profuse rewards bestowed upon them by the people, pointed in contrast to the house of Miltiadês as being noway more splendid than that of a private man. But though Miltiadês might continue to live in a modest establishment, he received from his countrymen marks of admiration and deference such as were never paid to any citizen before or after him; and, after all, admiration and deference constitute the precious essence of popular reward. No man except Miltiadês ever dared to raise his voice in the Athenian assembly, and say—"Give me a fleet of ships: do not ask what I am going to do with them, but only follow me, and I will enrich you." Herein we may read the unmeasured confidence which the Athenians placed in their victorious general, and the utter incapacity of a leading Greek to bear it without mental depravation; while we learn from it to draw the melancholy inference, that one result of success was to make the successful leader one of the most dangerous men in the community. We shall presently be called upon to observe the same tendency in the case of the Spartan Pausanias, and even in that of the Athenian Themistoklês.

Tendency of
eminent
Greeks to be
corrupted by
success.

¹ Dêmosthênês, Olynth. III. c. 9, p. 35 R.

It is indeed fortunate that the reckless aspirations of Miltiadês did not take a turn more noxious to Athens than the comparatively unimportant enterprise against Paros. For had he sought to acquire dominion and gratify antipathies against enemies at home, instead of directing his blow against a Parian enemy, the peace and security of his country might have been seriously endangered. Of the despots who gained power in Greece, a considerable proportion began by popular conduct and by rendering good service to their fellow-citizens: having first earned public gratitude, they abused it for purposes of their own ambition. There was far greater danger, in a Grecian community, of dangerous excess of gratitude towards a victorious soldier, than of deficiency in that sentiment. The person thus exalted acquired a position such that the community found it difficult afterwards to shake him off. Now there is a disposition almost universal among writers and readers to side with an individual, especially an eminent individual, against the multitude. Accordingly those who under such circumstances suspect the probable abuse of an exalted position, are denounced as if they harboured an unworthy jealousy of superior abilities; but the truth is, that the largest analogies of the Grecian character justified that suspicion, and required the community to take precautions against the corrupting effects of their own enthusiasm. There is no feature which more largely pervades the impressible Grecian character, than a liability to be intoxicated and demoralised by success: there was no fault from which so few eminent Greeks were free: there was hardly any danger, against which it was at once so necessary and so difficult for the Grecian governments to take security—especially the democracies, where the manifestations of enthusiasm were always the loudest. Such is the real explanation of those charges which have been urged against the Grecian democracies, that they came to hate and ill-treat previous benefactors. The history of Miltiadês illustrates it in a manner no less pointed than painful.

I have already remarked that the fickleness, which has been so largely imputed to the Athenian democracy in their dealings with him, is nothing more than a reasonable change of opinion on the best grounds: nor can it be said that fickleness was in any case an attribute of the Athenian democracy.

It is a well-known fact, that feelings, or opinions, or modes of judging, which have once obtained footing among a large number of people, are more lasting and unchangeable than those which belong only to one or a few; insomuch that the judgements and actions of the many admit of being more clearly understood as to the past, and more certainly predicted as to the future. If we are to predicate any attribute of the multitude, it will rather be that of undue tenacity than undue fickleness. There will occur nothing in the course of this history to prove that the Athenian people changed their opinions, on insufficient grounds, more frequently than an irresponsible one or few would have changed.

But there were two circumstances in the working of the Athenian democracy which imparted to it an appearance of greater fickleness, without the reality:—First, that the manifestations and changes of opinion were all open, undisguised, and noisy: the people gave utterance to their present impression, whatever it was, with perfect frankness; if their opinions were really changed, they had no shame or scruple in avowing it: Secondly—and this is a point of capital importance in the working of democracy generally—the *present* impression, whatever it might be, was not merely undisguised in its manifestations, but also had a tendency to be exaggerated in its intensity. This arose from their habit of treating public affairs in multitudinous assemblages, the well-known effect of which is, to inflame sentiment in every man's bosom by mere contact with a sympathising circle of neighbours. Whatever the sentiment might be, fear, ambition, cupidity, wrath, compassion, piety, patriotic devotion, &c.;¹ and whether well-founded or ill-founded—it was

¹ This is the general truth, which ancient authors often state, both partially, and in exaggerated terms as to degree:—"Hæc est natura multitudinis (says Livy); aut humiliter servit aut superbe dominatur." Again, Tacitus—"Nihil in vulgo modicum; terere, ni paveant; ubi pertimuerint, impune contemni." (Annal. i. 29.) Herodotus, iii. 81. ὁ δὲ δῆμος ἐμπεσὼν τὰ πρῆγματα ἀνευ νοῦ, χειρῶν ποταμῷ ἵκελος.

It is remarkable that Aristotle, in his

Politics, takes little or no notice of this attribute belonging to every numerous assembly. He seems rather to reason as if the aggregate intelligence of the multitude was represented by the sum total of each man's separate intelligence in all the individuals composing it (Polit. iii. 6, 4, 10, 12), just as the property of the multitude, taken collectively, would be greater than that of the few rich. He takes no notice of the difference between a number of individuals judging jointly and judging

constantly influenced more or less by such intensifying cause. This is a defect which of course belongs in a certain degree to all exercise of power by numerous bodies, even though they be representative bodies—especially when the character of the people, instead of being comparatively sedate and slow to move, like the English, is quick, impressible, and fiery, like Greeks or Italians; but it operated far more powerfully on the self-acting *Dêmos* assembled in the *Pnyx*. It was in fact the constitutional malady of the democracy, of which the people were themselves perfectly sensible—as I shall show hereafter from the securities which they tried to provide against it—but which no securities could ever wholly eradicate. Frequency of public assemblies, far from aggravating the evil, had a tendency to lighten it. The people thus became accustomed to hear and balance many different views as a preliminary to ultimate judgement; they contracted personal interest and esteem for a numerous class of dissentient speakers; and they even acquired a certain practical consciousness of their own liability to error. Moreover the diffusion of habits of public speaking, by means of the sophists and the rhetors, whom it has been so much the custom to disparage, tended in the same direction—to break the unity of sentiment among the listening crowd, to multiply separate judgements, and to neutralise the contagion of mere sympathising impulse. There were important deductions, still farther assisted by the superior taste and intelligence of the Athenian people: but still the inherent malady remained—excessive and misleading intensity of present sentiment. It was this which gave such inestimable value to the ascendancy of *Periklês*, as depicted by *Thucydidês*: his hold on the people was so firm, that he could always speak with effect against excess of the reigning tone of feeling. “When *Periklês* (says the historian) saw the people in a state of unreasonable and insolent confidence, he spoke so as to cow them into alarm; when again they were in groundless terror, he combated it, and brought them back to confidence.”¹ We shall find

separately: I do not indeed observe that such omission leads him into any positive mistake, but it occurs in some cases calculated to surprise us, and where the difference here adverted to is

important to notice; see *Politic.* iii. 10, 5, 6.

¹ *Thucyd.* ii. 65. “ὅποτε γοῦν ἀλσθητόν τι αὐτοὺς κατὰ καιρὸν ὑβρεῖ θαρσύντας, λόγων κατέκλυσεν πάλιν ἐπὶ τὸ φοβεῖ-

Dêmosthenês, with far inferior ascendancy, employed in the same honourable task. The Athenian people often stood in need of such correction, but unfortunately did not always find statesmen, at once friendly and commanding, to administer it.

These two attributes, then, belonged to the Athenian democracy; first, their sentiments of every kind were manifested loudly and openly; next, their sentiments tended to a pitch of great present intensity. Of course, therefore, when they changed, the change of sentiment stood prominent and forced itself upon every one's notice—being a transition from one strong sentiment past to another strong sentiment present.¹ And it was because such alterations, when they did take place, stood out so palpably to remark, that the Athenian people have drawn upon themselves the imputation of fickleness: for it is not at all true (I repeat) that changes of sentiment were more frequently produced in them by frivolous or insufficient causes, than changes of sentiment in other governments.

σθαι καὶ δεδιότας αὐτὸν ἀλόγως ἀντικαθίστη
πάλιν ἐπὶ τὸ θαρσεῖν.

¹ Such swing of the mind, from one intense feeling to another, is always deprecated by the Greek moralists, from the earliest to the latest; even Demo-

kritus, in the fifth century B.C., admonishes against it—*Αἱ ἐκ μεγάλων διαστημάτων κινούμεναι τῶν ψυχῶν ὅτε εὐσταθῆες εἰσὶν, ὅτε εὐθυμοί.* (Democriti Fragmenta, lib. iii. p. 168, ed. Mullach ap. Stobæum, Florileg. i. 40).

CHAPTER XXXVII.

IONIC PHILOSOPHERS.—PYTHAGORAS.—KROTON AND SYBARIS.

THE history of the powerful Grecian cities in Italy and Sicily, between the accession of Peisistratus and the battle of Marathon, is for the most part unknown to us. Phalaris, despot of Agrigentum in Sicily, made for himself an unenviable name during this obscure interval. His reign seems to coincide in time with the earlier part of the rule of Peisistratus (about 560-540 B.C.), and the few and vague statements, which we find respecting it,¹ merely show us that it was a period of extortion and cruelty, even beyond the ordinary licence of Grecian despots. The reality of the hollow bull of brass, which Phalaris was accustomed to heat in order to shut up his victims in it and burn them, appears to be better authenticated than the nature of the story would lead us to presume. For it is not only noticed by Pindar, but even the actual instrument of this torture—the brazen bull itself²—which had been taken away from Agrigentum as a trophy by the Carthaginians when they captured the town, was restored by the Romans, on the subjugation of

Phalaris
despot of
Agrigentum.

¹ The letters of Bentley against Boyle, discussing the pretended Epistles of Phalaris—full of acuteness and learning though beyond measure excursive—are quite sufficient to teach us that little can be safely asserted about Phalaris. His date is very imperfectly ascertained. Compare Bentley, p. 82, 83, and Seyfert, *Akragas und sein Gebiet*, p. 60: the latter assigns the reign of Phalaris to the years 570-554 B.C. It is surprising to see Seyfert citing the letters of the pseudo-Phalaris as an authority, after the exposure of Bentley.

² Pindar. *Pyth.* 1 *ad fin.* with the Scholia, p. 310, ed. Boeckh; Polyb. xii. 25; Diodor. xiii. 99; Cicero cont. Verr. iv. 33. The contradiction of Ti-

mæus is noway sufficient to make us doubt the authenticity of the story. Ebert (*Σικελίων*), part ii. p. 41-84. Königsberg, 1829) collects all the authorities about the bull of Phalaris. He believes the matter of fact substantially. Aristotle (*Rhetoric*, ii. 20) tells a story of the fable whereby Stésichorus the poet dissuaded the inhabitants of Himera from granting a guard to Phalaris: Conon (*Narrat.* 42 ap. Photium) recounts the same story with the name of Hiero substituted for that of Phalaris. But it is not likely that either the one or the other could ever have been in such relations with the citizens of *Himera*. Compare Polybius, vii. 7, 2.

Carthage, to its original domicile. Phalaris is said to have acquired the supreme command by undertaking the task of building a great temple¹ to Zeus Polieus on the citadel rock; a pretence, whereby he was enabled to assemble and arm a number of workmen and devoted partisans, whom he employed, at the festival of the Thesmophoria, to put down the authorities. He afterwards disarmed the citizens by a stratagem, and committed cruelties which rendered him so abhorred, that a sudden rising of the people, headed by Télémachus (ancestor of the subsequent despot Théron), overthrew and slew him. A severe revenge was taken on his partisans after his fall.²

During the interval between 540-500 B.C., events of much importance occurred among the Italian Greeks—especially at Kroton and Sybaris—events, unhappily, very imperfectly handed down. Between these two periods fall both the war between Sybaris and Kroton, and the career and ascendancy of Pythagoras. In connexion with this latter name, it will be requisite to say a few words respecting the other Grecian philosophers of the sixth century B.C.

I have, in a former chapter, noticed and characterized those distinguished persons called the Seven Wise Men of
 Thalès. Greece, whose celebrity falls in the first half of this century—men not so much marked by scientific genius as by practical sagacity and foresight in the appreciation of worldly affairs, and enjoying a high degree of political respect from their fellow-citizens. One of them, however, the Milesian Thalès, claims our notice, not only on this ground, but also as the earliest known name in the long line of Greek scientific investigators. His life, nearly contemporary with that of Solon, belongs seemingly to the interval about 640-550 B.C.: the stories mentioned in Herodotus (perhaps borrowed in part from the Milesian Hekataëus) are sufficient to show that his reputation, for wisdom as well as for science, continued to be very great, even a century after his death, among his fellow-citizens. And he marks an important epoch in the progress of the Greek mind, as having been the first man to depart both in letter and spirit from the Hesiodic Theogony,

¹ Polyæn. v. 1, 1; Cicero de Officiis, ii. 7.

² Plutarch, Philosophand. cum Principibus, c. 3, p. 778.

introducing the conception of substances with their transformations and sequences, in place of that string of persons and quasi-human attributes which had animated the old legendary world. He is the father of what is called the Ionic philosophy, which is considered as lasting from his time down to that of Sokratès. Writers ancient as well as modern have professed to trace a succession of philosophers, each one the pupil of the preceding, between these two extreme epochs. But the appellation is in truth undefined and even incorrect, since nothing entitled to the name of a school, or sect, or succession (like that of the Pythagoreans, to be noticed presently) can be made out. There is indeed a certain general analogy in the philosophical vein of Thalès, Hippo, Anaximèné, and Diogènès of Apollonia, whereby they all stand distinguished from Xenophanès of Elea, and his successors the Eleatic dialecticians Parmenidès and Zéno; but there are also material differences between their respective doctrines—no two of them holding the same. And if we look to Anaximander (the person next in order of time to Thalès), as well as to Herakleitus, we find them departing in a great degree even from that character which all the rest have in common, though both the one and the other are usually enrolled in the list of Ionic philosophers.

Ionic philosophers—not a school or succession.

Of the old legendary and polytheistic conception of nature, which Thalès partially discarded, we may remark that it is a state of the human mind in which the problems suggesting themselves to be solved, and the machinery for solving them, bear a fair proportion one to the other. If the problems be vast, indeterminate, confused, and derived rather from the hopes, fears, love, hatred, astonishment, &c., of men, than from any genuine desire of knowledge—so also does the received belief supply invisible agents in unlimited number and with every variety of power and inclination. The means of explanation are thus multiplied and diversified as readily as the phænomena to be explained. Though no event or state which has not yet occurred can be predicted, there is little difficulty in rendering a plausible account of every thing which has occurred in the past—of any and all things alike. Cosmogony, and the prior ages of the world, were conceived as a sort of personal

Step in philosophy commenced by Thalès.

history with intermarriages, filiation, quarrels, and other adventures, of these invisible agents; among whom some one or more were assumed as unbegotten and self-existent—the latter assumption being a difficulty common to all systems of cosmogony, and from which even this flexible and expansive hypothesis is not exempt. Now when Thalès disengaged Grecian philosophy from the old mode of explanation, he did not at the same time disengage it from the old problems and matters propounded for inquiry. These he retained, and transmitted to his successors, as vague and vast as they were at first conceived; and so they remained, though with some transformations and modifications, together with many new questions equally insoluble, substantially present to the Greeks throughout their whole history, as the legitimate problems for philosophical investigation. But these problems, adapted only to the old elastic system of polytheistic explanation and omnipresent personal agency, became utterly disproportioned to any impersonal hypotheses such as those of Thalès and the philosophers after him—whether assumed physical laws, or plausible moral and metaphysical dogmas, open to argumentative attack, and of course requiring the like defence. To treat the visible world as a whole, and inquire when and how it began, as well as into all its past changes—to discuss the first origin of men, animals, plants, the sun, the stars, &c.—to assign some comprehensive reason, why motion or change in general took place in the universe—to investigate the destinies of the human race, and to lay down some systematic relation between them and the gods—all these were topics admitting of being conceived in many different ways, and set forth with eloquent plausibility; but not reducible to any solution resting on scientific evidence or commanding steady adherence under a free scrutiny.¹

At the time when the power of scientific investigation was scanty and helpless, the problems proposed were thus such

¹ The less these problems are adapted for rational solution, the more nobly do they present themselves in the language of a great poet: see as a specimen, Euripidēs, Fragment 101, ed Dindorf.

Ὀλβιος ὅστις τῆς ἱστορίας
ἔσχε μῆσιν, μῆτε πολίων

Ἐκὶ πημοσύνη, μὲν' εἰς ἀδίκους
Πράξεις ὁρμῶν·
Ἄλλ' ἀθανάτου καθαρῶν φύσεως
Κόσμον ἀγῶνι, πῇ τε συνίστη
καὶ ὅση καὶ ὅσω.
Τοῖς δὲ τοιοῦτοις οὐδέποτε' αἰσχρῶν
Ἔργων μελέτημα προσίζει.

as to lie out of the reach of science in its largest compass. Gradually indeed subjects more special and limited, and upon which experience or deductions from experience could be brought to bear, were added to the list of *quæsitæ*, and examined with profit and instruction. But the old problems, with new ones alike unfathomable, were never eliminated, and always occupied a prominent place in the philosophical world. Now it was this disproportion, between questions to be solved and means of solution, which gave rise to that conspicuous characteristic of Grecian philosophy—the antagonist force of suspensive scepticism, passing in some minds into a broad negation of the attainability of general truth—which it nourished from its beginning to its end; commencing as early as Xenophanês, continuing to manifest itself seven centuries afterwards in *Ænecidêmus* and *Sextus Empiricus*, and including in the interval between these two extremes some of the most powerful intellects in Greece. The present is not the time for considering these Sceptics, who bear an unpopular name, and have not often been fairly appreciated; the more so, as it often suited the purpose of men themselves more than half sceptical, like *Sokratês* and *Plato*, to denounce professed scepticism with indignation. But it is essential to bring them into notice at the first spring of Grecian philosophy under *Thalês*, because the circumstances were then laid which so soon afterwards developed them.

One cause of the vein of scepticism which runs through Grecian philosophy.

Though the celebrity of *Thalês* in antiquity was great and universal, scarcely any distinct facts were known respecting him: it is certain that he left nothing in writing. Extensive travels in Egypt and Asia are ascribed to him, and as a general fact these travels are doubtless true, since no other means of acquiring knowledge were then open. At a time when the brother of the Lesbian *Alkæus* was serving in the Babylonian army, we may well conceive than an inquisitive Milesian would make his way to that wonderful city wherein stood the temple-observatory of the Chaldæan priesthood. How great his reputation was in his lifetime, the admiration expressed by his younger contemporary *Xenophanês* assures us; and *Herakleitus*, in the next generation, a severe judge of all other philosophers, spoke of him with similar esteem. To him were traced by the Grecian inquirers of the fourth

century B.C., the first beginnings of geometry, astronomy, and physiology in its large and really appropriate sense, the scientific study of nature : for the Greek word denoting nature (*φύσις*) first comes into comprehensive use about this time (as I have remarked in an earlier chapter¹) with its derivatives *physics* and *physiology*, as distinguished from the *theology* of the old poets. Little stress can be laid on those elementary propositions in geometry which are specified as discovered, or as first demonstrated, by Thalês—still less upon the solar eclipse respecting which (according to Herodotus) he determined beforehand the year of occurrence.² But the main doctrine of his physiology (using that word in its larger Greek sense) is distinctly attested. He stripped Oceanus and Tethys, primæval parents of the gods in the Homeric theogony, of their personality and laid down water, or fluid substance, as the single original element from which everything came and into which everything returned.³ The doctrine of one eternal element, remaining always the same in its essence, but indefinitely variable in its manifestations to sense, was thus first introduced to the discussion of the Grecian public. We have no means of knowing the reasons by which Thalês supported this opinion, nor could even Aristotle do more than conjecture what they might have been ; but one of the statements urged on behalf of it—that the earth itself rested on water⁴—we may safely refer to the Milesian himself, for it would hardly have been advanced at a later age. Moreover Thalês is reported to have held, that everything was living and full of gods ; and that the magnet, especially, was a living thing. Thus the gods, as far as we can pretend to follow opinions so very faintly transmitted, are conceived as active powers, and causes of changeful manifestation, attached to the primæval substance ;⁵ the universe being assimilated to an organized body or system.

Respecting Hippo—who reproduced the theory of Thalês

¹ Vol. i. ch. xvi.

² Diogen. Laërt. i. 23 ; Herodot. i. 75 ; Apuleius, Florid. iv. p. 144, Bip.

Proclus, in his Commentary on Euclid, specifies several propositions said to have been discovered by Thalês (Brandis, Handbuch der Gr. Philos. ch. xxviii. p. 11).

³ Aristotel. Metaphys. i. 3 ; Plutarch, Placit. Philos. i. 3, p. 875. *ὅς ἐξ ὕδατος φησὶ πάντα εἶναι, καὶ εἰς ὕδωρ πάντα ἀναλίσθαι.*

⁴ Aristotel. *ut supra*, and De Cælo, ii. 13.

⁵ Aristotel. De Animâ, i. 2-5 ; Cicero, De Legg. ii. 11 ; Diogen. Laërt. i. 24.

with some degree of generalization, substituting, in place of water, moisture, or something common to air and water¹—we do not know whether he belonged to the sixth or the fifth century B.C.: but both Anaximander, Xenophanēs, and Pherekydēs belong to the latter half of the sixth century. Anaximander the son of Praxiadēs was a native of Milētus—Xenophanēs, a native of Kolophōn: the former among the earliest expositors of doctrine in prose,² while the latter committed his opinions to the old medium of verse. Anaximander seems to have taken up the philosophical problem, while he materially altered the hypothesis, of his predecessor Thalēs. Instead of the primæval fluid of the latter, he supposed a primæval principle, without any actual determining qualities whatever, but including all qualities potentially, and manifesting them in an infinite variety from its continually self-changing nature—a principle, which was nothing in itself, yet had the capacity of producing any and all manifestations, however contrary to each other³—a primæval something, whose essence it was to be eternally productive of different phænomena—a sort of mathematical point, which counts for nothing in itself, but is vigorous in generating lines to any extent that may be desired. In this manner Anaximander professed to give a comprehensive explanation of change in general, or Generation or Destruction

Anaxi-
mander.

¹ Aristotel. De Animâ, i. 2; Alexander Aphrodis. in Aristotel. Metaphys.

i. 3.
² Apollodorus, in the second century B.C., had before him some brief expository treatises of Anaximander (Diogen. Laërt. ii. 2): *Περὶ φύσεως, τῆς Περιόδου, Περὶ τῶν Ἀστανῶν καὶ Σφαίρων καὶ ἄλλα τινά*. Suidas, v. *Ἀναξίμανδρος*. Theophrastus, *Orat.* xxv. p. 317: *ἐθάβησε πρῶτος ὃν ἴσμεν Ἑλλάνων λόγον ἐξεργασθεῖν περὶ φύσεως συγγεγραμμένον*.

³ Irenæus, ii. 19 (14), ap. Brandis, *Handbuch der Geschichte der Griech. Röm. Philos.* ch. xxxv. p. 133: "Anaximander hoc quod immensum est, omnium initium subiecit, seminaliter habens in semetipso omnium genesin, ex quo immensos mundos constare ait." Aristotel. *Physic.* *Auscult.* iii. 4, p. 203 Bek. *οὕτε γὰρ μάτην αὐτὸ οἶόν τε εἶναι (τὸ ἀπειρον), οὕτε ἄλλην ὑπάρχειν αὐτῷ δύναμιν, πλὴν ὡς ἀρχήν*. Aristotle sub-

jects this ἀπειρον to an elaborate discussion, in which he says very little more about Anaximander, who appears to have assumed it without anticipating discussion or objections. Whether Anaximander called his ἀπειρον divine, or god, as Tennemann (*Gesch. d. Philos.* i. 2, p. 67) and Panzerbieter affirm (ad Diogenis Apolloniat. *Fragment.* c. 13, p. 16), I think doubtful: this is rather an inference which Aristotle elicits from his language. Yet in another passage, which is difficult to reconcile, Aristotle ascribes to Anaximander, the water-doctrine of Thalēs (Aristotel. de Xenophane, p. 975, (Bek)).

Anaximander seems to have followed speculations analogous to that of Thalēs in explaining the first production of the human race (Plutarch. *Placit. Philos.* v. 19, p. 908), and in other matters (*ibid.* iii. 16, p. 896).

—how it happened that one sensible thing began and another ceased to exist—according to the vague problems which these early inquirers were in the habit of setting to themselves.¹ He avoided that which the first philosophers especially dreaded, the affirmation that generation could take place out of Nothing; yet the primæval Something which he supposed was only distinguished from Nothing by possessing this power of generation. In his theory he passed from the province of physics into that of metaphysics. He first introduced into Grecian philosophy that important word which signifies a Beginning or a Principle,² and first opened that metaphysical discussion, which was carried on in various ways throughout the whole period of Grecian philosophy, as to the One and the Many—the Continuous and the Variable—that which exists eternally, as distinguished from that which comes and passes away in ever-changing manifestations. His physiology or explanation of Nature thus conducted the mind into a different route from that suggested by the hypothesis of Thalês, which was built upon physical considerations, and was therefore calculated to suggest and stimulate observations of physical phænomena for the purpose of verifying or confuting it—while the hypothesis of Anaximander admitted only of being discussed dialectically, or by reasonings expressed in general language; reasonings, sometimes indeed referring to experience for the purpose of illustration, but seldom resting on it—and never looking out for it as a necessary support. The physical explanation of nature, however, once introduced by Thalês, although deserted by Anaximander, was taken up by Anaximénès and others afterwards, and reproduced with many divergences of doctrine—yet always more or less entangled and perplexed with metaphysical additions, since the two departments were never clearly parted throughout all Grecian philosophy.

Of these subsequent physical philosophers I shall speak hereafter: at present I confine myself to the thinkers of the sixth century B.C., among whom Anaximander stands pro-

¹ Aristotel. De Generat. et Destruct. c. 3, p. 317, Bek. ὁ μάλιστα φοβούμενοι διεκτείναν οἱ πρῶτοι φιλοσοφῆσαντες, τὸ ἐκ μηδενὸς γίνεσθαι προὔτάρχοντος: com-

pare Physic. Auscultat. i. 4, p. 187, Bek.

² Simplicius in Aristotel. Physic. fol. 6, 32. πρῶτος αὐτὸς Ἀρχὴν ὀνομάσας τὸ ὑποκείμενον.

minent, not as the follower of Thalês, but as the author of an hypothesis both new and tending in a different direction. It was not merely as the author of this hypothesis, however, that Anaximander enlarged the Greek mind and roused the powers of thought: we find him also mentioned as distinguished in astronomy and geometry. He is said to have been the first to establish a sun-dial in Greece, to construct a sphere, and to explain the obliquity of the ecliptic;¹ how far such alleged authorship really belongs to him, we cannot be certain—but there is one step of immense importance which he is clearly affirmed to have made. He was the first to compose a treatise on the geography of the land and sea within his cognizance, and to construct a chart or map founded thereupon—seemingly a tablet of brass. Such a novelty, wondrous even to the rude and ignorant, was calculated to stimulate powerfully inquisitive minds, and from it may be dated the commencement of Grecian rational geography—not the least valuable among the contributions of this people to the stock of human knowledge.

Xenophanês of Kolophon, somewhat younger than Anaximander, and nearly contemporary with Pythagoras (seemingly from about 570-480 B.C.), migrated from Kolophon² to Zanklê and Katana in Sicily and Elea in Italy, soon after the time when Ionia became subject to the Persians (540-530 B.C.). He was the founder of what is called the Eleatic school of philosophers—a real school, since it appears that Parmenidês, Zeno, and Melissus, pursued and developed, in a great degree, the train of speculation which had been begun by Xenophanês—doubtless with additions and variations of their own, but especially with a dialectic power which belongs to the age of Periklês, and is unknown in the sixth century B.C. He was the author of more than one poem of considerable length, one on the foundation of Kolophon and another on that of Elea; besides his poem on Nature, wherein his philosophical doctrines were set forth.³ His manner appears to have been controversial and full of asperity towards antagonists. But what is most

Xenophanês—his doctrine the opposite of that of Anaximander.

¹ Diogen. Laërt. ii. 81, 2. He agreed with Thalês in maintaining that the earth was stationary (Aristotel. de Cœlo, ii. 13, p. 295, ed. Bekk.).

² Diogen. Laërt. ix. 18.

³ Diogen. Laërt. ix. 22; Stobæus, Eclog. Phys. i. p. 294.

remarkable is the plain-spoken manner in which he declared himself against the popular religion, and in which he denounced as abominable the descriptions of the gods given by Homer and Hesiod.¹ He is said to have controverted the doctrines both of Thalês and Pythagoras: this is probable enough; but he seems to have taken his start from the philosophy of Anaximander—not however to adopt it, but to reverse it—and to set forth an opinion which we may call its contrary. Nature, in the conception of Anaximander, consisted of a Something having no other attribute except the unlimited power of generating and cancelling phænomenal changes: in this doctrine the Something or Substratum existed only in and for those changes, and could not be said to exist at all in any other sense: the Permanent was thus merged and lost in the Variable—the One in the Many. Xenophanês laid down the exact opposite: he conceived Nature as one unchangeable and indivisible Whole, spherical, animated, endued with reason, and penetrated by or indeed identical with God. He denied the objective reality of all change, or generation, or destruction, which he seems to have considered as only changes or modifications in the percipient, and perhaps different in one percipient and another. That which exists (he maintained) could not have been generated, nor could it ever be destroyed: there was neither real generation nor real destruction of anything; but that which men took for such was the change in their own feelings and ideas. He thus recognised the Permanent without the Variable²—the One without the Many. And his treatment of the received religious creed was in harmony with such physical or metaphysical hypothesis; for while he held the whole of nature to

¹ Sextus Empiricus, adv. Mathem. ix. 193.

² Aristot. Metaphys. i. 5, p. 986, Bek. Ξενοφάνης δὲ πρῶτος τούτων ἐνίστασ, οὐδὲν διεσαφηνίσειεν, οὐδὲ τῆς φύσεως τούτων (τοῦ κατὰ τὸν λόγον ἐνδὲ καὶ τοῦ κατὰ τὴν ὕλην) οὐδετέρας εἴκοιε θιγεῖν, ἀλλ' εἰς τὸν δλον οὐρανὸν ἀποβλέψας τὸ ἐν εἶναί φησι τὸν θεόν.

Plutarch. ap. Eusebium Præparat. Evangel. i. 8. Ξενοφάνης γὰρ ὁ Κολοφώνιος ἰδὼν μὲν τινα ὁδὸν πεπορευμένους καὶ παρηλαχυῖαν πάντας τοὺς προειρημένους, οὕτε γένεσιν οὕτε φθορὰν ἀπολείπει, ἀλλ' εἶναι

λέγει τὸ πᾶν αἰεὶ ὅμοιον. Compare Timon ap. Sext. Empiric. Pyrrh. Hypotyp. i. 224, 225. ἐδογματίσκει δὲ ὁ Ξενοφάνης παρὰ τὰς τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων προλήψεις, ἐν εἶναι τὸ πᾶν, καὶ τὸν θεὸν συμφυῆ τοῖς πᾶσιν εἶναι δὲ σφαιροειδῆ καὶ ἀπαθῆ καὶ ἀμετέβλητον καὶ λογικόν (Aristot. de Xenoph. c. 3, p. 977, Bek.). 'Ἀδύνατόν φησιν (ὁ Ξενοφάνης) εἶναι, εἴ τι ἐστίν, γενέσθαι, &c.

One may reasonably doubt whether all the arguments ascribed to Xenophanês in the short but obscure treatise last quoted really belong to him.

be God, without parts or change, he at the same time pronounced the popular gods to be entities of subjective fancy, imagined by men after their own model: if oxen or lions were to become religious (he added), they would in like manner provide for themselves gods after their respective shapes and characters.¹ This hypothesis, which seemed to set aside altogether the study of the sensible world as a source of knowledge, was expounded briefly, and, as it should seem, obscurely and rudely, by Xenophanês; at least we may infer thus much from the slighting epithet applied to him by Aristotle.² But his successors, Parmenidês and Zeno, in the succeeding century, expanded it considerably, supported it with extraordinary acuteness of dialectics, and even superadded a second part, in which the phænomena of sense—though considered only as appearances, not partaking in the reality of the One Ens—were yet explained by a new physical hypothesis; so that they will be found to exercise great influence over the speculations both of Plato and Aristotle. We discover in Xenophanês, moreover, a vein of scepticism, and a mournful despair as to the attainability of certain knowledge,³ which the nature of his philosophy was well-calculated to suggest, and in which the sillograph Timon of the third century B.C., who seems to have spoken of Xenophanês better than of most of the other philosophers, powerfully sympathised.

The Eleatic school, Parmenidês and Zeno, springing from Xenophanês—their dialectics—their great influence on Grecian speculation.

The cosmogony of Pherekydês of Syrus, contemporary of Anaximander and among the teachers of Pythagoras, seems, according to the fragments preserved, a combination of the old legendary fancies with Orphic mysticism,⁴ and probably exercised little influence over the subsequent course of Grecian philosophy. By what has been said of Thalês, Anaximander, and Xenophanês, it will be seen that the sixth century B.C. witnessed the opening of several of those roads of intellectual speculation which the

Pherekydês.

¹ Clemens Alexand. Stromat. v. p. 601, vii. p. 711.

² Aristot. Metaphysic. i. 5, p. 986, Bek. μικρὸν ἀγροικότερος.

³ Xenophanês, Fr. xiv. ed. Mullach; Sextus Empiric. adv. Mathematicos,

vii. 49-110; and Pyrrhon. Hypotyp. i. 224; Plutarch adv. Colôtên. p. 1114: compare Karsten ad Parmenidis Fragmenta, p. 146.

⁴ See Brandis, Handbuch der Griech. Röm. Philosophie, ch. xxii.

later philosophers pursued farther, or at least from which they branched off. Before the year 500 B.C. many interesting questions were thus brought into discussion, which Solon, who died about 558 B.C., had never heard of—just as he may probably never have seen the map of Anaximander. But neither of these two distinguished men—Anaximander or Xenophanês—was anything more than a speculative inquirer. The third eminent name of this century, of whom I am now about to speak—Pythagoras, combined in his character disparate elements which require rather a longer development.

Pythagoras was founder of a brotherhood, originally brought together by a religious influence, and with observances approaching to monastic peculiarity—working in a direction at once religious, political, and scientific, and exercising for some time a real political ascendancy,—but afterwards banished from government and state affairs into a sectarian privacy with scientific pursuits, not without however still producing some statesmen individually distinguished. Amidst the multitude of false and apocryphal statements which circulated in antiquity respecting this celebrated man, we find a few important facts reasonably attested and deserving credence.

History of
Pythagoras. He was a native of Samos,¹ son of an opulent merchant named Mnêsarchus,—or, according to some of his later and more fervent admirers, of Apollo: born as far as we can make out, about the fiftieth Olympiad, or 580 B.C. On the many marvels recounted respecting his youth it is unnecessary to dwell. Among them may be numbered his wide-reaching travels, said to have been prolonged for nearly thirty years, to visit the Arabians, the Syrians, the Phenicians, the Chaldæans, the Indians, and the Gallic Druids. But there is reason to believe that he really visited Egypt²—perhaps also Phenicia and Babylon,

¹ Herodot. iv. 95. The place of his nativity is certain from Herodotus, but even this fact was differently stated by other authors, who called him a Tyrrhenian of Lemnos or Imbros (Porphyry, Vit. Pythag. c. 1-10), a Syrian, a Phili-Asian, &c.

Cicero (De Repub. ii. 15: compare Livy, i. 18) censures the chronological blunder of those who made Pythagoras the preceptor of Numa; which cer-

tainly is a remarkable illustration how much confusion prevailed among literary men of antiquity about the dates of events even of the sixth century B.C. Ovid follows this story without hesitation: see Metamorph. xv. 60, with Burmann's note.

² Cicero de Fin. v. 29; Diogen. Laërt. viii. 3; Strabo, xiv. p. 638; Alexander Polyhistor ap. Cyril. cont. Julian. iv. p. 128, ed. Spanh. (For the

then Chaldæan and independent. At the time when he saw Egypt, between 560-540 B.C., about one century earlier than Herodotus, it was under Amasis, the last of its own kings, with its peculiar native character yet unimpaired by foreign conquest, and only slightly modified by the admission during the preceding century of Grecian mercenary troops and traders. The spectacle of Egyptian habits, the conversation of the priests, and the initiation into various mysteries or secret rites and stories not accessible to the general public, may very naturally have impressed the mind of Pythagoras, and given him that turn for mystic observance, asceticism, and peculiarity of diet and clothing, which manifested itself from the same cause among several of his contemporaries, but which was not a common phænomenon in the primitive Greek religion. Besides visiting Egypt, Pythagoras is also said to have profited by the teaching of Thalès, of Anaximander, and of Pherekydès of Syros:¹ amidst the towns of Ionia he would moreover have an opportunity of conversing with many Greek navigators who had visited foreign countries, especially Italy and Sicily. His mind seems to have been acted upon and impelled by this combined stimulus,—partly towards an imaginative and religious vein of speculation, with a life of mystic observance,—partly towards that active exercise, both of mind and body, which the genius of an Hellenic community so naturally tended to suggest.

Of the personal doctrines or opinions of Pythagoras, whom we must distinguish from Philolaus and the subsequent Pythagoreans, we have little certain knowledge, though doubtless the first germ of their geometry, arithmetic, astronomy, &c., must have proceeded from him. But that he believed in the metempsychosis or transmigration of the souls of deceased men into other men as well as into animals, we know, not only by other evidence, but also by the testimony of his contemporary, the philosopher Xenophanès of Elea. Pythagoras, seeing a dog beaten and hearing him howl, desired the striker to desist, saying—"It is the soul of

His character and doctrines.

vast reach of his supposed travels, see Porphyry, *Vit. Pythag.* 11; *Jamblic.* 14, *seqq.*

The same extensive journeys are ascribed to Démokritus, *Diogen. Laërt.*

ix. 35.

¹ The connexion of Pythagoras with Pherekydès is noticed by Aristoxenus, *ap. Diogen. Laërt.* i. 118, viii. 2; Cicero *de Divinat.* i. 13.

a friend of mine, whom I recognised by his voice." This—together with the general testimony of Hērakleitus, that Pythagoras was a man of extensive research and acquired instruction, but artful for mischief and destitute of sound judgement—is all that we know about him from contemporaries. Herodotus, two generations afterwards, while he conceives the Pythagoreans as a peculiar religious order, intimates that both Orpheus and Pythagoras had derived the doctrine of the metempsychosis from Egypt, but had pretended to it as their own without acknowledgement.¹ Pythagoras combines the character of a sophist (a man of large observation, and clever, ascendent, inventive mind—the original sense of the word Sophist, prior to the polemics of the Platonic school, and the only sense known to Herodotus),² with that of an inspired teacher, prophet, and worker of miracles,—approaching to and sometimes even confounded with the gods,—and employing all these gifts to found a new special order of brethren bound together by religious rites and observances peculiar to

¹ Xenophanēs, *Fragm.* 7, ed. Schneidewin; *Diogen. Laërt.* viii. 36: compare *Aulus Gellius*, iv. 11 (we must remark that this or a like doctrine is not peculiar to Pythagoreans, but believed by the poet Pindar, *Olymp.* ii. 68, and *Fragment*, *Thren.* x., as well as by the philosopher Pherekydēs, *Porphyrus de Antro Nympharum*, c. 31).

Καί ποτέ μιν στυφελίζομένου σκύλακος παρόντα
Φασίν ἐπαικίσταται, καὶ τόδε φάσθαι ἔπος—
Παῖδον, μὲν ῥά πῃς· ἡκεῖ φίλον ἄνθρωπος ἔστι
Τυχὴ, τὴν ἔγνων φθεγγόμενός αἶψα.

Consult also *Sextus Empiricus*, viii. 286, as to the *κοινωνία* between gods, men, and animals, believed both by Pythagoras and Empedoklēs. That *Herodotus* (ii. 123) alludes to Orpheus and Pythagoras, though refraining designedly from mentioning names, there can hardly be any doubt: compare ii. 81; also *Aristotle*, *de Animā*, i. 3, 23.

The testimony of Hērakleitus is contained in *Diogenes Laërtius*, viii. 6, ix. 1. Ἡρακλείτους γοῦν ὁ φυσικὸς μανθονυχὶ κέρραγε καὶ φησὶ Πυθαγόρης Μησαόρχου ἱστορίην ἥσκησεν ἀνθρώπων μάλιστα πάντων, καὶ ἐκλεξάμενος ταύτας τὰς συγγραφαί, ἐποίησάτο ἑαυτοῦ σοφίην, πολυμαθίην, κακοτεχνίην. Again, Πολυμαθίῃ νόον οὐ διδάσκει· Ἡσίοδον γὰρ ἂν εἰδίδαι καὶ Πυθαγόρην, αὐτὸς δὲ Ξενο-

φάρεδ τε καὶ Ἑκταῖον.

Dr. Thirlwall conceives *Xenophanēs* as having intended in the passage above cited to treat the doctrine of the metempsychosis "with deserved ridicule" (*Hist. of Greece*, ch. xii. vol. ii. p. 162). Religious opinions are so apt to appear ridiculous to those who do not believe them, that such a suspicion is not unnatural; yet I think, if *Xenophanēs* had been so disposed, he would have found more ridiculous examples among the many which this doctrine might suggest. Indeed it seems hardly possible to present the metempsychosis in a more touching or respectable point of view than that which the lines of his poem set forth. The particular animal selected is that one between whom and man the sympathy is most marked and reciprocal, while the doctrine is made to enforce a practical lesson against cruelty.

² *Herodot.* i. 29, ii. 49, iv. 95. Ἑλλήνων οὐ τῷ ἀσθενεστάτῳ σοφιστῇ Πυθαγόρῃ. *Hippokratēs* distinguishes the *σοφιστῆς* from the *ἱητὴς*, though both of them had handled the subject of medicine—the special from the general habits of investigation. (*Hippokratēs*, *Περὶ ἀρχαίας ἱητρικῆς*, c. 20, vol. i. p. 620, *Litttré*.)

themselves. In his prominent vocation, analogous to that of Epimenidês, Orpheus, or Melampus, he appears as the revealer of a mode of life calculated to raise his disciples above the level of mankind, and to recommend them to the favour of the gods; the Pythagorean life, like the Orphic life,¹ being intended as the exclusive prerogative of the brotherhood—approached only by probation and initiatory ceremonies, which were adapted to select enthusiasts rather than to an indiscriminate crowd—and exacting entire mental devotion to the master.² In these lofty pretensions the Agrigentine Empedoklês seems to have greatly copied him, though with some varieties, about half a century afterwards.³ While Aristotle tells us that the Krotoniates identified Pythagoras with the Hyperborean Apollo, the satirical Timon pronounced him to have been “a juggler of solemn speech, engaged in fishing for men.”⁴ This is the same character, looked at from the different points of view of the believer and the unbeliever. There is however no reason for regarding Pythagoras as an impostor, because experience seems to show, that while in certain ages it is not difficult for a man to persuade others that he is inspired, it is still less difficult for him to contract the same belief himself.

Looking at the general type of Pythagoras, as conceived by witnesses in and nearest to his own age—Xenophanês, Hera-
kleitus, Herodotus, Plato, Aristotle, Isokratês⁵ we find in him

¹ See Lobeck's learned and valuable treatise, *Aglaophamus*, *Orphica*, lib. ii. pp. 247, 698, 900; also Plato, *Legg.* vi. 782, and Euripid. *Hippol.* 946.

² Plato's conception of Pythagoras (*Republ.* x. p. 600) depicts him as something not unlike St. Benedict, or St. Francis, (or St. Elias, as some Carmelites have tried to make out: see Kuster ad *Jamblich.* c. 3)—“*Ἀλλὰ δὲ, εἰ μὴ δημοσίᾳ, ἰδίᾳ τοῖς ἡγεμὼν παιδείας αὐτὸς ζῶν λέγεται. Ὀμηρὸς γενέσθαι, οἱ ἐκείνων ἡγάπων ἐπὶ συνοσίᾳ καὶ τοῖς ὅστροις ὁδὸν τινα βίον παρίδουσιν Ὀμηρικὴν ὥσπερ Πυθαγόρας αὐτὸς τε διαφέρνους ἐπὶ τούτῳ ἡγαρήθη, καὶ οἱ ὅσπερ ἐπὶ καὶ νῦν Πυθαγορεῖον τροπὴν ἐπινομάζοντες τοῦ βίου διαφανεῖς πρὸς δοκοῦσιν εἶναι ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις.*”

The description of Melampus given in Herodot. ii. 49, very much fills up the idea of Pythagoras, as derived

from ii. 81-123, and iv. 95. Pythagoras, as well as Melampus, was said to have pretended to divination and prophecy (Cicero, *Divinat.* i. 3, 46; Porphyry, *Vit. Pyth.* c. 29: compare Kische, *De Societate a Pythagorâ in urbe Crotoniatarum conditâ Commentatio*, ch. v. p. 72. Göttingen, 1831).

³ Brandis, *Handbuch der Geschichte der Griechisch. Röm. Philosophie*, part i. sect. xlvii. p. 191.

⁴ *Ælian*, V. H. ii. 26; *Jamblicus*, *Vit. Pyth.* c. 31, 140; *Porphyry*, *Vit. Pyth.* c. 20; *Diodorus*, *Fragm.* lib. x. vol. iv. p. 56, Wess.:—*Timon ap. Diogen. Laërt.* viii. 36; and *Plutarch*, *Numa*, c. 8.

Πυθαγόρην τε γένεσσι ἀποκλίναντ' ἐπὶ δόξαν θάρη ἐπ' ἀνθρώπων, σφραγισσάμενος τῶν.

⁵ *Isokratês*, *Busiris*, p. 402, ed. Auger. *Πυθαγόρας δ' Ἰάμιος, ἀρκεόμενος εἰς Ἀθῆνας, καὶ μαθητὴς τῶν ἱερέων*

chiefly the religious missionary and schoolmaster, with little of the politician. His efficiency in the latter character, originally subordinate, first becomes prominent in those glowing fancies which the later Pythagoreans communicated to Aristoxenus and Dikæarchus. The primitive Pythagoras is inspired by the gods to reveal a new mode of life¹—the Pythagorean life—and to promise divine favour to a select and docile few as the recompense of strict ritual obedience, of austere self-control, and of laborious training, bodily as well as mental. To speak with confidence of the details of his training, ethical or scientific, and of the doctrines which he promulgated, is impossible; for neither he himself nor any of his disciples anterior to Philolaus (who was separated from him by about one intervening generation) left any memorials in writing.² Numbers and lines, studied partly in their own mutual relations, partly under various symbolising fancies, presented themselves to him as the primary constituent elements of the universe, and as a sort of magical key to phænomena, physical as well as moral. Such mathematical tendencies in his teaching, expanded by Pythagoreans his successors, and coinciding partly also (as has been before stated) with the studies of Anaximander and Thalès, acquired more and more development, so as to become one of the most

γενόμενος, τὴν τε ἄλλην φιλοσοφίαν πρῶτος εἰς Ἑλλήνας ἐκόμισε, καὶ τὰ περὶ τὰς θύσας καὶ τὰς ἀγυιέας ἐν τοῖς ἱεροῖς ἐπιφανέστερον τῶν ἄλλων ἐσπούδασε.

Compare Aristotel. Magn. Moralia, i. 1, about Pythagoras as an ethical teacher. Dēmokritos, born about 460 B.C., wrote a treatise (now lost) respecting Pythagoras, whom he greatly admired: as far as we can judge, it would seem that he too must have considered Pythagoras as an ethical teacher (Diogen. Laërt. ix. 38; Mullach, Democriti Fragmenta, lib. ii. p. 113; Cicero de Orator. iii. 15).

¹ Jamblichus, Vit. Pyth. c. 64, 115, 151, 199: see also the idea ascribed to Pythagoras, of divine inspirations coming on men (*ἐκίνοια παρὰ τοῦ δαιμονίου*). Aristoxenus apud Stobæum, Eclog. Physic. p. 206; Diogen. Laërt. viii. 32.

Meiners renders it probable that the stories respecting the miraculous powers and properties of Pythagoras got into

circulation either during his lifetime, or at least not long after his death (Geschichte der Wissenschaften, B. iii. vol. i. pp. 504, 505).

² Respecting Philolaus, see the valuable collection of his fragments, and commentary on them, by Boeckh (Philolaus des Pythagoreers Leben, Berlin, 1819). That Philolaus was the first who composed a work on Pythagorean science, and thus made it known beyond the limits of the brotherhood—among others to Plato—appears well-established (Boeckh, Philolaus, p. 22; Diogen. Laërt. viii. 15-55; Jamblichus, c. 119). Simmias and Kebēs, fellow-disciples of Plato under Sokrates, had held intercourse with Philolaus at Thebes (Plato, Phædon, p. 61), perhaps about 420 B.C. The Pythagorean brotherhood had then been dispersed in various parts of Greece, though the attachment of its members to each other seems to have continued long afterwards.

glorious and profitable manifestations of Grecian intellect. Living as Pythagoras did at a time when the stock of experience was scanty, the licence of hypothesis unbounded, and the process of deduction without rule or verifying test—he was thus fortunate enough to strike into that track of geometry and arithmetic, in which, from data of experience few, simple, and obvious, an immense field of deductive and verifiable investigation may be travelled over. We must at the same time remark, however, that in his mind this track, which now seems so straightforward and well-defined, was clouded by strange fancies which it is not easy to understand, and from which it was but partially cleared by his successors.

Of his spiritual training much is said, though not upon very good authority: we hear of his memorial discipline, his monastic self-scrutiny, his employment of music to soothe disorderly passions,¹ his long novitiate of silence, his knowledge of physiognomy which enabled him to detect even without trial unworthy subjects, his peculiar diet, and his rigid care for sobriety as well as for bodily vigour. He is also said to have inculcated abstinence from animal food; a feeling so naturally connected with the doctrine of the metempsychosis, that we may well believe him to have entertained it, as Empedoklēs also did after him.² It is certain that there were peculiar observances, and probably a certain measure of self-denial, embodied in the Pythagorean life. Yet on the other hand, it seems equally certain that the members of the order cannot have been all subjected to the same diet, or training, or studies; for Milo the Krotoniate was among them,³ the strongest man and the unparalleled

His ethical training—probably not applied to all the members of his order.

¹ Plutarch, *De Isid. et Osirid.* p. 384, ad fin. Quintilian, *Instit. Oratt.* ix. 4.

² Empedoklēs, ap. Aristot. *Rhetoric.* i. 14, 2; Sextus *Empiric.* ix. 127; Plutarch, *De Esu Carnium*, p. 993, 996, 997; where he puts Pythagoras and Empedoklēs together, as having both held the doctrine of the metempsychosis, and both prohibited the eating of animal food. Empedoklēs supposed that plants had souls, and that the souls of human beings passed after death into plants as well as into animals. "I have been myself heretofore (said he) a boy, a girl, a shrub, a bird, and a fish of the sea."

ἦδη γὰρ πρὸς τὸν γένεσιν κοῦρος τε κῆρυξ τε, θάλασσαν ἔ, αἰωρὸς τε καὶ ἐξ ἄλλης ἀνθρώπου ἰχθύος.

(Diogen. L. viii. 77; Sturz. ad Empedokl. *Frag.* p. 466.) Pythagoras is said to have affirmed that he had been not only Euphorbus in the Grecian army before Troy, but also a tradesman, a courtesan, &c., and various other human characters, before his actual existence; he did not however extend the same intercommunion to plants, in any case.

The abstinence from animal food was an Orphic precept as well as a Pythagorean (Aristophan. *Ran.* 1032).

³ Strabo, vi. p. 263; Diog. L. xiii. 40.

wrestler of his age—who cannot possibly have dispensed with animal food and ample diet (even setting aside the tales about his voracious appetite), and is not likely to have bent his attention on speculative study. Probably Pythagoras did not enforce the same bodily or mental discipline on all, or at least knew when to grant dispensations. The order, as it first stood under him, consisted of men different both in temperament and aptitude, but bound together by common religious observances and hopes, common reverence for the master, and mutual attachment as well as pride in each other's success. It must thus be distinguished from the Pythagoreans of the fourth century B.C., who had no communion with wrestlers, and comprised only ascetic, studious men, generally recluse, though in some cases rising to political distinction. The succession of these Pythagoreans, never very numerous, seems to have continued until about 300 B.C., and then nearly died out ; being superseded by other schemes of philosophy more suited to cultivated Greeks of the age after Sokratēs. But during the time of Cicero, two centuries afterwards, the orientalising tendency—then beginning to spread over the Grecian and Roman world, and becoming gradually stronger and stronger—caused the Pythagorean philosophy to be again revived. It was revived, too, with little or none of its scientific tendencies, but with more than its primitive religious and imaginative fanaticism—Apollonius of Tyana constituting himself a living copy of Pythagoras. And thus, while the scientific elements developed by the disciples of Pythagoras had become disjoined from all peculiarity of sect, and passed into the general studious world—the original vein of mystic and ascetic fancy belonging to the master, without any of that practical efficiency of body and mind which had marked his first followers, was taken up anew into the Pagan world, along with the disfigured doctrines of Plato. Neo-Pythagorism, passing gradually into Neo-Platonism, outlasted the other more positive and masculine systems of Pagan philosophy, as the contemporary and rival of Christianity. A large proportion of the false statements concerning Pythagoras come from these Neo-Pythagoreans, who were not deterred by the want of memorials from illustrating, with ample latitude of fancy, the ideal character of the master.

Decline and subsequent renovation of the Pythagorean order.

That an inquisitive man like Pythagoras, at a time when there were hardly any books to study, would visit foreign countries, and converse with all the Grecian philosophical inquirers within his reach, is a matter which we should presume even if no one attested it; and our witnesses carry us very little beyond this general presumption. What doctrines he borrowed or from whom, we are unable to discover. But in fact his whole life and proceedings bear the stamp of an original mind, and not of a borrower—a mind impressed both with Hellenic and with non-Hellenic habits and religion, yet capable of combining the two in a manner peculiar to himself; and above all endued with those talents for religious and personal ascendancy over others, which told for much more than the intrinsic merit of his ideas. We are informed that after extensive travels and inquiries he returned to Samos, at the age of about forty. He then found his native island under the despotism of Polykratês, which rendered it an unsuitable place either for free sentiments or for marked individuals. Unable to attract hearers, or found any school or brotherhood, in his native island, he determined to expatriate; and we may presume that at this period (about 535-530 B.C.) the recent subjugation of Ionia by the Persians was not without influence on his determination. The trade between the Asiatic and the Italian Greeks—and even the intimacy between Milêtus and Knidus on the one side, and Sybaris and Tarentum on the other—had been great and of long standing, so that there was more than one motive to determine him to the coast of Italy; in which direction also his contemporary Xenophanês, the founder of the Eleatic school of philosophy, emigrated seemingly about the same time—from Kolophon to Zanklê, Katana and Elea.¹

Kroton and Sybaris were at this time in their fullest prosperity—among the first and most prosperous cities of the Hellenic name. To the former of the two Pythagoras directed his course. A Council of One Thousand persons, taken from among the heirs and representatives of the principal proprietors at its first foundation, was here invested with the supreme authority:

Pythagoras not merely a borrower, but an original and ascendent mind.—He passes from Samos to Kroton.

State of Kroton—oligarchical government—excellent gymnastic training and medical skill.

¹ Diogen. Laërt. ix. 18.

in what manner the executive offices were filled, we have no information. Besides a great extent of power, and a numerous population, the large mass of whom had no share in the political franchise, Kroton stood at this time distinguished for two things—the general excellence of the bodily habit of the citizens, attested in part by the number of conquerors furnished to the Olympic games—and the superiority of its physicians or surgeons.¹ These two points were in fact greatly connected with each other; for the therapeutics of the day consisted not so much of active remedies as of careful diet and regimen; while the trainer, who dictated the life of an athlete during his long and fatiguing preparation for an Olympic contest—and the professional superintendent of the youths who frequented the public gymnasia—followed out the same general views, and acted upon the same basis of knowledge, as the physician who prescribed for a state of positive bad health.² Of medical education, properly so called,

¹ Herodot. iii. 131; Strabo, vi. p. 261; Menander de Encomiis, p. 96, ed. Heeren. 'Ἀθηναίους ἐν ἀγαλματοποιῇ τε καὶ ζωγραφίῃ, καὶ Κροτωνιάδας ἐν ἰατρικῇ, μέγα φρονήσαι, &c.

The Krotoniate Alkmeon, a younger contemporary of Pythagoras (Aristotel. Metaph. i. 5), is among the earliest names mentioned as philosophizing upon physical and medical subjects. See Brandis, Handbuch der Geschichte der Philos. sect. lxxiii. p. 508, and Aristotel. De Generat. Animal. iii. 2, p. 752, Bekker.

The medical art in Egypt, at the time when Pythagoras visited that country, was sufficiently far advanced to excite the attention of an inquisitive traveller—the branches of it minutely subdivided and strict rules laid down for practice (Herodot. ii. 84; Aristotel. Politic. iii. 10, 4).

² See the analogy of the two strikingly brought out in the treatise of Hippokrates Περὶ ἀρχαῆς ἱατρικῆς, c. 3, 4, 7, vol. i. p. 580-584, ed. Littre.

“Ἐτι γούν καὶ νῦν οἱ τῶν γυμνασίων καὶ ἀσκησίων ἐπιμελόμενοι αἰεὶ τι προσεξευρίσκουσι, καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν ὁδὸν ζητούντες ὅ, τι ἴδωσιν καὶ πλὴν ἐπικρατήσῃ τε αὐτῶν μάλιστα, καὶ ἰσχυρότερος αὐτὸς ἐκείνου ἴσται (p. 580); again, p. 584: Τί οὖν φαίνεται ἑτεροῖον διασθεῖς ὁ καλεῖ- μένος ἱατρὸς καὶ ὁμολογημένος χειροτέχ-
νης, ὅς ἐξέωρε τὴν ἀμφὶ τοὺς κήμοντας διαίταν καὶ τροφήν, ἢ κείνος ὁ ἀπ’ ἀρχῆς τοῖσι πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποισι τροφήν, ὃ νῦν χρέμεθα, ἐξ ἐκείνης τῆς ἀγρῆς καὶ θηριώ- δεος εὐδὼν τε καὶ παρασκευάσας διαίτης: compare another passage not less illustrative in the treatise of Hippokrates Περὶ διαίτης ἀέτων, c. 3, vol. ii. p. 245, ed. Littre.

Following the same general idea, that the theory and practice of the physician is a farther development and variety of that of the gymnastic trainer, I transcribe some observations from the excellent Remarques Rétrospectives of M. Littre, at the end of the fourth volume of his edition of Hippokrates (p. 662).

After having observed (p. 659) that physiology may be considered as divided into two parts—one relating to the mechanism of the functions; the other, to the effects produced upon the human body by the different influences which act upon it and the media by which it is surrounded: and after having observed that on the first of these two branches, the ancients could never make progress, from their ignorance of anatomy—he goes on to state, that respecting the second branch they acquired a large amount of know-
ledge:—

“Sur la physiologie des influences

especially of anatomy, there was then little or nothing. The physician acquired his knowledge from observation of men sick as well as healthy, and from a careful notice of the way in which the human body was acted upon by surrounding agents and circumstances: and this same knowledge was not less necessary for the trainer; so that the same place which contained the best men in the latter class was also likely to be distinguished in the former. It is not improbable that such celebrity of Kroton may have been one of the reasons which determined Pythagoras to go thither. For among the precepts ascribed to him, precise rules as to diet and bodily regulation occupy a prominent place. The medical or surgical celebrity of Dêmokêdês (son-in-law of the Pythagorean Milo) to whom allusion has been made in a former chapter, is contemporaneous with the presence of Pythagoras at Kroton; and the medical men of Magna Græcia maintained themselves in credit, as rivals of the schools of the Asklepiads at Kôs and Knidus, throughout all the fifth and fourth centuries B.C.

extérieures, la Grèce du temps d'Hippocrate et après lui fut le théâtre d'expériences en grand les plus importantes et les plus instructives. Toute la population (la population libre, s'entend) étoit soumise à un système régulier d'éducation physique (N.B. this is a little too strongly stated): dans quelques cités, à Lacédémone par exemple, les femmes n'en étoient pas exemptées. Ce système se composoit d'exercices et d'une alimentation que combinèrent l'empirisme d'abord, puis une théorie plus savante: il concernoit (comme dit Hippocrate lui-même, en ne parlant, il est vrai, que de la partie alimentaire), il concernoit et les malades pour leur rétablissement, et les gens bien portans pour la conservation de leur santé, et les personnes livrées aux exercices gymnastiques pour l'accroissement de leurs forces. On savoit au juste ce qu'il falloit pour conserver seulement le corps en bon état ou pour traiter un malade—pour former un militaire ou pour faire un athlète—et en particulier, un lutteur, un coureur, un sauteur, un pugiliste. Une classe d'hommes, les maîtres des gymnases, étoient exclusivement adonnés à la culture de cet art, auquel les médecins participoient dans les limites de

leur profession; et Hippocrate, qui dans les Aphorismes, invoque l'exemple des athlètes, nous parle dans le Traité des Articulations des personnes maigres, qui n'ayant pas été amaigris par un procédé régulier de l'art, ont les chairs muqueuses. Les anciens médecins savoient, comme on le voit, procurer l'amaigrissement conformément à l'art, et reconnoître à ses effets un amaigrissement irrégulier: toutes choses auxquelles nos médecins sont étrangers, et dont on ne retrouve l'analogie que parmi les entraîneurs Anglois. Au reste cet ensemble de connoissances empiriques et théoriques doit être mis au rang des pertes fâcheuses qui ont accompagné la longue et turbulente transition du monde ancien au monde moderne. Les admirables institutions destinées dans l'antiquité à développer et affermir le corps, ont disparu: l'hygiène publique est destituée à cet égard de toute direction scientifique et générale, et demeure abandonnée complètement au hasard."

See also the remarks of Plato respecting Herodikos, *De Republicâ*, iii. p. 406; Aristotel. *Politic.* iii. 11, 6, iv. 1, i. viii. 4, 1.

The biographers of Pythagoras tell us that his arrival there, his preaching and his conduct, produced an effect almost electric upon the minds of the people, with an extensive reform, public as well as private. Political discontent was repressed, incontinence disappeared, luxury became discredited, and the women hastened to exchange their golden ornaments for the simplest attire. No less than two thousand persons were converted at his first preaching. So effective were his discourses to the youth, that the Supreme Council of One Thousand invited him into their assembly, solicited his advice, and even offered to constitute him their Prytanis or president, while his wife and daughter were placed at the head of the religious processions of females.¹ His influence was not confined to Kroton. Other towns in Italy and Sicily—Sybaris, Metapontum, Rhêgium, Katana, Himera, &c., all felt the benefit of his exhortations, which extricated some of them even from slavery. Such are the tales of which the biographers of Pythagoras are full:² and we see that even the disciples of Aristotle, about the year 300 B.C.—Aristoxenus, Dikæarchus, Herakleidês of Pontus, &c.—are hardly less charged with them than the Neo-Pythagoreans of three or four centuries later. They doubtless heard these tales from their contemporary Pythagoreans,³ the last members of a declining sect,

¹ Valerius Maxim. iii. 15, xv. 1; Jamblichus, Vit. Pyth. c. 45; Timæus, Fragn. 78, ed. Didot.

² Porphyry, Vit. Pythag. c. 21-54; Jamblich. 33-35, 166.

³ The compilations of Porphyry and Jamblichus on the life of Pythagoras, copied from a great variety of authors, will doubtless contain some truth amidst their confused heap of statements, many incredible, and nearly all unauthenticated. But it is very difficult to single out what these portions of truth really are. Even Aristoxenus and Dikæarchus, the best authors from whom these biographers quote, lived near two centuries after the death of Pythagoras, and do not appear to have had any early memorials to consult, nor any better informants than the contemporary Pythagoreans—the last of an expiring sect, and probably among the least eminent for intellect, since the philosophers of the Sokratic vein in its

various branches carried off the acute and aspiring young men of that time.

Meiners, in his *Geschichte der Wissenschaften* (vol. i. b. iii. p. 191 *seq.*), has given a careful analysis of the various authors from whom the two biographers have borrowed, and a comparative estimate of their trustworthiness. It is an excellent piece of historical criticism, though the author exaggerates both the merits and the influence of the first Pythagoreans: Kiessling in the notes to his edition of Jamblichus has given some extracts from it, but by no means enough to dispense with the perusal of the original. I think Meiners allows too much credit, on the whole, to Aristoxenus (see p. 214) and makes too little deduction for the various stories difficult to be believed, of which Aristoxenus is given as the source: of course the latter could not furnish better matter than he heard from his own witnesses. Where the

among whom the attributes of the primitive founder passed for godlike, but who had no memorials, no historical judgement, and no means of forming a true conception of Kroton as it stood in 530 B.C.¹ To trace these tales to a true foundation is impossible. But we may reasonably believe that the success of Pythagoras, as a person favoured by the gods and patentee of divine secrets, was very great—that he procured to himself both the reverence of the multitude, and the peculiar attachment and obedience of many devoted adherents, chiefly belonging to the wealthy and powerful classes—that a select body of these adherents, three hundred in number, bound themselves by a sort of vow both to Pythagoras and to each other, adopting a peculiar diet, ritual, and observances, as a token of union—though without anything like community of property, which some have ascribed to them. Such a band of men, standing high in the city for wealth and station, and bound together by this intimate tie, came by almost unconscious tendency to mingle political ambition with religious and scientific pursuits. Political clubs with sworn members, under one form or another, were a constant phenomenon in the Grecian cities.² Now the Pythagorean order

He forms a powerful club or society, consisting of three hundred men taken from the wealthy classes at Kroton.

judgement of Meiners is more severe, it is also better borne out, especially respecting Porphyry himself, and his scholar Jamblichus. These later Pythagorean philosophers seem to have set up as a formal canon of credibility, that which many religious men of antiquity acted upon from a mere unconscious sentiment and fear of giving offence to the gods—That it was *not right to disbelieve any story* recounted respecting the gods, and wherein the divine agency was introduced; no one could tell but what it *might be true*: to deny its truth was to set bounds to the divine omnipotence. Accordingly they made no difficulty in believing what was recounted about Aristæus, Abaris, and other eminent subjects of myths (Jamblichus, Vit. Pyth. c. 138-148) *καὶ τοῦτό γε πάντες οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι ὁμοῦ ἔχουσι πιστευτικῶς, οἷον περὶ Ἀρισταίου καὶ Ἀβάριδος τὰ μυθολογούμενα καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα λέγεται . . . τῶν τοιούτων δὲ τῶν δοκούντων μυθικῶν ἀπομνημονεύουσιν, ὥς οὐδὲν ἀπιστοῦντες ὅτι ἂν εἰς τὸ θεῖον ἀνάγεται*. Also not

less formally laid down in Jamblichus, Adhortatio ad Philosophiam, as the fourth Symbolum, p. 324, ed. Kiessling. *Περὶ θεῶν μηδὲν θαυμαστὸν ἀπιστεῖ, μηδὲ περὶ θεῶν δογμάτων*. Reasoning from their principles, this was a consistent corollary to lay down; but it helps us to estimate their value as selectors and discriminators of accounts respecting Pythagoras. The extravagant compliments paid by the Emperor Julian in his letters to Jamblichus will not suffice to establish the authority of the latter as a critic and witness: see the Epistolæ 34, 40, 41, in Heyler's edit. of Julian's letters.

¹ Aulus Gell. N.A. iv. 11. Apollon. (ap. Jamblich. c. 262) alludes to τὰ ὑπομνήματα τῶν Κροτωνιατῶν: what the date of these may be, we do not know, but there is no reason to believe them anterior to Aristoxenus.

² Thucyd. viii. 54. τὰς ξυνουσίας, αἵπερ ἐτύγχανον πρότερον οὐσαι ἐν τῇ πόλει ἐπὶ δίκαις καὶ ἀρχαῖς, ἀπάσας ἐπελήθων, &c.

On this important passage, in which

at its first formation was the most efficient of all clubs; since it presented an intimacy of attachment among its members, as well as a feeling of haughty exclusiveness against the public without, such as no other fraternity could parallel.¹ The devoted attachment of Pythagoreans towards each other is not less emphatically set forth than their contempt for every one else: in fact these two attributes of the order seem the best ascertained as well as the most permanent of all. Moreover, we may be sure that the peculiar observances of the order passed for exemplary virtues in the eyes of its members, and exalted ambition into a duty, by making them sincerely believe that they were the only persons fit to govern. It is no matter of surprise, then, to learn that the Pythagoreans gradually drew to themselves great ascendancy in the government of Kroton. And as similar clubs, not less influential, were formed at Metapontum and other places, so the Pythagorean order spread its net, and dictated the course of affairs over a large portion of Magna Græcia. Such ascendancy of the Pythagoreans must have procured for the master himself some real, and still more supposed, influence over the march of government at Kroton and elsewhere, of a nature not then possessed by any of his contemporaries throughout Greece.² Yet his influence was probably exercised in the background, through the medium of the brotherhood who revered him: for it is hardly conformable to Greek manners that a stranger of his character should guide personally and avowedly the political affairs of any Grecian city.

Nor are we to believe that Pythagoras came originally to

Thucydides notes the political clubs of Athens as sworn societies, numerous, notorious, and efficient—I shall speak farther in a future stage of the history. Dr. Arnold has a good note on the passage.

¹ Justin, xx. 4. "Sed trecenti ex juvenibus eum sodalitiis juris sacramento quodam nexi, separatam a ceteris civibus vitam exercebant, quasi cœtum clandestinæ conjurationis habebant, civitatem in se converterunt."

Compare Diogen. Laërt. viii. 3; Apollonius ap. Jamblich. c. 254; Porphyry, Vit. Pyth. c. 33.

The story of the devoted attachments

of the two Pythagoreans Damon and Phintias appears to be very well attested: Aristoxenus heard it from the lips of the younger Dionysius the despot, whose sentence had elicited such manifestation of friendship (Porphyry, Vit. Pyth. c. 59-62; Cicero, De Officiis, iii. 10; and Davis ad Cicero. Tusc. Disp. v. 22).

² Plutarch, Philosophand. cum Principib. c. i. p. 777. ἂν δ' ἀρχοντος ἀνδρὶ καὶ πολιτικοῦ καὶ πρακτικοῦ καθάψηται (ὁ φιλόσοφος) καὶ τοῦτον ἀναπλήσῃ καλοκαθίας, πολλοὺς δι' ἐνὸς ὠφέλησεν, ὡς Πυθαγόρας τοῖς πρωτεύουσι τῶν Ἰταλιωτῶν συγγενόμενος.

Kroton with the express design of creating for himself an ascendent political position—still less that he came for the purpose of realizing a great preconceived political idea, and transforming Kroton into a model-city of pure Dorism, as has been supposed by some eminent modern authors. Such schemes might indeed be ascribed to him by Pythagoreans of the Platonic age, when large ideas of political amelioration were rife in the minds of speculative men—by men disposed to forego the authorship of their own opinions, and preferring to accredit them as traditions handed down from a founder who had left no memorials. But it requires better evidence than theirs to make us believe that any real Greek born in 580 B.C. actually conceived such plans. We cannot construe the scheme of Pythagoras as going farther than the formation of a private, select, order of brethren, embracing his religious fancies, ethical tone, and germs of scientific idea—and manifesting adhesion by those observances which Herodotus and Plato call the Pythagorean orgies and mode of life. And his private order became politically powerful, because he was skilful or fortunate enough to enlist a sufficient number of wealthy Krotoniates, possessing individual influence which they strengthened immensely by thus regimenting themselves in intimate union. The Pythagorean orgies or religious ceremonies were not inconsistent with public activity, bodily as well as mental. Probably the rich men of the order may have been rendered even more active, by being fortified against the temptations of a life of indulgence. The character of the order as it first stood, different from that to which it was afterwards reduced, was indeed religious and exclusive, but also active and domineering; not despising any of those bodily accomplishments which increased the efficiency of the Grecian citizen, and which so particularly harmonised with the pre-existing tendencies of Kroton.¹ Niebuhr and

Political
influence of
Pythagoras
—was an in-
direct result
of the con-
stitution of
the order.

¹ I transcribe here the summary given by Kriche, at the close of his Dissertation on the Pythagorean order, p. 101. "Societatis scopus fuit mere politicus, ut lapsam optimatum potestatem non modo in pristinum restitueret, sed firmaret amplificaretque: cum summo hoc scopo duo conjuncti fuerunt; moralis

alter, alter ad literas spectans. Discipulos suos bonos probosque homines reddere voluit Pythagoras, et ut civitatem moderantes potestate sua non abuterentur ad plebem opprimendam; et ut plebs, intelligens suis commodis consuli, conditione sua contenta esset. Quoniam vero bonum sapiensque mode-

O. Müller have even supposed that the select Three Hundred Pythagoreans constituted a sort of smaller senate at that city¹—an hypothesis no way probable; we may rather conceive them as a powerful private club, exercising ascendancy in the interior of the senate, and governing through the medium of the constituted authorities. Nor can we receive without great allowance the assertion of Varro,² who, assimilating Pythagoras to Plato, tells us that he confined his instructions on matters of government to chosen disciples, who had gone through a complete training, and had reached the perfection of wisdom and virtue. It seems more probable that the political Pythagoreans were those who were most qualified for action, and least for speculation; and that the general of the order possessed that skill in turning to account

ramen nisi a prudente literisque exulto viro expectari (non) licet, philosophiæ studium necessarium duxit Samius iis, qui ad civitatis clavum tenendum se accingerent." This is the general view (coinciding substantially with that of O. Müller—Dorians, iii. 9, 16) given by an author who has gone through the evidences with care and learning. It differs on some important points from the idea which I conceive of the primitive master and his contemporary brethren. It leaves out the religious ascendancy, which I imagine to have stood first among the means as well as among the premeditated purposes of Pythagoras, while it sets forth a reformatory political scheme as directly contemplated by him, of which there is no proof. Though the political ascendancy of the early Pythagoreans is the most prominent feature in their early history, it is not to be considered as the manifestation of any peculiar or settled political idea—it is rather a result of their position and means of union. Ritter observes (in my opinion more justly), "We must not believe that the mysteries of the Pythagorean order were of a simply political character: the most probable accounts warrant us in considering that its central point was a mystic religious teaching" (Geschicht. der Philosophie, h. iv. ch. i. vol. i. p. 365-368): compare Hoeck, Kreta, vol. iii. p. 223.

Krische (p. 32) as well as Boeckh (Philolaus, p. 39-42) and O. Müller assimilate the Pythagorean life to the

Dorian or Spartan habits, and call the Pythagorean philosophy the expression of Grecian Dorism, as opposed to the Ionians and the Ionic philosophy. I confess that I perceive no analogy between the two, either in action or speculation. The Spartans stand completely distinct from other Dorians; and even the Spartan habits of life, though they present some points of resemblance with the bodily training of the Pythagoreans, exhibit still more important points of difference, in respect to religious peculiarity and mysticism, as well as to the scientific element embodied with it. The Pythagorean philosophy, and the Eleatic philosophy, were both equally opposed to the Ionic; yet neither of them is in any way connected with Dorian tendencies. Neither Elea nor Kroton were Doric cities: moreover Xenophanēs as well as Pythagoras were both Ionians.

The general assertions respecting Ionic mobility and inconstancy, contrasted with Doric constancy and steadiness, will not be found borne out by a study of facts. The Dorism of Pythagoras appears to me a complete fancy. O. Müller even turns Kroton into a Dorian city, contrary to all evidence.

¹ Niebuhr, Römisch. Gesch. i. p. 165, 2nd edit.; O. Müller, Hist. of Dorians, iii. 9, 16: Krische is opposed to this idea, sect. v. p. 84.

² Varro ap. Augustin. de Ordine, ii. 30; Krische, p. 77.

the aptitudes of individuals, which two centuries ago was so conspicuous in the Jesuits; to whom in various ways, the Pythagoreans bear considerable resemblance. All that we can be said to know about their political principles is, that they were exclusive and aristocratical, adverse to the control and interference of the people; a circumstance no way disadvantageous to them, since they coincided in this respect with the existing government of the city—had not their own conduct brought additional odium on the old aristocracy, and raised up an aggravated democratical opposition carried to the most deplorable lengths of violence.

All the information which we possess, apocryphal as it is, respecting this memorable club is derived from its warm admirers. Yet even their statements are enough to explain how it came to provoke deadly and extensive enmity. A stranger coming to teach new religious dogmas and observances, with a tincture of science and some new ethical ideas and phrases, though he would obtain some zealous votaries, would also bring upon himself a certain measure of antipathy. Extreme strictness of observances, combined with the art of touching skilfully the springs of religious terror in others, would indeed do much both to fortify and to exalt him. But when it was discovered that science, philosophy, and even the mystic revelations of religion, whatever they were, remained confined to the private talk and practice of the disciples, and were thus thrown into the background, while all that was seen and felt without was the political predominance of an ambitious fraternity—we need not wonder that Pythagorism in all its parts became odious to a large portion of the community. Moreover we find the order represented not merely as constituting a devoted and exclusive political party, but also as manifesting an ostentatious self-conceit throughout their personal demeanour¹—

Causes which led to the subversion of the Pythagorean order.

¹ Apollonius ap. Jamblichum, V. P. c. 254, 255, 256, 257. ἡγεμόνες δὲ ἐγένοντο τῆς διαφορᾶς οἱ τοῖς συγγενεῖσι καὶ τοῖς οἰκεῖσιν ἐγγύτατα καθεστηκότες τῶν Πυθαγορείων. Αἰτίον δ' ἦν, ὅτι τὰ μὲν πολλὰ αὐτοὺς ἐλύπει τῶν πραττομένων, &c.: compare also the lines descriptive of Pythagoras, c. 259. Τοὺς μὲν ἱταίρους ἦγεν Ἰσούς μακροῦσι θεοῖσι. Τοὺς δ' ἄλλους ἡγεῖν' οὐτ' ἐν.

λόγῳ, οὐτ' ἐν ἀριθμῷ.

That this Apollonius, cited both by Jamblichus and by Porphyry, is Apollonius of Tyana, has been rendered probable by Meiners (Geschich. der Wissenschaft. v. i. p. 239-245): compare Welcker, Prolegomena ad Theognid. p. xlv. xlvii.

When we read the life of Apollonius by Philostratus, we see that the former

refusing the hand of fellowship to all except the brethren, and disgusting especially their own familiar friends and kinsmen. So far as we know Grecian philosophy, this is the only instance in which it was distinctly abused for political and party objects. The early days of the Pythagorean order stand distinguished for such perversion, which fortunately for the progress of philosophy, never presented itself afterwards in Greece.¹ Even at Athens, however, we shall hereafter see that Sokratês, though standing really aloof from all party intrigue, incurred much of his unpopularity from supposed political conjunction with Kritias and Alkibiadês,² to which indeed the orator Æschinês distinctly ascribes his condemnation, speaking about sixty years after the event. Had Sokratês been known as the founder of a band holding together intimately for ambitious purposes, the result would have been eminently pernicious to philosophy, and probably much sooner pernicious to himself.

It was this cause which brought about the complete and violent destruction of the Pythagorean order. Their ascendancy had provoked such wide-spread discontent, that their enemies became emboldened to employ extreme force against them. Kylon and Ninon—the former of whom is said to have sought admittance into the order, but to have been rejected on account of his bad character—took the lead in pronounced opposition to the Pythagoreans; whose unpopularity extended itself farther to the Senate of One Thousand, through the medium of which their ascendancy had been exercised. Propositions were made for rendering the government more democratical, and for constituting a new senate, taken by lot from all the people, before which the magistrates should go through their trial of accountability after office: an opportunity being chosen in which the Senate of One Thousand had

was himself extremely communicative: he might be the rather disposed therefore to think that the seclusion and reserve of Pythagoras was a defect, and to ascribe to it much of the mischief which afterwards overtook the order.

¹ Schleiermacher observes that "Philosophy among the Pythagoreans was connected with political objects, and their school with a practical brotherly partnership, such as was never on any

other occasion seen in Greece" (Introduction to his Translation of Plato, p. 12). See also Theopompus, Fr. 68, ed. Didot, apud Athenæum, v. p. 213, and Euripidês, *Medæa*, 294.

² Xenophon, *Memorab.* i. 2, 12; Æschines, cont. Timarch. c. 34. ὁμοίως, ὡς Ἀθηναῖοι, Σωκράτη τὴν σοφιστὴν ἀπεκρίνατε, ὅτι Κριτίαν ἐφάρη περαιομένους, ἵνα τῶν τριδύκωντα.

given signal offence by refusing to divide among the people the recently conquered territory of Sybaris.¹ In spite of the opposition of the Pythagoreans, this change of government was carried through. Violences which accompanied its subversion. Ninon and Kylon, their principal enemies, made use of it to exasperate the people still farther against the order, until they provoked actual popular violence against it. The Pythagoreans were attacked when assembled in their meeting-house near the temple of Apollo, or, as some said, in the house of Milo. The building was set on fire, and many of the members perished;² none but the younger and more vigorous escaping. Similar disturbances, and the like violent suppression of the order, with destruction of several among the leading citizens, are said to have taken place in other cities of Magna Græcia—Tarentum, Metapontum, Kaulonia. And we are told that these cities remained for some time in a state of great disquietude and commotion, from which they were only rescued by the friendly mediation of the Peloponnesian Achæans, the original founders of Sybaris and Kroton—assisted indeed by mediators from other parts of Greece. The cities were at length pacified, and induced to adopt an amicable congress, with common religious festivals, at a temple founded expressly for the purpose and dedicated to Zeus Homarius.³ Thus perished the original Pythagorean order. Respecting Pythagoras himself, there were conflicting accounts; some representing that he was burnt in the temple with his disciples;⁴ others, that he had died a short time previously; others again

¹ This is stated in Jamblichus, c. 255; yet it is difficult to believe; for if the fact had been so, the destruction of the Pythagoreans would naturally have produced an allotment and permanent occupation of the Sybaritan territory—which certainly did not take place, since Sybaris remained without resident possessors until the foundation of Thurii.

² Jamblichus, c. 255-259; Porphyry, c. 54-57; Diogen. Laert. viii. 39; Diodor. x. Fragm. vol. iv. p. 56, Wess.

³ Polyb. ii. 39; Plutarch, De Genio Socratis, c. 13, p. 583; Aristoxenus, ap. Jamblich. c. 250. That the enemies of the order attacked it by setting fire to the house in which the members were assembled, is the circumstance in which

all accounts agree. On all other points there is great discrepancy, especially respecting the names and date of the Pythagoreans who escaped: Boeckh (Philolaus, p. 9 *seq.*) and Brandis (Handbuch der Gesch. d. Philos. ch. lxxiii. p. 432) try to reconcile these discrepancies.

Aristophanês introduces Strepsiadês, at the close of the Nubes, as setting fire to the meeting-house (*φωρτιστήριον*) of Sokratês and his disciple; possibly the Pythagorean conflagration may have suggested this.

⁴ "Pythagoras Samius suspicione dominatûs injustâ vivus in fano concrematus est" (Arnobius adv. Gentes, lih. i. p. 23, ed. Elmenhorst).

affirmed, that he was alive at the time, but absent, and that he died not long afterwards in exile, after forty days of voluntary abstinence from food. His tomb was still shown at Metapontum in the days of Cicero.¹ As an active brotherhood, the Pythagoreans never revived; but the dispersed members came together as a sect, for common religious observances and common pursuit of science. They were re-admitted, after some interval, into the cities of Magna Græcia,² from which they had been originally expelled, but to which the sect is always considered as particularly belonging—though individual members of it are found besides at Thebes and in other cities of Greece. Indeed some of these later Pythagoreans sometimes even acquired great political influence, as we see in the case of the Tarentine Archytas, the contemporary of Plato.

It has already been stated that the period when Pythagoras arrived at Kroton may be fixed somewhere between B.C. 540-530. His arrival is said to have occurred at a time of great depression in the minds of the Krotoniates. They had recently been defeated by the united Lokrians and Rhegians, vastly inferior to themselves in number, at the river Sagra; which humiliation is said to have rendered them docile to the training of the Samian missionary.³ As the birth of the Py-

¹ Cicero, *De Finib.* v. 2 (who seems to have copied from Dikæarchus; see Fuhr. ad Dikæarchi Fragment. p. 55); Justin, xx. 4; Diogen. Laërt. viii. 40; Jamblichus, V. P. c. 249.

O. Müller says (*Dorians*, iii. 9, 16), that "the influence of the Pythagorean league upon the administration of the Italian states was of the most beneficial kind, which continued for many generations after the dissolution of the league itself."

The first of these two assertions cannot be made out, and depends only on the statements of later encomiasts, who even supply materials to contradict their own general view. The judgment of Welcker respecting the influence of the Pythagoreans, much less favourable, is at the same time more probable (*Prefat.* ad Theognid. p. xlv.).

The second of the two assertions appears to me quite incorrect; the influence of the Pythagorean order on the government of Magna Græcia ceased

altogether, as far as we are able to judge. An individual Pythagorean like Archytas might obtain influence, but this is not the influence of the order. Nor ought O. Müller to talk about the Italian Greeks giving up the Doric customs and adopting an Achæan government. There is nothing to prove that Kroton ever had Doric customs.

² Aristotel. *de Cælo*, ii. 13. *οἱ περὶ τὴν Ἰταλίαν καλούμενοι δὲ Πυθαγορείοι.* "Italic philosophers quondam nominati" (Cicero, *De Senectute*, c. 21).

³ Heyne places the date of the battle of Sagra about 560 B.C.; but this is very uncertain. See his *Opuscula*, vol. ii. *Prolus.* ii. p. 53, and *Prolus.* x. p. 184. See also Justin, xx. 3, and Strabo, vi. p. 261-263. It will be seen that the latter conceives the battle of the Sagra as having happened after the destruction of Sybaris by the Krotoniates; for he states twice, that the Krotoniates lost so many citizens at the Sagra, that the city did not long survive so terrible a

thagorean order is thus connected with the defeat of the Krotoniates at the Sagra, so its extinction is also connected with their victory over the Sybarites at the river Traeis or Trionto, about twenty years afterwards.

Of the history of these two great Achæan cities we unfortunately know very little. Though both were powerful, yet down to the period of 510 B.C., Sybaris seems to have been decidedly the greatest. Of its dominion as well as of its much-denounced luxury I have spoken in a former chapter.¹ It was at that time that the war broke out between them, which ended in the destruction of Sybaris. It is certain that the Sybaritans were aggressors in the war; but by what causes it had been preceded in their own town, or what provocation they had received, we make out very indistinctly. There had been a political revolution at Sybaris (we are told) not long before, in which a popular leader named Têlys had headed a rising against the oligarchical government, and induced the people to banish five hundred of the leading rich men, as well as to confiscate their properties. He had acquired the sovereignty and become despot of Sybaris.² It appears too, that he, or his rule at Sybaris, was much abhorred at Kroton; since the Krotoniate Philippus, a man of splendid muscular form and an Olympic victor, was exiled for having engaged himself to marry the daughter of Têlys.³ According to the narrative given by the later Pythagoreans, those exiles, whom Têlys had driven from Sybaris, took refuge at Kroton, casting themselves as suppliants on the altars for protection: it may well be, indeed, that they were in part Pythagoreans of Sybaris. A body of powerful exiles, harboured in a town so close at hand, inspired alarm, and Têlys demanded that they should be delivered up, threatening war in case of refusal. This demand excited con-

War between Sybaris and Kroton.

blow: he cannot therefore have supposed that the complete triumph of the Krotoniates over the great Sybaris was gained afterwards.

¹ See above chap. xxii.

² Diodor. xii. 9. Herodotus calls Têlys in one place βασιλῆς, in another τύραννος of Sybaris (v. 44): this is not at variance with the story of Diodorus.

The story given by Athenæus, out of Herakleidês Ponticus, respecting the

subversion of the dominion of Têlys, cannot be reconciled either with Herodotus or Diodorus (Athenæus, xii. p. 522). Dr. Thirlwall supposes the deposition of Têlys to have occurred between the defeat at the Traeis and the capture of Sybaris; but this is inconsistent with the statement of Herakleidês, and not countenanced by any other evidence.

³ Herodot. v. 47.

sternation at Kroton, since the military strength of Sybaris was decidedly superior. The surrender of the exiles was much debated, and almost decreed, by the Krotoniates, until at length the persuasion of Pythagoras himself is said to have determined them to risk any hazard sooner than incur the dishonour of betraying suppliants.

On the demand of the Sybarites being refused, Têlys marched against Kroton at the head of a force which is reckoned at 300,000 men.¹ He marched, too, in defiance of the strongest religious warnings against the enterprise; for the sacrifices, offered on his behalf by the Iamid prophet Kallias of Elis, were so decisively unfavourable, that the prophet himself fled in terror to Kroton.² Near the river Traeis or Trionto, Têlys was met by the forces of Kroton, consisting (we are informed) of 100,000 men, and commanded by the great athlete and Pythagorean Milo; who was clothed (we are told) in the costume and armed with the club of Heraklê. They were farther reinforced by a valuable ally, the Spartan Dorieus (younger brother of king Kleomenês),

then coasting along the Gulf of Tarentum, with a body of colonists, intending to found a settlement in Sicily. A bloody battle was fought, in which the Sybarites were totally worsted, with prodigious slaughter; while the victors, fiercely provoked and giving no quarter, followed up the pursuit so warmly that they took the city, dispersed its inhabitants, and crushed its whole power³ in the short space of seventy days. The Sybarites fled in great part to Laos and Skidros,⁴ their settlements planted on the Mediterranean coast, across the Calabrian peninsula. So eager were the Krotoniates to render the site of Sybaris untenable, that they turned the course of the river Krathis so as to overwhelm and destroy it: the dry bed in which the river had originally flowed was still visible in the time of Herodotus,⁵ who was among the settlers in

Defeat of the
Sybarites,
and destruc-
tion of their
city, partly
through the
aid of the
Spartan
Dorians.

¹ Diodor. xii. 9; Strabo, vi. p. 263; Jamblichus, Vit. Pythag. c. 260; Skyrm. Chi. v. 340.

² Herodot. v. 44.

³ Diodor. xii. 9, 10; Strabo, vi. p. 263.

⁴ Herodot. vi. 21; Strabo, vi. p. 253.

⁵ Herodot. v. 45; Diodor. xii. 9, 10; Strabo, vi. p. 263. Strabo mentions expressly the turning of the river for the purpose of overwhelming the city—*ἐλόντες γὰρ τὴν πόλιν ἐπέγαγον τὸν ποταμὸν καὶ κατέκλυσαν*. It is to this change in the channel of the river that I refer the expression in Hero-

the town of Thurii afterwards founded nearly adjoining. It appears however that the Krotoniates for a long time kept the site of Sybaris deserted, refusing even to allot the territory among the body of their own citizens: from which circumstances (as has been before noticed) the commotion against the Pythagorean order is said to have arisen. They may perhaps have been afraid of the name and recollections of the city. No large or permanent establishment was ever formed there until Thurii was established by Athens about sixty-five years afterwards. Nevertheless the name of the Sybarites did not perish: they maintained themselves at Laos, Skidros, and elsewhere—and afterwards formed the privileged Old-citizens among the colonists of Thurii; but misbehaved themselves in that capacity, and were mostly either slain or expelled. Even after that, however, the name of Sybaris still remained on a reduced scale in some portion of the territory: Herodotus recounts what he was told by the Sybarites, and we find subsequent indications of them even as late as Theokritus.

The conquest and destruction of the original Sybaris—perhaps in 510 B.C. the greatest of all Grecian cities—appears to have excited a strong sympathy in the Hellenic world. In Milētus especially, with which it had maintained intimate union, the grief was so vehement, that all the Milesians shaved their heads in token of mourning.¹ The event, happening just at the time of the expulsion of Hippias from Athens, must have made a sensible revolution in the relations of the Greek cities on the Italian coast with the rustic population of

Sensation excited in the Hellenic world by the destruction of Sybaris. Gradual decline of the Greek power in Italy.

dotus—*τέμενος τε καὶ ὑπὸν λόγῳ παρὰ τὸν ξηρὸν Κράθιν*. It was natural that the old deserted bed of the river should be called "*the dry Krathis*": whereas, if we suppose that there was only one channel, the expression has no appropriate meaning. For I do not think that any one can be well satisfied with the explanation of Bähr—"Vocatur Crathis hoc loco ξηρὸς siccat, ut qui hieme fluit, æstatis vero tempore exsiccatus est: quod adhuc in multis Italiæ inferioris fluviis observant." I doubt whether this be true, as a matter of fact, respecting the river Krathis (see

my preceding volume, ch. xxii.); but even if the fact were true, the epithet in Bähr's sense has no especial significance for the purpose contemplated by Herodotus, who merely wishes to describe the site of the temple erected by Dorieus. "Near the Krathis," or "near the dry Krathis," would be equivalent expressions, if we adopted Bähr's construction; whereas to say "near the deserted channel of the Krathis," would be a good local designation.

¹ Herodot. vi. 21.

the interior. The Krotoniates might destroy Sybaris and disperse its inhabitants, but they could not succeed to its wide dominion over dependent territory: and the extinction of this great aggregate power, stretching across the peninsula from sea to sea, lessened the means of resistance against the Oscan movements from the inland. From this time forward, the cities of Magna Græcia, as well as those of Ionia, tend to decline in consequence; while Athens, on the other hand, becomes both more conspicuous and more powerful. At the invasion of Greece by Xerxès, thirty years after this conquest of Sybaris, Sparta and Athens send to ask for aid both from Sicily and Korkyra, but not from Magna Græcia.

It is much to be regretted that we do not possess fuller information respecting such important changes among the Greco-Italian cities. Yet we may remark that even Herodotus—himself a citizen of Thurii and dwelling on the spot not more than eighty years after the capture of Sybaris—evidently found no written memorials to consult, and could obtain from verbal conversation nothing better than statements both meagre and contradictory. The material circumstance, for example, of the aid rendered by the Spartan Dorieus and his colonists, though positively asserted by the Sybarites, was as positively denied by the Krotoniates, who alleged that they had accomplished the conquest by themselves and with their own unaided forces. There can be little hesitation in crediting the affirmative assertion of the Sybarites, who showed to Herodotus a temple and precinct erected by the Spartan prince in testimony of his share in the victory, on the banks of the dry deserted channel out of which the Krathis had been turned, and in honour of the Krathian Athênê.¹ This of itself forms a proof, coupled with the positive assertion of the Sybarites, sufficient for the case; but they produced another indirect argument to confirm it, which deserves notice. Dorieus had attacked Sybaris while he was passing along the coast of Italy to go and found a colony in Sicily, under the express mandate and encouragement of the oracle. After tarrying awhile at Sybaris, he pursued his journey to the south-western portion of Sicily, where he and nearly all his companions

Contradictory statements and arguments respecting the presence of Dorieus.

¹ Herodot. v. 45.

perished in a battle with the Carthaginians and Egestæans—though the oracle had promised him that he should acquire and occupy permanently the neighbouring territory near Mount Eryx. Now the Sybarites deduced from this fatal disaster of Dorieus and his expedition, combined with the favourable promise of the oracle beforehand, a confident proof of the correctness of their own statement that he had fought at Sybaris. For if he had gone straight to the territory marked out by the oracle (they argued) without turning aside for any other object, the prophecy on which his hopes were founded would have been unquestionably realised, and he would have succeeded. But the ruinous disappointment which actually overtook him was at once explained, and the truth of prophecy vindicated, when it was recollected that he had turned aside to help the Krotoniates against Sybaris, and thus set at nought the conditions prescribed to him. Upon this argument (Herodotus tells us) the Sybarites of his day especially insisted.¹ And while we note their pious and literal faith in the communications of an inspired prophet, we must at the same time observe how perfectly that faith supplied the place of historical premises—how scanty their stock was of such legitimate evidence—and how little they had yet learnt to appreciate its value.

It is to be remarked that Herodotus, in his brief mention of the fatal war between Sybaris and Kroton, does not make the least allusion to Pythagoras or his brotherhood. The least which we can infer from such silence is, that the part which they played in reference to the war, and their general ascendancy in Magna Græcia, was in reality less conspicuous and overruling than the Pythagorean historians set forth. Even making such allowance, however, the absence of all allusion in Herodotus, to the commotions which accompanied the subversion of the Pythagoreans, is a circumstance not easily explicable. Nor can I pass over a perplexing statement in Polybius, which seems to show that he too must have conceived the history of Sybaris in a way different from that in

Herodotus does not mention the Pythagoreans when he alludes to the war between Sybaris and Kroton.

¹ Herodot. v. 45. Τοῦτο δὲ, αὐτοῦ Δωριέος τὸν θάνατον μαρτύριον μέγιστον ποιεῖνται (Συβαρίται), ὅτι παρὰ τὰ μεμνημένα ποιεῖν διεφθάρη. Εἰ γὰρ δὴ μὴ παρέκτρεψε μὴδὲν, ἐκ' ᾧ δὲ Ἰστιάη ἔποιεε, εἶλε ἂν τὴν Ἑρκεσίην χώραν καὶ ἑλὼν κάτεσχε, οὐδ' ἂν αὐτὸς τε καὶ ἡ στρατιὴ διεφθάρη.

which it is commonly represented. He tells us, that after much suffering in Magna Græcia from the troubles which followed the expulsion of the Pythagoreans, the cities were induced by Achæan mediation to come to an accommodation and even to establish something like a permanent league, with a common temple and sacrifices. Now the three cities which he specifies as having been the first to do this are, Kroton, Sybaris, and Kaulonia.¹ But according to the sequence of events and the fatal war (just described) between Kroton and Sybaris, the latter city must have been at that time in ruins; little, if at all, inhabited. I cannot but infer from this statement of Polybius, that he followed different authorities respecting the earlier history of Magna Græcia in the beginning of the fifth century B.C.

Indeed the early history of these cities gives us little more than a few isolated facts and names. With regard to their legislators, Zalcukus and Charondas, nothing is made out except their existence—and even that fact some ancient critics contested. Of Zalcukus, whom chronologists place in 664 B.C., I have already spoken; the date of Charondas cannot be assigned, but we may perhaps presume that it was at some time between 600-500 B.C. He was a citizen of middling station, born in the Chalkidic colony of Katana in Sicily,² and he framed laws not only for his own city, but for the other Chalkidic cities in Sicily and Italy—Leontini, Naxos, Zanklê, and Rhégium. The laws and the solemn preamble ascribed to him by Diodorus and Stobæus, belong to a later day,³ and we are

¹ Polyb. ii. 39. Heyne thinks that the agreement here mentioned by Polybius took place Olymp. 80, 3; or indeed after the re-population of the Sybaritan territory by the foundation of Thurii (Opuscula, vol. ii.; Prolus. x. p. 189). But there seems great difficulty in imagining that the state of violent commotion—which (according to Polybius) was only appeased by this agreement—can possibly have lasted so long as half a century; the received date of the overthrow of the Pythagoreans being about 504 B.C.

² Aristot. Politic. ii. 9, 6, iv. 9, 10. Heyne puts Charondas much earlier than the foundation of Thurii, in which

I think he is undoubtedly right: but without determining the date more exactly (Opuscul. vol. ii.; Prolus. ix. p. 160), Charondas must certainly have been earlier than Anaxilas of Rhégium and the great Sicilian despots; which will place him higher than 500 B.C.: but I do not know that any more precise mark of time can be found.

³ Diodorus, xii. 35; Stobæus, Serm. xlv. 20-40; Cicero de Legg. ii. 6. See K. F. Hermann, Lehrbuch der Griech. Staatsalterthümer, ch. 89; Heyne, Opuscul. vol. ii. p. 72-164. Brandis (Geschichte der Röm. Philosophie, ch. xxvi. p. 102) seems to conceive these prologues as genuine.

obliged to content ourselves with collecting the brief hints of Aristotle, who tells us that the laws of Charondas descended to great minuteness of distinction and specification, especially in graduating the fine for offences according to the property of the guilty person fined¹—but that there was nothing in his laws strictly original and peculiar, except that he was the first to introduce the solemn indictment against perjured witnesses before justice. The perjured witness in Grecian ideas, was looked upon as having committed a crime half religious, half civil. The indictment raised against him, known by a peculiar name, partook of both characters, approaching in some respects to the procedure against a murderer. Such distinct form of indictment against perjured testimony—with its appropriate name,² which we shall find maintained at Athens throughout the best known days of Attic law—was first enacted by Charondas.

The mistakes and confusion made by ancient writers respecting these law-givers—even by writers earlier than Aristotle (Polit. ii. 9, 5)—are such as we have no means of clearing up.

Seneca (Epist. 90) calls both Zaleucus and Charondas disciples of Pythagoras; that the former was so, is not to be believed; but it is not wholly impossible that the latter may have been so, or at least a contemporary of the earliest Pythagoreans.

¹ Aristotel. Politic. ii. 9, 8. *Χαρώνδου δ' ὅτιον μὲν οὐδὲν ἐστὶ πλὴν αἱ δίκαι τῶν ψευδομαρτύρων πρῶτος γὰρ ἐποίησε τὴν ἐπίσκηψιν τῇ δ' ἀκριβεῖα τῶν νόμων ἐστὶ γλαφυρότερος καὶ τῶν σὺν νομοθετῶν.* To the fulness and precision predicated respecting Charondas in the latter part of this passage, I refer the other passage in Politic. iv. 10, 6, which is not to be construed as if it meant that Charondas had graduated fines on the rich and poor with a distinct view to

that political trick (of indirectly eliminating the poor from public duties) which Aristotle had been just adverting to—but merely means that Charondas had been nice and minute in graduating pecuniary penalties generally, having reference to the wealth or poverty of the person sentenced.

² *Πρῶτος γὰρ ἐποίησε τὴν ἐπίσκηψιν* (Aristot. Politic. ii. 9, 8). See Harpokration, v. *Ἐπισκήψατο*, and Pollux, viii. 33; Dēmosthenēs cont. Stephanum, ii. c. 5; cont. Euerg. et Mnēsibul. c. 1. The word *ἐπίσκηψιν* carries with it the solemnity of meaning adverted to in the text, and seems to have been used especially with reference to an action or indictment against perjured witnesses: which indictment was permitted to be brought with a less degree of risk or cost to the accuser than most others in the Attic dikasteries (Dēmosth. cont. Euerg. et. Mn. l. c.).

CHAPTER XXXVIII.

FROM THE BATTLE OF MARATHON TO THE MARCH OF
XERXES AGAINST GREECE.

I HAVE recounted, in a preceding chapter, the Athenian victory at Marathon, the repulse of the Persian general Datis, and the return of his armament across the Ægean to the Asiatic coast. He had been directed to conquer both Eretria and Athens; an order which he had indeed executed in part with success, as the string of Eretrian prisoners brought to Susa attested—but which remained still unfulfilled in regard to the city principally obnoxious to Darius. Far from satiating his revenge upon Athens, the Persian monarch was compelled to listen to the tale of an ignominious defeat. His wrath against the Athenians rose to a higher pitch than ever, and he commenced vigorous preparations for a renewed attack upon them as well as upon Greece generally. Resolved upon assembling the entire force of his empire, he directed the various satraps and sub-governors throughout all Asia to provide troops, horses, and ships both of war and burthen. For no less than three years the empire was agitated by this immense levy, which Darius determined to conduct in person against Greece.¹ Nor was his determination abated by a revolt of the Egyptians, which broke out about the time when his preparations were completed. He was on the point of undertaking simultaneously the two enterprises—the conquest of Greece and the reconquest of Egypt—when he was surprised by death, after a reign of thirty-six years. As a precaution previous to this intended march, he had nominated as successor Xerxes, his son by Atossa; for the ascendancy of that queen ensured to Xerxes the preference over his elder brother Artabazanes, son of Darius by a former

¹ Herodot. vii. 3, 4.

wife, and born before the latter became king. The choice of the reigning monarch passed unquestioned, and Xerxes succeeded without opposition.¹ It deserves to be remarked, that though we shall meet with several acts of cruelty and atrocity perpetrated in the Persian regal family, there is nothing like that systematic fratricide which has been considered necessary to guarantee succession in Turkey and other Oriental empires.

The intense wrath against Athens, which had become the predominant sentiment in the mind of Darius, was yet unappeased at the time of his death, and it was fortunate for the Athenians that his crown now passed to a prince less obstinately hostile as well as in every respect inferior. Xerxes, personally the handsomest² and most stately man amid the immense crowd which he led against Greece, was in character timid and faint-hearted, over and above those defects of vanity, childish self-conceit, and blindness of appreciation, which he shared more or less with all the Persian kings. Yet we shall see that even under his conduct, the invasion of Greece was very near proving successful: and it might well have succeeded altogether, had he been either endued with the courageous temperament, or inflamed with the fierce animosity, of his father.

On succeeding to the throne, Xerxes found the forces of the empire in active preparation, pursuant to the orders of Darius; except Egypt, which was in a state of revolt. His first

Succeeded
by his son
Xerxes.

¹ Herodot. vii. 1-4. He mentions—simply as a report, and seemingly without believing it himself—that Demaratus the exiled king of Sparta was at Susa at the moment when Darius was about to choose a successor among his sons (this cannot consist with Ktesias, Persic. c. 23); and that he suggested to Xerxes a convincing argument by which to determine the mind of his father, urging the analogy of the law of regal succession at Sparta, whereby the son of a king, born after his father became king, was preferred to an elder son born before that event. The existence of such a custom at Sparta may well be doubted.

Some other anecdotes, not less difficult of belief than this, and alike calculated to bestow a factitious importance on Demaratus, will be noticed in the

subsequent pages. The latter received from the Persian king the grant of Pergamus and Teuthrania, with their land-revenues, which his descendants long afterwards continued to occupy (Xenoph. Hellen. iii. 1-6); and perhaps these descendants may have been among the persons from whom Herodotus derived his information respecting the expedition of Xerxes. See vii. 239.

Plutarch (De Fraternali Amore, p. 488) gives an account in many respects different concerning the circumstances which determined the succession of Xerxes to the throne, in preference to his elder brother.

² Herod. vii. 187. The like personal beauty is ascribed to Darius Codomannus, the last of the Persian kings (Plutarch, Alexand. c. 21).

necessity was to reconquer this country ; a purpose for which the great military power now in readiness was found amply sufficient. Egypt was subdued and reduced to a state of much harder dependence than before : we may presume that not only the tribute was increased, but also the numbers of the Persian occupying force, maintained by contributions levied on the natives. Achæmenes, brother of Xerxes, was installed there as satrap.

But Xerxes was not at first equally willing to prosecute the schemes of his deceased father against Greece. At least such is the statement of Herodotus : who represents Mardonius as the grand instigator of the invasion, partly through thirst for warlike enterprise, partly from a desire to obtain the intended conquest as a satrapy for himself. There were not wanting Grecian counsellors to enforce his recommendation both by the promise of help and by the colour of religion. The great family of the Aleuadaæ, belonging to Larissa and perhaps to other towns in Thessaly, were so eager in the cause, that their principal members came to Susa to offer an easy occupation of that frontier territory of Hellas ; while the exiled Peisistratids from Athens still persevered in striving to procure their own restoration at the tail of a Persian army. On the present occasion, they brought with them to Susa a new instrument, the holy mystic Onomakritus—a man who had acquired much reputation, not by prophesying himself, but by collecting, arranging, interpreting, and delivering out, prophetic verses passing under the name of the ancient seer or poet Musæus. Thirty years before, in the flourishing days of the Peisistratids, he had lived at Athens, enjoying the confidence of Hipparchus, and consulted by him as the expositor of these venerated documents. But having been detected by the poet Lasus of Hermione, in the very act of interpolating them with new matter of his own, he was indignantly banished by Hipparchus. The Peisistratids however, now in banishment themselves, forgot or forgave this offence, and carried Onomakritus with his prophecies to Susa, announcing him as a person of oracular authority, to assist in working on the mind of Xerxes. To this purpose his interpolations, or his omissions, were now directed. When introduced to the Persian monarch, he recited emphatically

B.C. 485,

Revolt and reconquest of Egypt by the Persians.

Indifference of Xerxes to the invasion of Greece—persons who advised and instigated him—persuasions which they employed—prophecies produced by Onomakritus.

various encouraging predictions, wherein the bridging of the Hellespont, and the triumphant march of a barbaric host into Greece, appeared as predestined ; while he carefully kept back all those of a contrary tenor, which portended calamity and disgrace. So at least Herodotus,¹ strenuous in upholding the credit of Bakis, Musæus, and other Grecian prophets whose verses were in circulation, expressly assures us. The religious encouragements of Onomakritus, and the political co-operation proffered by the Aleuadæ, enabled Mardonius effectually to overcome the reluctance of his master. Indeed it was not difficult to show, according to the feelings then prevalent, that a new king of Persia was in honour obliged to enlarge the boundaries of the empire.² The conquering impulse springing from the first founder was as yet unexhausted ; the insults offered by the Athenians remained still unavenged ; and in addition to this double stimulus to action, Mardonius drew a captivating picture of Europe as an acquisition—"it was the finest land in the world, produced every variety of fruit-bearing trees, and was too good a possession for any mortal man except the Persian kings."³ Fifteen years before, the Milesian Aristagoras,⁴ when entreating the Spartans to assist the Ionic revolt, had exaggerated the wealth and productiveness of Asia in contrast with the poverty of Greece—a contrast less widely removed from the truth, at that time, than the picture presented by Mardonius.

Having thus been persuaded to alter his original views, Xerxes convoked a meeting of the principal Persian counsellors, and announced to them his resolution to invade Greece ; setting forth the mingled motives of revenge and aggrandisement which impelled him, and representing the conquest of Greece as carrying with it that of all Europe, so that the Persian empire would become co-extensive with the æther of Zeus and the limits of the sun's course.

Xerxes resolves to invade Greece.

¹ Herodot. vii. 6 ; viii. 20, 96, 77. 'Ονομάκριτος—κατέλιγε τῶν χρησμάτων—εἰ μὲν τι ἐνέοι σφάλμα φέρον τῷ Πέρσῃ, τῶν μὲν ἔλεγε οὐδέν· ὁ δὲ τὰ εὐτυχίστατα ἐκλεγόμενος, ἔλεγε τὸν τε Ἑλλησποντον ὡς ζευχθῆναι χρέον εἴη ὑπ' ἀνδρὸς Πέρσῃ, τήν τε ἑλᾶσιν ἐξηγεόμενος, &c.

An intimation somewhat curious respecting this collection of prophecies ;

it was of an extremely varied character, and contained promises or threats to meet any emergency which might arise.

² Æschylus, Pers. 761.

³ Herodot. vii. 5. ὡς ἡ Εὐρώπη περικαλλὴς χώρα, καὶ δένδρεα παντοῖα φέρει τὰ ἡμεῖς, βασιλεῖ τα μόνον θνητῶν ἀξίη ἐκτῆσθαι—χώρην παμφορτωτέραν (vii. 8).

⁴ Herodot. v. 49.

On the occasion of this invasion, now announced and about to take place, we must notice especially the historical manner and conception of our capital informant—Historical manner and conception of Herodotus. Herodotus. The invasion of Greece by Xerxes, and the final repulse of his forces, constitute the entire theme of his three last books, and the principal object of his whole history, towards which the previous matter is intended to conduct. Amidst those prior circumstances, there are doubtless many which have a substantive importance and interest of their own, recounted at so much length that they appear co-ordinate and principal, so that the thread of the history is for a time put out of sight. Yet we shall find, if we bring together the larger divisions of his history, omitting the occasional prolixities of detail, that such thread is never lost in the historian's own mind: it may be traced by an attentive reader, from his preface and the statement immediately following it—of Cræsus as the first barbaric conqueror of the Ionian Greeks—down to the full expansion of his theme, "*Græcia Barbariæ lento collisa duello*," in the expedition of Xerxes. That expedition, as forming the consummation of his historical scheme, is not only related more copiously and continuously than any events preceding it, but is also ushered in with an unusual solemnity of religious and poetical accompaniment, so that the seventh Book of Herodotus reminds us in many points of the second Book of the *Iliad*; probably too, if the lost Grecian epics had reached us, we should trace many other cases in which the imagination of the historian has unconsciously assimilated itself to them. The Dream sent by the Gods to frighten Xerxes, when about to recede from his project—as well as the ample catalogue of nations and eminent individuals embodied in the Persian host—have both of them marked parallels in the *Iliad*: and Herodotus seems to delight in representing to himself the enterprise against Greece as an antithesis to that of the *Atreidæ* against Troy. He enters into the internal feeling of Xerxes with as much familiarity as Homer into those of Agamemnon, and introduces "the counsel of Zeus" as not less direct, special, and overruling, than it appears in the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*:¹ though the God-

¹ Homer, *Iliad*, i. 3. Διὸς δ' ἐν-
 λειρο βουλῇ. Herodotus is charac-
 terized as Ὀμήρου ζηλωτής—Ὀμηρικώ-

τατος—(Dionys. Halic. ad Cn. Pom-
 peium, p. 772, Reiske; Longinus De
 Sublim. p. 86, ed. Pearce).

head in Herodotus, compared with Homer, tends to become neuter instead of masculine or feminine, and retains only the jealous instincts of a ruler, apart from the appetites, lusts, and caprices of a man: acting moreover chiefly as a centralized, or at least as a homogeneous force, in place of the discordant severalty of agents conspicuous in the Homeric theology. The religious idea, so often presented elsewhere in Herodotus—that the Godhead was jealous and hostile to excessive good fortune or immoderate desires in man,—is worked into his history of Xerxes as the ever-present moral and as the main cause of its disgraceful termination. For we shall discover as we proceed, that the historian, with that honourable frankness which Plutarch calls his “malignity,” neither ascribes to his countrymen credit greater than they deserve for personal valour, nor seeks to veil the many chances of defeat which their mismanagement laid open.¹

I have already mentioned that Xerxes is described as having originally been averse to the enterprise, and only stimulated thereto by the persuasions of Mardonius. This was probably the genuine Persian belief, for the blame of

¹ While Plutarch (if indeed the treatise de Herodoti Malignitate be the work of Plutarch) treats Herodotus as uncandid, malicious, corrupt, the calumniator of great men and glorious deeds—Dionysius of Halikarnassus on the contrary, with more reason, treats him as a pattern of excellent dispositions in an historian, contrasting him in this respect with Thucydides, to whom he imputes an unfriendly spirit in criticising Athens, arising from his long banishment: ‘*Ἡ μὲν Ἡρόδοτος διδθεσις ἐν ἁπασιν ἐπικρίτης, καὶ τοῖς μὲν ἀγαθοῖς συνηθομένη, τοῖς δὲ κακοῖς συναλγοῦσα· ἡ δὲ Θουκυδίδου διδθεσις αὐθεκαστός τις καὶ πικρά, καὶ τῇ πατρίδι τῆς φυχῆς μνησικακοῦσα· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἀμαρτήματα ἐτερίζεται καὶ μάλα ἀκριβῶς, τῶν δὲ κατὰ τοὺν κεχωρηκότων καθάπαξ οὐ μέμνηται ἢ ὥσπερ ἠναγκασμένος.*’ (Dionys. Hal. ad Cn. Pompeium de Præcip. Historicis Judic. p. 774. Reiske.)

Precisely the same fault which Dionysius here imputes to Thucydides (though in other places he acquits him, ἀπὸ παντὸς φθόνου καὶ πάσης κολακείας, p. 824), Plutarch and Dio cast far more harshly upon Herodotus. In neither case is the reproach deserved.

Both the moralists and rhetoricians of ancient times were very apt to treat history, not as a series of true matters of fact, exemplifying the laws of human nature and society, and enlarging our knowledge of them for purposes of future inference—but as if it were a branch of fiction, so to be handled as to please our taste or improve our morality. Dionysius, blaming Thucydides for the choice of his subject, goes so far as to say that the Peloponnesian war, a period of ruinous discord in Greece, ought to have been left in oblivion and never to have passed into history (στοιχῇ καὶ λήθῃ παραδοθῆναι, ὑπὸ τῶν ἐπιγυγγομένων ἡγοῦσθαι, *ibid.* p. 768)—and that especially Thucydides ought never to have thrown the blame of it upon his own city, since there were many other causes to which it might have been imputed (ἐτέραις ἔχοντα πολλὰς ἀφορμαῖς περιέφαι τὰς αἰτίας, p. 770). It will be found, however, if we read Thucydides with attention, that he does not throw the blame of the Peloponnesian war upon Athens, whatever may be thought of his strictures on her conduct in various particular cases.

so great a disaster would naturally be transferred from the monarch to some evil counsellor.¹ As soon as Xerxes, yielding to persuasion, has announced, to the Persian chief men whom he had convoked, his resolution to bridge over the Hellespont and march to the conquest of Greece and Europe, Mardonius is represented as expressing his warm concurrence in the project, extolling the immense force² of Persia, and depreciating the Ionians in Europe (so he denominated them) as so poor and disunited that success was not only certain but easy. Against the rashness of this general—the evil genius of Xerxes—we find opposed the prudence and long experience of Artabanus, brother of the deceased Darius, and therefore uncle to the monarch. The age and relationship of this Persian Nestor embolden him to undertake the dangerous task of questioning the determination which Xerxes, though professing to invite the opinions of others, had proclaimed as already settled in his own mind. The speech which Herodotus puts into the mouth of Artabanus is that of a thoughtful and religious Greek. It opens with the Grecian conception of the necessity of hearing and comparing opposite views, prior to any final decision—reproves Mardonius for falsely depreciating the Greeks and seducing his master into personal danger—sets forth the probability that the Greeks, if victorious at sea, would come and destroy the bridge by which Xerxes had crossed the Hellespont—reminds the latter of the imminent hazard which Darius and his army had undergone in Scythia, from the destruction (averted only by Histæus and his influence) of the bridge over the Danube: such prudential suggestions being further strengthened by adverting to the jealous aversion of the Godhead towards overgrown human power.³

The impatient monarch silences his uncle in a tone of insult and menace: nevertheless, in spite of himself, the dissuasions work upon him so powerfully, that before night they gradually alter his resolution, and decide him to renounce the scheme. In this latter disposition he falls asleep, when a dream appears:

Xerxes is induced by Artabanus to renounce his project—his repeated dreams—divine command to invade Greece.

¹ Herodot. viii. 99. Μαρδόνιον ἐν αἰτίῃ τιθέντες: compare c. 100.

² Herodot. vii. 9.

³ Herodot. vii. 10.

a tall stately man stands over him, denounces his change of opinion, and peremptorily commands him to persist in the enterprise as announced. In spite of this dream, Xerxes still adheres to his altered purpose, assembles his council the next morning, and after apologising for his angry language towards Artabanus, acquaints them to their great joy that he adopts the recommendations of the latter, and abandons his project against Greece. But in the following night, no sooner has Xerxes fallen asleep, than the same dream and the same figure again appear to him, repeating the previous command in language of terrific menace. The monarch, in a state of great alarm, springs from his bed and sends for Artabanus, whom he informs of the twice-repeated vision and divine mandate interdicting his change of resolution. "If (says he) it be the absolute will of God that this expedition against Greece should be executed, the same vision will appear to thee also, provided thou puttest on my attire, sittest in my throne, and sleepest in my bed."¹ Not without reluctance, Artabanus obeys this order (for it was high treason in any Persian to sit upon the regal throne²), but he at length complies, expecting to be able to prove to Xerxes that the dream deserved no attention. "Many dreams (he says) are not of divine origin, nor anything better than mere wandering objects such as we have been thinking upon during the day: this dream, of whatever nature it may be, will not be foolish enough to mistake me for the king, even if I be in the royal attire and bed; but if it shall still continue to appear to thee, I shall myself confess it to be divine."³ Accordingly Artabanus is placed in the regal throne and bed, and as soon as he falls asleep, the very same figure shows itself to him also, saying, "Art thou he who dissuadest Xerxes, on the plea of solicitude for his safety, from marching against Greece? Xerxes has already been

¹ Herodot. vii. 15. *Εἰ ἄν θεός ᾖσι δ' ἐπιέμῃων καὶ οἱ πάντως ἐν ἡδονῇ ᾖσι γενέσθαι στρατηλασίην ἐπὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα, ἐπιστήσεται καὶ σοὶ ταῦτ' οὗτο ὕπνιον, ὁμοίως καὶ ἐμοὶ ἐντελλόμενον. Εὐρίσκω δὲ ὅδε ἂν γινόμενα ταῦτα, εἰ λάβοις τὴν ἐμὴν σκευὴν πᾶσαν, καὶ ἐνθὺς, μετὰ ταῦτα ἴσαιο ἐς τὸν ἐμὸν θρόνον, καὶ ἔπειτα ἐν κοίτῃ τῇ ἐμῇ κατυπνώσῃαι. Compare vii. 8. θεός τε οὕτω ἔγει, &c.*

² See Brissonius, *De Regno Persarum*, lib. i. p. 27.

³ Herodot. vii. 16. *Οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἐς τοσούτ' γε εὐθιγέης ἀνέκει τοῦτο, δτι δὴ κοτὲ ᾖσι τὸ ἐπιφαινόμενόν τοι ἐν τῷ ὕπνῳ, ὥστε δόξει ἐμὲ δρῶν σε δρᾶν, τῇ σῇ ἰσθῆτι τεκμαίρομενον. . . . εἰ γὰρ δὴ ἐπιφουτῆσειε γε συνεχέως, φαίην ἂν καὶ αὐτὸς θεῖον εἶναι.*

forewarned of that which he will suffer if he disobeys, and thou too shalt not escape either now or in future, for seeking to avert that which must and shall be." With these words the vision assumes a threatening attitude, as though preparing to burn out the eyes of Artabanus with hot irons, when the sleeper awakens in terror, and runs to communicate with Xerxes. "I have hitherto, O king, recommended to thee to rest contented with that vast actual empire on account of which all mankind think thee happy; but since the divine impulsion is now apparent, and since destruction from on high is prepared for the Greeks, I too alter my opinion, and advise thee to command the Persians as God directs; so that nothing may be found wanting on thy part for that which God puts into thy hands."¹

It is thus that Herodotus represents the great expedition of Xerxes to have originated; partly in the rashness of Mardonius, who reaps his bitter reward on the field of battle at Plataea—but still more in the influence of "mischievous Oneiros," who is sent by the gods (as in the second book of the *Iliad*) to put a cheat upon Xerxes, and even to overrule by terror both his scruples and those of Artabanus. The gods having determined (as in the instances of Astyagês, Polykratês, and others) that the Persian empire shall undergo signal humiliation and repulse at the hands of the Greeks, constrain the Persian monarch into a ruinous enterprise against his own better judgement. Such religious imagination is not to be regarded as peculiar to Herodotus, but as common to him with his contemporaries generally, Greeks as well as Persians, though peculiarly stimulated among the Greeks by the abundance of their epic or quasi-historical poetry. Modified more or less in each individual narrator, it is made to supply connecting links as well as initiating causes for the great events of history. As a cause for this expedition, incom-

¹ Herodot. vii. 18. Ἐπεὶ δὲ δαιμονίη τις γίγνεται ὄρυξ, καὶ Ἕλληνας, ὡς δοκεῖ, φόβῳ τὶς καταλαμβάνει θεήλατος, ἐγὼ μὲν καὶ αὐτὸς τράπομαι, καὶ τὴν γνώμην μετατίθεμαι Ποίει δὲ οὕτω δίκως, τοῦ θεοῦ παραδιδόντος, τῶν σῶν ἐνδεήσεται μηδέν.

The expression τοῦ θεοῦ παραδιδόν-

τος in this place denotes what is expressed by τὸ χρίον γίγνεσθαι, c. 17. The dream threatens Artabanus and Xerxes for trying to turn aside the current of destiny—or in other words, to contravene the predetermined will of the gods.

parably the greatest fact and the most fertile in consequences, throughout the political career both of Greeks and Persians, nothing less than a special interposition of the gods would have satisfied the feelings either of one nation or the other. The story of the dream has its rise (as Herodotus tell us¹) in Persian fancy, and is in some sort a consolation for the national vanity; but it is turned and coloured by the Grecian historian, who mentions also a third dream, which appears to Xerxes after his resolution to march was finally taken, and which the mistake of the Magian interpreters falsely construed² into an encouragement, though it really threatened ruin. How much this religious conception of the sequence of events belongs to the age, appears by the fact, that it not only appears in Pindar and the Attic tragedians generally, but pervades especially the Persæ of Æschylus, exhibited seven years after the battle of Salamis—in which we find the premonitory dreams as well as the jealous enmity of the gods towards vast power and overweening aspirations in man;³ though without any of that inclination, which Herodotus seems to have derived from Persian informants, to exculpate Xerxes by representing him as disposed himself to sober counsels, but driven in a contrary direction by the irresistible fiat of the gods.⁴

¹ Herodot. vii. 12. Καὶ δὲ καὶ ἐν τῇ νυκτὶ εἶδε ὅψιν τοιήδε, ὡς λέγεται ἐν τῷ Περσέων.

Herodotus seems to use *δρεῖπος* in the neuter gender, not *δρεῖπος* in the masculine: for the alteration of Bähr (ad vii. 16) of *δῶντα* in place of *δῶντος*, is not at all called for. The masculine gender *δρεῖπος* is commonly used in Homer; but there are cases of the neuter *δρεῖπον*.

Respecting the influence of dreams in determining the enterprises of the early Turkish sultans, see von Hammer, *Geschichte des Osmanischen Reichs*, book ii. vol. i. p. 49.

² Compare the dream of Darius Codomannus, Plutarch, Alexander, c. 18. Concerning the punishment inflicted by Astyages on the Magians for misinterpreting his dreams, see Herodot. i. 128.

Philochorus, skilled in divination, affirmed that Nikias put a totally wrong interpretation upon that fatal eclipse of the moon which induced him to delay

his retreat, and proved his ruin (Plutarch, Nikias, c. 23).

³ Æschylus, Pers. 96, 104, 181, 220, 368, 745, 825: compare Sophocles, Ajax, 129, 744, 775, and the end of the Oedipus Tyrannus; Euripid, Hecub. 58; Pindar, Olymp. viii. 86; Isthm. vi. 39; Pausanias, ii. 33, 3. Compare the sense of the word *δεισιδαίμων* in Xenophon, Agesilaus, c. 11, sect. 8.—“the man who in the midst of success fears the envious gods”—opposed to the person who confides in continuance of success: and Klausen, *Theologumena Æschyli*, p. 18.

⁴ The manner in which Herodotus groups together the facts of his history in obedience to certain religious and moral sentiments in his own mind, is well set forth in Hoffmeister, *Sittlich-religiöse Lebensansicht des Herodotos*, Essen, 1832, especially sects. 21, 22, pp. 112 *seq.* Hoffmeister traces the veins of sentiment, running through, and often overlaying or transforming, the

While we take due notice of those religious conceptions with which both the poet and the historian surround this vast

matters of fact through a considerable portion of the nine books. He does not, perhaps, sufficiently advert to the circumstance, that the informants from whom Herodotus collected his facts were for the most part imbued with sentiments similar to himself; so that the religious and moral vein pervaded more or less his original materials, and did not need to be added by himself. There can be little doubt that the priests, the ministers of temples and oracles, the exegetæ or interpreting guides around these holy places—were among his chief sources for instructing himself: a stranger, visiting so many different cities, must have been constantly in a situation to have no other person whom he could consult. The temples were interesting both in themselves and in the trophies and offerings which they exhibited, while the persons belonging to them were (as a general rule) accessible and communicative to strangers, as we may see both from Pausanias and Plutarch—both of whom, however, had books before them also to consult, which Herodotus hardly had at all. It was not only the priests and ministers of temples in Egypt, of Hēraklēs at Tyre, and of Bélus at Babylon, that Herodotus questioned (i. 181; ii. 3, 44, 143), but also those of Delphi Δελφῶν οἶδα ἐγὼ οὕτως ἀκούσαι γινέσθαι, i. 20: compare i. 91, 92, 51; Dōdōna (ii. 52): of the Ismenian Apollo at Thebes (v. 59); of Athēnē Alea at Tegea (i. 66); of Dēmētēr at Paros (vi. 134—if not the priests, at least persons full of temple inspirations); of Halus in Achaia Phthiōtis (vii. 197); of the Kabeiri in Thrace (ii. 51); of persons connected with the Herōon of Proteus in the Chersonese (ix. 116, 120). The facts which these persons communicated to him were always presented along with associations referring to their own functions or religious sentiments, so that Herodotus did not introduce anything new when he incorporated them as such in his history. The treatise of Plutarch—"Cur Pythia nunc non reddat Oracula Carmine"—affords an instructive description of the ample and multifarious narratives given by the expositors at Delphi, respecting the eminent persons and events of Grecian history, to satisfy

visitors who came full of curiosity—φιλοθεάμονες, φιλόλογοι and φιλομαθεῖς (Plutarch, *ih.* p. 394)—such as Herodotus was in a high degree. Compare pp. 396, 397, 400, 407, of the same treatise: also Plutarch *De Defectu Oraculorum*, p. 417—οἱ Δελφῶν θεολόγοι &c. Plutarch remarks that in his time political life was extinguished in Greece, and that the questions put to the Pythian priestess related altogether to private and individual affairs; whereas, in earlier times, almost all political events came somehow or other under her cognizance, either by questions to be answered, or by commemorative public offerings (p. 407). In the time of Herodotus, the great temples, especially those of Delphi and Olympia, were interwoven with the whole web of Grecian political history. See the Dissertation of Preller, annexed to his edition of Polemonis Fragmenta, c. 3, p. 157-162; *De Historia atque Arte Periegetarum*; also K. F. Hermann, *Gottesdienstliche Alterthümer der Griechen*, part I. ch. 12, p. 52.

The religious interpretation of historical phenomena is thus not peculiar to Herodotus, but belongs to him in common with his informants and his age generally, as indeed Hoffmeister observes (p. 31-136): though it is remarkable to notice the frankness with which he (as well as the contemporary poets: see the references in Monk, Eurip. *Alceis*, 1154) predicates envy and jealousy of the gods, in cases where the conduct which he supposes them to pursue, is really such as would deserve that name in a man,—and such as he himself ascribes to the despot (iii. 80). He does not think himself obliged to call the gods just and merciful while he is attributing to them acts of envy and jealousy in their dealing with mankind. But the religious interpretation does not reign alone throughout the narrative of Herodotus: it is found side by side with careful sifting of fact and specification of positive, definite, appreciable causes: and this latter vein is what really distinguished the historian from his age,—forming the preparation for Thucydides, in whom it appears predominant and almost exclusive. See this point illustrated in Creuzer, *His-*

conflict of Greeks and barbarians, we need look no farther than ambition and revenge for the real motives of the invasion. Considering that it had been a pro-^{Vast preparations of Xerxes.} claimed project in the mind of Darius for three years previous to his death, there was no probability that his son and successor would gratuitously renounce it. Shortly after the reconquest of Egypt, Xerxes began to make his preparations, the magnitude of which attested the strength of his resolve as well as the extent of his designs. The satraps and subordinate officers, throughout the whole range of his empire, received orders to furnish the amplest quota of troops and munitions of war—horse and foot, ships of war, horse-transport, provisions, or supplies of various kinds, according to the circumstances of the territory; while rewards were held out to those who should execute the orders most efficiently. For four entire years these preparations were carried on, and as we are told that similar preparations had been going forward during the three years preceding the death of Darius, though not brought to any ultimate result, we cannot doubt that the maximum of force, which the empire could possibly be made to furnish,¹ was now brought to execute the schemes of Xerxes.

The Persian empire was at this moment more extensive than ever it will appear at any subsequent period; for it comprised maritime Thrace and Macedonia as far as the borders of Thessaly, and nearly all the islands of the Ægean north of Krete and east of Eubœa—including even the Cyclades. There existed Persian forts and garrisons at Doriskus, Eion, and other places on the coast of Thrace, while Abdëra with the other Grecian settlements on that coast were numbered among the tributaries of Susa.² It is

torische Kunst der Griechen, Abschnitt iii. pp. 150-159.

Jäger (Disputationes Herodotæ, p. 16, Göttingen, 1828) professes to detect evidences of old age (senile ingenium) in the moralising colour which overspreads the history of Herodotus, but which I believe to have belonged to his middle and mature age not less than to his latter years—if indeed he lived to be very old, which is noway proved, except upon reasons which I have already disputed. See Bähr, Com-

mentatio de Vitâ et Scriptis Herodoti, in the fourth volume of his edition, c. 6. p. 388.

¹ Herodot. vii. 19. *χῶρον πάντα ἱερυνῶν τῆς ἡπείρου.*

² Herodot. vii. 106. *Κατίστασαν γὰρ ἴτι πρότερον ταύτης τῆς ἐξελδοῖς (i. e. the invasion by Xerxes) ὅπαρχοι ἐν τῇ Θρηίκῃ καὶ τοῦ Ἑλλησπόντου πανταχῇ.* vii. 108. *ἰδεοῦλωτο γὰρ, ὥς καὶ πρότερόν μοι δεδήλωται, ἡ μέχρι Θεσσαλίας πῶσα, καὶ ἣν ὑπὸ βασιλῆα δασμοφόροι, Μεγαβάου τε καταστρεψάμενον καὶ ὕστερον*

necessary to bear in mind these boundaries of the empire, at the time when Xerxes mounted the throne, as compared with its reduced limits at the later time of the Peloponnesian war—partly that we may understand the apparent chances of success to his expedition, as they presented themselves both to the Persians and to the *medising* Greeks—partly that we may appreciate the after-circumstances connected with the formation of the Athenian maritime empire.

In the autumn of the year 481 B.C., the vast army thus raised by Xerxes arrived, from all quarters of the empire, at or near to Sardis; a large portion of it having been directed to assemble at Kritala in Kapadokia, on the eastern side of the Halys, where it was joined by Xerxes himself on the road from Susa.¹ From thence he crossed the Halys, and marched through Phrygia and Lydia, passing through the Phrygian towns of Kelænæ, Anaua, and Kolossæ, and the Lydian town of Kallatêbus, until he reached Sardis, where winter-quarters were prepared for him. But this land force, vast as it was (respecting its numbers, I shall speak farther presently), was not all that the empire had been required to furnish. Xerxes had determined to attack Greece, not by traversing the Ægean, as Datis had passed to Eretria and Marathon, but by a land force and fleet at once; the former crossing the Hellespont, and marching through Thrace, Macedonia, and Thessaly; while the latter was intended to accompany and co-operate. A fleet of 1207 ships of war, besides numerous vessels of service and burthen, had been assembled on the Hellespont and on the coasts of Thrace and Ionia; moreover Xerxes, with a degree of forethought much exceeding that of his father Darius in the Scythian expedition, had directed the formation of large magazines of provisions at suitable maritime stations along the line of march, from the Hellespont to the Strymonic Gulf. During the four years of military preparation there had been time to bring together great quantities of flour and other essential articles from Asia and Egypt.²

March of Xerxes from the interior of Asia—collection of the invading army at Sardis—his numerous fleet and large magazines of provision before-hand.

Μαρόνιον; also vii. 59, and Xenophon, Memorab. iii. 5, 11. Compare Æschylus, Pers. 871-896, and the vision ascribed to Cyrus in reference to his suc-

cessor Darius, covering with his wings both Europe and Asia (Herodot. i. 209).

¹ Herodot. vii. 26-31.

² Herodot. vii. 23-25.

If the whole contemporary world were overawed by the vast assemblage of men and muniments of war, which Xerxes thus brought together, so much transcending all past, we might even say all subsequent, experience—they were no less astounded by two enterprises which entered into his scheme—the bridging of the Hellespont, and the cutting of a ship-canal through the isthmus of Mount Athos. For the first of the two there had indeed been a precedent, since Darius about thirty-five years before had caused a bridge to be thrown over the Thracian Bosphorus, and crossed it in his march to Scythia. Yet this bridge of Darius, though constructed by the Ionians and by a Samian Greek, having had reference only to distant regions, seems to have been little known or little thought of among the Greeks generally, as we may infer from the fact that the poet Æschylus¹ speaks as if he had never heard of it; while the bridge of Xerxes was ever remembered both by Persians and by Greeks as a most imposing display of Asiatic omnipotence. The bridge of boats—or rather the two separate bridges not far removed from each other,—which Xerxes caused to be thrown across the Hellespont, stretched from the neighbourhood of Abydos on the Asiatic side to the coast between Sestos and Madytus on the European, where the strait is about an English mile in breadth. The execution of the work was at first entrusted, not to Greeks, but to Phœnicians and Egyptians, who had received orders long beforehand to prepare cables of extraordinary strength and size expressly for the purpose; the material used by the Phœnicians was flax, that employed by the Egyptians was the fibre of the papyrus. Already had the work been completed and announced to Xerxes as available for transit, when a storm arose, so violent as altogether to ruin it. The wrath of the monarch, when apprised of this catastrophe, burst all bounds. It was directed partly against the chief engineers, whose heads he caused to be struck off,² but partly also against the Hellespont itself. He commanded that the strait

He throws a bridge of boats across the Hellespont.

The bridge is destroyed by a storm—wrath of Xerxes—he puts to death the engineers and punishes the Hellespont.

¹ Æschylus, Pers. 731, 754, 873.

² Plutarch (*De Tranquillitate Animi*, p. 470) speaks of them as having had their noses and ears cut off.

should be scourged with 300 lashes, and that a set of fetters should be let down into it as a farther punishment. Moreover Herodotus had heard, but does not believe, that he even sent irons for the purpose of branding it. "Thou bitter water (exclaimed the scourgers while inflicting this punishment), this is the penalty which our master inflicts upon thee, because thou hast wronged him though he hath never wronged thee. King Xerxes *will* cross thee, whether thou wilt or not; but thou deservest not sacrifice from any man, because thou art a treacherous river of (useless) salt water."¹

Such were the insulting terms heaped by order of Xerxes on the rebellious Hellespont. Herodotus calls them "non-Hellenic and blasphemous terms," which together with their brevity leads us to believe that he gives them as he heard them, and that they are not of his own invention, like so many other speeches in his work, where he dramatises, as it were, a given position. It has been common however to set aside in this case not merely the words, but even the main incident of punishment inflicted on the Hellespont,² as a mere Greek fable rather than a real fact; the extreme childishness and absurdity of the proceeding giving to it the air of an enemy's calumny. But this reason will not appear sufficient, if we transport ourselves back to the time and to the party concerned. To transfer to inanimate objects the sensitive as well as the willing and designing attributes of human beings, is among the early and wide-spread instincts of mankind, and one of the primitive forms of religion. And although the enlargement of reason and experience gradually displaces this elementary Fetichism, banishing it from the regions of reality into those of conventional fiction—yet the force of momentary passion will often suffice to supersede

Remarks on this story of the punishment inflicted on the Hellespont: there is no sufficient reason for disbelieving its reality.

¹ Herodot. vii. 34, 35. ἐντέλλετο δὲ ὁ βασιλεύωντας, λέγειν βάρβαρά τε καὶ ἀτάσθαλα, ὅτι πικρὸν ὕδωρ, δεσπότης τοι δίκην ἐπιτίθει τήνδε, ὅτι μιν ἠδίκησας, οὐδὲν πρὸς ἐκείνου ἔδικον παῖός. Καὶ βασιλεὺς μὲν Εἰρένης διαβήσεται σε, ἣν τε σύ γε βούλῃ, ἣν τε καὶ μή σοι δὲ κατὰ δίκην ἄρα οὐδεὶς ἀνθρώπων θύει, ὥς ἔδωκε δουλεῖν τε καὶ ἄλμυρόν ποταμόν.

The assertion that no one was in the habit of sacrificing to the Hellespont—

appears strange, when we look to the subsequent conduct of Xerxes himself (vii. 53): compare vii. 113, and vi. 76. The epithet *salt*, employed as a reproach, seems to allude to the undrinkable character of the water.

² See Stanley and Blomfield ad Æschyl. Pers. 731, and K. O. Müller (in his Review of Benjamin Constant's work *Sur la Religion*), *Kleine Schriften*, vol. ii. p. 59.

the acquired habit: and even an intelligent man¹ may be impelled in a moment of agonizing pain to kick or beat the lifeless object from which he has suffered. By the old procedure, never formally abolished, though gradually disused at Athens—an inanimate object which had caused the death of a man was solemnly tried and cast out of the border. And the Arcadian youths, when they returned hungry from an unsuccessful day's hunting,² scourged and pricked the god Pan or his statue by way of revenge. Much more may we suppose a young Persian monarch, corrupted by universal subservience around him, to be capable of thus venting an insane wrath. The vengeance exercised by Cyrus on the river Gyndès (which he caused to be divided into three hundred and sixty streamlets, because one of his sacred horses had been drowned in it), affords a fair parallel to the scourging of the Hellespont by Xerxes. To offer sacrifice to rivers, and to testify in this manner gratitude for service rendered by rivers, was a familiar rite in the ancient religion. While the grounds for distrusting the narrative are thus materially weakened, the positive evidence will be found very forcible. The expedition of Xerxes took place when Herodotus was about four years old, so that he afterwards enjoyed ample opportunity of conversing with persons who had witnessed and taken part in it: and the whole of his narrative shows

¹ See Auguste Comte, *Traité de Philosophie Positive*, vol. v. leçon 52, pp. 40, 46.

² See Wachsmuth, *Hellenische Alterthümer*, 2. i. p. 320, and K. F. Hermann, *Griech. Staatsalterthümer*, sect. 104.

For the manner in which Cyrus dealt with the river Gyndès, see Herodot. i. 202. The Persian satrap Pharnuchès was thrown from his horse at Sardis, and received an injury of which he afterwards died: he directed his attendants to lead the horse to the place where the accident had happened, to cut off all his legs, and leave him to perish there (Herodot. vii. 88). The kings of Macedonia offered sacrifice even during the time of Herodotus, to the river which had been the means of preserving the life of their ancestor Perdikas; after he had crossed it, the stream swelled and arrested his pursuers (Herodot. viii. 138): see an analogous story about the

inhabitants of Apollonia and the river Aëus, Valerius, *Maxim.* i. 5, 2.

After the death of the great boxer, wrestler, &c., Theagènes of Thasus, a statue was erected to his honour. A personal enemy, perhaps one of the 1400 defeated competitors, came every night to gratify his wrath and revenge by flogging the statue. One night the statue fell down upon this scourger and killed him; upon which his relatives indicted the statue for murder: it was found guilty by the Thasians, and thrown into the sea. The gods however were much displeased with the proceeding, and visited the Thasians with continued famine, until at length a fisherman by accident fished up the statue, and it was restored to its place (Pausan. vi. 11. 2). Compare the story of the statue of Hermès in Babrius, *Fabul.* 119, edition of Mr. Lewis.

that he availed himself largely of such access to information. Besides, the building of the bridge across the Hellespont, and all the incidents connected with it, were acts necessarily known to many witnesses, and therefore the more easily verified. The decapitation of the unfortunate engineers was an act fearfully impressive, and even the scourging of the Hellespont, while essentially public, appears to Herodotus¹ (as well as to Arrian afterwards), not childish, but impious. The more attentively we balance, in the case before us, the positive testimony against the intrinsic negative probabilities, the more shall we be disposed to admit without diffidence the statement of our original historian.

New engineers—perhaps Greek along with, or in place of, Phœnicians and Egyptians—were immediately directed to recommence the work, which Herodotus now describes in detail, and which was executed with increased care and solidity. To form the two bridges, two lines of ships—triremes and pentekonters blended together—were moored across the strait breastwise, with their sterns towards the Euxine and their heads towards the Ægean, the stream flowing always rapidly from the former towards the latter.² They were moored by anchors head and

Reconstruction of the bridge—description of it in detail.

¹ Herodot. vii. 35-54: compare viii. 109. Arrian, Exp. Alex. vii. 14. 9.

² Herodot. vii. 36. The language in which Herodotus describes the position of these ships which formed the two bridges, seems to me to have been erroneously or imperfectly apprehended by most of the commentators: see the notes of Bähr, Kruse, Wesseling, Rennell, and especially Larcher: Schweighæuser is the most satisfactory.—τοῦ μὲν Πόντου ἐπικαρσίας, τοῦ δὲ Ἑλλησπόντου κατὰ ῥέον. The explanation given by Tzetzes of ἐπικαρσίας by the word πλαγίας seems to me hardly exact: it means, not *oblique* but *at right angles with*. The course of the Bosphorus and Hellespont, flowing out of the Euxine sea, is conceived by the historian as meeting that sea at right angles; and the ships, which were moored near together along the current of the strait, taking the line of each from head to stern, were therefore also at right angles with the Euxine sea. Moreover Herodotus does not mean to distinguish the two bridges hereby, and to say that the ships of the one bridge

were τοῦ Πόντου ἐπικαρσίας, and those of the other bridge τοῦ Ἑλλησπόντου κατὰ ῥέον, as Bähr and other commentators suppose: *both* the predicates apply alike to *both* the bridges,—as indeed it stands to reason that the arrangement of ships best for one bridge must also have been best for the other. Respecting the meaning of ἐπικαρσίας in Herodotus, see iv. 101; i. 180. In the Odyssey (ix. 70: compare Eustath. ad loc.) ἐπικαρσίας does not mean oblique, but heallong before the wind: compare ἐπικαρ, Iliad, xviii. 392. So in the position of the ships as described by Herodotus, if the wind blew from the Euxine, it would be right abaft of them.

The circumstance stated by Herodotus, that in the bridge higher up the stream or nearest to the Euxine, there were in all 360 vessels, while in the other bridge there were no more than 314,—has perplexed the commentators and induced them to resort to inconvenient explanations—as that of saying, that in the higher bridge the vessels

stern, and by very long cables. The number of ships placed to carry the bridge nearest to the Euxine was three hundred

were moored not in a direct line across, but in a line slanting, so that the extreme vessel on the European side was lower down the stream than the extreme vessel on the Asiatic side. This is one of the false explanations given of *ἑλικασίας* (*slanting, schräg*): while the idea of Gronovius and Larcher, that the vessels in the higher bridge presented their *broadside* to the current, is still more inadmissible. But the difference in the number of ships employed in the one bridge compared with the other, seems to admit of an easier explanation. We need not suppose, nor does Herodotus say, that the two bridges were quite close together: considering the multitude which had to cross them, it would be convenient that they should be placed at a certain distance from each other. If they were a mile or two apart, we may well suppose that the breadth of the strait was not exactly the same in the two places chosen, and that it may have been broader at the point of the upper bridge—which moreover might require to be made more secure, as having to meet the first force of the current. The greater number of vessels in the upper bridge will thus be accounted for in a simple and satisfactory manner.

In some of the words used by Herodotus there appears an obscurity: they run thus—*ἑξήκοντα δὲ ὤδε Περσικὸν τέρας καὶ τριήρας συνθέντες, ὑπὸ μὲν τὴν* (these words are misprinted in Bähr's edition) *πρὸς τοῦ Εὐξείνου Πόντου, ἐξήκοντά τε καὶ τριηκοσίας, ὑπὸ δὲ τὴν ἑτέρην τέσσαρες καὶ δέκα καὶ τριηκοσίας (τοῦ μὲν Πόντου, ἑλικασίας, τοῦ δὲ Ἑλλησπόντου κατὰ ῥόον), ἵνα ἀνακωχέω τὸντόνον τῶν ὅλων συνθέντες δὲ, ἀγκύρας κατήκασαν περιμήκειας, &c.*

There is a difficulty respecting the words *ἵνα ἀνακωχέω τὸντόνον τῶν ὅλων*—what is the nominative case to this verb? Bähr says in his note, *sc. ὁ ῥόος*, and he construes *τῶν ὅλων* to mean the cables whereby the anchors were held fast. But if we read farther on, we shall see that *τὰ ὅπλα* mean, not the anchor-cables, but the cables which were stretched across from shore to shore to form the bridge: the very same words *τῶν ὅλων τοῦτόνον*, applied to these latter cables, occur a few lines afterwards. I think that the nominative

case belonging to *ἀνακωχέω* is *ἡ γέφυρα* (not *ὁ ῥόος*), and that the words from *τοῦ μὲν Πόντου* down to *ῥόος* are to be read parenthetically, as I have printed them above: the express object for which the ships were moored was, "that the bridge might hold up, or sustain, the tension of its cables stretched across from shore to shore." I admit that we should naturally expect *ἀνακωχέωσι*, and not *ἀνακωχέω*, since the proposition would be true of *both* bridges; but though this makes an awkward construction, it is not inadmissible, since each bridge had been previously described in the singular number.

Bredow and others accuse Herodotus of ignorance and incorrectness in this description of the bridges, but there seems nothing to bear out this charge.

Herodotus (iv. 85), Strabo, (xiii. p. 591), and Pliny (H. N. iv. 12; vi. 1) give seven stadia as the breadth of the Hellespont in its narrowest part. Dr. Pococke also assigns the same breadth: Tournefort allows about a mile (vol. ii. lett. 4). Some modern French measurements give the distance as something considerably greater—1130 or 1150 toises (see Miot's note on his translation of Herodotus). The Duke of Ragusa states it at 790 toises (*Voyage en Turquie*, vol. ii. p. 164). If we suppose the breadth to be one mile or 5280 feet, 360 vessels at an average breadth of 14½ feet would exactly fill the space. Rennell says, "Eleven feet is the breadth of a barge: vessels of the size of the smallest coasting craft were adequate to the purpose of the bridge." (On the Geography of Herodotus, p. 127).

The recent measurements or estimates stated by Miot go much beyond Herodotus: that of the Duke of Ragusa nearly coincides with him. But we need not suppose that the vessels filled up entirely the whole breadth, without leaving any gaps between: we only know, that there were no gaps left large enough for a vessel in voyage to sail through, except in three specified places.

I avail myself of a second edition to notice some comments of Professor Dunbar upon this note, inserted in the critical remarks appended to the third edition of his Greek and English Lexicon, voc. *Ἑλικασίας*, Herodotus.

and sixty; the number in the other, three hundred and fourteen. Over each of the two lines of ships, across from

Mr. Dunbar differs from me, as well as well as from Liddell and Scott, in the meaning of the word *ἐπικαρπός*, but I do not perceive that he brings any convincing arguments. He says, that this adjective signifies "in a cross direction, and is opposed by Herodotus to *ὀρθός*, in a straight direction, and to *ὀθείας* (Herodot. iv. 101; i. 180)."

I have made reference in my note to both these passages, and they seem to me to bear out my meaning. In the latter of the two, it is not exact to say that *ἐπικαρπός* is opposed to *ὀθείας*: on the contrary, the two epithets are applied to the very same streets: "All the streets of Babylon (says Herodotus) are cut straight; those streets which run directly down to the river, as well as the rest."

It is true that in iv. 101, Herodotus contrasts, in a certain sense, *ἐπικαρπός* with *ὀρθός*. Speaking of the figure of Scythia, he says that it is a parallelogram, of which two sides forming an angle with each other, are lines of coast; while the other two sides run straight up into the interior (*ὀρθοὶ εἰς τὴν μεσόγειαν*) to a certain point of junction. To go from the coast into the interior is always conceived by a Greek as going upward—*ἄνω*; to come from inland to the coast, as coming downward, *κάτω*. Hence Herodotus says that these two sides go straight up into the interior. The other two sides of the parallelogram, which run along the coast, Herodotus calls *ἐπικαρπός*, falling in a straight line, or directly, upon the other two which run *ὀρθοὶ εἰς τὴν μεσόγειαν*. It is plain that if the two sides, which ran up into the interior and there joined each other, were straight, the other two sides of the parallelogram would be straight also: so that *ἐπικαρπός* in this passage does not bear any sense inconsistent with straightness.

In construing the passage—*Ἐξεύγυσαν δὲ ὧδε Πεντηκοντήρους καὶ τριηρέας συνθίτες, ὑπὸ μὲν τὴν πρὸς τοῦ Εὐξείνου Πόντου ἐξήκοντά τε καὶ τριηκοσίας, ὑπὸ δὲ τὴν ἑτέραν τεσσαρσκαίδεκα καὶ τριηκοσίας, (τοῦ μὲν Πόντου, ἐπικαρπός, τοῦ δὲ Ἑλληνιστοῦ, κατὰ βόαν) ἵνα ἀνακωχέωρ τὸν τόνον τῶν ὕλων*, Mr. Dunbar says, "Mr. Grote and the editors of Herodotus supply *γυφύραν* with *ὑπὸ μὲν τὴν*,

and *ὑπὸ δὲ τὴν ἑτέραν*. But I cannot conceive what rational meaning can be exacted from *ἐξεύγυσαν*—*ὑπὸ μὲν τὴν (γυφύραν)*, when the pentekonteres and the triremes formed the *γυφύραν*. There can (I imagine) be no doubt that *γῆν* or *χώραν* must be understood (which they very often are with the Greek writers); the *land*, namely, on each side of the strait: *ὑπὸ μὲν τὴν (γῆν)*, on the Asian side; *ὑπὸ δὲ τὴν ἑτέραν*, on the European side."

To deal first with Mr. Dunbar's objection to my meaning, which is the same as that of Bähr and others, I cannot admit his assertion, that "the pentekonteres and the triremes formed the *γυφύραν*." They formed the support of the bridge: standing in the same relation to it, as the piles of Waterloo Bridge stand to the bridge itself. Speaking largely, or for common purposes, indeed the bridge is understood to mean the whole construction, support and all; but the essential portion of the bridge is, the continuous way across from bank to bank, which, in the case of a narrow stream, may exist without any supports at all. Now the pentekonteres and triremes did not of themselves form any continuous way across: this was formed by the row of tight parallel cables laid over them, resting upon them, and stretching across from bank to bank. And Herodotus uses the preposition *ὑπὸ* which expresses this relation: the pentekonteres and triremes were put together side by side under the bridge; or rather, they were first put, and then the bridge of tightened cables was laid over or upon them.

Mr. Dunbar's supposition that the substantive belonging to *ὑπὸ μὲν τὴν*, &c. is *γῆν*—meaning the two opposite coasts, Asiatic and European—seems to me inadmissible. The words *τὴν πρὸς τοῦ Εὐξείνου Πόντου*, if you apply them to one of the two bridges, designate naturally enough the one which is highest up in the stream: but they cannot be employed to signify the Asiatic coast as distinguished from the European, for they have just as much reference to one as to the other. Nor can I think that the preposition *ὑπὸ* can be used to signify what Mr. Dunbar means.

shore to shore, were stretched six vast cables, which discharged the double function of holding the ships together,

Assuming even that it could properly be used to mean those ships which were moored near or close to the land, we must recollect that what Herodotus is here describing, is a series of ships lying near each other across the whole breadth of the stream. Of the larger portion of these ships it could never be said with any propriety, that they lay *ὑπὸ τὴν γῆν*—either *under* the Asiatic or European coast. Besides, on Mr. Dunbar's construction, Herodotus would be only describing *one* bridge, whereas there were undeniably *two*.

Mr. Dunbar's conception of the structure of the bridge differs essentially from mine, but I should lengthen this note too much by commenting upon it.

He contests my supposition that the two bridges may have been at some distance from each other, on the ground that both of them terminated in an *ἀκτὴ τραχὴ εἰς θάλασσαν κατήκουσα*, on the European side; and he translates *ἀκτὴ promontory* or *headland*. But *ἀκτὴ*, just as often, if not oftener—means a line of coast, stretching along for a considerable distance (see Herodot. iv. 38).

Again, he differs from me, and agrees with Bähr, in regard to the nominative case which is to be understood to the verb *ἀνακωχεύω*. He thinks that *ὁ ῥόος* is understood, not *ἡ γαφύρα*—observing:—

"How the bridge should keep the cables in a state of tension, I cannot comprehend. *ἵνα* must be referred to a cause immediately preceding and well-ascertained; and this can only be the *τεττ ρόος*. From the statement which the historian gives of the different modes of anchoring the two divisions, it would appear that it was necessary for the triremes to be moored in the direction of the current, in order that it might by its force *keep the cables taut*, and not allow them to swing." I confess, that I do not feel the difficulty which strikes Mr. Dunbar, in translating the words *ἵνα ἀνακωχεύῃ τὸν τόνον τῶν ὕλων*, in the way that I have proposed in an earlier part of this note. And I have already remarked that by the words *τὸν τόνον τῶν ὕλων*, Herodotus does not mean the anchor-cables, but the vast cables stretched across: as he himself again uses the phrase a few lines farther on—*κόσμη ἐπέτιθεσαν κατύπερθε τῶν ὕλων*

τοῦ τόνου, where Bähr and Schweighaeuser justly remark that it is equivalent to *κατύπερθε τῶν ὕλων ἐπιτεταμένων*. It might be possible to suppose *ἡ σύνθεσις* or *τὰ συντιθέμενα* (extracted out of the preceding participle *συνθέντες*) the understood nominative case to *ἀνακωχεύω*, which would get rid of the awkward construction of *γαφύρα* in the singular number—*Περσικοντίρους καὶ τριηρίας συνθέντες ἵνα ἀνακωχεύῃ (ἡ σύνθεσις τῶν τριηρίων) τὸν τόνον τῶν ὕλων, ἀγκύρας κατήκων περιμήκειας, &c.* For cases in which an unexpressed nominative case is extracted out of the verb preceding, compare Matthiæ, Gr. Gr. s. 295; and Kühner, Gr. Gr. s. 414.

Mr. Dunbar speaks "*of the different modes of anchoring the two divisions:*" and Bähr holds the same opinion. But as I understand Herodotus, he speaks of no such difference: all the ships, in both bridges, were anchored both ahead and astern, with their heads down the stream. *Συνθέντες δὲ ἀγκύρας κατήκων περιμήκειας, τὰς μὲν πρὸς τοῦ Πόντου τῆς ἐτέρας, τὰς ἀνίμων εἵκεον τῶν ἰσχυρῶν ἐκπνεύοντων, τῆς δὲ ἐτέρας, τῆς πρὸς ἰσπερίας τε καὶ τοῦ Αἰγαίου, ἐβρου τε καὶ νότον εἵκεον.* Bähr construes *τῆς ἐτέρας*—*τῆς δὲ ἐτέρας*—as if they agreed with *γαφύρας*, and as if the anchors of the ships belonging to one bridge had been let down at the extremity towards the Euxine—the anchors of those belonging to the other bridge at the extremity towards the Ægean. Surely this explanation cannot be received. If a ship beld by only one anchor, that anchor always must be at the extremity towards the Euxine; for the current of the Hellespont, which runs *from* the Euxine, would not permit it to be otherwise. Even if the anchor were originally let down at the head, when pointing to the Ægean, the force of the current would alter the position of the ship until the anchor came to be between the ship and the Euxine. Besides, it surely cannot be doubted, that the same mode of anchorage which was suitable for the ships of one bridge would also be suitable for those of the other. Moreover, the historian tells us that some anchors were intended to guard against the winds blowing out of the Euxine—others, to guard against those blowing out of the Ægean. Surely, each ship of each bridge would need to

and of supporting the bridge-way to be laid upon them. They were tightened by means of capstans on each shore: in three different places along the line, a gap was left between the ships for the purpose of enabling small trading vessels without masts, in voyage to or from the Euxine, to pass and repass beneath the cables.

Out of the six cables assigned to each bridge, two were of flax and four of papyrus, combined for the sake of increased strength; for it seems that in the bridges first made, which proved too weak to resist the winds, the Phoenicians had employed cables of flax for one bridge, the Egyptians those of papyrus for the other.¹ Over these again were laid planks of wood, sawn to the appropriate width, secured above by a second line of cables stretched across to keep them in their places. Lastly, upon this foundation the causeway itself was formed, out of earth and wood, with a palisade on each side high enough to prevent the cattle which passed over from seeing the water.

Xerxes cut
a ship-canal
across the
isthmus of
Mount
Athos.

The other great work which Xerxes caused to be performed for facilitating his march, was, the cutting through the isthmus which connects the stormy promontory of Mount Athos with the mainland.² That isthmus, near the point where it joins the mainland, was

be made fast against *both*. Compare Pindar, Olymp. vi. 101, δὲ ἀγκύραι. I construe the words τῆς ἐτέρης—τῆς δὲ ἐτέρης—differently from Bähr. It seems to me that they do not agree with γεφύρας, but with μέριδος, τελευτῆς, or some word indicating direction, or relative bearing; on the one side, on the other side, equivalent to *ἐνθεν μὲν, ἐνθεν δέ*. Sufficient vindication may be found of the use of the genitive case ἐτέρης in Matthiæ, Gr. Gr. § 377; Kühner, Gr. Gr. § 523. And in this case it coincides with the fundamental conception which these authors give us of a Greek Genitive—as designing the *whence*, or source from which an action arises. The anchors are conceived as *pulling* from one side and from the other side, against the dangerous winds when they blow.

¹ For the long celebrity of these cables, see the epigram of Archimælus, composed two centuries and a half afterwards in the time of Hiero II. of Syracuse, ap. Athenæum, v. 209.

Herodotus states that in thickness and compact make (παχυτῆς καὶ καλλονῇ) the cables of flax were equal to those of papyrus; but that in weight the former were superior; for each cubit in length of the flaxen cable weighed a talent; we can hardly reason upon this, because we do not know whether he means an Attic, an Euboic, or an Æginæan talent; nor, if he meant an Attic talent, whether it be an Attic talent of commerce, or of the monetary standard.

The cables contained in the Athenian dockyard are distinguished as *σχολία* ὀκτωδάκτυλα, ἑξαδάκτυλα—in which expressions, however, M. Boeckh cannot certainly determine whether circumference or diameter be meant: he thinks probably the former. See his learned book, *Das Seewesen der Athener*, ch. x. p. 165.

² For a specimen of the destructive storms near the promontory of Athos, see Ephorus, Fragment. 121, ed. Didot; Diodor. xiii. 41.

about twelve stadia (not quite so many furlongs) across, from the Strymonic to the Toronaic Gulf; and the canal dug by order of Xerxes was broad and deep enough for two triremes to sail abreast. In this work, too, as well as in the bridge across the Hellespont, the Phœnicians were found the ablest and most efficient among all the subjects of the Persian monarch; but the other tributaries, especially the Greeks from the neighbouring town of Akanthus, and indeed the entire maritime forces of the empire,¹ were brought together to assist. The head-quarters of the fleet were first at Kymê and Phokæa, next at Elæus in the southern extremity of the Thracian Chersonese, from which point it could protect and second at once the two enterprises going forward at the Hellespont and at Mount Athos. The canal-cutting at the latter was placed under the general directions of two noble Persians—Bubarês and Artachæus, and distributed under their measurement as task-work among the contingents of the various nations; an ample supply of flour and other provisions being brought for sale in the neighbouring plain from various parts of Asia and Egypt.

Three circumstances in the narrative of Herodotus respecting this work deserve special notice. First, the superior intelligence of the Phœnicians, who, within sight of that lofty island of Thasos, which had been occupied three centuries before by their free ancestors, were now labouring as instruments to the ambition of a foreign conqueror. Amidst all the people engaged, they alone took the precaution of beginning the excavation at a breadth far greater than the canal was finally destined to occupy, so as gradually to narrow it, and leave a convenient slope for the sides. The others dug straight down, so that the time as well as the toil of their work was doubled by the continual falling in of the sides—a remarkable illustration of the degree of practical intelligence then prevalent; since the nations assembled were many and diverse. Secondly, Herodotus remarks that Xerxes must have performed this laborious work from motives of mere ostentation: "for it would have cost no trouble at all" (he observes²) to drag all the ships in the

¹ Herodot. vii. 22, 23, 116; Diodor. xi. 2.

² Herodot. vii. 24: ὥς μὲν ἐπὶ συμ-
βαλλόμενον εὐρίσκειν, μεγαλοφροσύνης

fleet across the isthmus; so that the canal was nowise needed. So familiar a process was it, in the mind of a Greek of the fifth century B.C., to transport ships by mechanical force across an isthmus; a special groove or slip being seemingly prepared for them: such was the case at the Diolkus across the isthmus of Corinth. Thirdly, it is to be noted, that the men who excavated the canal at Mount Athos worked under the lash; and these, be it borne in mind, were not bought slaves, but freemen, except in so far as they were tributaries

οἵνεκα αὐτὸ Πέρξης ὀρύσσειν ἐκέλευε, ἐθέλων τε δύναμιν ἀποδείκνυσθαι, καὶ μνημόσυνα ληψέσθαι· παρὲν γὰρ, μὴ δὲ ναύον λαβόντας, τὸν ἰσθμὸν τὰς νέας διειρύσαι, ὀρύσσειν ἐκέλευε διώρυχα τῇ θαλάσῃ, εὖρος ὡς δύο τριήρεας πλεῖν ὁμοῦ ἐλαστρεμέναις.

According to the manner in which Herodotus represents this excavation to have been performed, the earth dug out was handed up by man to man from the bottom of the canal to the top—the whole performed by hand, without any aid of cranes or barrows.

The pretended work of turning the course of the river Halys, which Grecian report ascribed to Croesus on the advice of Thalés, was a far greater work than the cutting at Athos (Herodot. i. 75).

As this ship-canal across the isthmus of Athos had been treated often as a fable both by ancients (Juvenal, Sat. x.) and by moderns (Cousinéry, Voyage en Macédoine), I transcribe the observations of Colonel Leake. That excellent observer points out evident traces of its past existence; but in my judgement, even if no such traces now remained, the testimony of Herodotus and Thucydides (iv. 109) would alone be sufficient to prove that it *had* existed really. The observations of Colonel Leake illustrate at the same time the motives in which the canal originated: "The canal (he says) seems to have been not more than sixty feet wide. As history does not mention that it was ever kept in repair after the time of Xerxes, the waters from the heights around have naturally filled it in part with soil in the course of ages. It might, however, without much labour, be renewed, and there can be no doubt that it would be useful to the navigation of the Ægean: for such is the fear entertained by the Greek boatmen of the strength and

uncertain direction of the currents around Mount Athos, and of the gales and high seas to which the vicinity of the mountain is subject during half the year, and which are rendered more formidable by the deficiency of harbours in the Gulf of Orfaná, that I could not, as long as I was on the peninsula, and though offering a high price, prevail upon any boat to carry me from the eastern side of the peninsula to the western. Xerxes, therefore, was perfectly justified in cutting this canal, as well from the security which it afforded to his fleet, as from the facility of the work and the advantages of the ground, which seems made expressly to tempt such an undertaking. The experience of the losses which the former expedition under Mardonius had suffered suggested the idea. The circumnavigation of the capes Ampelus and Canastræum was much less dangerous, as the gulfs afford some good harbours, and it was the object of Xerxes to collect forces from the Greek cities in those gulfs as he passed. If there be any difficulty arising from the narrative of Herodotus, it is in comprehending how the operation should have required so long a time as three years, when the king of Persia had such multitudes at his disposal, and among them Egyptians and Babylonians, accustomed to the making of canals." (Leake, Travels in Northern Greece, vol. iii. ch. 24, p. 145).

These remarks upon the enterprise are more judicious than those of Major Rennell (Geogr. of Herodot. p. 116). I may remark that Herodotus does not affirm that the actual cutting of the canal occupied three years,—he assigns that time to the cutting with all its preliminary arrangements included—προτοιμαζέτο ἐκ τριῶν ἐτῶν καὶ μάλιστα ἐς τὸν Ἀθῶν (vii. 22).

of the Persian monarch; perhaps the father of Herodotus, a native of Halikarnassus and a subject of the brave Queen Artemisia, may have been among them. We shall find other examples as we proceed, of this indiscriminate use of the whip, and full conviction of its indispensable necessity on the part of the Persians¹—even to drive the troops of their subject-contingents on to the charge in battle. To employ the scourge in this way towards freemen, and especially towards freemen engaged in military service, was altogether repugnant both to Hellenic practice and to Hellenic feeling. The Asiatic and insular Greeks were relieved from it, as from various other hardships, when they passed out of Persian dominion to become, first allies, afterwards subjects, of Athens: and we shall be called upon hereafter to take note of this fact when we appreciate the complaints preferred against the hegemony of Athens.

Employment of the lash over the workmen engaged on the canal—impression made thereby on the Greeks.

At the same time that the subject-contingents of Xerxes excavated this canal, which was fortified against the sea at its two extremities by compact earthen walls or embankments, they also threw bridges of boats over the river Strymon. These two works, together with the renovated double bridge across the Hellespont, were both announced to Xerxes as completed and ready for passage, on his arrival at Sardis at the beginning of winter 481-480 B.C. Whether the whole of his vast army arrived at Sardis at the same time as himself, and wintered there, may reasonably be doubted; but the whole was united at Sardis and ready to march against Greece, at the beginning of spring 480 B.C.

Bridge of boats thrown across the Strymon.

While wintering at Sardis, the Persian monarch despatched heralds to all the cities of Greece, except Sparta and Athens, to demand the received tokens of submission, earth and water. The news of his prodigious armament was well calculated to spread terror even among the most resolute of them. And

¹ Herodot. vii. 22: ἔρυσσον ὑπὸ μαστιγῶν παρορθακοὶ τῆς στρατιῆς διὰδοχοὶ δ' ἐφοίων.—vii. 56: Ἡρόης δὲ, ἐπεὶ τε διέβη ἐς τὴν Εὐρώπην, ἐθήετο τὸν στρατὸν ὑπὸ μαστιγῶν διαβαλόντα:—compare vii. 103, and Xenophon, Anabasis, iii. 4-25.

The essential necessity, and plentiful

use, of the whip, towards subject-tributaries, as conceived by the ancient Persians, finds its parallel in the modern Turks. See the Mémoires du Baron de Tott, vol. i. p. 256 *seqq.*, and his dialogue on this subject with his Turkish conductor Ali-Aga.

he at the same time sent orders to the maritime cities in Thrace and Macedonia to prepare "dinner" for himself and his vast suite as he passed on his march. That march was commenced at the first beginning of spring, and continued in spite of several threatening portents during the course of it—one of which Xerxes was blind enough not to comprehend, though, according to Herodotus, nothing could be more obvious than its signification¹—while another was misinterpreted into a favourable omen by the compliant answer of the Magian priests.

On quitting Sardis, the vast host was divided into two nearly equal columns; a spacious interval being left between the two for the king himself with his guards and select Persians. First of all² came the baggage, carried by beasts of burden, immediately followed by one-half of the entire body of infantry, without any distinction of nations. Next, the select troops, 1000 Persian cavalry with 1000 Persian spearmen, the latter being distinguished by carrying their spears with the point downwards, as well as by the spear itself, which had a golden pomegranate at its other extremity, in place of the ordinary spike or point whereby the weapon was planted in the ground when the soldier was not on duty. Behind these troops walked ten sacred horses, of vast power and splendidly caparisoned, bred on the Nisæan plains in Media: next, the sacred chariot of

March of
Xerxes from
Sardis—dis-
position of
his army.

¹ Herodot. vii. 57. *Τίρας σφι ἐφάνη μέγα, τὸ Εἶρξος ἐν οὐδενὶ λόγῳ ἐποίησται, καί περ εὐσύμβλητον ἔόν· Ἰππος γὰρ ἔτεκε λαγόν. Εὐσύμβλητον ἂν τῆδε εἴνετο, ὅτι ἐμελλε μὲν ἑλᾶν στρατὸν ἐπὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα Εἶρξος ἀγαυρότατα καὶ μεγαλοκρεπέστατα, ὅπως δὲ περὶ ταῦτου τρέχων ἤξειν ἐς τὸν αὐτὸν χώρον.*

The prodigy was, that a mare brought forth a hare, which signified that Xerxes would set forth on his expedition to Greece with strength and splendour, but that he would come back in timid and disgraceful flight.

The implicit faith of Herodotus, first in the reality of the fact—next, in the certainty of his interpretation—deserves notice, as illustrating his canon of belief and that of his age. The interpretation is doubtless here the generating cause of the story interpreted: an ingenious man, after

the expedition has terminated, imagines an appropriate simile for its proud commencement and inglorious termination (*Parturiunt montes, nascetur ridiculus mus*), and the simile is recounted, either by himself or by some hearer who is struck with it, as if it had been a real antecedent fact. The aptness of this supposed antecedent fact to foreshadow the great Persian invasion (*τὸ εὐσύμβλητον* of Herodotus) serves as presumptive evidence to bear out the witness asserting it; while departure from the established analogies of nature affords no motive for disbelief to a man who admits that the gods occasionally send special signs and warnings.

² Compare the description of the processional march of Cyrus, as given in the *Cyropædia* of Xenophon, viii. 2, 1-20.

Zeus, drawn by eight white horses—wherein no man was ever allowed to mount, not even the charioteer, who walked on foot behind with the reins in his hand. Next after the sacred chariot came that of Xerxes himself, drawn by Nisæan horses; the charioteer, a noble Persian named Patiramphês, being seated in it by the side of the monarch—who was often accustomed to alight from the chariot and to enter a litter. Immediately about his person were a chosen body of 1000 horse-guards, the best troops and of the highest breed among the Persians, having golden apples at the reverse extremity of their spears, and followed by other detachments of 1000 horse, 10,000 foot, and 10,000 horse, all native Persians. Of these 10,000 Persian infantry, called the Immortals because their number was always exactly maintained, 9000 carried spears with pomegranates of silver at the reverse extremity, while the remaining 1000, distributed in front, rear, and on each side of this detachment, were marked by pomegranates of gold on their spears. With them ended what we may call the household troops: after whom, with an interval of two furlongs, the remaining host followed pell-mell.¹ Respecting its numbers and constituent portions I shall speak presently, on occasion of the great review at Doriskus.

On each side of the army, as it marched out of Sardis, was seen suspended one-half of the body of a slaughtered man, placed there expressly for the purpose of impressing a lesson on the subjects of Persia. It was the body of the eldest son of the wealthy Pythius, a Phrygian old man, resident at Kelænxæ, who had entertained Xerxes in the course of his march from Kappadokia to Sardis, and who had previously recommended himself by rich gifts to the preceding king Darius. So abundant was his hospitality to Xerxes, and so pressing his offers of pecuniary contribution for the Grecian expedition, that the monarch asked him what was the amount of his wealth. "I possess (replied Pythius), besides lands and slaves, 2000 talents of silver and 3,993,000 of golden darics, wanting only 7000 of being 4,000,000. All this gold and silver do I present to thee, retaining only my lands and slaves, which will be quite

Story of the rich Kappadokian Pythius—son put to death by order of Xerxes.

¹ Herodot. vii. 41. Μετὰ δὲ τὴν ἵππον διελέλειπτο καὶ δύο σταδίου, καὶ ἔπειτα ὁ λοιπὸς ὄμιλος ἦν ἀσμίξ.

enough." Xerxes replied by the strongest expressions of praise and gratitude for his liberality; at the same time refusing his offer, and even giving to Pythius out of his own treasure the sum of 7000 darics, which was wanting to make up the exact sum of 4,000,000. The latter was so elated with this mark of favour, that when the army was about to depart from Sardis, he ventured, under the influence of terror from the various menacing portents, to prefer a prayer to the Persian monarch. His five sons were all about to serve in the invading army against Greece: his prayer to Xerxes was, that the eldest of them might be left behind, as a stay to his own declining years, and that the service of the remaining four with the army might be considered as sufficient. But the unhappy father knew not what he asked. "Wretch! (replied Xerxes) dost thou dare to talk to me about *thy* son, when I am myself on the march against Greece, with my sons, brothers, relatives, and friends? thou who art my slave, and whose duty it is to follow me with thy wife and thy entire family? Know that the sensitive soul of man dwells in his ears: on hearing good things, it fills the body with delight, but boils with wrath when it hears the contrary. As, when thou didst good deeds and madest good offers to me, thou canst not boast of having surpassed the king in generosity—so now, when thou hast turned round and become impudent, the punishment inflicted on thee shall not be the full measure of thy deserts, but something less. For thyself and for thy four sons, the hospitality which I received from thee shall serve as protection. But for that one son whom thou especially wishest to keep in safety the forfeit of his life shall be thy penalty." He forthwith directed that the son of Pythius should be put to death, and his body severed in twain; of which one-half was to be fixed on the right-hand, the other on the left-hand, of the road along which the army was to pass.¹

A tale essentially similar, yet rather less revolting, has been already recounted respecting Darius, when undertaking his expedition against Scythia. Both tales illustrate the intense force of sentiment with which the Persian kings regarded the

¹ The incident respecting Pythius is in Herodot. vii. 27, 28, 38, 39. I place no confidence in the estimate of the wealth of Pythius; but in other respects, the story seems well entitled to credit.

obligation of universal personal service, when they were themselves in the field. They seem to have measured their strength by the number of men whom they collected around them, with little or no reference to quality : and the very mention of exemption—the idea that a subject and a slave should seek to withdraw himself from a risk which the monarch was about to encounter—was an offence not to be pardoned. In this as in the other acts of Oriental kings, whether grateful, munificent or ferocious, we trace nothing but the despotic force of personal will, translating itself into act without any thought of consequences, and treating subjects with less consideration than an ordinary Greek master would have shown towards his slaves.

From Sardis, the host of Xerxes directed its march to Abydos, first across Mysia and the river Karkus—then through Atarneus, Karinë, and the plain of Thêbê. They passed Adramyttium and Antandrus, and crossed the range of Ida, most part of which was on their left-hand, not without some loss from stormy weather and thunder.¹ From hence they reached Ilium and the river Skamander, the stream of which was drunk up, or probably in part trampled and rendered undrinkable, by the vast host of men and animals. In spite of the immortal interest which the Skamander derives from the Homeric poems, its magnitude is not such as to make this fact surprising. To the poems themselves even Xerxes did not disdain to pay tribute. He ascended the holy hill of Ilium,—reviewed the Pergamus where Priam was said to have lived and reigned,—sacrificed 1000 oxen to the patron goddess Athênê,—and caused the Magian priests to make libations in honour of the heroes who had fallen on that venerated spot. He even condescended to inquire into the local details,² abundantly supplied to visitors by the inhabitants of Ilium, of that great real or mythical war to which Grecian chronologers had hardly yet learned to assign a precise date. And doubtless when he contemplated the narrow area of that Troy which all the Greeks confederated under Agamemnon had been unable for ten years to overcome, he could not but fancy that these same Greeks would fall an

March to
Abydos—
respect
shown to
Ilium by
Xerxes.

¹ Herodot. vii. 42.

² Herodot. vii. 43. *θεμελιώμενος δὲ καὶ πυθώμενος κείνων ἔκαστα, &c.*

easy prey before his innumerable host. Another day's march between Rhœteium, Ophryneium and Dardanus on the left-hand, and the Teukrians of Gergis on the right-hand, brought him to Abydos, where his two newly-constructed bridges over the Hellespont awaited him.

On this transit from Asia into Europe Herodotus dwells with peculiar emphasis—and well he might do so, since when we consider the bridges, the invading number, the unmeasured hopes succeeded by no less unmeasured calamity—it will appear not only to have been the most imposing event of his century, but to rank among the most imposing events of all history. He surrounds it with much dramatic circumstance, not only mentioning the marble throne erected for Xerxes on a hill near Abydos, from whence he surveyed both his masses of land-force covering the shore and his ships sailing and racing in the strait (a race in which the Phœnicians of Sidon surpassed the Greeks and all the other contingents)—but also superadding to this real fact a dialogue with Artabanus, intended to set forth the internal mind of Xerxes. He farther quotes certain supposed exclamations of the Abydenes at the sight of his superhuman power. "Why (said one of these terror-stricken spectators¹), why dost thou, oh Zeus, under the shape of a Persian man and the name of Xerxes, thus bring together the whole human race for the ruin of Greece? It would have been easy for thee to accomplish *that* without so much ado." Such emphatic ejaculations exhibit the strong feeling which Herodotus or his informants throw into the scene, though we cannot venture to apply to them the scrutiny of historical criticism.

At the first moment of sunrise, so sacred in the mind of Orientals,² the passage was ordered to begin. The bridges were perfumed with frankincense and strewed with myrtle boughs, while Xerxes himself made libations into the sea with a golden censer, and offered up prayers to Helios, that

¹ Herodot. vii. 45, 53, 56. Ὁ Ζεῦ, τί δὴ ἀνθρὶ εἰδόμενος Πέρσῃ, καὶ ὄνομα ἀντὶ Διὸς Πέρσης θέμενος, ἀνάστατον τὴν Ἑλλάδα ἐθέλεις ποιῆσαι, ὄγων πάντας ἀνθρώπους; καὶ γὰρ ἀνευ τούτων ἐξῆν τοι ποιεῖν ταῦτα.

² Tacitus, Histor. iii. 24. "Undique clamor, et orientem solem, ita in Syriâ

mos est, consalutavêre"—in his striking description of the night battle near Cremona between the Roman troops of Vitellius and Vespasian, and the rise of the sun while the combat was yet unfinished: compare also Quintus Curtius (iii. 3, 8, p. 41, ed. Mützel).

he might effect without hindrance his design of conquering Europe even to its farthest extremity. Along with his libation he cast into the Hellespont the censer itself, with a golden bowl and a Persian scimitar—"I do not exactly know" (adds the historian) whether he threw them in as a gift to Helios, or as a mark of repentance and atonement to the Hellespont for the stripes which he had inflicted upon it." Of the two bridges, that nearest to the Euxine was devoted to the military force—the other to the attendants, the baggage, and the beasts of burthen. The 10,000 Persians, called Immortals, all wearing garlands on their heads, were the first, to pass over. Xerxes himself, with the remaining army, followed next, though in an order somewhat different from that which had been observed in quitting Sardis: the monarch having reached the European shore, saw his troops crossing the bridges after him "under the lash." But in spite of the use of this sharp stimulus to accelerate progress, so vast were the numbers of his host, that they occupied no less than seven days and seven nights, without a moment of intermission, in the business of crossing over—a fact to be borne in mind presently, when we come to discuss the totals computed by Herodotus.¹

Xerxes and his army cross over the Hellespontine bridges.

Having thus cleared the strait, Xerxes directed his march along the Thracian Chersonese, to the isthmus whereby it is joined with Thrace, between the town of Kardia on his left-hand and the tomb of Hellê on his right—the eponymous heroine of the strait. After passing this isthmus, he turned westward along the coast of the Gulf of Melas and the Ægean Sea—crossing the river from which that Gulf derived its name, and even drinking its waters up (according to Herodotus) with the men and animals of his army. Having passed by the Æolic city of Ænus and the harbour called Stentoris, he reached the sea-coast and plain called Doriskus covering the rich delta near the mouth of the Hebrus. A fort had been built there and garrisoned by Darius. The spacious plain called by this

March to Doriskus in Thrace near the mouth of the Hebrus—his fleet joins him here.

¹ Herodot. vii. 54. ταῦτα οὐκ ἔχω ἀκριβῶς διακρίνειν, οὔτε εἰ τῷ Ἥλῳ ἀνατιθεὶς κατήκε δι τὸ πέρατος, οὔτε εἰ μετεμέλησέ οἱ τὸν Ἑλλησπόντον μαστιγώσαντι, καὶ ἀντὶ τούτων τὴν θάλασσαν

ἰδωρίετο.

² Herodot. vii. 55, 56. Διέβη δὲ ὁ στρατὸς αὐτοῦ ἐν ἐκτῇ ἡμέρῃ καὶ ἐν ἐκτῇ εὐφρόνῃ, εὐρίσας οὐδὲνα χρόνον.

same name reached far along the shore to Cape Serreium, and comprised in it the towns of Salê and Zonê, possessions of the Samothracian Greeks planted on the territory once possessed by the Thracian Kikones on the mainland. Having been here joined by his fleet, which had doubled¹ the southernmost promontory of the Thracian Chersonese, he thought the situation convenient for a general review and enumeration both of his land and his naval force.

Never probably in the history of mankind has there been brought together a body of men from regions so remote and so widely diverse, for one purpose and under one command, as those which were now assembled in Thrace near the mouth of the Hebrus. About the numerical total we cannot pretend to form any definite idea; about the variety of contingents there is no room for doubt. "What Asiatic nation was there (asks Herodotus,² whose conceptions of this expedition seem to outstrip his powers of language) that Xerxes did not bring against Greece?" Nor was it Asiatic nations alone, comprised within the Oxus, the Indus, the Persian Gulf, the Red Sea, the Levant, the Ægean and the Euxine: we must add to these also the Egyptians, the Ethiopians on the Nile south of Egypt, and the Libyans from the desert near Kyrênê. Not all the expeditions, fabulous or historical, of which Herodotus had ever heard, appeared to him comparable to this of Xerxes, even for total number; much more in respect of variety of component elements. Forty-six different nations,³ each with its distinct national costume,

Review and muster on the plain of Doriskus—immense variety of the nations brought together.

¹ Herodot. vii. 58-59; Pliny, H. N. iv. 11. See some valuable remarks on the topography of Doriskus and the neighbourhood of the town still called Enos, in Grisebach, *Reise durch Rumelien und nach Brussa*, ch. vi. vol. i. p. 157-159 (Göttingen, 1841). He shows reason for believing that the indentation of the coast, marked on the map as the Gulf of Ænos, did not exist in ancient times, any more than it exists now.

² Herodot. vii. 20-21.

³ See the enumeration in Herodotus, vii. 61-96. In chapter 76, one name has dropped out of the text (see the note of Wesseling and Schweighæuser), which, in addition to those specified under the head of the land force, makes

up exactly forty-six. It is from this source that Herodotus derives the boast which he puts into the mouth of the Athenians (ix. 27) respecting the battle of Marathon, in which they pretend to have vanquished forty-six nations—*ἑρκατήνδε ἔθνη ἔξ καὶ τεσσαράκοντα*; though there is no reason for believing that so great a number of contingents were engaged with Datis at Marathon.

Compare the boasts of Antiochus king of Syria (B.C. 192) about his immense Asiatic host brought across into Greece, as well as the contemptuous comments of the Roman consul Quinctius (Livy, xxxv. 48-49). "Varia enim genera armorum, et multa nomina gentium inauditarum, Dahæ, et Medos, et

mode of arming, and local leaders, formed the vast land force. Eight other nations furnished the fleet, on board of which Persians, Medes and Sakæ served as armed soldiers or marines. The real leaders, both of the entire army and of all its various divisions, were native Persians of noble blood, who distributed the various native contingents into companies of thousands, hundreds, and tens. The forty-six nations composing the land-force were as follows:—Persians, Medes, Kissians, Hyrkanians, Assyrians, Baktrians, Sakæ, Indians, Arians, Parthians, Chorasmians, Sogdians, Gandarians, Dadikæ, Kaspian, Sarangæ, Paktyes, Utii, Myki, Parikanii, Arabians, Ethiopians in Asia and Ethiopians south of Egypt, Libyans, Paphlagonians, Ligyes, Matieni, Maryandyni, Syrians, Phrygians, Armenians, Lydians, Mysians, Thracians, Kabêlians, Mares, Kolchians, Alarodians, Saspeires, Sagartii. The eight nations who furnished the fleet were—Phœnicians (300 ships of war), Egyptians (200), Cypriots (150), Kilikians (100), Pamphylians (30), Lykians (50), Karians (70), Ionic Greeks (100), Doric Greeks (30), Æolic Greeks (60), Hellespontic Greeks (100), Greeks from the islands in the Ægean (17): in all 1207 triremes or ships of war with three banks of oars. The descriptions of costumes and arms which we find in Herodotus are curious and varied. But it is important to mention that no nation except the Lydians, Pamphylians, Cypriots and Karians (partially also the Egyptian marines on shipboard) bore arms analogous to those of the Greeks (*i. e.* arms fit for steady conflict and sustained charge,¹—for hand combat in line as well as for defence of the person,—but inconveniently heavy either in pursuit or in flight). The other nations were armed with missile weapons,—light shields of wicker or leather, or no shields at all,—turbans or leather caps instead of helmets,—swords and scythes. They were not properly equipped either for fighting in regular order or for resisting the line of spears and shields which the Grecian hoplites brought to bear upon them. Their persons too were

Cadusios, et Elymaeos—Syros omnes esse: haud paulo mancipiorum melius, propter servilia ingenia, quam militum genus:" and the sharp remark of the Arcadian envoy Antiochus (Xenophon, *Hellen.* vii. 1, 33). Quintus Curtius also has some rhetorical turns about the

number of nations, whose names even were hardly known, tributary to the Persian empire (iii. 4, 29; iv. 45, 9) "ignota etiam ipsi Dario gentium nomina," &c.

¹ Herodot. vii. 89-93.

much less protected against wounds than those of the latter; some of them indeed, as the Mysians and Libyans, did not even carry spears, but only staves with the end hardened in the fire.¹ A nomadic tribe of Persians, called Sagartii, to the number of 8000 horsemen, came armed only with a dagger and with the rope known in South America as the lasso, which they cast in the fight to entangle an antagonist. The Æthiopians from the Upper Nile had their bodies painted half red and half white, wore the skins of lions and panthers, and carried, besides the javelin, a long bow with arrows of reed, tipped with a point of sharp stone.

It was at Doriskus that the fighting-men of the entire land-army were first numbered; for Herodotus expressly informs us that the various contingents had never been numbered separately, and avows his own ignorance of the amount of each. The means employed for numeration were remarkable. Ten thousand men were counted,² and packed together as closely as possible: a line was drawn, and a wall of enclosure built, around the space which they had occupied, into which all the army was directed to enter successively, so that the aggregate number of divisions, comprising 10,000 each, was thus ascertained. One hundred and seventy of these divisions were affirmed by the informants of Herodotus to have been thus numbered, constituting a total of 1,700,000 foot, besides 80,000 horse, many war-chariots from Libya and camels from Arabia, with a presumed total of 20,000 additional men.³ Such was the vast land-force of the Persian monarch: his naval equipments were of corresponding magnitude, comprising not only the 1207 triremes⁴ or war-ships of three banks of oars, but also 3000 smaller vessels of war and transports. The crew of each trireme comprised 200 rowers, and thirty fighting-men, Persians or Sakæ; that of each of the accompanying vessels included eighty men, according to an average which Herodotus supposes not far from the truth. If we sum up these

¹ Herodot. vii. 61-81.

² The army which Darius had conducted against Scythia is said to have been counted by divisions of 10,000 each, but the progress is not described in detail (Herodot. iv. 87).

³ Herodot. vii. 60, 87, 184. This

same rude mode of enumeration was employed by Darius Codomannus a century and a half afterwards, before he marched his army to the field of Issus. (Quintus Curtius, iii. 2, 3, p. 24, Mützel.)

⁴ Herodot. vii. 89-97.

items, the total numbers brought by Xerxes from Asia to the plain and to the coast of Doriskus would reach the astounding figure of 2,317,000 men. Nor is this all. In the farther march from Doriskus to Thermopylæ, Xerxes pressed into his service men and ships from all the people whose territory he traversed; deriving from hence a reinforcement of 120 triremes, with aggregate crews of 24,000 men, and of 300,000 new land troops, so that the aggregate of his force when he appeared at Thermopylæ was 2,640,000 men. To this we are to add, according to the conjecture of Herodotus, a number not at all inferior, as attendants, slaves, sutlers, crews of the provision-craft and ships of burthen, &c., so that the male persons accompanying the Persian king when he reached his first point of Grecian resistance amounted to 5,283,220! So stands the prodigious estimate of this army, the whole strength of the eastern world, in clear and express figures of Herodotus,¹ who himself evidently supposes the number to have been even greater; for he conceives the number of "camp-followers" as not only equal to, but considerably larger than, that of fighting-men. We are to reckon, besides, the eunuchs, concubines, and female cooks, at whose number Herodotus does not pretend to guess; together with cattle, beasts of burthen, and Indian dogs, in indefinite multitude, increasing the consumption of the regular army.

To admit this overwhelming total, or anything near to it, is obviously impossible: yet the disparaging remarks which it has drawn down upon Herodotus are noway merited.² He takes pains to distinguish that which informants told him, from that which he merely guessed. His description of the review at Doriskus is so detailed, that he had evidently conversed with persons who were present at it, and had learnt the separate totals promulgated by the enumerators—infantry, cavalry, and ships of war great and small. As to the number of triremes, his

and incredible totals brought out by Herodotus.

Comments upon the evidence of Herodotus and upon himself as witness and judge.

¹ Herodot. vii. 185-186. ἐν δὲ γυνὴν πᾶντα τὸν ἥπιν σπαρὰν ἐκ τῆς Ἀσίης. (vii. 157.) "Vires Orientis et ultima secum Bactra ferens," to use the language of Virgil about Antony at Actium.

² Even Dahlmann, who has many good remarks in defence of Herodotus hardly does him justice (Herodot. Aus seinem Buche sein Leben, ch. xxxiv. p. 176).

statement seems beneath the truth, as we may judge from the contemporary authority of Æschylus, who in the 'Persæ' gives the exact number of 1207 Persian ships as having fought at Salamis : but between Doriskus and Salamis, Herodotus¹ has himself enumerated 647 ships as lost or destroyed, and only 120 as added. No exaggeration therefore can well be suspected in this statement, which would imply about 276,000 as the number of the crews, though there is here a confusion or omission in the narrative which we cannot clear up. But the aggregate of 3000 smaller ships, and still more that of 1,700,000 infantry, are far less trustworthy. There would be little or no motive for the enumerators to be exact, and every motive for them to exaggerate—an immense nominal total would be no less pleasing to the army than to the monarch himself—so that the military total of land-force and ships' crews, which Herodotus gives as 2,641,000 on the arrival at Thermopylæ, may be dismissed as unwarranted and incredible. And the computation whereby he determines the amount of non-military persons present, as equal or more than equal to the military, is founded upon suppositions no way admissible. For though in a Grecian well-appointed army it was customary to reckon one light-armed soldier or attendant for every hoplite, no such estimate can be applied to the Persian host. A few grandees and leaders might be richly provided with attendants of various kinds, but the great mass of the army would have none at all. Indeed, it appears that the only way in which we can render the military total, which must at all events have been very great, consistent with the conditions of possible subsistence, is by supposing a comparative absence of attendants, and by adverting to the fact of the small consumption, and habitual

¹ Only 120 ships of war are mentioned by Herodotus (vii. 185) as having joined afterwards from the seaports in Thrace. But 400 were destroyed, if not more, in the terrible storm on the coast of Magnesia (vii. 190); and the squadron of 200 sail, detached by the Persians round Eubœa, were also all lost (viii. 7); besides forty-five taken or destroyed in the various sea-fights near Artemisium (vii. 194; viii. 11). Other losses are also indicated (viii. 14-16).

As the statement of Æschylus for the number of the Persian triremes at Salamis appears well entitled to credit, we must suppose either that the number of Doriskus was greater than Herodotus has mentioned, or that a number greater than that which he has stated joined afterwards.

See a good note of Amersfoordt, ad Demosthen. Orat. de Symmoris, p. 88 (Leyden, 1821).

patience as to hardship, of Orientals in all ages. An Asiatic soldier will at this day make his campaign upon scanty fare, and under privations which would be intolerable to an European.¹ And while we thus diminish the probable consumption, we have to consider that never in any case of ancient history had so much previous pains been taken to accumulate supplies on the line of march: in addition to which, the cities in Thrace were required to furnish such an amount of provisions when the army passed by, as almost brought them to ruin. Herodotus himself expresses his surprise how provisions could have been provided for so vast a multitude, and were we to admit his estimate literally, the difficulty would be magnified into an impossibility. Weighing the circumstances of the case well, and considering that this army was the result of a maximum of effort throughout the vast empire,—that a great numerical total was the thing chiefly demanded,—and that prayers for exemption were regarded by the Great King as a capital offence—and that provisions had been collected for three years before along the line of march—we may well believe that the numbers of Xerxes were greater than were ever assembled in ancient times, or perhaps at any known epoch of history. But it would be rash to pretend to guess at any positive number, in the entire absence of ascertained data. When we learn from Thucydides that he found it impossible to find out the exact numbers of the small armies of Greeks who fought at Mantinea,² we shall not be ashamed to avow our inability to

¹ See on this point Volney, *Travels in Egypt and Syria*, ch. xxiv. vol. ii. p. 70, 71; ch. xxxii. p. 367; and ch. xxxix. p. 435 (Engl. transl.)

Kinneir, *Geographical Memoir of the Persian Empire*, p. 22-23. Bernier, who followed the march of Aurungzebe from Delhi, in 1665, says that some estimated the number of persons in the camp at 300,000, others at different totals, but that no one knew, nor had they ever been counted. He says, "You are no doubt at a loss to conceive how so vast a number both of men and animals can be maintained in the field. The best solution of the difficulty will be found in the temperance and simple diet of the Indians." (Bernier, *Travels in the Mogul Empire*, translated by

Brock, vol. ii. App. p. 118.)

So also Petit de la Croix says, about the enormous host of Genghis-Khan, "Les hommes sont si sobres, qu'ils s'accoutument de toutes sortes d'alimens."

That author seems to estimate the largest army of Genghis at 700,000 men. (*Histoire de Genghis*, liv. ii. ch. vi. p. 193).

² Thucyd. v. 68. Xenophon calls the host of Xerxes *innumerable*—ἀναριθμητὸν στρατὸν (*Anabasis* iii. 2, 13).

It seems not to be considered necessary for a Turkish minister to know the number of an assembled Turkish army. In the war between the Russians and Turks in 1770 when the Turkish army was encamped at Babadag near the

count the Asiatic multitudes at Doriskus. We may remark, however, that, in spite of the reinforcements received afterwards in Thrace, Macedonia, and Thessaly, it may be doubted whether the aggregate total ever afterwards increased. For Herodotus takes no account of desertions, which yet must have been very numerous, in a host disorderly, heterogeneous, without any interest in the enterprise; and wherein the numbers of each separate contingent were unknown.

Ktesias gives the total of the host at 800,000 men, and 1000 triremes, independent of the war-chariots: if he counts the crews of the triremes apart from the 800,000 men (as seems probable), the total will then be considerably above a million. Ælian assigns an aggregate of 700,000 men: Diodorus¹ appears to follow partly Herodotus, partly other authorities. None of these witnesses enable us to correct Herodotus, in a case where we are obliged to disbelieve him. He is in some sort an original witness, having evidently conversed with persons actually present at the muster of Doriskus, giving us their belief as to the numbers, together with the computation, true or false, circulated among them by authority. Moreover, the contemporary Æschylus, while agreeing with him exactly as to the number of triremes, gives no specific figure as to the

Other testimonies about the number of the Persians.

Balkan, Baron de Tott tells us, "Le Visir me demanda un jour fort sérieusement si l'armée Ottomane étoit nombreuse. C'est à vous que je m'adresserois, lui dis-je, si j'étais curieux de le savoir. Je l'ignore, me répondit-il. Si vous l'ignorez, comment pourrois-je en être instruit? *En lisant la Gazette de Vienne*, me répliqua-t-il. Je restai confondu."

The Duke of Ragusa (in his *Voyage en Hongrie, Turquie, &c.*), after mentioning the prodigiously exaggerated statements current about the numbers slain in the suppressed insurrection of the Janissaries at Constantinople in 1826, observes, "On a dit et répété, que leur nombre s'étoit élevé à huit ou dix mille, et cette opinion s'est accréditée (it was really about 500). Mais les Orientaux en général, et les Turcs en particulier, n'ont aucune idée des nombres: ils les emploient sans exactitude, et ils sont par caractère portés à l'exagération. D'un autre côté, le gouvernement a dû favoriser cette opinion

populaire, pour frapper l'imagination et inspirer une plus grande terreur." (vol. ii. p. 37).

¹ Ktesias, *Persica*, c. 22, 23; Ælian, V. H. xiii. 3; Diodorus, xi. 2-11.

Respecting the various numerical statements in this case, see the note of Bos ad Cornel. Nepot. Themistocl. c. 2, p. 75, 76.

The Samian poet Chœrilus, a few years younger than Herodotus, and contemporary with Thucydides, composed an epic poem on the expedition of Xerxes against Greece. Two or three short fragments of it are all that is preserved: he enumerated all the separate nations who furnished contingents to Xerxes, and we find not only the Sake, but also the Solymi (apparently the Jews, and so construed by Josephus) among them. See *Fragments*, iii. and iv. in Naëke's edition of Chœrilus, p. 121-134. Josephus cont. Apion. p. 454, ed. Havercamp.

land-force, but conveys to us in his 'Persæ' a general sentiment of vast number, which may seem in keeping with the largest statement of Herodotus: the Persian empire is drained of men—the women of Susa are left without husbands and brothers—the Baktrian territory has not been allowed to retain even its old men.¹ The terror-striking effect of this crowd was probably quite as great as if its numbers had really corresponded to the ideas of Herodotus.

After the numeration had taken place, Xerxes passed in his chariot by each of the several contingents, observed their equipment, and put questions to which the royal scribes noted down the answers. He then embarked on board a Sidonian trireme (which had been already fitted up with a gilt tent), and sailed along the prows of his immense fleet, moored in line about 400 feet from the shore, and every vessel completely manned for action. Such a spectacle was well calculated to rouse emotions of arrogant confidence. It was in this spirit that he sent forthwith for Demaratus the exiled king of Sparta, who was among his auxiliaries—to ask whether resistance on the part of the Greeks, to such a force, was even conceivable. The conversation between them, dramatically given by Herodotus, is one of the most impressive manifestations of sentiment in the Greek language.²

Xerxes passes in review the land-force and the fleet at Doriskus—his conversation with the Spartan king Demaratus.

¹ Æschylus, *Pers.* 14-124, 722-737. Heeren (in his learned work on the commerce of the ancient world, *Ueber den Verkehr der alten Welt*, part 1, sect. 1, pp. 162, 558, 3rd edition) conceives that Herodotus had seen the actual muster-roll, made by Persian authority, of the army at Doriskus. I cannot think this at all probable: it is much more reasonable to believe that all his information was derived from Greeks who had accompanied the expedition. He must have seen and conversed with many such. The Persian royal scribes or secretaries accompanied the king, and took note of any particular fact or person who might happen to strike his attention (Herodot. vii. 100; viii. 90), or to exhibit remarkable courage. They seem to have been specially attached to the person of the king as ministers to his curiosity and amusement, rather than keepers of authentic and continuous records.

Heeren is disposed to accept the numerical totals, given by Herodotus as to the army of Xerxes, much too easily, in my judgement; nor is he correct in supposing that the contingents of the Persian army marched with their wives and families (p. 557-559).

² When Herodotus specifies his informants (it is much to be regretted that he does not specify them oftener) they seem to be frequently Greeks, such as Dikæus the Athenian exile, Thersander of Orchomenus in Boeotia, Archias of Sparta, &c. (iii. 55; viii. 65; ix. 16). He mentions the Spartan king Demaratus often, and usually under circumstances both of dignity and dramatic interest: it is highly probable that he may have conversed with that prince himself, or with his descendants, who remained settled for a long time in Teuthrania, near the Æolie coast of Asia Minor (Xenoph. *Hellenica*, iii. 1, 6), and he may thus

Demaratus assures him that the Spartans most certainly, and the Dorians of Peloponnesus probably, will resist him to the death, be the difference of numbers what it may. Xerxes receives the statement with derision, but exhibits no feeling of displeasure: an honourable contrast to the treatment of Charidemus a century and a half afterwards, by the last monarch of Persia.¹

After the completion of the review, Xerxes with the army pursued his march westward, in three divisions and along three different lines of road, through the territories of seven distinct tribes of Thracians, interspersed with Grecian maritime colonies. All was still within his own empire, and he took reinforcements from each as he passed: the Thracian Satræ were preserved from this levy by their unassailable seats amidst the woods and snows of Rhodopæ. The islands

have heard of representations offered by the exiled Spartan king to Xerxes. Nevertheless the remarks made by Hoffmeister, on the speeches ascribed to Demaratus, by Herodotus, are well-deserving of attention (*Sittlich-religiöse Lebensansicht des Herodotus*, p. 118).

"Herodotus always brings into connection with insolent kings some man or other through whom he gives utterance to his own lessons of wisdom. To Croesus, at the summit of his glory, comes the wise Solon: Croesus himself, reformed by his captivity, performs the same part towards Cyrus and Kambyzes: Darius, as a prudent and honest man, does not require any such counsellor; but Xerxes in his pride has the sententious Artabanus and the sagacious Demaratus attached to him; while Amasis king of Egypt is employed to transmit judicious counsel to Polykratès, the despot of Samos. Since all these men speak one and the same language, it appears certain that they are introduced by Herodotus merely as spokesmen for his own criticisms on the behaviour and character of the various monarchs—criticisms which are nothing more than general maxims, moral and religious, brought out by Solon, Croesus, or Artabanus, on occasion of particular events. The speeches interwoven by Herodotus have, in the main, not the same purpose as those of Tacitus—to make the reader more intimately acquainted with the existing posture of

affairs or with the character of the agents—but a different purpose quite foreign to history: they embody in the narrative his own personal convictions respecting human life and the divine government."

This last opinion of Hoffmeister is to a great degree true, but is rather too absolutely delivered.

¹ Herodot. vii. 101-104. How inferior is the scene between Darius and Charidemus, in Quintus Curtius! (iii. 2, 9-19, p. 20, ed. Müttel).

Herodotus takes up substantially the same vein of sentiment and the same antithesis as that which runs through the *Persæ* of Æschylus; but he handles it like a social philosopher, with a strong perception of the real causes of Grecian superiority.

It is not improbable that the skeleton of the conversation between Xerxes and Demaratus was a reality, heard by Herodotus from Demaratus himself or from his sons; for the extreme speciality with which the Lacedæmonian exile confines his praise to the Spartans and Dorians, not including the other Greeks, hardly represents the feeling of Herodotus himself.

The minuteness of the narrative which Herodotus gives respecting the deposition and family circumstances of Demaratus (vi. 63 *seq.*), and his view of the death of Kleomenès as an atonement to that prince for injury done, may seem derived from family information (vi. 48).

of Samothrace and Thasus, with their subject towns on the mainland—and the Grecian colonies Dikæa,¹ Maroneia, and Abdêra—were successively laid under contribution for contingents of ships or men. What was still more ruinous—they were constrained to provide a day's meal for the immense host as it passed: on the day of his passage the Great King was their guest. Orders had been transmitted for this purpose long beforehand, and for many months the citizens had been assiduously employed in collecting food for the army, as well as delicacies for the monarch—in grinding flour of wheat and barley, fattening cattle, keeping up birds and fowls; together with a decent display of gold and silver plate for the regal dinner. A superb tent was erected for Xerxes and his immediate companions, while the army received their rations in the open region around: on commencing the march next morning, the tent with all its rich contents was plundered, and nothing restored to those who had furnished it. Of course so prodigious a host, which had occupied seven days and seven nights in crossing the double Hellespontine bridge, must also have been for many days on its march through the territory, and therefore at the charge, of each one among the cities, so that the cost brought them to the brink of ruin, and even in some cases drove them to abandon house and home. The cost incurred by the city of Thasus, on account of their possessions of the mainland, for this purpose was no less than 400 talents² (= 92,800*l.*): while at Abdêra, the witty Megakreon recommended to his countrymen to go in a body to the temples and thank the gods, because Xerxes was pleased to be satisfied with one meal in the day. Had the monarch required breakfast as well as dinner, the Abderites must have been reduced to the alternative either of exile or of utter destitution.³ A stream called

March of Xerxes from Doriskus westward along Thrace.—Contributions levied on the Grecian towns on the coast of Thrace—particularly Thasus and Abdêra.

¹ Herodot. vii. 109, 111, 118.

² This sum of 400 talents was equivalent to the entire annual tribute charged in the Persian king's rent-roll, upon the satrapy comprising the western and southern coast of Asia Minor, wherein were included all the Ionic and Æolic Greeks, besides Lykians, Pamphylians,

&c. (Herodot. iii. 90).

³ Herodot. vii. 118-120. He gives (vii. 187) the computation of the quantity of corn which would have been required for daily consumption, assuming the immense numbers as he conjectures them, and reckoning one chœnix of wheat for each man's daily

Lissus, which seems to have been of no great importance, is said to have been drunk up by the army, together with a lake of some magnitude near Pistyrus.¹

Through the territory of the Edonian Thracians and the Pierians, between Pangæus and the sea, Xerxes and his army reached the river Strymon at the important station called Ennea Hodoi or Nine-Roads, afterwards memorable by the foundation of Amphipolis. Bridges had been already thrown over the river, to which the Magian priests rendered solemn honours by sacrificing white horses and throwing them into the stream. Moreover, the religious feelings of Xerxes were not satisfied without the more precious sacrifices often resorted to by the Persians. He here buried alive nine native youths and nine maidens, in compliment to Nine-Roads, the name of the spot :² he also left, under the care of the Pæonians of Siris, the sacred chariot of Zeus, which had been brought from the seat of empire, but which doubtless was found inconvenient on the line of march. From the Strymon he marched forward along the Strymonic Gulf, passing through the territory of the Bisaltæ near the Greek colonies of Argilus and Stageirus, until he came to the Greek town of Akanthus, hard by the isthmus of Athos which had been recently cut through. The fierce king of the Bisaltæ³ refused submission to Xerxes, fled to Rhodopê for safety, and forbade his six sons to join the Persian host. Unhappily for themselves, they nevertheless did so, and when they came back he caused all of them to be blinded.

All the Greek cities which Xerxes had passed by, obeyed his orders with sufficient readiness, and probably few doubted the ultimate success of so prodigious an armament. But the inhabitants of Akanthus had been eminent for their zeal and exertions in the cutting of the canal, and had probably made considerable profits during the operation : Xerxes now repaid their zeal by contracting with them the tie of hospitality,

consumption (= $\frac{1}{2}$ th of a medimnus). It is unnecessary to examine a computation founded on such inadmissible data.

¹ Herodot. vii. 108, 109.

² Herodot. vii. 114. He pronounces this savage practice to be specially Persian. The old and cruel Persian

queen Amestris, wife of Xerxes, sought to prolong her own life by burying alive fourteen victims, children of illustrious men, as offerings to the subterranean god.

³ Herodot. viii. 116.

accompanied with praise and presents ; though he does not seem to have exempted them from the charge of maintaining the army while in their territory. He here separated himself from his fleet, which was directed to sail through the canal of Athos, to double the two south-western capes of the Chalkidic peninsula, to enter the Thermaic Gulf, and to await his arrival at Therma. The fleet in its course gathered additional troops from the Greek towns in the two peninsulas of Sithonia and Pallênê, as well as on the eastern side of the Thermaic Gulf, in the region called Krusis or Krossæa, on the continental side of the Isthmus of Pallênê. These Greek towns were numerous, but of little individual importance. Near Therma (Salonichi) in Mygdonia, in the interior of the Gulf and eastward of the mouth of the Axios, the fleet awaited the arrival of Xerxes by land from Akanthus. He seems to have had a difficult march, and to have taken a route considerably inland, through Pæonia and Krestônia—a wild, woody, and untrodden country, where his baggage-camels were set upon by lions, and where there were also wild bulls of prodigious size and fierceness. At length he rejoined his fleet at Therma, and stretched his army throughout Mygdonia, the ancient Pieria, and Bottiæis, as far as the mouth of the Haliakmôn.¹

March of
Xerxes to
Therma—
his fleet
join him
in the
Thermaic
Gulf.

Xerxes had now arrived within sight of Mount Olympus, the northern boundary of what was properly called Hellas ; after a march through nothing but subject territory, with magazines laid up beforehand for the subsistence of his army—with additional contingents levied in his course—and probably with Thracian volunteers joining him in the hopes of plunder. The road along which he had marched was still shown with solemn reverence by the Thracians, and protected both from intruders and from tillage, even in the days of Herodotus.² The Macedonian princes, the last of his western tributaries, in whose territory he now found himself—together with the Thessalian Aleuadæ—undertook to conduct him farther. Nor did the task as yet appear difficult ; what steps the Greeks were taking to oppose him, shall be related in the coming chapter.

Favourable
prospects
of the in-
vasion—real
of the Mace-
donian
prince to
assist
Xerxes.

¹ Herodot. vii. 122-127.

² Herodot. vii. 116.

CHAPTER XXXIX.

PROCEEDINGS IN GREECE FROM THE BATTLE OF MARATHON
TO THE TIME OF THE BATTLE OF THERMOPYLÆ.

OUR information respecting the affairs of Greece immediately after the repulse of the Persians from Marathon, is very scanty.

Kleomenês and Leotychidês, the two kings of Sparta, (the former belonging to the elder or Eurystheneid, the latter to the younger or the Prokleid, race), had conspired for the purpose of dethroning the former Prokleid king Demaratus : and Kleomenês had even gone so far as to tamper with the Delphian priestess for this purpose. His manœuvre being betrayed shortly afterwards, he was so alarmed at the displeasure of the Spartans, that he retired into Thessaly, and from thence into Arcadia, where he employed the powerful influence of his regal character and heroic lineage to arm the Arcadian people against his country. The Spartans, alarmed in their turn, voluntarily invited him back with a promise of amnesty. But his renewed lease did not last long. His habitual violence of character became aggravated into decided insanity, insomuch that he struck with his stick whomsoever he met ; and his relatives were forced to confine him in chains under a Helot sentinel. By severe menaces, he one day constrained this man to give him his sword, with which he mangled himself dreadfully and perished. So shocking a death was certain to receive a religious interpretation : yet which, among the misdeeds of his life, had drawn down upon him the divine wrath, was a point difficult to determine. Most of the Greeks imputed it to the sin of his having corrupted the Pythian priestess.¹ But the Athenians and Argeians were each disposed to an hypothesis of their own—the former believed that the gods had thus

Violent
proceedings
and death of
Kleomenês,
king of
Sparta.

¹ Herodot. vi. 74, 75.

punished the Spartan king for having cut timber in the sacred grove of Eleusis—the latter recognized the avenging hand of the hero Argus, whose grove Kleomenês had burnt, along with so many suppliant warriors who had taken sanctuary in it. Without pronouncing between these different suppositions, Herodotus contents himself with expressing his opinion that the miserable death of Kleomenês was an atonement for his conduct to Demaratus. But what surprises us most is, to hear that the Spartans, usually more disposed than other Greeks to refer every striking phænomenon to divine agency, recognized on this occasion nothing but a vulgar physical cause: Kleomenês had gone mad (they affirmed) through habits of intoxication, learnt from some Scythian envoys who had come to Sparta.¹

The death of Kleomenês, and the discredit thrown on his character, emboldened the Æginetans to prefer a complaint at Sparta respecting their ten hostages, whom Kleomenês and Leotychidês had taken away from the island, a little before the invasion of Attica by the Persians under Datis, and deposited at Athens as guarantee to the Athenians against aggression from Ægina at that critical moment. Leotychidês was the surviving auxiliary of Kleomenês in the requisition of these hostages, and against him the Æginetans complained. Though the proceeding was one unquestionably beneficial to the general cause of Greece,² yet such was the actual displeasure of the Lacedæmonians against the deceased king and his acts, that the survivor Leotychidês was brought to a public trial, and condemned to be delivered up as prisoner in atonement to the Æginetans. The latter were about to carry away their prisoner, when a dignified Spartan named Theasidês, pointed out to them the danger which they were incurring by such an indignity against the regal person. The Spartans (he observed) had passed sentence under feelings of temporary wrath, which would probably be exchanged for sympathy if they saw the sentence executed.

Accordingly the Æginetans contented themselves with

¹ Herodot. vi. 84.

² Herodot. vi. 61. Κλεομένης, δόντα ἐν τῇ Αἰγίνῃ, καὶ κοινὰ τῇ Ἑλλάδι ἀγαθὰ προσεργαζόμενον, &c.

stipulating that Leotychidēs should accompany them to Athens and redemand their hostages detained there.

The Spartans deliver Leotychidēs to the Æginetans, who require him to go with them to Athens, to get back the hostages.

The Athenians refused to give up the hostages, in spite of the emphatic terms in which the Spartan king set forth the sacred obligation of restoring a deposit.¹ They justified the refusal in part by saying that the deposit had been lodged by the two kings jointly, and could not be surrendered to one of them alone.

But they probably recollected that the hostages were placed with them less as a deposit than as a security against Æginetan hostility—which security they were not disposed to forego.

Leotychidēs having been obliged to retire without success, the Æginetans resolved to adopt measures of retaliation for themselves. They waited for the period of a solemn festival celebrated every fifth year at Sunium: on which occasion a ship, peculiarly equipped and carrying some of the leading Athenians as Theōrs or sacred envoys, sailed thither from Athens. This ship they found means to capture, and carried all on board prisoners to Ægina. Whether an exchange took place, or whether the prisoners and hostages on both sides were put to death, we do not know. But the consequence of their proceeding was an active and decided war between Athens and Ægina,² beginning seemingly about 488 or 487 B.C., and lasting until 481 B.C., the year preceding the invasion of Xerxes.

An Æginetan citizen named Nikodromus took advantage of this war to further a plot against the government of the island. Having been before banished (as he thought unjustly), he now organized a revolt of the people against the ruling oligarchy, concerting with the Athenians a simultaneous in-

¹ Herodot. vi. 85; compare vi. 49-73, and chap. xxxvi. of this History.

² Herodot. vi. 87, 88.

Instead of *ἦν γὰρ δὴ τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις πεντήρης ἐπὶ Σούνῳ* (vi. 87), I follow the reading proposed by Schömann and sanctioned by Boeckh—*πεντετηρίς*. It is hardly conceivable that the Athenians at that time should have had any ships with five banks of oars (*πεντήρης*); moreover, apart from this objection, the word *πεντήρης* makes considerable embarrassment in the sentence: see

Boeckh, *Urkunden über das Attische Seewesen*, chap. vii. p. 75, 76.

The elder Dionysius of Syracuse is said to have been the first Greek who constructed *πεντήρης* or quinquereme ships (Diodor. xiv. 40, 41).

There were many distinct *pentaëterides*, or solemnities celebrated every fifth year, included among the religious customs of Athens; see Aristoteles—*Πολιτ.* *Fragm.* xlviii. ed. Neumann; Pollux, viii. 187.

vasion in support of his plan. Accordingly on the appointed day he rose with his partisans in arms and took possession of the Old Town—a strong post which had been superseded in course of time by the more modern city on the sea-shore, less protected though more convenient.¹ But no Athenians appeared, and without them he was unable to maintain his footing. He was obliged to make his escape from the island, after witnessing the complete defeat of his partisans; a large body of whom, seven hundred in number, fell into the hands of the government, and were led out for execution. One man alone among these prisoners burst his chains, fled to the sanctuary of Dēmêtēr Thesmophorus, and was fortunate enough to seize the handle of the door before he was overtaken. In spite of every effort to drag him away by force, he clung to it with convulsive grasp. His pursuers did not venture to put him to death in such a position, but they severed the hands from the body and then executed him, leaving the hands still hanging to and grasping² the door-handle, where they seem to have long remained without being taken off. Destruction of the seven hundred prisoners does not seem to have drawn down upon the Æginetan oligarchy either vengeance from the gods, or censure from their contemporaries. But the violation of sanctuary, in the case of that one unfortunate man whose hands were cut off, was a crime which the goddess Dēmêtēr never forgave. More than fifty years afterwards, in the first year of the Peloponnesian war, the Æginetans, having been previously conquered by Athens, were finally expelled from their island: such expulsion was the divine judgement upon them for this ancient impiety, which half a century of continued expiatory sacrifice had not been sufficient to wipe out.³

The Æginetan Nikodromus lays a scheme for a democratical revolution in Ægina, in concert with Athens—the movement fails.

Treatment of the defeated conspirators—sacrilege.

¹ See Thucyd. i. 8.

The acropolis at Athens, having been the primitive city inhabited, bore the name of *The City* even in the time of Thucydidēs (ii. 15), at a time when Athens and Peiræus covered so large a region around and near it.

² Herodot. vi. 91. *χεῖρες δὲ κείναι ἐμπεφυκῆναι ἦσαν τοῖσι ἐπισπαστῆρσι*. The word *κείναι* for *ἐκείναι*, "those hands," appears so little suitable in this phrase, that I rather imagine the real

reading to have been *κεῖναι* (the Ionic dialect for *κεῖναι*), "the hands with nothing attached to them;" compare a phrase not very unlike, Homer, *Iliad*, iii. 376, *κεῖνὴ δὲ τροφάλεια δμ' ἔσπετο*, &c.

Compare the narrative of the arrest of the Spartan king Pausanias, and of the manner in which he was treated when in sanctuary at the temple of Athēnē Chalkiokkos (Thucyd. i. 134).

³ Herodot. vi. 91. *Ἀπὸ τούτου δὲ*

The Athenians land a force in Ægina—war which ensues.

The Athenians who were to have assisted Nikodromus arrived at Ægina one day too late. Their proceedings had been delayed by the necessity of borrowing twenty triremes from the Corinthians, in addition to fifty of their own: with these seventy sail they defeated the Æginetans, who met them with a fleet of equal number—and then landed on the island. The Æginetans solicited aid from Argos, but that city was either too much displeased with them, or too much exhausted by the defeat sustained from the Spartan Kleomenēs, to grant it. Nevertheless, one thousand Argeian volunteers, under a distinguished champion of the pentathlon named Eurybatēs, came to their assistance, and a vigorous war was carried on with varying success, against the Athenian armament.

At sea, the Athenians sustained a defeat, being attacked at a moment when their fleet was in disorder, so that they lost four ships with their crews: on land they were more successful, and few of the Argeian volunteers survived to return home. The general of the latter, Eurybatēs, confiding in his great personal strength and skill, challenged the best of the Athenian warriors to single combat. He slew three of them in succession, but the arm of the fourth, Sôphanēs of Dekeleia, was victorious, and proved fatal to him.¹ At length the invaders were obliged to leave the island without any decisive result, and the war seems to have been prosecuted by frequent descents and privateering on both sides—in which Nikodromus and the Æginetan exiles, planted by Athens on the coast of Attica near Sunium, took an active part;² the advantage on the whole being on the side of Athens.

καὶ ἄγος σφι ἐγένετο, τὸ ἐκθύσασθαι οὐχ αἰεὶ τε ἐγένοντο ἐπιμηχανώμενοι, ἀλλ' ἐβήσαν ἐκπεσόντες πρότερον ἐκ τῆς νῆσου ἢ σφι ἔλεον γενέσθαι τὴν θεόν.

Compare Thucyd. ii. 27 about the final expulsion from Ægina. The Lacedæmonians assigned to these expelled Æginetans a new abode in the territory of Thyrea, on the eastern coast of Peloponnesus, where they were attacked, taken prisoners, and put to death by the Athenians, in the eighth year of the war (Thucyd. iv. 57). Now Herodotus, while he mentions the expulsion, does not allude to their subsequent and still more calamitous fate. Had he known the fact, he could hardly have failed to

notice it, as a farther consummation of the divine judgement. We may reasonably presume ignorance in this case, which would tend to support the opinion thrown out in a preceding chapter (c. xxxiii.) respecting the date of composition of his history—in the earliest years of the Peloponnesian war.

¹ Herodot. ix. 75.

² Herodot. vi. 90, 91, 92, 93. Thucyd. i. 41. About Sôphanēs, compare ix. 75.

How much damage was done by such a privateering war, between countries so near as Ægina and Attica, may be seen by the more detailed description of a later war of the same kind in 388 B.C. (Xenophon, Hellenic. v. 1).

The general course of this war, and especially the failure of the enterprise concerted with Nikodromus in consequence of delay in borrowing ships from Corinth, were well calculated to impress upon the Athenians the necessity of enlarging their naval force. And it is from the present time that we trace among them the first growth of that decided tendency towards maritime activity, which coincided so happily with the expansion of their democracy, and opened a new phase in Grecian history, as well as a new career for themselves.

Effect of this war in inducing the Athenians to enlarge their military force.

The exciting effect produced upon them by the repulse of the Persians at Marathon has been dwelt upon in a preceding chapter. Miltiadês, the victor in that field, having been removed from the scene under circumstances already described, Aristeidês and Themistoklês became the chief men at Athens : and the former was chosen archon during the succeeding year. His exemplary uprightness in magisterial functions ensured to him lofty esteem from the general public, not without a certain proportion of active enemies, some of them sufferers by his justice. These enemies naturally became partisans of his rival Themistoklês, who had all the talents necessary for bringing them into cooperation. The rivalry between the two chiefs became so bitter and menacing, that even Aristeidês himself is reported to have said, "If the Athenians were wise they would cast both of us into the barathrum." Under such circumstances it is not too much to say that the peace of the country was preserved mainly by the institution called Ostracism, the true character of which I have already explained. After three or four years of continued political rivalry, the two chiefs appealed to a vote of ostracism, and Aristeidês was banished.

Themistoklês and Aristeidês, the chief men at Athens—intense rivalry between them.—Banishment of the latter by ostracism.

Of the particular points on which their rivalry turned, we are unfortunately little informed. But it is highly probable that one of them was, the important change of policy above alluded to—the conversion of Athens from a land-power into a sea-power,—the development of this new and stirring element in the minds of the people. By all authorities, this change of policy is ascribed principally and specially to Themistoklês.¹

Conversion of Athens from a land power into a naval power proposed and urged by Themistoklês.

¹ Plutarch, Themist. c. 19.

On that account, if for no other reason, Aristeidēs would probably be found opposed to it: but it was moreover a change not in harmony with that old-fashioned Hellenism, undisturbed uniformity of life, and narrow range of active duty and experience—which Aristeidēs seems to have approved in common with the subsequent philosophers. The seaman was naturally more of a wanderer and cosmopolite than the heavy-armed soldier: the modern Greek seaman even at this moment is so to a remarkable degree, distinguished for the variety of his ideas, and the quickness of his intelligence.¹ The land-service was a type of steadiness and inflexible ranks, the sea-service that of mutability and adventure. Such was the idea strongly entertained by Plato and other philosophers:² though we may remark that they do not render justice to the Athenian seaman. His training was far more perfect and laborious, and his habits of obedience

¹ See Mr. Galt's interesting account of the Hydriot sailors, *Voyages and Travels in the Mediterranean*, p. 376-378 (London, 1802).

"The city of Hydra originated in a small colony of boatmen belonging to the Morea, who took refuge in the island from the tyranny of the Turks. About forty years ago they had multiplied to a considerable number, their little village began to assume the appearance of a town, and they had cargoes that went as far as Constantinople. In their mercantile transactions, the Hydriots acquired the reputation of greater integrity than the other Greeks, as well as of being the most intrepid navigators in the Archipelago; and they were of course regularly preferred. Their industry and honesty obtained its reward. The islands of Spezzia, Paros, Myconi, and Ipsara, resemble Hydra in their institutions, and possess the same character for commercial activity. In paying their sailors, Hydra and its sister islands have a peculiar custom. The whole amount of the freight is considered as a common stock, from which the charges of victualling the ship are deducted. The remainder is then divided into two equal parts: one is allotted to the crew and equally shared among them without reference to age or rank; the other part is appropriated to the ship and captain. The capital of

the cargo is a trust given to the captain and crew on certain fixed conditions. The character and manners of the Hydriot sailors, from the moral effect of these customs, are much superior in regularity to the ideas that we are apt to entertain of sailors. They are sedate, well-dressed, well-bred, shrewd, informed, and speculative. They seem to form a class, in the orders of mankind, which has no existence among us. By their voyages, they acquire a liberality of notion which we expect only among gentlemen, while in their domestic circumstances their conduct is suitable to their condition. The Greeks are all traditional historians, and possess much of that kind of knowledge to which the term *learning* is usually applied. This, mingled with the other information of the Hydriots, gives them that advantageous character of mind which I think they possess."

² Plato, *Legg.* iv. pp. 705, 706. Plutarch, *Themistoklēs*, c. 19, *Isokrātēs*, *Panathenæic*, c. 43.

Plutarch, *Philopoemen*, c. 14. Πλην Ἐπαμεινώνδαν μὲν ἔνοι λέγουσιν ἀκούοντα γεῦσαι τῶν κατὰ θάλασσαν ὠφελειῶν τοῦς πολίτας, ὅπως αὐτῷ μὴ λάθωσιν ἀντὶ μονίμων ὀπλιτῶν, κατὰ Πλάτωνα, ναῖται γενόμενοι καὶ διαφθαρέντες, ἄπρακτον ἐκ τῆς Ἀσίας καὶ τῶν νήσων ἀπελθεῖν ἐκούσιος: compare vii. p. 301.

far more complete,¹ than that of the Athenian hoplite or horseman: a training beginning with Themistoklēs, and reaching its full perfection about the commencement of the Peloponnesian war.

In recommending extraordinary efforts to create a navy as well as to acquire nautical practice, Themistoklēs displayed all that sagacious appreciation of the circumstances and dangers of the time, for which Thucydides gives him credit: and there can be no doubt that Aristeidēs, though the honester politician of the two, was at this particular crisis the less essential to his country. Not only was there the struggle with Ægina, a maritime power equal or more than equal, and within sight of the Athenian harbour—but there was also in the distance a still more formidable contingency to guard against. The Persian armament had been driven with disgrace from Attica back to Asia; but the Persian monarch still remained with undiminished means of aggression as well as increased thirst for revenge; and Themistoklēs knew well that the danger from that quarter would recur greater than ever. He believed that it would recur again in the same way, by an expedition across the Ægean like that of Datis to Marathon;² against which the best defence would be found in a numerous and well-trained fleet. Nor could the large preparations of Darius for renewing the attack remain unknown to a vigilant observer, extending as they did over so many Greeks subject to the Persian empire. Such positive warning was more than enough to stimulate the active genius of Themistoklēs, who now prevailed upon his countrymen to begin with energy the work of maritime preparation, as well against Ægina as against Persia.³ Not only were two hundred new ships built, and citizens trained as seamen—but the important work was commenced, during the year when Themistoklēs was either archon or general, of forming and fortifying a new harbour for Athens at Peiræus, instead of

Views and long-sighted calculations of Themistoklēs—he was at this time more essential to his country than Aristeidēs.

¹ See the remarkable passage in Xenophon (Memorab. iii. 5, 19), attesting that the Hoplites and the Hippeis, the persons first in rank in the city, were also the most disobedient on military service.

² Thucyd. i. 93. Ἰὼν (Themistoklēs) τῆς βασιλέως στρατιᾶς τὴν κατὰ θάλασσαν ἰφθοὺν εὐπορωτέραν τῆς κατὰ γῆν οὖσαν.

³ Thucyd. i. 14. Herodot. vii. 144.

the ancient open bay of Phalærum. The latter was indeed somewhat nearer to the city, but Peiræus with its three separate natural ports,¹ admitting of being closed and fortified, was incomparably superior in safety as well as in convenience. It is not too much to say, with Herodotus—that the Æginetan “war was the salvation of Greece, by constraining the Athenians to make themselves a maritime power.”² The whole efficiency of the resistance subsequently made to Xerxes turned upon this new movement in the organisation of Athens, allowed as it was to attain tolerable completeness through a fortunate concurrence of accidents; for the important delay of ten years, between the defeat of Marathon and the fresh invasion by which it was to be avenged, was in truth the result of accident. First, the revolt of Egypt; next, the death of Darius; thirdly, the indifference of Xerxes at his first accession towards Hellenic matters—postponed until 480 B.C., an invasion which would naturally have been undertaken in 487 or 486 B.C., and which would have found Athens at that time without her wooden walls—the great engine of her subsequent salvation.

Another accidental help, without which the new fleet could not have been built—a considerable amount of public money—was also by good fortune now available to the Athenians. It is first in an emphatic passage of the poet Æschylus, and next from Herodotus on the present occasion, that we hear of the silver mines of Laurium³ in Attica, and the valuable produce which they rendered to the state. They were situated in the southern portion of the territory, not very far from the promontory of Sunium,⁴ amidst a district of low hills which

¹ Thucyd. i. 93.

² Herodot. vii. 144. Οὗτος γὰρ ὁ πόλεμος συντάς ἔσωσε τότε τὴν Ἑλλάδα, ἀναγκάσας θαλασσίους γενέσθαι Ἀθηναίους.

Thucyd. i. 18. ναυτικοὶ ἐγένοντο.

³ Æschylus, Persæ, 235.

⁴ The mountain region of Laurium has been occasionally visited by modern travellers, but never carefully surveyed until 1836, when Dr. Fiedler examined it mineralogically by order of the present Greek government. See his *Reisen*

durch Griechenland, vol. i. pp. 39, 73.

The region is now little better than a desert, but Fiedler especially notices the great natural fertility of the plain near Thorikus, together with the good harbour at that place—both circumstances of great value at the time when the mines were in work. Many remains are seen of shafts sunk in ancient times—and sunk in so workmanlike a manner as to satisfy the eye of a miner of the present day.—p. 76.

extended across much of the space between the eastern sea at Thorikus, and the western at Anaphlystus. At what time they first began to be worked, we have no information : but it seems hardly possible that they could have been worked with any spirit or profitable result, until after the expulsion of Hippias and the establishment of the democratical constitution of Kleisthenês. Neither the strong local factions, by which different portions of Attica were set against each other before the time of Peisistratus—nor the rule of that despot succeeded by his two sons—were likely to afford confidence and encouragement. But when the democracy of Kleisthenês first brought Attica into one systematic and comprehensive whole, with equal rights assigned to each part, and with a common centre at Athens—the power of that central government over the mineral wealth of the country, and its means of binding the whole people to respect agreements concluded with individual undertakers, would give a new stimulus to private speculation in the district of Laurium. It was the practice of the Athenian government either to sell, or to let for a long term of years, particular districts of this productive region to individuals or companies ; on consideration partly of a sum or fine paid down, partly of a reserved rent equal to one twenty-fourth part of the gross produce.

We are told by Herodotus that there was in the Athenian treasury, at the time when Themistoklês made his proposition to enlarge the naval force, a great sum¹ arising from the Laurian mines, out of which a distribution was on the point of being made among the citizens—ten drachms to each man. This great amount in hand must probably have been the produce of the purchase-money or fines received from recent sales, since the small annual reserved rent can hardly have been accumulated during many successive years. New and enlarged enterprises in mines must be supposed to have been recently begun by individuals under contract with the government : otherwise there could hardly have been at the moment so overflowing an exchequer, or adequate means for the special distribution contemplated. Themis-

Themistoklês prevails upon the Athenian people to forego the distribution of this fund, and employ it in building an increased number of ships.

¹ Herodot. vii. 144. "Ὅτε Ἀθηναίοισι γενομένων χρημάτων μεγάλων ἐν τῇ κοινῇ, τὰ ἐκ τῶν μεταλλῶν σφι προσῆλθε τῶν ἀπὸ Λαυρείου, ἐμελλόν λάξεσθαι ὀρχηδὸν ἑκατοσθὲν δέκα δραχμῶν.

toklēs availed himself of this precious opportunity—set forth the necessities of the war with Ægina, and the still more formidable menace from the great enemy in Asia—and prevailed upon the people to forego the promised distribution for the purpose of obtaining an efficient navy.¹ One cannot doubt that there must have been many speakers who would try to make themselves popular by opposing this proposition and supporting the distribution; insomuch that the power of the people generally to feel the force of a distant motive as predominant over a present gain, deserves notice as an earnest of their approaching greatness.

¹ All the information—unfortunately it is very scanty—which we possess respecting the ancient mines of Laurium, is brought together in the valuable Dissertation of M. Boeckh, translated and appended to the English translation of his *Public Economy of Athens*. He discusses the fact stated in this chapter of Herodotus, in sect. 8 of that Dissertation; but there are many of his remarks in which I cannot concur.

After multiplying ten drachmæ by the assumed number of 20,000 Athenian citizens, making a sum total distributed of 33 talents, he goes on—"That the distribution was made annually might have been presumed from the principles of the Athenian administration, without the testimony of Cornelius Nepos. We are not therefore to suppose that the savings of several years are meant, nor merely a surplus; but that all the public money arising from the mines, as it was not required for any other object, was divided among the members of the community" (p. 632).

We are hardly authorised to conclude from the passage of Herodotus that *all* the sum received from the mines was about to be distributed. The treasury was very rich, and a distribution was about to be made—but it does not follow that nothing was to be left in the treasury after the distribution. Accordingly, all calculations of the total produce of the mines, based upon this passage of Herodotus, are uncertain. Nor is it clear that there was any regular annual distribution, unless we are to take the passage of Cornelius Nepos as proving it; but he talks rather about the magistrates employing this money for jobbing purposes—not about a regular distribution

("Nam cum pecunia publica quæ ex metallis redibat, largitione magistratum quotannis periret." Corn. Nep. Themist. c. 2). A story is told by Polyænus, from whomsoever he copied it—of a sum of 100 talents in the treasury, which Themistoklēs persuaded the people to hand over to 100 rich men, for the purpose of being expended as the latter might direct, with an obligation to reimburse the money in case the people were not satisfied with the expenditure: these rich men employed each the sum awarded to him in building a new ship, much to the satisfaction of the people (Polyæn. i. 30). This story differs materially from that of Herodotus, and we cannot venture either to blend the two together or to rely upon Polyænus separately.

I imagine that the sum of 33 talents, or 50 talents, necessary for the distribution, formed part of a larger sum lying in the treasury, arising from the mines. Themistoklēs persuaded the people to employ the *whole* sum in shipbuilding, which of course implied that the distribution was to be renounced. Whether there had been distributions of a similar kind in former years, as M. Boeckh affirms, is a matter on which we have no evidence. M. Boeckh seems to me not to have kept in view the fact (which he himself states just before) that there were two sources of receipt into the treasury—original purchase-money paid down, and reserved annual rent. It is from the former source that I imagine the large sum lying in the treasury to have been derived: the small reserved rent probably went among the annual item of the state-budget.

Immense indeed was the recompense reaped for this self-denial, not merely by Athens but by Greece generally, when the preparations of Xerxes came to be matured, and his armament was understood to be approaching. The orders for equipment of ships and laying in of provisions, issued by the Great King to his subject Greeks in Asia, the Ægean, and Thrace, would of course become known throughout Greece Proper; especially the vast labour bestowed on the canal of Mount Athos, which would be the theme of wondering talk with every Thasian or Akanthian citizen who visited the festival games in Peloponnesus. All these premonitory evidences were public enough, without any need of that elaborate stratagem whereby the exiled Demaratus is alleged to have secretly transmitted, from Susa to Sparta, intelligence of the approaching expedition.¹ The formal announcements of Xerxes all designated Athens as the special object of his wrath and vengeance.² Other Grecian cities might thus hope to escape without mischief: so that the prospect of the great invasion did not at first provoke among them any unanimous dispositions to resist. Accordingly, when the first heralds despatched by Xerxes from Sardis in the autumn of 481 B.C., a little before his march to the Hellespont, addressed themselves to the different cities with demand of earth and water, many were disposed to comply. Neither to Athens, nor to Sparta, were any heralds sent; and these two cities were thus from the beginning identified in interest and in the necessity of defence. Both of them sent, in this trying moment, to consult the Delphian oracle; while both at the same time joined to convene a Pan-hellenic congress at the Isthmus of Corinth, for the purpose of organising resistance against the expected invader.

Preparations of Xerxes—known beforehand in Greece.

Heralds from Persia to demand earth and water from the Grecian cities—many of them comply and submit.

I have in the preceding chapters pointed out the various steps whereby the separate states of Greece were gradually brought, even against their own natural instincts, into something approaching more nearly to political union. The present congress, assembled under the influence of common fear from Persia, has more of a Pan-hellenic character than any political

¹ Herodot. vii. 239.

² Herodot. vii. 8-138.

event which has yet occurred in Grecian history. It extends far beyond the range of those Peloponnesian states who constitute the immediate allies of Sparta: it comprehends Athens, and is even summoned in part by her strenuous instigation; moreover it seeks to combine every city of Hellenic race and language, however distant, which can be induced to take part in it—even the Kretans, Korkyræans, and Sicilians.

It is true that all these states do not actually come,—but earnest efforts are made to induce them to come. The dispersed brethren of the Hellenic family are entreated to marshal themselves in the same ranks for a joint political purpose¹—the defence of the common hearth and metropolis of the race. This is a new fact in Grecian history, opening scenes and ideas unlike to anything which has gone before—enlarging prodigiously the functions and duties connected with that headship of Greece which had hitherto been in the hands of Sparta, but which is about to become too comprehensive for her to manage—and thus introducing increased habits of cooperation among the subordinate states, as well as rival hopes of aggrandizement among the leaders. The congress at the Isthmus of Corinth marks such further advance in the centralising tendencies of Greece, and seems at first to promise an onward march in the same direction, but the promise will not be found realized.

Its first step was indeed one of inestimable value. While most of the deputies present came prepared, in the name of their respective cities, to swear reciprocal fidelity and brotherhood, they also addressed all their efforts to appease the feuds and dissensions which reigned among particular members of their own meeting. Of these the most prominent, as well as the most dangerous, was the war still subsisting between Athens and Ægina. The latter was not exempt, even now, from suspicions of *medising*² (*i. e.* embracing the cause of the Persians), which had been raised by her giving earth and water ten years before to Darius. But her present conduct afforded no

¹ Herodot. vii. 145. Φρονήσαντες εἴ πως ἔν τε γένοιτο τὸ Ἑλληνικὸν, καὶ εἰ συγκύψαντες τωὶτὸ πρήσσοιεν πάντες, ὡς δεινὸν ἐπιδόντων ὁμοίως πᾶσι Ἕλλησι.

² Herodot. viii. 92.

countenance to such suspicions: she took earnest part in the congress as well as in the joint measures of defence, and willingly consented to accommodate her difference with Athens.¹ In this work of reconciling feuds, so essential to the safety of Greece, the Athenian Themistoklēs took a prominent part, as well as Cheileos of Tegea in Arcadia.² The congress proceeded to send envoys and solicit cooperation from such cities as were yet either equivocal or indifferent, especially Argos, Korkyra, and the Kretan and Sicilian Greeks; and at the same time to despatch spies across to Sardis, for the purpose of learning the state and prospects of the assembled army.

These spies presently returned, having been detected and condemned to death by the Persian generals, but released by express order of Xerxes, who directed that the full strength of his assembled armament should be shown to them, in order that the terror of the Greeks might be thus magnified. The step was well calculated for such a purpose: but the discouragement throughout Greece was already extreme, at this critical period when the storm was about to burst upon them. Even to intelligent and well-meaning Greeks, much more to the careless, the timid, or the treacherous—Xerxes with his countless host appeared irresistible, and indeed something more than human.³ Of course such an impression would be encouraged by the large number of Greeks already his tributaries: and we may even trace the manifestation of a wish to get rid of the Athenians altogether, as the chief objects of Persian vengeance and chief hindrance to tranquil submission. This despair of the very continuance of Hellenic life and autonomy breaks forth even from the sanctuary of Hellenic religion, the Delphian temple; when the Athenians, in their distress and uncertainty, sent to consult the oracle. Hardly had their two envoys performed the customary sacrifices, and sat down in the inner chamber near the priestess Aristonikê, when she at once exclaimed—"Wretched men, why sit ye there? Quit your land and city, and flee afar! Head, body, feet, and

Alarm and
mistrust
prevalent
throughout
Greece.

¹ Herodot. vii. 145.

² Plutarch, Themistokl. c. 10. About Cheileos, Herodot. ix. 9.

³ Herodot. vii. 203. οὐ γὰρ θεὸν εἶναι τὸν ἐπιδόντα ἐπὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα, ἀλλ' ἀνθρώπων, &c. : compare also vii. 56.

hands are alike rotten: fire and sword, in the train of the Syrian chariot, shall overwhelm you: nor only *your* city, but other cities also, as well as many even of the temples of the gods—which are now sweating and trembling with fear, and foreshadow, by drops of blood on their roofs, the hard calamities impending. Get ye away from the sanctuary, with your souls steeped in sorrow.”¹

So terrific a reply had rarely escaped from the lips of the priestess. The envoys were struck to the earth by it, and durst not carry it back to Athens. In their sorrow they were encouraged yet to hope by an influential Delphian citizen named Timon (we trace here as elsewhere the underhand working of these leading Delphians on the priestess), who advised them to provide themselves with the characteristic marks of supplication, and to approach the oracle a second time in that imploring guise: “O lord, we pray thee (they said), have compassion on these boughs of supplication, and deliver to us something more comfortable concerning our country; else we quit not thy sanctuary, but remain here, until death.” Upon which the priestess replied—“Athênê with all her prayers and all her sagacity cannot propitiate Olympian Zeus.”² But this assurance I will give you, firm as adamant. When everything else in the land of Kekrops shall be taken, Zeus grants to Athênê that the wooden wall alone shall remain unconquered, to defend you and your children. Stand not to await the assailing horse and foot from the continent, but turn your backs and retire: you shall yet live to fight another day. O divine Salamis, thou too shalt destroy the children of women, either at the seed-time or at the harvest.”³

This second answer was a sensible mitigation of the first.

¹ Herodot. vii. 140.

Ἄλλ' ἴναρ ἔξ ἀδύτου, κακοῖς δ' ἐνικεύετε θυμόν.

The general sense and scope of the oracle appears to me clear, in this case. It is a sentence of nothing but desolation and sadness; though Bähr and Schweighäuser with other commentators try to infuse into it something of encouragement by construing θυμόν, *fortitude*. The translation of Valla and Schultz is nearer to the truth. But even when the general sense of an oracle is plain (which

it hardly ever is), the particular phrases are always wild and vague.

² Herodot. vii. 141.

Οὐ δύναται Πάλλας Δ' Ὀλύμπιον ἐξελάσσεσθαι
Λισσαμένη πολλοῖσι λόγοις καὶ μῆτιν πυκνήν.

Compare with this the declaration of Apollo to Croesus of Lydia (i. 91).

³ Τείχεος Τριτογενεῖ ξύλινον διδοῖ εὐρύστα
Ζεὺς
Μοῖνον ἀπώρθητον τελέθειν, τὸ σὲ τέκεα τ' ὀρήσει.

.....
Ἡ θεὸς Σαλαμῖς, ἀπολήτ' ἂν σὺ τέκεα γυναικῶν,
&c.—(Herodot. vii. 141.)

It left open some hope of escape, though faint, dark and unintelligible: and the envoys wrote it down to carry back to Athens, not concealing probably the terrific sentence which had preceded it. When read to the people the obscurity of the meaning provoked many different interpretations. What was meant by "the wooden wall"? Some supposed that the acropolis itself, which had originally been surrounded with a wooden palisade, was the refuge pointed out; but the greater number, and among them most of those who were by profession expositors of prophecy, maintained that the wooden wall indicated the fleet. But these professional expositors, while declaring that the god bade them go on shipboard, deprecated all idea of a naval battle, and insisted on the necessity of abandoning Attica for ever. The last lines of the oracle, wherein it was said that Salamis would destroy the children of women, appeared to them to portend nothing but disaster in the event of a naval combat.

Sentence of the oracle frightful, yet obscure: efforts of the Athenians to interpret it: ingenuity and success of Themistoklēs.

Such was the opinion of those who passed for the best expositors of the divine will. It harmonized completely with the despairing temper then prevalent, heightened by the terrible sentence pronounced in the first oracle. Emigration to some foreign land presented itself as the only hope of safety even for their persons. The fate of Athens,—and of Greece generally, which would have been helpless without Athens,—now hung upon a thread, when Themistoklēs, the great originator of the fleet, interposed with equal steadfastness of heart and ingenuity, to ensure the proper use of it. He contended that if the god had intended to designate Salamis as the scene of a naval disaster to the Greeks, that island would have been called in the oracle by some such epithet as "wretched Salamis:" but the fact that it was termed "divine Salamis," indicated that the parties destined to perish there were the enemies of Greece, not the Greeks themselves. He encouraged his countrymen therefore to abandon their city and country, and to trust themselves to the fleet as the wooden wall recommended by the god, but with full determination to fight and conquer on board.¹ Great indeed were

¹ Herodot. vii. 143. Ταῦτ᾽ ἑμιστοκλῆους ἀποφαινομένου, Ἀθηναῖοι ταῦτά σφι ἐγνώσαν αἰρετώτερα εἶναι μᾶλλον ἢ τὰ τῶν χρησμολόγων, οἳ οὐκ εἶον ναυμα-

the consequences which turned upon this bold stretch of exegetical conjecture. Unless the Athenians had been persuaded, by some plausible show of interpretation, that the sense of the oracle encouraged instead of forbidding a naval combat, they would in their existing depression have abandoned all thought of resistance.

Even with the help of an encouraging interpretation, however, nothing less than the most unconquerable resolution and patriotism could have enabled the Athenians to bear up against such terrific denunciations from the Delphian god, and persist in resistance in place of seeking safety by emigration. Herodotus emphatically impresses this truth upon his readers:¹ nay, he even steps out of his way to do so, proclaiming Athens as the real saviour of Greece. Writing as he did about the beginning of the Peloponnesian war—at a time when Athens, having attained the maximum of her empire, was alike feared, hated, and admired, by most of the Grecian states—he knows that the opinion which he is giving will be unpopular with his hearers generally, and he apologizes for it as something wrung from him against his will by the force of the evidence.² Not only did the Athenians

Great and genuine Pan-hellenic patriotism of the Athenians—strongly attested by Herodotus, as his own judgement.

χίην ἀρνέεσθαι, ἀλλὰ ἐκλιπόντας χώραν τὴν Ἀττικὴν, ἄλλην τιὰν οἰκίσειν.

There is every reason to accept the statement of Herodotus as true, respecting these oracles delivered to the Athenians, and the debated interpretation of them. They must have been discussed publicly in the Athenian assembly, and Herodotus may have conversed with persons who had heard the discussion. Respecting the other oracle which he states to have been delivered to the Spartans—intimating that either Sparta must be conquered or a king of Sparta must perish—we may reasonably doubt whether it was in existence before the battle of Thermopylæ (Herodot. vii. 220).

The later writers, Justin (ii. 12), Cornelius Nepos (c. 2), and Polyænus (i. 30), give an account of the proceeding of Themistoklēs, inferior to Herodotus in vivacity as well as in accuracy.

¹ Herodot. vii. 139. οὐδὲ σφίτας χρηστήρια φοβερά, ἐλθόντα ἐκ Δελφῶν, καὶ ἐς δέμα βαλόντα, ἐπεισε ἐκλιπεῖν τὴν Ἑλλάδα, &c.

For the abundance of oracles and

prophecies, from many different sources, which would be current at such a moment of anxiety, we may compare the analogy of the outbreak of the Peloponnesian war, described by the contemporary historian (Thucyd. ii. 8).

² Herodot. vii. 139. Ἐνθαῦτα ἀναγκαίῃ ἐξέργομαι γνώμην ἀποδέεσθαι, ἐπίφθορον μὲν πρὸς τῶν πλεόνων ἀνθρώπων· ὁμοι δέ, τῇ γέ μοι φαίνεται εἶναι ἀληθές, οὐκ ἐπισχέσω. Εἰ Ἀθηναῖοι, καταβρυθήσαντες τὸν ἐπιδότα κίνδυνον, ἐξέλικοι τὴν σφετέρην, &c. . . . Νῦν δὲ, Ἀθηναίους ἄν τις λέγων σωτήρας γενέσθαι τῆς Ἑλλάδος, οὐκ ἂν ἁμαρτάνοι τὸ ἀληθές, &c.

The whole chapter deserves peculiar attention, as it brings before us the feelings of those contemporaries to whom his history is addressed, and the mode of judging with which they looked back on the Persian war. One is apt unconsciously to fancy that an ancient historian writes for men in the abstract, and not for men of given sentiments, prejudices, and belief. The persons whom Herodotus addressed are those who were so

dare to stay and fight against immense odds: they, and they alone, threw into the cause that energy and forwardness whereby it was enabled to succeed,¹ as will appear farther in the sequel.

But there was also a third way, not less deserving of notice, in which they contributed to the result. As soon as the congress of deputies met at the Isthmus of Corinth, it became essential to recognize some one commanding city. With regard to the land-force, no one dreamt of contesting the pre-eminence of Sparta. But in respect to the fleet, her pretensions were more disputable, since she furnished at most only sixteen ships, and little or no nautical skill; while Athens brought two-thirds of the entire naval force, with the best ships and seamen. Upon these grounds the idea was at first started, that Athens should command at sea and Sparta on land: but the majority of the allies manifested a decided repugnance, announcing that they would follow no one but a Spartan. To the honour of the Athenians, they at once waived their pretensions, as soon as they saw that the unity of the confederate force at this moment of peril would be compromised.² To appreciate this generous abnegation of a claim in itself so reasonable, we must recollect that the love of pre-eminence was among the most prominent attributes of the Hellenic character; a prolific source of their greatness and excellence, but producing also no small amount both of their follies and their crimes. To renounce at the call of public obligation a claim to personal honour and glory, is perhaps the rarest of all virtues in a son of Hellen.

We find thus the Athenians nerved up to the pitch of resistance—prepared to see their country wasted, and to live as well as to fight on shipboard, when the necessity should arrive—furnishing two-thirds of the whole fleet, and yet prosecuting the building of fresh ships until the last moment.³

full of admiration for Sparta, as to ascribe to her chiefly the honour of having beaten back the Persians; and to maintain, that even without the aid of Athens, the Spartans and Peloponnesians, both could have defended, and would have defended, the Isthmus of Corinth, fortified as it was by a wall built expressly. The Peloponnesian allies of that day

forgot that they were open to attack by sea as well as by land.

¹ Herodot. vii. 139. ἰσχυροὶ δὲ τὴν Ἑλλάδα περιεῖναι ἐλευθέρην, τοῦτο τὸ Ἑλληνικὸν πᾶν τὸ λοιπὸν, ὅσον μὴ ἐμήδισε, αὐτοὶ οὗτοι ἦσαν οἱ ἐπεγείραντες, καὶ βασιλεία μετὰ γε θεοῦ ἀνωσόμενοι.

² Herodot. viii. 2, 3: compare vii. 161. ³ Herodot. vii. 144.

—sending forth the ablest and most forward leader in the common cause, while content themselves to serve like other states under the leadership of Sparta. During the winter preceding the march of Xerxes from Sardis, the congress at the Isthmus was trying, with little success, to bring the Grecian cities into united action. Among the cities north of Attica and Peloponnesus, the greater number were either inclined to submit, like Thebes and the greater part of Bœotia, or were at least lukewarm in the cause of independence: so rare at this trying moment (to use the language of the unfortunate Plataeans fifty-three years afterwards) was the exertion of resolute Hellenic patriotism against the invader.¹

Even in the interior of Peloponnesus, the powerful Argos maintained an ambiguous neutrality. It was one of the first steps of the congress to send special envoys to Argos, setting forth the common danger and soliciting co-operation. The result is certain, that no co-operation was obtained—the Argeians did nothing throughout the struggle; but as to their real position, or the grounds of their refusal, contradictory statements had reached the ears of Herodotus. They themselves affirmed that they were ready to have joined the Hellenic cause, in spite of dissuasion from the Delphian oracle—exactng only as conditions that the Spartans should conclude a truce with them for thirty years, and should equally divide the honours of headship with Argos. To the proposed truce there would probably have been no objection, nor was there any as to the principle of dividing the headship. But the Spartans added, that they had two kings, while the Argeians had only one; and inasmuch as neither of the two Spartan kings could be deprived of his vote, the Argeian king could only be admitted to a third vote conjointly with them. This proposition appeared to the Argeians (who considered that even the undivided headship was no more than their ancient right) as nothing better than insolent encroachment, and incensed them so much that they desired the envoys to quit their territory

¹ Thucyd. iii. 56. *ἰν καιροῖς οἷς σπάρτιον ἦν τῶν ἑλλήνων τιὰ ἀρετὴν τῇ κέρει θυράμεν ἀντιτάξασθαι.*

This view of the case is much more

conformable to history than the boasts of later orators respecting wide-spread patriotism in these times. See Demosthen. Philipp. iii. 37, p. 120.

before sunset; preferring even a tributary existence under Persia to a formal degradation as compared with Sparta.¹

Such was the story told by the Argeians themselves, but seemingly not credited either by any other Greeks, or by Herodotus himself. The prevalent opinion was, that the Argeians had a secret understanding with Xerxes. It was even affirmed that they had been the parties who invited him into Greece, as a means both of protection and of vengeance to themselves against Sparta after their defeat by Kleomenēs. And Herodotus himself evidently believed that they *medised*, though he is half afraid to say so, and disguises his opinion in a cloud of words which betray the angry polemics going on about the matter, even fifty years afterwards.² It is certain that in act the Argeians were neutral, and one of their reasons for neutrality was, that they did not choose to join any Pan-Hellenic levy except in the capacity of chiefs. But probably the more powerful reason was, that they shared the impression, then so widely diffused throughout Greece, as to the irresistible force of the approaching host, and chose to hold themselves prepared for the event. They kept up secret negotiations even with Persian agents, yet not compromising them-

Different stories current in Greece about Argos—opinion of Herodotus.

¹ Herodot. vii. 147-150.

² The opinion of Herodotus is delivered in a remarkable way, without mentioning the name of the Argeians, and with evident reluctance. After enumerating all the Grecian contingents assembled for the defence of the isthmus, and the different inhabitants of Peloponnesus, ethnically classified, he proceeds to say: *Τούτων ἂν τῶν ἐπὶ ἰσθμῶν αἱ λοιπαὶ πόλεις, πάρεχ' τὸν κατέλειψα, ἐκ τοῦ μίσου ἐκατίσταν εἰ δὲ ἐλευθέρως ἔξεστι εἰπεῖν, ἐκ τοῦ μίσου κατήμενοι ἐμῇδίζον* (viii. 73). This assertion includes the Argeians without naming them.

When he speaks respecting the Argeians by name, he is by no means so free and categorical: compare vii. 152—he will give no opinion of his own, differing from the allegation of the Argeians themselves—he mentions other stories, incompatible with that allegation; but without guaranteeing their accuracy—he delivers a general admonition that those who think they have great reason to

complain of the conduct of others would generally find, on an impartial scrutiny, that others have as much reason to complain of them—"And thus the conduct of Argos has not been *so much worse than that of others*"—*οὕτω δὲ οὐκ Ἀργείοισι ἀσχείστα πεπολεῖται*.

At the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, when the history of Herodotus was probably composed, the Argeians were in a peculiarly favourable position. They took part neither with Athens nor Lacedæmon, each of whom was afraid of offending them. An historian who openly countenanced a grave charge of treason against them in the memorable foregone combat against Xerxes, was thus likely to incur odium from both parties in Greece.

The comments of Plutarch on Herodotus in respect to this matter are of little value (De Herodoti Malignit. c. 28, p. 863), and are indeed unfair, since he represents the Argeian version of the facts as being universally believed (*δῆναυτε ἴσασιν*), which it evidently was not.

selves while matters were still pending. Nor is it improbable, in their vexation against Sparta, that they would have been better pleased if the Persians had succeeded,—all which may reasonably be termed, *medising*.

The absence of Hellenic fidelity in Argos was borne out by the parallel examples of Krete and Korkyra, to which places envoys from the Isthmus proceeded at the same time. The Kretans declined to take any part, on the ground of prohibitory injunctions from the oracle;¹ the Korkyræans promised without performing, and even without any intention to perform. Their neutrality was a serious loss to the Greeks, since they could fit out a naval force of sixty triremes, second only to that of Athens. With this important contingent they engaged to join the Grecian fleet, and actually set sail from Korkyra; but they took care not to sail round Cape Malea, or to reach the scene of action. Their fleet remained on the southern or western coast of Peloponnesus, under pretence of being weather-bound, until the decisive result of the battle of Salamis was known. Their impression was that the Persian monarch would be victorious, in which case they would have made a merit of not having arrived in time; but they were also prepared with the plausible excuse of detention from foul winds, when the result turned out otherwise, and when they were reproached by the Greeks for their absence.² Such duplicity is not very astonishing, when we recollect that it was the habitual policy of Korkyra to isolate herself from Hellenic confederacies.³

The envoys who visited Korkyra proceeded onward on their mission to Gelon the despot of Syracuse. Of that potentate, regarded by Herodotus as more powerful than any state in Greece, I shall speak more fully in a subsequent chapter: it is sufficient to mention now, that he rendered no aid against Xerxes. Nor was it in his power to do so, whatever might have been his inclinations; for the same year which brought the Persian monarch against Greece,

Mission to
Gelon at
Syracuse—
his reply.

¹ Herodot. vii. 169.

² Herodot. vii. 168.

³ Thucyd. i. 32-37. It is perhaps singular that the Corinthian envoys in Thucydides do not make any allusion to the duplicity of the Korkyræans in regard to the Persian invasion, in the strong in-

vective which they deliver against Korkyra before the Athenian assembly. (Thucyd. i. 37-42). The conduct of Corinth herself, however, on the same occasion, was not altogether without reproach.

was also selected by the Carthaginians for a formidable invasion of Sicily, which kept the Sicilian Greeks to the defence of their own island. It seems even probable that this simultaneous invasion had been concerted between the Persians and Carthaginians.¹

The endeavours of the deputies of Greeks at the Isthmus had thus produced no other reinforcement to their cause except some fair words from the Korkyræans. It was about the time when Xerxes was about to pass the Hellespont, in the beginning of 480 B.C., that the first actual step for resistance was taken, at the instigation of the Thessalians. Though the great Thessalian family of the Aleuadæ were among the companions of Xerxes, and the most forward in inviting him into Greece, with every promise of ready submission from their countrymen—yet it seems that these promises were in reality unwarranted. The Aleuadæ were at the head only of a minority, and perhaps were even in exile, like the Peisistratidæ;² while most of the Thessalians were disposed to resist Xerxes—for which purpose they now sent envoys to the Isthmus,³ intimating the necessity of guarding the passes of Olympus, the northernmost entrance of Greece. They offered their own cordial aid in this defence, adding that they should be under the necessity of making their own separate submission, if this demand were not complied with. Accordingly a body of 10,000 Grecian heavy-armed infantry, under the command of the Spartan Euxenetus and the Athenian Themistoklès, were despatched by sea to Alus in Achæa Phthiôtis, where they disembarked and marched by land across Achæa and Thessaly.⁴ Being joined by the Thessalian horse, they occupied the defile of Tempê, through which the river Pencius makes its way to the sea, by a cleft between the mountains Olympus and Ossa.

The long, narrow, and winding defile of Tempê formed then, and forms still, the single entrance, open throughout winter as well as summer, from Lower or maritime Macedonia into Thessaly. The lofty mountain precipices approach so closely

Grecian
army sent
into Thes-
saly, to
defend the
defile of
Tempê
against
Xerxes.
B.C. 480.

¹ Herodot. vii. 158-167. Diodor. xi. 22.

² See Schol. ad Aristeid., Panathenaic. p. 138.

³ Herodot. vii. 172 : compare c. 130.

⁴ Herodot. vii. 173.

as to leave hardly room enough in some places for a road : it is thus eminently defensible, and a few resolute men would be sufficient to arrest in it the progress of the most numerous host.¹ But the Greeks soon discovered that the position was such as they could not hold,—first, because the powerful fleet of Xerxes would be able to land troops in their rear ; secondly, because there was also a second entrance passable in summer, from Upper Macedonia into Thessaly, by the mountain passes over the range of Olympus ; an entrance which traversed the country of the Perrhæbians and came into Thessaly near Gonnus, about the spot where the defile of Tempê begins to narrow. It was in fact by this second pass, evading the insurmountable difficulties of Tempê, that the advancing march of the Persians was destined to be made, under the auspices of Alexander king of Macedon, tributary to them and active in their service. That prince sent a communication of the fact to the Greeks at Tempê, admonishing them that they would be trodden under foot by the countless host approaching, and urging them to renounce their hopeless position.² He passed for a friend, and probably believed himself to be acting as such, in dissuading the Greeks from unavailing resistance to Persia ; but he was in reality a very dangerous mediator ; and as such the Spartans had good reason to dread him, in a second intervention of which we shall hear more hereafter.³ On the present occasion, the Grecian commanders were quite ignorant of the existence of any other entrance into Thessaly, besides Tempê, until their arrival in that region. Perhaps it might have been possible to defend both entrances at once, and con-

¹ Herodot. vii. 172. τὴν ἐσβολὴν τὴν Ὀλυμπικὴν. See the description and plan of Tempê in Dr. Clarke's Travels, vol. iv. ch. ix. p. 280 ; and the Dissertation of Kriegk, in which all the facts about this interesting defile are collected and compared (Das Thessalische Tempe, Frankfurt, 1834).

The description of Tempê in Livy (xliii. 18 ; xlv. 6) seems more accurate than that of Pliny (H. N. iv. 8). We may remark that both the one and the other belong to times subsequent to the formation and organisation of the Macedonian empire, when it came to hold Greece in a species of dependence. The Macedonian princes after Alexander the

Great, while they added to the natural difficulties of Tempê by fortifications, at the same time made the road more convenient as a military communication. In the time of Xerxes these natural difficulties had never been approached by the hand of art, and were doubtless much greater.

The present road through the pass is about thirteen feet broad in its narrowest part, and between fifteen and twenty feet broad elsewhere—the pass is about five English miles in length (Kriegk, p. 21-33).

² Herodot. vii. 173.

³ Herodot. viii. 140-143.

sidering the immense importance of arresting the march of the Persians at the frontiers of Hellas, the attempt would have been worth some risk. So great was the alarm, however, produced by the unexpected discovery, justifying or seeming to justify the friendly advice of Alexander, that they remained only a few days at Tempê, then at once retired back to their ships, and returned by sea to the Isthmus of Corinth—about the time when Xerxes was crossing the Hellespont.¹

This precipitate retreat produced consequences highly disastrous and discouraging. It appeared to leave all Hellas north of Mount Kithæron and of the Megarid territory without defence, and it served either as reason or pretext for the majority of the Grecian states, north of that boundary, to make their submission to Xerxes, which some of them had already begun to do before.² When Xerxes in the course of his march reached the Thermaic Gulf, within sight of Olympus and Ossa, the heralds whom he had sent from Sardis brought him tokens of submission from a third portion of the Hellenic name—the Thessalians, Dolopes, Ænians, Perhæbians, Magnètes, Lokrians, Dorians, Melians, Phthiôtid Achæans, and Bœotians. Among the latter is included Thebes, but not Thespiæ or Platæa. The Thessalians, especially, not only submitted, but manifested active zeal and rendered much service in the cause of Xerxes, under the stimulus of the Aleuadaæ, whose party now became predominant: they were probably indignant at the hasty retreat of those who had come to defend them.³

Consequences of this retreat—the Thessalians, and nearly all Hellas north of Kithæron, either submit to Xerxes, or waver.

Had the Greeks been able to maintain the passes of Olympus and Ossa, all this northern fraction might probably have been induced to partake in the resistance instead of becoming auxiliaries to the invader. During the six weeks or two months which elapsed between the retreat of the Greeks from Tempê and the arrival of Xerxes at Therma, no new plan of defence was yet thoroughly organised; for it was not until that arrival became known at the Isthmus, that the Greek army and fleet made its forward movement to occupy Thermopylæ and Artemisium.⁴

¹ Herodot. vii. 173, 174.

² Diodor. xi. 4. *ἔτι παρούσης τῆς ἐν τοῖς Τέμπεσι φυλακῆς, &c.*

³ Herodot. vii. 131, 132, 174.

⁴ Herodot. vii. 177.

CHAPTER XL.

BATTLES OF THERMOPYLÆ AND ARTEMISIUM.


IT was while the northerly states of Greece were thus successively falling off from the common cause, that the deputies assembled at the Isthmus took among themselves the solemn engagement, in the event of success, to inflict upon these recusant brethren condign punishment ; to tithe them in property, and perhaps to consecrate a tenth of their persons, for the profit of the Delphian god. Exception was to be made in favour of those states which had been driven to yield by irresistible necessity.¹ Such a vow seemed at that moment little likely to be executed. It was the manifestation of a determined feeling binding together the states which took the pledge, but it cannot have contributed much to intimidate the rest.

Engagement taken by the confederate Greeks against such Greeks as joined the Persians.

To display their own force, was the only effective way of keeping together doubtful allies. The pass of Thermopylæ was now fixed upon as the most convenient point of defence, next to that of Tempê—leaving out indeed, and abandoning to the enemy, Thessalians, Perrhæbians, Magnètes, Phthiôtid Achæans, Dolopes, Ænians, Malians, &c., who would all have been included if the latter line had been adhered to ; but comprising the largest range consistent with safety. The position of Thermopylæ presented another advantage which was not to be found at Tempê ; the mainland was here separated from the island of Eubœa only by a narrow strait, about two English miles and a half in its smallest breadth, between Mount Knêmis and Cape Kênæum. On the northern portion of Eubœa, immediately facing Magnesia and Achæa Phthiôtis, was situated the line of coast called Artemisium ; a name derived from the temple of Artemis, which was its most conspicuous feature,

Resolution taken to defend Thermopylæ as well as the adjoining strait of Eubœa.

¹ Herodot. vii. 132 ; Diodor. xi. 3.



GRÖT'S GREEK, Vol. IV, p. 164.

belonging to the town of Histiaæa. It was arranged that the Grecian fleet should be mustered there, in order to co-operate with the land-force, and to oppose the progress of the Persians on both elements at once. To fight in a narrow space¹ was supposed favourable to the Greeks on sea not less than on land, inasmuch as their ships were both fewer in number, and heavier in sailing than those in the Persian service. From the position of Artemisium, it was calculated that they might be able to prevent the Persian fleet from advancing into the narrow strait which severs Eubœa to the north and west from the mainland, and which between Chalkis and Bœotia becomes not too wide for a bridge. It was at this latter point that the Greek seamen would have preferred to place their defence; but the occupation of the northern part of the Eubœan strait was indispensable to prevent the Persian fleet from landing troops in the rear of the defenders of Thermopylæ.

Of this Eubœan strait, the western limit is formed by what was then called the Maliac Gulf, into which the river Spercheius poured itself—after a course from west to east between the line of Mount Othrys to the north and Mount Cæta to the south—near the town of Antikyra. The lower portion of this spacious and fertile valley of the Spercheius was occupied by the various tribes of the Malians, bordering to the north and east on Achæa Phthiôtis: the southernmost Malians, with their town of Trachis, occupied a plain—in some places considerable, in others very narrow—enclosed between Mount Cæta and the sea. From Trachis the range of Cæta stretched eastward, bordering close on the southern shore of the Maliac Gulf; between the two lay the memorable pass of Thermopylæ.² On the road from Trachis to Thermopylæ, immediately outside of the latter and at the mouth of the little streams called the Phoenix and the Asôpus, was placed the town of Anthêla, celebrated for its temples of Amphiktyon and of the Amphiktyonic Dêmêtêr, as well as for the autumnal assemblies of the

Pass of
Thermopylæ
and its
neighbour-
hood.

¹ Herodot. viii. 15-60. Compare Isokratês, Panegyric, Or. iv. p. 59.

I shall have occasion presently to remark the revolution which took place in Athenian feeling on this point between the Persian and Peloponnesian wars.

² The word *Pass* commonly conveys the idea of a path enclosed between mountains. In this instance it is employed to designate a narrow passage, having mountains on one side only, and water (or marsh ground) on the other.

Amphiktyonic council, for whom seats were provided in the temple.

Immediately near to Anthéla, the northern slope of the mighty and prolonged ridge of Cæta approached so close to the gulf, or at least to an inaccessible morass which formed the edge of the gulf, as to leave no more than one single wheel track between. This narrow entrance formed the western gate of Thermopylæ. At some little distance, seemingly about a mile, to the eastward, the same close conjunction between the mountain and the sea was repeated—thus forming the eastern gate of Thermopylæ, not far from the first town of the Lokrians, called Alpêni. The space between these two gates was wider and more open, but it was distinguished, and is still distinguished, by its abundant flow of thermal springs, salt and sulphureous. Some cells were here prepared for bathers, which procured for the place the appellation of Chytri or the Pans : but the copious supply of mineral water spread its mud, and deposited its crust over all the adjacent ground ; and the Phokians, some time before, had designedly endeavoured so to conduct the water as to render the pass utterly impracticable, at the same time building a wall across it near to the western gate. They had done this in order to keep off the attacks of the Thessalians, who had been trying to extend their conquests southward and eastward. The warm springs, here as in other parts of Greece, were consecrated to Hêraklês,¹ whose legendary exploits and sufferings ennobled all the surrounding region—Mount Cæta, Trachis, Cape Kenæum, the Lichades islands, the river Dyrras. Some fragments of these legends have been transmitted and adorned by the genius of Sophoklês, in his drama of the Trachinian Maidens.

Such was the general scene—two narrow openings with an intermediate mile of enlarged road and hot springs between them—which passed in ancient times by the significant name of Thermopylæ, the Hot Gates ; or sometimes, more briefly, Pylæ—The Gates. At a point also near Trachis, between the mountains and the sea, about two miles

The Greeks
take post at
Thermo-
pylæ.

¹ According to one of the numerous hypotheses for refining religious legend into matter of historical and physical fact, Hêraklês was supposed to have been an engineer or water-finder in very

early times—*θεωρῶν κατὰ τὴν ἰσχυρίαν ὁδὸν καὶ συναγωγὴν*. See Plutarch, *Cum principibus viris philosopho esse disserendum*, c. i. p. 776.

outside or westward of Thermopylæ, the road was hardly less narrow, but it might be turned by marching to the westward, since the adjacent mountains were lower, and *presented less difficulty of transit: while at Thermopylæ itself, the overhanging projection of Mount Ceta was steep, woody, and impracticable, leaving access, from Thessaly into Lokris and the territories south-east of Ceta, only through the straight gate;¹ save and except an unfrequented as well as circuitous mountain path which will be presently noticed. The wall originally built across the pass by the Phokians was now half-ruined by age and neglect; but the Greeks easily re-established it, determining to await in this narrow pass, in that age narrower even than the defile of Tempé, the approach of the invading

¹ About Thermopylæ, see Herodot. vii. 175, 176, 199, 200.

*Ἡ δ' αὖ διὰ Τρηχίνοις ἰσοδοῖς ἐς τὴν Ἑλλάδα ἔστι, τῇ στενωπόταν, ἡμίλειθρον οὐ μέντοι κατὰ τοῦτό γ' ἔστι τὸ στενωπόταν τῆς χάρης τῆς ἄλλης, ἀλλ' ἐμπροσθὶ τῇ Θερμοπυλῶν καὶ ὅπισθε κατὰ τὴν Ἀλφειοῦ, ὅπισθε ἰόντας, ἰούσα ἁμαξίτις μόνη καὶ ἐμπροσθὲ κατὰ Φοίνικα ποταμὸν, ἁμαξίτις ἄλλη μόνη.

Compare Pausanias, vii. 15, 2. τὸ στένον τὸ Ἡρακλείας τε μεταξὺ καὶ Θερμοπυλῶν; also Strabo ix. p. 429; and Livy, xxxvi. 12.

Herodotus says about Thermopylæ—στενωπὴν γὰρ ὀφθαίνοτο ἰούσα τῇς εἰς Θεσσαλίην, *i. e.* than the defile of Tempé.

If we did not possess the clear topographical indications given by Herodotus, it would be almost impossible to comprehend the memorable event here before us; for the configuration of the coast, the course of the rivers, and the general local phenomena, have now so entirely changed, that modern travellers rather mislead than assist. In the interior of the Maliac Gulf, three or four miles of new land have been formed by the gradual accumulation of river deposit, so that the Gulf itself is of much less extent, and the mountain bordering the gate of Thermopylæ is not now near to the sea. The river Spercheus has materially altered its course; instead of flowing into the sea in an easterly direction considerably north of Thermopylæ, as it did in the time of Herodotus, it has been diverted southward in the lower part of its course, with many

windings, so as to reach the sea much south of the pass, while the rivers Dyrras, Melas, and Asopus, which in the time of Herodotus all reached the sea separately between the mouth of Spercheus and Thermopylæ, now do not reach the sea at all, but fall into the Spercheus. Moreover the perpetual flow of the thermal springs has tended to accumulate deposit and to raise the level of the soil generally throughout the pass. Herodotus seems to consider the road between the two gates of Thermopylæ as bearing north and south, whereas it would bear more nearly east and west. He knows nothing of the appellation Callidromus, applied by Livy and Strabo to an undefined portion of the eastern ridge of Ceta.

Respecting the past and present features of Thermopylæ, see the valuable observations of Colonel Leake, *Travels in Northern Greece*, vol. ii. ch. x. p. 7-40; Gell, *Itinerary of Greece*, p. 239; Kruse, *Hellas*, vol. iii. ch. x. p. 129. Dr. Clarke observes, "The hot springs issue principally from two mouths at the foot of the limestone precipices of Ceta, upon the left of the causeway, which here passes close under the mountain, and on this part of it scarcely admits two horsemen abreast of each other, the morass on the right, between the causeway and the sea, being so dangerous, that we were very near being buried with our horses, by our imprudence in venturing a few paces into it from the paved road." (*Clarke's Travels*, vol. iv. ch. viii. p. 247.)

host. The edge of the sea-line appears to have been for the most part marsh, fit neither for walking nor for sailing ; but there were points at which boats could land, so that constant communication could be maintained with the fleet at Artemisium, while Alpēni was immediately in their rear to supply provisions.

Though a general resolution of the Greek deputies assembled at the Isthmus, to defend conjointly Thermopylæ and the Eubœan strait, had been taken seemingly not long after the retreat from Tempê, their troops and their fleet did not actually occupy these positions until Xerxes was known to have reached the Thermaic Gulf. Both were then put in motion : the land force under the Spartan king Leonidas, the naval force under the Spartan commander Eurybiadēs, apparently about the latter part of the month of June. Leonidas was the younger brother, the successor, and the son-in-law, of the former Eurystheneid king Kleomenēs, whose only daughter Gorgo he had married. Another brother of the same family—Dorieus, older than Leonidas—had perished, even before the death of Kleomenēs, in an unsuccessful attempt to plant a colony in Sicily ; and room had been thus made for the unexpected succession of the youngest brother. Leonidas now conducted from the Isthmus to Thermopylæ a select band of 300 Spartans—all being citizens of mature age, and persons who left at home sons to supply their places.¹ Along with them were 200 hoplites from Tegea, 500 from Mantinea, 120 from the Arcadian Orchomenus, 1000 from the rest of Arcadia, 400 from Corinth, 200 from Phlius, and 80 from Mykenæ. There were also doubtless Helots and other light troops, in undefined number, and probably a certain number of Lacedæmonian hoplites, not Spartans. In their march through Bœotia they were joined by 700 hoplites

Leonidas, king of Sparta, conducts the force thither—the combined fleet under Eurybiadēs occupy the Eubœan strait.

Numbers and composition of the force of Leonidas.

¹ Herodot. vii. 177, 205. ἐπιλεξάμενος ἄνδρας τε τοὺς κατεστειώτας τριηκοσίους, καὶ τοῖσι ἐνὶ γυῖανος παῖδες ἔδυντες.

In selecting men for a dangerous service, the Spartans took by preference those who already had families : if such a man was slain, he left behind him a son to discharge his duties to the state,

and to maintain the continuity of the family sacred rites, the extinction of which was considered as a great misfortune. In our ideas, the life of the father of a family in mature age would be considered as of more value, and his death a greater loss, than that of a younger and unmarried man.

of Thespiæ, hearty in the cause, and by 400 Thebans of more equivocal fidelity under Leontiadês. It appears indeed that the leading men of Thebes, at that time under a very narrow oligarchy, decidedly *medised*, or espoused the Persian interest, as much as they dared before the Persians were actually in the country : and Leonidas, when he made the requisition for a certain number of their troops to assist in the defence of Thermopylæ, was doubtful whether they would not refuse compliance, and openly declare against the Greek cause. The Theban chiefs thought it prudent to comply, though against their real inclinations, and furnished a contingent of 400 men,¹ chosen from citizens of a sentiment opposed to their own. Indeed the Theban people and the Bœotians generally, with the exception of Thespiæ and Plataea, seem to have had little sentiment on either side, and to have followed passively the inspirations of their leaders.

With these troops Leonidas reached Thermopylæ, whence he sent envoys to invite the junction of the Phokians and the Lokrians of Opus. The latter had been among those who had sent earth and water to Xerxes, of which they are said to have repented : the step was taken probably only from fear, which at this particular moment prescribed acquiescence in the summons of Leonidas, justified by the plea of necessity in case the Persians should prove ultimately victorious :² while the Phokians, if originally disposed to *medise*, were now precluded from doing so by the fact that their bitter enemies the Thessalians were active in the cause of Xerxes and influential in guiding his movements.³ The Greek envoys added strength to their summons by all the encouragements in their power. "The troops now at Thermopylæ (they said) were a mere advanced body,

Phokians
and
Lokrians.

¹ Herodot. vii. 205 ; Thucyd. iii. 62 ; Diodor. xi. 4 ; Plutarch, Aristeidês, c. 18.

The passage of Thucydides is very important here, as confirming to a great degree the statement of Herodotus, and enabling us to appreciate the criticisms of Plutarch, on this particular point very plausible (De Herodoti Malign. pp. 865, 866). The latter seems to have copied from a lost Bœotian author named Aristophanês, who tried to make out a more

honourable case for his countrymen in respect to their conduct in the Persian war.

The statement of Diodorus—*Θηβαίων ἀπὸ τῆς ἐτέρας μέρους ὡς τετρακισίων*—is illustrated by a proceeding of the Korkyræan government (Thucyd. iii. 75) when they enlisted their enemies in order to send them away ; also that of the Italian Cumæ (Dionys. Hal. vii. 5).

² Diodor. xi. 4.

³ Herodot. viii. 30.

preceding the main strength of Greece, which was expected to arrive every day: on the side of the sea, a sufficient fleet was already on guard. Moreover there was no cause for fear, since the invader was after all not a god, but a man, exposed to those reverses of fortune which came inevitably on all men, and most of all, upon those in pre-eminent condition."¹ Such arguments prove but too evidently the melancholy state of terror which then pervaded the Greek mind. Whether reassured by them or not, the great body of the Opuntian Lokrians, and 1000 Phokians, joined Leonidas at Thermopylæ.

That this terror was both genuine and serious, there cannot be any doubt: and the question naturally suggests itself, why the Greeks did not at once send their full force instead of a mere advanced guard? The answer is to be found in another attribute of the Greek character—it was the time of celebrating the Olympic festival-games on the banks of the Alpheius, and the Karneian festival at Sparta and most of the other Dorian states.² Even at a moment when their whole freedom and existence were at stake, the Greeks could not bring themselves to postpone these venerated solemnities: especially the Peloponnesian Greeks among whom this force of religious routine appears to have been the strongest. At a period more than a century later, in the time of Demosthenēs, when the energy of the Athenians had materially declined, we shall find them too postponing the military necessities of the state to the complete and splendid fulfilment of their religious festival obligations—starving all

Olympian and Karneian festivals—the Greeks could not bring themselves to postpone these, even under such imminent danger.

¹ Herodot. vii. 203. λέγοντες δ' ἀγγέλων, ὡς αὐτοὶ μὲν ἦσαν προδρομοὶ τῶν ἄλλων, οἱ δὲ λοιποὶ τῶν συμμάχων προσδοκίμοι πᾶσαν εἰσι τῇμερην. . . καὶ σφι εἴη δεῦνδον οὐδέν· οὐ γὰρ θεὸν εἶναι τὸν ἐπίδοντα ἐπὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα, ἀλλ' ἀνθρώπου· εἶναι δὲ θνητὸν οὐδένα, οὐδὲ ἰσεσθαι, τῷ κακῷ δὲ ἀρχῆς γνωμένην αὐ συνέμειχθη, τοῖσι δὲ μεγίστοις αὐτέων, μέγιστα δ' οφείλειν ἂν καὶ τὸν ἐπελαύνοντα, ὡς ἐόντα θνητὸν, ἀπὸ τῆς δόξης πεσείναι αὐ.

² Herodot. vii. 206. It was only the Dorian states (Lacedæmon, Argos, Sikyon, &c.) which were under obligations of abstinence from aggressive military

operations during the month of the Karneian festival: other states (even in Peloponnesus), Elis, Mantinea, &c., and of course Athens, were not under similar restraint (Thucyd. v. 54, 75).

I do not here mean to assert that these two festivals (the Karneia and the Olympia) took place so exactly at the same time, that persons could not attend both. It would seem that the Karneia came latest of the two. But the Grecian festivals depended on the lunar months, and varied more or less in reference to the solar year. The Karneia were annual; the Olympia quadrennial.

their measures of foreign policy in order that the Theôric exhibitions might be imposing to the people and satisfactory to the gods. At present, we find little disposition in the Athenians to make this sacrifice—certainly much less than in the Peloponnesians. The latter, remaining at home to celebrate their festivals while an invader of superhuman might was at their gates, remind us of the Jews in the latter days of their independence, who suffered the operations of the besieging Roman army round their city to be carried on without interruption during the Sabbath.¹ The Spartans and their confederates reckoned that Leonidas with his detachment would be strong enough to hold the pass of Thermopylæ until the Olympic and Karneian festivals should be past, after which period they were prepared to march to his aid with their whole military force.² They engaged to assemble in Bœotia for the purpose of defending Attica against attack on the land-side, while the great mass of the Athenian force was serving on shipboard.

At the time when this plan was laid, they believed that the narrow pass of Thermopylæ was the only means of possible access for an invading army. But Leonidas, on reaching the spot, discovered for the first time that there was also a mountain path starting from the neighbourhood of Trachis, ascending the gorge of the river Asôpus and the hill called Anopæa, then crossing the crest of Ceta and descending in the rear of Thermopylæ near the Lokrian town of Alpêni. This path—then hardly used, though its ascending half now serves as the regular track from Zeitun, the ancient Lamia, to Salona on the Corinthian Gulf, the ancient Amphissa—was revealed to him by its first discoverers, the inhabitants of Trachis, who in former days had conducted the Thessalians over it to attack Phokis, after the Phokians had blocked up the pass of Thermopylæ. It was therefore not unknown to the Phokians: it conducted from Trachis into their country, and they volunteered to Leonidas that they would

Path over
Mount Ceta
by which
Thermo-
pylæ might
be evaded
—Leonidas
first in-
formed of it
on reaching
the spot—
the Phokians
engaged to
defend it.

¹ Josephus, *Bell. Judaic.* i. 7, 3; ii. 16, 4; *ibid.* *Antiqq. Judaic.* xiv. 4, 2. If their bodies were attacked on the Sabbath, the Jews defended themselves; but they would not break through the religious obligations of the day in order to impede any military operations of the besiegers. See Reimar, *ad. Dion. Cass.* lxi. 7.

² Herodot. vii. 206; viii. 40.

occupy and defend it.¹ But the Greeks thus found themselves at Thermopylæ under the same necessity of providing a double line of defence, for the mountain path as well as for the defile, as that which had induced their former army to abandon Tempê; and so insufficient did their numbers seem, when the vast host of Xerxes was at length understood to be approaching, that a panic terror seized them. The Peloponnesian troops especially, anxious only for their own separate line of defence at the Isthmus of Corinth, wished to retreat thither forthwith. The indignant remonstrances of the Phokians and Lokrians, who would thus have been left to the mercy of the invader, induced Leonidas to forbid this retrograde movement: but he thought it necessary to send envoys to the various cities, insisting on the insufficiency of his numbers, and requesting immediate reinforcements.² So painfully were the consequences now felt, of having kept back the main force until after the religious festivals in Peloponnesus.

Nor was the feeling of confidence stronger at this moment in their naval armament, though it had mustered in far superior numbers at Artemisium on the northern coast of Eubœa, under the Spartan Eurybiadês. It was composed as follows:—100 Athenian triremes, manned in part by the citizens of Platœa, in spite of their total want of practice on shipboard, 40 Corinthian, 20 Megarian, 20 Athenian, manned by the inhabitants of Chalkis and lent to them by Athens, 18 Æginetan, 12 Sikyonian, 10 Lacedæmonian, 8 Epidaurian, 7 Eretrian, 5 Trœzenian, 2 from Styrys in Eubœa, and 2 from the island of Keos. There were thus in all 271 triremes; together with 9 pente-konters, furnished partly by Keos and partly by the Lokrians of Opus. Themistoklês was at the head of the Athenian contingent, and Adeimantus of the Corinthian; of other officers we hear nothing.³ Three cruising vessels, an Athenian, an Æginetan, and a Trœzenian, were pushed forward along the coast of Thessaly, beyond the island of Skiathos, to watch the advancing movements of the Persian fleet from Therma.

¹ Herodot. vii. 212, 216, 218.

² Herodot. vii. 207.

³ Herodot. viii. 1, 2, 3. Diodorus (xi. 12) makes the Athenian number stronger by twenty triremes.

It was here that the first blood was shed in this memorable contest. Ten of the best ships in the Persian fleet, sent forward in the direction of Skiathos, fell in with these three Grecian triremes, who probably supposing them to be the precursors of the entire fleet sought safety in flight. The Athenian trireme escaped to the mouth of the Peneius, where the crew abandoned her, and repaired by land to Athens, leaving the vessel to the enemy: the other two ships were overtaken and captured afloat—not without a vigorous resistance on the part of the Æginetan, one of whose hoplites, Pythês, fought with desperate bravery, and fell covered with wounds. So much did the Persian warriors admire him, that they took infinite pains to preserve his life, and treated him with the most signal manifestations both of kindness and respect, while they dealt with his comrades as slaves.

Three triremes of the Grecian fleet sent forward as scouts—their first encounter with the Persian fleet.

On board the Trœzenian vessel, which was the first to be captured, they found a soldier named Leon, of imposing stature: this man was immediately taken to the ship's head and slain, as a presaging omen in the approaching contest: perhaps (observes the historian) his name may have contributed to determine his fate.¹ The ten Persian ships advanced no farther than the dangerous rock Myrmêx, between Skiathos and the mainland, which had been made known to them by a Greek navigator of Skyros, and on which they erected a pillar to serve as warning for the coming fleet. Still, so intense was the alarm which their presence, communicated by firesignals² from Skiathos, and strengthened by the capture of the three look-out ships, inspired to the fleet at Artemisium, that they actually abandoned their station, believing that the entire fleet of the enemy was at hand.³ They sailed up the Eubœan strait to Chalkis, as the narrowest and most defensible passage; leaving scouts on the high lands to watch the enemy's advance.

Capture of these three triremes—panic of the general Grecian fleet, who abandon Artemisium and retire to Chalkis.

¹ Herodot. vii. 180. τάχα δ' ἂν τι καὶ τοῦ ὀνόματος ἐπαύροιο.

Respecting the influence of a name and its etymology, in this case unhappy for the possessor, compare Herodot. ix. 91; and Tacit. Hist. iv. 53.

² For the employment of fire-signals, compare Livy, xxviii. 5; and the opening of the Agamemnôn of Æschylus and the same play, v. 270, 300; also Thucyd., iii. 22-80.

³ Herodot. vii. 181, 182, 183.

Probably this sudden retreat was forced upon the generals by the panic of their troops, similar to that which King Leonidas, more powerful than Eurybiadēs and Themistoklēs, had found means to arrest at Thermopylæ. It ruined for the time the whole scheme of defence, by laying open the rear of the army at Thermopylæ to the operations of the Persian fleet. But that which the Greeks did not do for themselves was more than compensated by the beneficent intervention of their gods, who opposed to the invader the more terrible arms of storm and hurricane. He was allowed to bring his overwhelming host, land force as well as naval, to the brink of Thermopylæ and to the coast of Thessaly, without hindrance or damage; but the time had now arrived when the gods appeared determined to humble him, and especially to strike a series of blows at his fleet which should reduce it to a number not beyond what the Greeks could contend with.¹ Amidst the general terror which pervaded Greece, the Delphians were the first to earn the gratitude of their countrymen by announcing that divine succour was at hand.² On entreating advice from their own oracle, they were directed to pray to the Winds, who would render powerful aid to Greece. Moreover the Athenian seamen, in their retreat at Chalkis, recollecting that Boreas was the husband of the Attic princess or heroine Oreithyia, daughter of their ancient king Erechtheus, addressed fervent prayers to their son-in-law for his help in need. Never was help more effective, or more opportune, than the destructive storm, presently to be recounted, on the coast of Magnesia, for which grateful thanks and annual solemnities were still rendered even in the time of Herodotus, at Athens as well as at Delphi.³

¹ Herodot. vii. 184. μέχρι μὲν δὴ τοῦτου τοῦ χώρου καὶ τῶν Θερμοπυλίων, ἀπαθὴς τε κακῶν ἦν ὁ στρατός, καὶ πληθος ἦν τῆνικαῦτα ἐπὶ τόσῳ, &c.—viii. 13. ἐποιεῖτο δὲ πᾶν ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ, ὥπως ἂν ἐξισωθείη τῷ Ἑλληνικῷ τὸ Περσικόν, μηδὲ πολλὰ πλέον εἴη. Compare viii. 109; and Diodor. xi. 13.

² Herodot. vii. 178. Δεῖλοι δὲ δεξιόμενοι τὸ ματηῖον, πρῶτα μὲν, Ἑλλήνων τοῖσι βουλευμένοισι εἶναι ἐλευθέροισι ἐξήγγειλαν τὰ χρησθέντα αὐτοῖσι καὶ σφὶ δεινῶς καταβρῦθέουσι τὸν βάρβαρον ἐξαπ-

γείλαντες, χάρῳ ἀθάνατον κατέθεντο.

³ Herodot. vii. 189. The language of the historian in this chapter is remarkable: his incredulous reason rather gets the better of religious acquiescence.

Clemens Alexandrinus, reciting this incident together with some other miracles of Æakus, Aristæus, Empedoklēs, &c., reproves his Pagan opponents for their inconsistency, while believing these, in rejecting the Miracles of Moses and the prophets (Stromat. vi. pp. 629, 630).

Imminent danger of the Greek scheme of defence—they are rescued by a terrific storm.

Xerxes had halted on the Thermaic Gulf for several days, employing a large portion of his numerous army in cutting down the woods, and clearing the roads, on the pass over Olympus from Upper Macedonia into Perrhæbia, which was recommended by his Macedonian allies as preferable to the defile of Tempê.¹ Not intending to march through the latter, he is said to have gone by sea to view it; and remarks are ascribed to him on the facility of blocking it up so as to convert all Thessaly into one vast lake.² His march from Therma through Macedonia, Perrhæbia, Thessaly, and Achæa Phthiôtis, into the territory of the Malians and the neighbourhood of Thermopylæ, occupied eleven or twelve days:³ the people through whose towns he passed had already made their submission, and the Thessalians especially were zealous in seconding his efforts. His numerous host was still farther swelled by the presence of these newly-submitted people, and by the Macedonian troops under Alexander; so that the river Onochônus in Thessaly, and even the Apidanus in Achæa Phthiôtis, would hardly suffice to supply it, but were drunk up, according to the information given to Herodotus. At Alus in Achæa, he condescended to listen to the gloomy legend connected with

Movements
of Xerxes
from
Therma.

¹ The pass over which Xerxes passed was that by Petra, Pythium, and Olooson — "saltum ad Petram" — "Perrhæbiæ saltum" (Livy, xlv. 21; xlv. 27). Petra was near the point where the road passed from Pieria, or Lower Macedonia (see Livy, xxxix. 26).

Compare respecting this pass, and the general features of the neighbouring country, Colonel Leake, *Travels in Northern Greece*, vol. iii. ch. xviii. p. 337-343, and ch. xxx. p. 430; also Boué, *La Turquie en Europe*, vol. i. p. 198-202.

The Thracian king Sitalkês, like Xerxes on this occasion, was obliged to cause the forests to be cut, to make a road for his army, in the early part of the Peloponnesian war (Thucyd. ii. 98).

² Herodot. vii. 130, 131. That Xerxes, struck by the view of Olympus and Ossa, went to see the narrow defile between them, is probable enough; but the remarks put into his mouth are probably the fancy of some ingenious contemporary Greeks, suggested by the

juxtaposition of such a landscape and such a monarch. To suppose this narrow defile walled up, was easy for the imagination of any spectator: to suppose that *he* could order it to be done, was in character with a monarch who disposed of an indefinite amount of manual labour; and who had just finished the cutting of Athos. Such dramatic fitness was quite sufficient to convert that which *might have been* said into that which *was* said, and to procure for it a place among the historical anecdotes communicated to Herodotus.

³ The Persian fleet did not leave Therma until eleven days after Xerxes and his land force (Herodot. vii. 183): it arrived in one day on the Sêpias Aktê or south-eastern coast of Magnesia (ibid.) was then assailed and distressed for three days by the hurricane (vii. 191), and proceeded immediately afterwards to Aphetæ (vii. 193). When it arrived at the latter places, Xerxes himself had been *three days* in the Malian territory (vii. 196).

the temple of Zeus Laphysteus and the sacred grove of the Athamantid family. He respected and protected these sacred places: an incident which shows that the sacrilege and destruction of temples imputed to him by the Greeks, though true in regard to Athens, Abæ, Milætus, &c., was by no means universally exhibited, and is even found qualified by occasional instances of great respect for Grecian religious feeling.¹ Along the shore of the Malian Gulf he at length came into the Trachinian territory near Thermopylæ, where he encamped, seemingly awaiting the arrival of the fleet, so as to combine his farther movements in advance,² now that the enemy were immediately in his front.

But his fleet was not destined to reach the point of communication with the same ease as he had arrived before Thermopylæ. After having ascertained by the ten ships already mentioned (which captured the three Grecian guardships) that the channel between Skiathos and the mainland was safe, the Persian admiral Magabates sailed with his whole fleet from Therma, or from Pydna,³ his station in the Thermaic Gulf, eleven days after the monarch had begun his land-march; and reached in one long day's sail the eastern coast of Magnesia, not far from its southernmost promontory. The greater part of this line of coast, formed by the declivities of Ossa and Pelion, is thoroughly rocky and inhospitable; but south of the town called Kasthanæa there was a short extent of open beach where the fleet rested for the night before coming to the line of coast called the Sêpias Aktê.⁴ The first line of ships were moored to the land, but the larger number of this immense fleet swung at anchor in a depth of eight lines. In this condition they were overtaken the next morning by a sudden and desperate hurricane—a wind called

¹ This point is set forth by Hoffmeister, *Sittlich-religiöse Lebensansicht des Herodotus*. Essen, 1832, sect. 19, p. 93.

² Herodot. vii. 196, 197, 201.

³ Diodor. xi. 12.

⁴ Diodorus (xi. 12), Plutarch (*Themistoklēs*, 8) and Mannert (*Geogr. der Gr. und Römer*, vol. vii. p. 596), seem

to treat Sêpias as a *cape*, the south-eastern corner of Magnesia: this is different from Herodotus, who mentions it as a line of some extent (*ἀπασα ἡ ἀκτὴ ἡ Σηπιάς*, vii. 191), and notices separately *τὴν ἄκρην τῆς Μαγνησίας*, vii. 193.

The geography of Apollonius Rhodius (i. 560-580) seems sadly inaccurate.

by the people of the country Hellespontias, which blew right upon the shore. The most active among the mariners found means to forestall the danger by beaching and hauling their vessels ashore; but a large number unable to take such a precaution, were carried before the wind and dashed to pieces near Melibœa, Kasthanæa, and other points of this unfriendly region. Four hundred ships of war, according to the lowest estimate, together with a countless heap of transports and provision craft, were destroyed: and the loss of life as well as of property was immense. For three entire days did the terrors of the storm last, during which time the crews ashore, left almost without defence, and apprehensive that the inhabitants of the country might assail or plunder them, were forced to break up the ships driven ashore in order to make a palisade out of the timbers.¹ Though the Magian priests who accompanied the armament were fervent in prayer and sacrifice—not merely to the Winds but also to Thetis and the Nereids, the tutelary divinities of Sêpias Aktê—they could obtain no mitigation until the fourth day:² thus long did the prayers of Delphi and Athens, and the jealousy of the gods against superhuman arrogance, protract the terrible visitation. At length on the fourth day calm weather returned, when all those ships which were in condition to proceed put to sea and sailed along the land, round the southern promontory of Magnesia to Aphetæ at the entrance of the Gulf of Pagasæ. Little indeed had Xerxes gained by the laborious cutting through Mount Athos, in hopes to escape the unseen atmospheric enemies which howl around that formidable promontory: the work of destruction to his fleet was only transferred to the opposite side of the intervening Thracian sea.

Had the Persian fleet reached Aphetæ without misfortune, they would have found the Eubœan strait evacuated by the Greek fleet and undefended, so that they would have come immediately into communication with the land-army, and

¹ Herodot. vii. 189-191.

² Herodot. vii. 191. On this occasion, as in regard to the prayers addressed by the Athenians to Boreas, Herodotus suffers a faint indication of scepticism to escape him: *ἡμέρας γὰρ δὴ ἐχρίμαζε*

τρεις· τέλος δὲ, ἔντομά τε ποιῦντες καὶ καταειδόντες γόοισι τῷ ἀνέμῳ οἱ Μάγοι, πρὸς τε τούτοις καὶ Θίτι καὶ τῇσι Νηρηΐσι θύοντες, ἔπαυσαν τετάρτῃ ἡμέρῃ· ἢ ἄλλως κως αὐτὸς ἐθέλων ἐκόπασσε.

would have acted upon the rear of Leonidas and his division.

Encourage-
ment occa-
sioned to the
Greek fleet
—they re-
turn from
Chalkis to
Artemisium.
But the storm completely altered this prospect, and revived the spirits of the Greek fleet at Chalkis. It was communicated to them by their scouts on the high lands of Eubœa, who even sent them word that the entire Persian fleet was destroyed: upon which, having returned thanks and offered libations to Poseidon the Saviour, the Greeks returned back as speedily as they could to Artemisium. To their surprise, however, they saw the Persian fleet, though reduced in number, still exhibiting a formidable total and appearance at the opposite station of Aphetæ. The last fifteen ships of that fleet having been so greatly crippled by the storm as to linger behind the rest, mistook the Greek ships for their own comrades, fell into the midst of them, and were all captured. Sandôkês, sub-satrap of the Æolic Kymê—Aridôlis, despot of Alabanda in Karia—and Penthylus, despot of Paphos in Cyprus—the leaders of this squadron, were sent prisoners to the Isthmus of Corinth, after having been questioned respecting the enemy: the latter of these three had brought to Xerxes a contingent of twelve ships, out of which eleven had foundered in the storm, while the last was now taken with himself aboard.¹

Delay of
Xerxes with
his land
force near
Trachis.
Meanwhile Xerxes, encamped within sight of Thermopylæ, suffered four days to pass without making any attack. A probable reason may be found in the extreme peril of his fleet, reported to have been utterly destroyed by the storm: but Herodotus assigns a different cause. Xerxes could not believe (according to him) that the Greeks at Thermopylæ, few as they were in number, had any serious intention to resist. He had heard in his march that a handful of Spartans and other Greeks, under a Herakleid leader, had taken post there, but he treated the news with scorn: and when a horseman—whom he sent to reconnoitre them, and who approached near enough to survey their position, without exciting any attention among them by his presence—brought back to him a description of the pass, the wall of defence, and the apparent number of the division, he was yet more astonished and puzzled. It happened too, that at the moment when this horseman rode up, the Spartans

¹ Herodot. vii. 194.

were in the advanced guard, outside of the wall: some were engaged in gymnastic exercises, others in combing their long hair, and none of them heeded the approach of the hostile spy. Xerxes next sent for the Spartan king Demaratus, to ask what he was to think of such madness: upon which the latter reminded him of their former conversation at Doriskus, again assuring him that the Spartans in the pass would resist to the death, in spite of the smallness of their number, and adding, that it was their custom, in moments of special danger, to comb their hair with peculiar care. In spite of this assurance from Demaratus, and of the pass not only occupied, but in itself so narrow and impracticable, before his eyes — Xerxes still persisted in believing that the Greeks did not intend to resist, and that they would disperse of their own accord. He delayed the attack for four days: on the fifth he became wroth at the impudence and recklessness of the petty garrison before him, and sent against them the Median and Kissian divisions, with orders to seize them and bring them as prisoners into his presence.¹

Impressions
of Xerxes
about the
defenders at
Thermopylae
— conversation
with
Demaratus,
whom he
will not
believe.

Though we read thus in Herodotus, it is hardly possible to believe that we are reading historical reality. We rather find laid out before us a picture of human self-conceit in its most exaggerated form, ripe for the stroke of the jealous gods, and destined, like the interview between Cræsus and Solon, to point and enforce that moral which was ever present to the mind of the historian; whose religious and poetical imagination, even unconsciously to himself, surrounds the naked facts of history with accompaniments of speech and motive which neither Homer nor Æschylus would have deemed unsuitable. The whole proceedings of Xerxes, and the immensity of host which he summoned, show that he calculated on an energetic resistance; and though the numbers of Leonidas, compared with the Persians, were insignificant, they could hardly have looked insignificant in the position which they then occupied—an entrance little wider than a single carriage-road, with a cross wall, a prolonged space somewhat widened, and then another equally narrow

Doubts
about the
motives
ascribed by
Herodotus
to Xerxes.

¹ Herodot. vii. 208, 210. πέμπει δὲ αὐτοὺς Μήδους καὶ Κισσίους θυμωθεὶς, ἐντε-
λάμενός σφας ζυγῆσαντας ἄγειν εἰς ὤψιν τὴν ἐωυτοῦ.

exit, behind it. We are informed by Diodorus¹ that the Lokrians, when they first sent earth and water to the Persian monarch, engaged at the same time to seize the pass of Thermopylæ on his behalf, and were only prevented from doing so by the unexpected arrival of Leonidas; nor is it unlikely that the Thessalians, now the chief guides of Xerxes,² together with Alexander of Macedon, would try the same means of frightening away the garrison of Thermopylæ, as had already been so successful in causing the evacuation of Tempê. An interval of two or three days might be well bestowed for the purpose of leaving to such intrigues a fair chance of success: the fleet meanwhile would be arrived at Aphetæ after the dangers of the storm. We may thus venture to read the conduct of Xerxes in a manner somewhat less childish than it is depicted by Herodotus.

The Medes, whom Xerxes first ordered to the attack, animated as well by the recollection of their ancient Asiatic supremacy as by the desire of avenging the defeat of Marathon,³ manifested great personal bravery. The position was one in which bows and arrows were of little avail: a close combat hand to hand was indispensable, and in this the Greeks had every advantage of organization as well as armour. Short spears, light wicker shields, and tunics, in the assailants, were an imperfect match for the long spears, heavy and spreading shields, steady ranks,⁴ and practised fighting of the defenders. Yet the bravest men of the Persian army pressed on from behind, and having nothing but numbers in their favour, maintained long this unequal combat, with great slaughter to themselves, and little loss to the Greeks. Though constantly repulsed, the attack was as constantly renewed, for two successive days: the Greek troops were sufficiently numerous to relieve each other when fatigued, since the space was so narrow that few could contend at once; and even the Immortals, or ten thousand choice Persian guards, and the other choice troops of the army, when sent to the attack on the second day, were driven back with the same disgrace and the same slaughter as the rest. Xerxes surveyed this humiliating repulse from a lofty throne

First attack upon Thermopylæ—made by the Median troops—repulsed.

Repeated attacks, by the best troops in the Persian army, all repulsed with slaughter.

¹ Diodor. xi. 4.

² Herodot. vii. 174; viii. 29-32.

³ Diodor. xi. 6.

⁴ Herodot. vii. 211; ix. 62, 63; Diodor. xi. 7; compare Æschyl. Pers. 244.

expressly provided for him : " thrice (says the historian, with Homeric vivacity) did he spring from his throne, in agony for his army."¹

At the end of two days' fighting no impression had been made. The pass appeared impracticable, and the defence not less triumphant than courageous—when a Malian named Ephialtēs revealed to Xerxes the existence of the unfrequented mountain-path. This at least was the man singled out by the general voice of Greece as the betrayer of the fatal secret. After the final repulse of the Persians, he fled his country for a time, and a reward was proclaimed by the Amphiktyonic assembly for his head ; having returned to his country too soon, he was slain by a private enemy, whom the Lacedæmonians honoured as a patriot.² There were however other Greeks who were also affirmed to have earned the favour of Xerxes by the same valuable information ; and very probably there may have been more than one informant—indeed the Thessalians, at that time his guides, can hardly have been ignorant of it. So little had the path been thought of, however, that no one in the Persian army knew it to be already occupied by the Phokians. At nightfall Hydarnēs with a detachment of Persians proceeded along the gorge of the river Asōpus, ascended the path of Anopæa, through the woody region between the mountains occupied by the Cētæans and those possessed by the Trachinians, and found himself at daybreak near the summit, within sight of the Phokian guard of 1000 men. In the stillness of day-break, the noise of his army trampling through the wood³ aroused the defenders ; but the surprise was mutual, and Hydarnēs in alarm asked his guides whether these men also were Lacedæmonians. Having

Embarrassment of Xerxes—he is relieved from it by hearing of the path over the mountain.

¹ Herodot. vii. 212. 'Εν ταύτραι τῇσι προσόδοις τῆς μάχης λέγεται βασιλεῖα, θηρόμενον, τρίς ἀναδραμεῖν ἐκ τοῦ θρόνου, δειλῶντα περὶ τῇ στρατῇ. See Homer, Iliad, xx. 62 ; Æschyl. Pers. 472.

² Herodot. vii. 213, 214 ; Diodor. xi. 8.

Ktesias states that it was two powerful men of Trachis, Kalliadēs and Timaphernēs, who disclosed to Xerxes the mountain path (Persica, c. 24).

³ Herodot. vii. 217, 218. ὥς τε δὴ διέφαινε—ἦν μὲν δὴ σσημεῖον, ψόφου δὲ

γενομένου πολλοῦ, &c.

I cannot refrain from transcribing a remark of Colonel Leake: "The stillness of the dawn, which saved the Phokians from being surprised, is very characteristic of the climate of Greece in the season when the occurrence took place, and like many other trifling circumstances occurring in the history of the Persian invasion, is an interesting proof of the accuracy and veracity of the historian." (Travels in Northern Greece, vol. ii. c. x. p. 55.)

ascertained the negative, he began the attack, and overwhelmed the Phokians with a shower of arrows, so as to force them to abandon the path and seek their own safety on a higher point of the mountain. Anxious only for their own safety, they became unmindful of the inestimable opening which they were placed to guard. Had the full numerical strength of the Greeks been at Thermopylæ, instead of staying behind for the festivals, they might have planted such a force on the mountain-path as would have rendered it not less impregnable than the pass beneath.

Hydarnês, not troubling himself to pursue the Phokians, followed the descending portion of the mountain-path, shorter than the ascending, and arrived in the rear of

Thermopylæ not long after midday.¹ But before he had yet completed his descent, the fatal truth

had already been made known to Leonidas, that the enemy were closing in upon him behind. Scouts on the hills, and deserters from the Persian camp, especially a Kymæan² named Tyrastidas, had both come in with the news. And even if such informants had been wanting, the prophet Megistias, descended from the legendary seer Melampus, read the approach of death in the gloomy aspect of the morning sacrifices. It was evident that Thermopylæ could be no longer defended. There was however ample time for the defenders to retire, and the detachment of Leonidas

were divided in opinion on the subject. The greater number of them were inclined to abandon a position now become untenable, and to reserve themselves for future occasions on which they might effectively contribute to repel the invader. Nor is it to be doubted that such was the natural impulse, both of brave soldiers and of prudent officers, under the circumstances. But to Leonidas the idea of retreat was intolerable. His own personal honour, together with that of his Spartan companions and of Sparta herself,³ forbade him to think of yielding to the enemy the pass which he had been sent to defend. The laws of his country required him to conquer or die in the post as-

A Persian detachment under Hydarnês march over the mountain-path, driving away the Phokian guard.

They arrive in the rear of Leonidas.

Debate among the defenders of Thermopylæ when it became known that the Persians were approaching their rear.

¹ Herodot. vii. 216, 217.

² Diodor. xi. 9.

³ Herodot. vii. 219. ἐνθυῖτα ἐβουλευόντο οἱ Ἕλληνες, καὶ σφειωρ ἐσχίζοντο αἱ γυνῆμαι.

signed to him, whatever might be the superiority of number on the part of the enemy :¹ moreover we are told that the Delphian oracle had declared that either Sparta itself, or a king of Sparta, must fall victim to the Persian arms. Had he retired he could hardly have escaped that voice of reproach which, in Greece especially, always burst upon the general who failed : while his voluntary devotion and death would not only silence every whisper of calumny, but exalt him to the pinnacle of glory both as a man and as a king, and set an example of chivalrous patriotism at the moment when the Greek world most needed the lesson.

Resolution of Leonidas to stay and die in the pass.

The three hundred Spartans under Leonidas were found fully equal to this act of generous and devoted self-sacrifice. Perhaps he would have wished to inspire the same sentiment to the whole detachment : but when he found them indisposed, he at once ordered them to retire, thus avoiding all unseemly reluctance and dissension.² The same order was also given to the prophet Megistias, who however refused to obey it and staid, though he sent away his only son.³ None of the contingents remained with Leonidas except the Thespian and the Theban. The former, under their general Demophilus, volunteered to share the fate of the Spartans, and displayed even more than Spartan heroism, since they were not under that species of moral constraint which arises from the necessity of acting up to a pre-established fame and superiority. But retreat with them presented no prospect better than the mere preservation of life, either in slavery or in exile and misery ; since Thespiæ was in Bœotia, sure to be overrun by

The three hundred Spartans, together with the Thespians, remain with Leonidas : the rest of the detachment retire.

¹ Herodot. vii. 104.

² Herodot. vii. 220. Ταύτη καὶ μᾶλλον τῇ γνώμῃ πλείστός εἰμι, Λεωνίδην, ἐπεὶ τε ἡσθετο τοὺς συμμάχους ἰόντας ἀπροθύμους, καὶ οὐκ ἐθέλοντας συνδιακινδυνεύειν, κελεύσαι σφίσι ἀπαλλάσσεσθαι· αὐτῷ δὲ ἀπέναι οὐ καλῶς ἔχειν μένοντι δὲ αὐτῷ κλῆος μέγα ἐλείπετο, καὶ ἡ Σπάρτης εὐδαιμονίῃ οὐκ ἐξηλείφετο.

Compare a similar act of honourable self-devotion, under less conspicuous circumstances, of the Lacedæmonian commander Anaxibius, when surprised by the Athenians under Iphikratēs in the territory of Abydos (Xenophon, Hellenic. iv. 8, 38). He and twelve

Lacedæmonian harmosts all refused to think of safety by flight. He said to his men, when resistance was hopeless, "Ἄνδρες, ἐμοὶ μὲν καλὸν ἐνθαδὲ ἀποθανεῖν· ὑμεῖς δὲ, πρὶν ζυμμίζειν τοῖς πολεμοῖσι, σπεύδετε εἰς τὴν σωτηρίαν."

³ Herodot. vii. 221. According to Plutarch, there were also two persons belonging to the Herakleid lineage, whom Leonidas desired to place in safety, and for that reason gave them a despatch to carry home. They indignantly refused, and staid to perish in the fight (Plutarch. Herodot. Malign. p. 866).

the invaders ;¹ while the Peloponnesian contingents had behind them the Isthmus of Corinth, which they doubtless hoped still to be able to defend. With respect to the Theban contingent, we are much perplexed ; for Herodotus tells us that they were detained by Leonidas against their will as hostages, that they took as little part as possible in the subsequent battle, and surrendered themselves prisoners to Xerxes as soon as they could. Diodorus says that the Thespians alone remained with the Spartans ; and Pausanias, though he mentions the eighty Mykenæans as having staid along with the Thespians (which is probably incorrect), says nothing about the Thebans.² All things considered, it seems probable that the Thebans remained, but remained by their own offer—being citizens of the anti-Persian party, as Diodorus represents them to have been, or perhaps because it may have been hardly less dangerous for them to retire with the Peloponnesians, than to remain, suspected as they were of *medism*. But when the moment of actual crisis arrived, their courage not standing so firm as that of the Spartans and Thespians, they endeavoured to save their lives by taking credit for *medism*, and pretending to have been forcibly detained by Leonidas.

The devoted band thus left with Leonidas at Thermopylæ consisted of the 300 Spartans, with a certain number of Helots attending them, together with 700 Thespians, and apparently 400 Thebans. If there had

Last exploits
and death of
Leonidas
and his
band.

¹ The subsequent distress of the surviving Thespians is painfully illustrated by the fact, that in the battle of Platæa in the following year, they had no heavy armour (Herodot. ix. 30). After the final repulse of Xerxes, they were forced to recruit their city by the admission of new citizens (Herodot. viii. 75).

² Herodot. vii. 222. *Θηβαῖοι μὲν ἀέκοντες ἔμενον, καὶ οὐ βουλόμενοι, κατέχε γὰρ σφας Λαωνίδης, ἐν δμήρων λόγῳ ποιεύμενος.* How could these Thebans serve as hostages ? Against what evil were they intended to guard Leonidas, or what advantages could they confer upon him ? Unwilling comrades on such an occasion would be noway desirable. Plutarch (De Herodot. Malign. p. 865) severely criticises this statement of Herodotus, and on very plausible

grounds : among the many unjust criticisms in his treatise, this is one of the few exceptions.

Compare Diodorus, xi. 9 ; and Pausanias x. 20, 1.

Of course the Thebans, taking part as they afterwards did heartily with Xerxes, would have an interest in representing that their contingent had done as little as possible against him, and may have circulated the story that Leonidas detained them as hostages. The politics of Thebes before the battle of Thermopylæ were essentially double-faced and equivocal ; not daring to take any open part against the Greeks before the arrival of Xerxes.

The eighty Mykenæans, like the other Peloponnesians, had the Isthmus of Corinth behind them as a post which presented good chances of defence.

been before any Lacedæmonians (not Spartans) present, they must have retired with the other Peloponnesians. By previous concert with the guide Ephialtēs, Xerxes delayed his attack upon them until near noon, when the troops under Hydarnēs might soon be expected in the rear. On this last day, however, Leonidas, knowing that all which remained was to sell the lives of his detachment dearly, did not confine himself to the defensive,¹ but advanced into the wider space outside of the pass; becoming the aggressor, and driving before him the foremost of the Persian host, many of whom perished as well by the spears of the Greeks as in the neighbouring sea and morass, and even trodden down by their own numbers. It required all the efforts of the Persian officers, assisted by threats and the plentiful use of the whip, to force their men on to the fight. The Greeks fought with reckless bravery and desperation against this superior host, until at length their spears were broken, and they had no weapon left except their swords. It was at this juncture that Leonidas himself was slain, and around his body the battle became fiercer than ever: the Persians exhausted all their efforts to possess themselves of it, but were repulsed by the Greeks four several times, with the loss of many of their chiefs, especially two brothers of Xerxes. Fatigued, exhausted, diminished in number, and deprived of their most effective weapons, the little band of defenders retired, with the body of their chief, into the narrow strait behind the cross wall, where they sat altogether on a hillock, exposed to the attack of the main Persian army on one side, and of the detachment of Hydarnēs, which had now completed its march, on the other. They were thus surrounded, overwhelmed with missiles, and slain to a man; not losing courage even to the last, but defending themselves with their remaining daggers, with their unarmed hands, and even with their mouths.²

¹ The story of Diodorus (xi. 10) that Leonidas made an attack upon the Persian camp during the night, and very nearly penetrated to the regal tent, from which Xerxes was obliged to flee suddenly, in order to save his life, while the Greeks, after having caused immense slaughter in the camp, were at length overpowered and slain—is irreconcilable with Herodotus and decidedly to

be rejected. Justin however (ii. 11), and Plutarch (*De Herodot. Malign.* p. 866) follow it. The rhetoric of Diodorus is not calculated to strengthen the evidence in its favour. Plutarch had written, or intended to write, a biography of Leonidas (*De Herodot. Mal. ibid.*): but it is not preserved.

² Herodot. vii. 225.

Thus perished Leonidas with his heroic comrades—300 Spartans and 700 Thespians. Amidst such equal heroism, it seemed difficult to single out any individual as distinguished: nevertheless Herodotus mentions the Spartan Diênêkês, Alpheus and Maron—and the Thespian Dithyrambus—as standing pre-eminent. The reply ascribed to the first became renowned.¹

"The Persian host (he was informed) is so prodigious that their arrows conceal the sun." "So much the better (he answered), we shall then fight them in the shade." Herodotus had asked and learnt the name of every individual among this memorable three hundred. And even six hundred years afterwards, Pausanias could still read the names engraved on a column at Sparta.² One alone among them—Aristodêmus—returned home, having taken no part in the combat. He, together with Eurytus, another soldier, had been absent from the detachment on leave, and both were lying at Alpêni suffering from a severe complaint in the eyes. Eurytus, apprised that the fatal hour of the detachment was come, determined not to survive it, asked for his armour, and desired his attendant Helot to lead him to his place in the ranks; where he fell gallantly fighting, while the Helot departed and survived. Aristodêmus did not imitate this devotion of his sick comrade: overpowered with physical suffering, he was carried to Sparta—but he returned only to scorn and infamy among his fellow-citizens.³ He was denounced as

Individuals among them distinguished—scorn exhibited towards Aristodêmus who did not fight.

¹ Herodot. vii. 226.

² Herodot. vii. 224. *ἐκπυθόμεν δὲ καὶ πάντων τῶν τριακοσίων.* Pausanias, iii. 14, 1. Annual festivals, with a panegyric oration and gymnastic matches, were still celebrated even in his time in honour of Leonidas, jointly with the regent Pausanias, whose subsequent treason tarnished his laurels acquired at Platœa. It is remarkable, and not altogether creditable to Spartan sentiment, that the two kings should have been made partners in the same public honours.

³ Herodot. vii. 299. *Ἀριστόδημον—λειποψυχίστα λειφθῆναι—ἀλγέσαντα ἀπονοστήσαι ἐς Σπάρτην.* The commentators are hard upon Aristodêmus when they translate these epithets "animo deficientem, timidum, pusillanimum,"

considering that *ἐλειψόχρησε* is predicated by Thucydides (iv. 12) even respecting the gallant Brasidas. Herodotus scarcely intends to imply anything like pusillanimity, but rather the effect of extreme physical suffering. It seems, however, that there were different stories about the cause which had kept Aristodêmus out of the battle.

The story of another soldier named Pantitês, who having been sent on a message by Leonidas into Thessaly, did not return in time for the battle, and was so disgraced when he went back to Sparta that he hanged himself—given by Herodotus as a report, is very little entitled to credit. It is not likely that Leonidas would send an envoy into Thessaly, then occupied by the Persians: moreover the disgrace of Aristo-

"the coward Aristodēmus;" no one would speak or communicate with him, or even grant him a light for his fire.¹ After a year of such bitter disgrace, he was at length enabled to retrieve his honour at the battle of Plataea, where he was slain, after surpassing all his comrades in heroic and even reckless valour.

Amidst the last moments of this gallant band, we turn with repugnance to the desertion and surrender of the Thebans. They are said to have taken part in the final battle, though only to save appearances and under the pressure of necessity: but when the Spartans and Thespians, exhausted and disarmed, retreated to die upon the little hillock within the pass, the Thebans then separated themselves, approached the enemy with out-stretched hands and entreated quarter. They now loudly proclaimed that they were friends and subjects of the Great King, and had come to Thermopylae against their own consent; all which was confirmed by the Thessalians in the Persian army. Though some few were slain before this proceeding was understood by the Persians, the rest were admitted to quarter; not without the signal disgrace, however, of being branded with the regal mark as untrustworthy slaves—an indignity to which their commander Leontiades was compelled to submit along with the rest. Such is the narrative which Herodotus recounts, without any expression of mistrust or even of doubt: Plutarch emphatically contradicts it, and even cites a Boeotian author,² who affirms that Anaxarchus,

Fate of the
Theban
contingent.

dēmus is particularly explained by Herodotus by the difference between his conduct and that of his comrade Eurystus: whereas Pantitēs stood alone.

¹ See the story of the single Athenian citizen, who returned home alone, after all his comrades had perished in an unfortunate expedition to the island of Ægina. The widows of the slain warriors crowded round him, each asking him what had become of her husband, and finally put him to death by pricking with their bodkins (Herodot. v. 87).

In the terrible battle of St. Jacob on the Birs, near Basle (August 1444), where 1500 Swiss crossed the river and attacked 40,000 French and Germans under the Dauphin of France, against strong remonstrances from their com-

manders—all of them were slain, after deeds of unrivalled valour and great loss to the enemy, except sixteen men, who receded from their countrymen in crossing the river, thinking the enterprise desperate. These sixteen men on their return were treated with intolerable scorn and hardly escaped execution (Vogelin, Geschichte der Schweizer Eidgenossenschaft, vol. i. ch. 5, p. 393).

² Herodot. vii. 233; Plutarch, Herodot. Malign. p. 867. The Boeotian history of Aristophanēs, cited by the latter, professed to be founded in part upon memorials arranged according to the sequence of magistrates and generals—*ἐκ τῶν κατὰ ἀρχοντας ὑπομνημάτων*.

not Leontiadēs, was commander of the Thebans at Thermopylæ. Without calling in question the equivocal conduct and surrender of this Theban detachment, we may reasonably dismiss the story of this ignominious branding, as an invention of that strong anti-Theban feeling which prevailed in Greece after the repulse of Xerxes.

The wrath of that monarch, as he went over the field after the close of the action, vented itself upon the corpse of the gallant Leonidas, whose head he directed to be cut off and fixed on a cross. But it was not wrath alone which filled his mind. He was farther impressed with involuntary admiration of the little detachment which had here opposed to him a resistance so unexpected and so nearly invincible.

Impressions
of Xerxes
after the
combat—
advice given
to him by
Demaratus
—he rejects
it.

He now learnt to be anxious respecting the farther resistance which remained behind. "Demaratus (said he to the exiled Spartan king at his side), thou art a good man: all thy predictions have turned out true; now tell me how many Lacedæmonians are there remaining, and are they all such warriors as these fallen men?" "O king (replied Demaratus), the total of the Lacedæmonians and of their towns is great; in Sparta alone there are 8000 adult warriors, all equal to those who have here fought; and the other Lacedæmonians, though inferior to them, are yet excellent soldiers." "Tell me (rejoined Xerxes) what will be the least difficult way of conquering such men?" Upon which Demaratus advised him to send a division of his fleet to occupy the island of Kythêra, and from thence to make war on the southern coast of Laconia, which would distract the attention of Sparta, and prevent her from co-operating in any combined scheme of defence against his land-force. Unless this were done, the entire force of Peloponnesus would be assembled to maintain the narrow isthmus of Corinth, where the Persian king would have far more terrible battles to fight than anything which he had yet witnessed.¹

Happily for the safety of Greece, Achæmenes the brother of Xerxes interposed to dissuade the monarch from this prudent plan of action; not without aspersions on the temper and motives of Demaratus, who (he affirmed) like other Greeks,

¹ Herodot. vii. 235.

hated all power, and envied all good fortune above his own. The fleet (added he), after the damage sustained by the recent storm, would bear no farther diminution of number : and it was essential to keep the entire Persian force, on land as well as on sea, in one undivided and cooperating mass.¹

A few such remarks were sufficient to revive in the monarch his habitual sentiment of confidence in overpowering number. Yet while rejecting the advice of Demaratus, he emphatically repelled the imputations against the good faith and sincere attachment of that exiled prince.²

Meanwhile the days of battle at Thermopylæ had been not less actively employed by the fleets at Aphetæ and Artemisium. It has already been mentioned that the Greek ships, having abandoned their station at the latter place and retired to Chalkis, were induced to return by the news that the Persian fleet had been nearly ruined by the recent storm ; and that on returning to Artemisium, the Grecian commanders felt renewed alarm on seeing the enemy's fleet, in spite of the damage just sustained, still mustering an overwhelming number at the opposite station of Aphetæ. Such was the effect of this spectacle, and the impression of their own inferiority, that they again resolved to retire, without fighting, leaving the strait open and undefended. Great consternation was caused by the news of their determination among the inhabitants of Eubœa, who entreated Eurybiadês to maintain his position for a few days, until they could have time to remove their families and their property. But even such postponement was thought unsafe and was refused. He was on the point of giving orders for retreat, when the Eubœans sent their envoy Pelagon to Themistoklês with the offer of thirty talents, on condition that the fleet should keep its station and hazard an engagement in defence of the island. Themistoklês employed the money adroitly and successfully, giving five talents to Eurybiadês, with large

Proceedings of the two fleets, at Artemisium and Aphetæ—alarm among the Grecian fleet—Themistoklês determines them to stay and fight, at the urgent instance of the Eubœans.

¹ Herodot. vii. 236.

² Herodot. vii. 237. "The citizen (Xerxes is made to observe) does indeed naturally envy another citizen more fortunate than himself, and if asked for counsel will keep back what he has best

in his mind, unless he be a man of very rare virtue. But a foreign friend usually sympathises heartily with the good fortune of another foreigner, and will give him the best advice in his power whenever he is asked."

presents besides to the other leading chiefs. The most unmanageable among them was the Corinthian Adeimantus,—who at first threatened to depart with his own squadron alone, if the remaining Greeks were mad enough to remain. His alarm was silenced, if not tranquilized, by a present of three talents.¹

However Plutarch may be scandalized at such inglorious revelations preserved to us by Herodotus respecting the underhand agencies of this memorable struggle, there is no reason to call in question the bribery, here described. But Themistoklēs doubtless was only tempted to do, and enabled to do, by means of the Eubœan money, that which he would have wished, and had probably tried, to accomplish, without the money—to bring on a naval engagement at Artemisium. It was absolutely essential to the maintenance of Thermopylæ, and to the general plan of defence, that the Eubœan strait should be defended against the Persian fleet; and the Greeks could not expect any more favourable position to fight in.

We may reasonably presume that Themistoklēs, distinguished not less by daring than by sagacity, and the great originator of maritime energies in his country, concurred unwillingly in the projected abandonment of Artemisium. But his high mental capacity did not exclude that pecuniary corruption which rendered the presents of the Eubœans both admissible and welcome—yet still more welcome to him perhaps, as they supplied means of bringing over the other opposing chiefs and the Spartan admiral.² It was finally determined therefore to remain, and if necessary, to hazard an engagement in the Eubœan strait; but at any rate to procure for the inhabitants of the island a short interval to remove their families. Had these Eubœans heeded the oracles (says Herodotus³) they would have packed up and removed long

¹ Plutarch, Themistoklēs, c. 7; Herodot. viii. 5, 6.

² The expression of Herodotus is somewhat remarkable: Οὗτοί τε δὴ πλεονέκτες δώροισι (Eurybiadēs, Adeimantus &c.) ἀναπεισισμένοι ἦσαν, καὶ τοῖσι Εὐβοέσιν ἐκεχάριστο· αὐτὸς τε ὁ Θεμιστοκλῆς ἐκέρδην, ἐλάμβανε δὲ τὰ λοιπὰ ἔχων.

³ Herodot. viii. 20. Οἱ γὰρ Εὐβοέες παραχρησάμενοι τὸν Βάκιδος χρησμὸν ὡς

οὐδὲν λέγοντα, οὐτε τι ἐξεκομίσαντο οὐδὲν, οὐτε προσέβησαν, ὥς παρυσμένον σφί περ πολέμου· περιπετὴ δὲ ἐποήσαντο σφίσι αὐτοῖσι τὰ πρήγματα. Βάκις γὰρ ὥδε ἔχει περὶ τούτων ὁ χρησμὸς·

Θρήξο βαρβαρόφωνον ὅταν ζῆναι εἰς ἄλλα βάλῃ Νύβλιον, Εὐβοίῃσι ἀπέχην πολυμερέας αἰγας. Τούτοις δὲ οὐδὲν τοῖσι ἔπειτα χρῆσασμένοις ἐν τοῖσι τότε παροῦσι τε καὶ προσδοκίμοις κακοῖσι, παρῆν σφί συμφορρῇ χρῆσθαι πρὸς τὰ μέγιστα.

before; for a text of Bakis gave them express warning: but having neglected the sacred writings as unworthy of credit, they were now severely punished for such presumption.

Among the Persian fleet at Aphetæ, on the other hand, the feeling prevalent was one of sanguine hope and confidence in their superior numbers, forming a strong contrast with the discouragement of the Greeks at Artemisium. Had they attacked the latter immediately, when both fleets first saw each other from their opposite stations, they would have gained an easy victory, for the Greek fleet would have fled, as the admiral was on the point of ordering, even without an attack. But this was not sufficient for the Persians, who wished to cut off every ship among their enemies even from flight and escape.¹ Accordingly they detached 200 ships to circumnavigate the island of Eubœa, and to sail up the Eubœan strait from the south, in the rear of the Greeks; postponing their own attack in front until this squadron should be in position to intercept the retreating Greeks. But though the manœuvre was concealed by sending the squadron round outside of the island of Skiathos, it became known immediately among the Greeks, through a deserter—Skiyllias of Skionê. This man, the best swimmer and diver of his time, and now engaged like other Thracian Greeks in the Persian service, passed over to Artemisium, and communicated to the Greek commanders both particulars of the late destructive storm, and the despatch of the intercepting squadron.²

It appears that his communications, respecting the effects of the storm and the condition of the Persian fleet, somewhat reassured the Greeks, who resolved during the ensuing night to sail from their station at Artemisium for the purpose of surprising the detached squadron of 200 ships, and who even became bold enough, under the inspirations of Themistoklês, to go out and offer battle to the main fleet near Aphetæ.³ Wanting to acquire some practical experience, which neither leaders nor soldiers as yet possessed, of the manner in which Phœni-

Confident hopes of the Persian fleet—they detach a squadron to sail round Eubœa, and take the Greeks in the rear.

Sea-fight off Artemisium—advantage gained by the Greeks.

¹ Herodot. viii. 6. *καὶ ἐμελλον θῆθεν ἐκφυγεῖσθαι (οἱ Ἕλληνες). ἔδει δὲ μὴδὲ πυρφόρον, τῷ ἐκείνων (Περσῶν) λόγῳ, περιγέρεσθαι.*

² Herodot. viii. 7, 8. Wonderful stories were recounted respecting the prowess of Skiyllias, as a diver.

³ Diodorus, xi. 12.

cians and others in the Persian fleet handled and manœuvred their ships, they waited till a late hour of the afternoon, when little daylight remained.¹ Their boldness in thus advancing out, with inferior numbers and even inferior ships, astonished the Persian admirals, and distressed the Ionians and other subject Greeks who were serving them as unwilling auxiliaries. To both it seemed that the victory of the Persian fleet, which was speedily brought forth to battle, and was numerous enough to encompass the Greeks, would be certain as well as complete. The Greek ships were at first marshalled in a circle, with their sterns in the interior, and presenting their prows in front, at all points of the circumference.² In this position, compressed into a narrow space, they seemed to be awaiting the attack of the enemy, who formed a larger circle around them: but on a second signal given, their ships assumed the aggressive, rowed out from the inner circle in direct impact against the hostile ships around, and took or disabled no less than thirty of them: in one of which Philaon, brother of Gorgus despot of Salamis in Cyprus, was made prisoner. Such unexpected forwardness at first disconcerted the Persians, who however rallied and inflicted considerable damage and loss on the Greeks. But the near approach of night put an end to the combat, and each fleet retired to its former station; the Persians to Aphetæ, the Greeks to Artemisium.³

The result of this first day's combat, though indecisive in itself, surprised both parties, and did much to exalt the confidence of the Greeks. But the events of the ensuing night did yet more. Another tremendous storm was sent by the gods to aid them. Though it was the middle of summer—a season when rain rarely falls in the climate of Greece—the most violent wind, rain, and thunder prevailed during the whole night, blowing right on shore against the Persians at Aphetæ, and thus but little troublesome to the Greeks on the opposite side of the strait. The seamen of the Persian fleet,

Second storm—increased damage to the Persian fleet, and ruin to the detachment sent round Eubœa.

¹ Herodot. viii. 9. δειλην ὄψιν γινόμενην τῆς ἡμέρης φυλάξαντες, αὐτοὶ ἑπ' ἀπὸ πλῶν ἐπὶ τοῖς βαρβάρους, ἀπέπειραν αὐτῶν ποτήσασθαι βουλόμενοι τῆς τε μάχης καὶ τοῦ διεκπλοῦ.

² Compare the description in Thucyd. ii. 84, of the naval battle between the

Athenian fleet under Phormio and the Lacedæmonian fleet, where the ships of the latter are marshalled in this same array.

³ Herodot. viii. 11. πολλὸν παρὰ δόξαν ἀγωνισμένοι—ἑτασάκτως ἀγωνισμένοι, &c.

scarcely recovered from the former storm at Sêpias Aktê, were almost driven to despair by this repetition of the same peril ; the more so when they found the prows of their ships surrounded, and the play of their oars impeded, by the dead bodies and the spars from the recent battle, which the current drove towards their shore. If this storm was injurious to the main fleet at Aphetæ, it proved the entire ruin of the squadron detached to circumnavigate Eubœa, who, overtaken by it near the dangerous eastern coast of that island (called the Hollows of Eubœa), were driven upon the rocks and wrecked. The news of this second conspiracy of the elements, or intervention of the gods, against the schemes of the invaders, was highly encouraging to the Greeks ; and the seasonable arrival of fifty-three fresh Athenian ships, who reinforced them the next day, raised them to a still higher pitch of confidence. In the afternoon of the same day, they sailed out against the Persian fleet at Aphetæ, and attacked and destroyed some Kilikian ships even at their moorings ; the fleet having been too much damaged by the storm of the preceding night to come out and fight.¹

But the Persian admirals were not of a temper to endure such insults—still less to let their master hear of them. About noon on the ensuing day, they sailed with their entire fleet near to the Greek station at Artemisium, and formed themselves into a half-moon ; while the Greeks kept near to the shore, so that they could not be surrounded, nor could the Persians bring their entire fleet into action ; the ships running foul of each other, and not finding space to attack. The battle raged fiercely all day, and with great loss and damage on both sides : the Egyptians bore off the palm of valour among the Persians, the Athenians among the Greeks. Though the positive loss sustained by the Persians was by far the greater, and though the Greeks being near their own shore, became masters of the dead bodies as well as of the disabled ships and floating fragments—still they were themselves hurt and crippled in greater proportion with reference to their inferior total : and the Athenian vessels especially, foremost in the preceding combat, found one half of their number out of condition to

Renewed
sea-fight
off Ar-
temisium—
indecisive—
—but the
Greek fleet
resolves to
retreat.

¹ Herodot. viii. 12, 13, 14 ; Diodor. xi. 12.

renew it.¹ The Egyptians alone had captured five Grecian ships with their entire crews.

Under these circumstances, the Greek leaders—and Themistoklēs, as it seems, among them—determined that they could no longer venture to hold the position of Artemisium, but must withdraw the naval force farther into Greece :² though this was in fact a surrender of the pass of Thermopylæ, and though the removal which the Eubœans were hastening was still unfinished. These unfortunate men were forced to be satisfied with the promise of Themistoklēs to give them convoy for their boats and their persons ; abandoning their sheep and cattle for the consumption of the fleet, as better than leaving them to become booty for the enemy. While the Greeks were thus employed in organising their retreat, they received

They retreat immediately on hearing of the disaster at Thermopylæ—they go to Salamis.

news which rendered retreat doubly necessary. The Athenian Abrônynchus, stationed with his ship near Thermopylæ, in order to keep up communication between the army and fleet, brought the disastrous intelligence that Xerxes was already master of the pass, and that the division of Leonidas was either destroyed or in flight. Upon this the fleet abandoned Artemisium forthwith, and sailed up the Eubœan strait ; the Corinthian ships in the van, the Athenians bringing up the rear. Themistoklēs, conducting the latter, staid long enough at the various watering-stations and landing-places to inscribe, on some neighbouring stones, invitations to the Ionian contingents serving under Xerxes ; whereby the latter were conjured not to serve against their fathers, but to desert, if possible—or at least, to fight as little and as backwardly as they could. Themistoklēs hoped by this stratagem perhaps to detach some of the Ionians from the Persian side, or at any rate, to render them objects of mistrust, and thus to diminish their efficiency.³ With no longer delay than was requisite for such inscriptions, he followed the remaining fleet, which sailed round the coast of Attica, not stopping until it reached the island of Salamis.

The news of the retreat of the Greek fleet was speedily con-

¹ Herodot. viii. 17, 18.

² Herodot. viii. 13. *δησμον δὲ ἐβούλευον ἶσιν ἐς τὴν Ἑλλάδα.*

³ Herodot. viii. 19, 21, 22 ; Plutarch, Themistoklēs, c. 9.

veyed by a citizen of Histiaëa to the Persians at Aphetæ, who at first disbelieved it, and detained the messenger until they had sent to ascertain the fact. On the next day, their fleet passed across to the north of Eubœa, and became master of Histiaëa and the neighbouring territory; from whence many of them, by permission and even invitation of Xerxes, crossed over to Thermopylæ to survey the field of battle and the dead. Respecting the number of the dead, Xerxes is asserted to have deliberately imposed upon the spectators: he buried all his own dead, except 1000 whose bodies were left out—while the total number of Greeks who had perished at Thermopylæ, 4000 in number, were all left exposed, and in one heap, so as to create an impression that their loss had been much more severe than their own. Moreover the bodies of the slain Helots were included in the heap, all of them passing for Spartans or Thespians in the estimation of the spectators. We are not surprised to hear, however, that this trick, gross and public as it must have been, really deceived very few.¹ According to the statement of Herodotus, 20,000 men were slain on the side of the Persians—no unreasonable estimate, if we consider that they wore little defensive armour, and that they were three days fighting. The number of Grecian dead bodies is stated by the same historian as 4000: if this be correct, it must include a considerable proportion of Helots, since there were no hoplites present on the last day except the 300 Spartans, the 700 Thespians, and the 400 Thebans. Some hoplites were of course slain in the first two days' battles, though apparently not many. The number who originally came to the defence of the pass seems to have been about 7000:² but the epigram composed shortly afterwards and inscribed on the spot by order of the Amphiktyonic assembly, transmitted to posterity the formal boast that 4000 warriors "from Peloponnesus had

Advance of the Persian fleet to Eubœa—Manœuvres ascribed to Xerxes in respect to the dead bodies at Thermopylæ.

Numbers of dead on both sides. Subsequent commemorating inscriptions.

¹ Herodot. viii. 24, 25. οὐ μὲν οὐδ' ἴδανθαι τοὺς διαβεβηκότας ἑρέτης ταῦτα πρήξας περὶ τοὺς νεκροὺς τοὺς ἑωυτοῦ· καὶ γὰρ δὴ καὶ γελοῖον ἦν, &c.

² About the numbers of the Greeks at Thermopylæ, compare Herodot. vii. 202; Diodorus, xi. 4; Pausanias, x. 20, 1; and Manso's Sparta, vol. ii. p. 308;

Beylage 24th.

Isokratēs talks about 1000 Spartans, with a few allies, Panegyric, Or. iv. p. 59. He mentions also only sixty Athenian ships of war at Artemisium; in fact his numerical statements deserve little attention.

here fought with 300 myriads or 3,000,000 of enemies."¹ Respecting this alleged Persian total, some remarks have already been made: the statement of 4000 warriors from Peloponnesus, must indicate all those who originally marched out of that peninsula under Leonidas. Yet the Amphiktyonic assembly, when they furnished words to record this memorable exploit, ought not to have immortalized the Peloponnesians apart from their extra-Peloponnesian comrades, of merit fully equal; especially the Thespians, who exhibited the same heroic self-devotion as Leonidas and his Spartans, without having been prepared for it by the same elaborate and iron discipline. While this inscription was intended as a general commemoration of the exploit, there was another near it, alike simple and impressive, destined for the Spartan dead separately: "Stranger, tell the Lacedæmonians that we lie here, in obedience to their orders." On the hillock within the pass, where this devoted band received their death-wounds, a monument was erected, with a marble lion in honour of Leonidas; decorated apparently with an epigram by the poet Simonidēs. That distinguished genius composed at least one ode, of which nothing but a splendid fragment now remains, to celebrate the glories of Thermopylæ: besides several epigrams, one of which was consecrated to the prophet Megistias, "who, though well aware of the fate coming upon him, would not desert the Spartan chiefs."

Impressive
epigram of
Simonidēs.

¹ Herodot. vii. 228.

CHAPTER XLI.

BATTLE OF SALAMIS.—RETREAT OF XERXES.

THE sentiment, alike durable and unanimous, with which the Greeks of after-times looked back on the battle of Thermopylæ, and which they have communicated to all subsequent readers, was that of just admiration for the courage and patriotism of Leonidas and his band. But among the contemporary Greeks that sentiment, though doubtless sincerely felt, was by no means predominant. It was overpowered by the more pressing emotions of disappointment and terror. So confident were the Spartans and Peloponnesians in the defensibility of Thermopylæ and Artemisium, that when the news of the disaster reached them, not a single soldier had yet been put in motion; the season of the festival-games had passed, but no active step had yet been taken.¹ Meanwhile the invading force, army and fleet, was in its progress towards Attica and Peloponnesus, without the least preparations—and what was still worse, without any combined and concerted plan—for defending the heart of Greece. The loss sustained by Xerxes at Thermopylæ, insignificant in proportion to his vast total, was more than compensated by the fresh Grecian auxiliaries which he now acquired. Not merely the Malians, Lokrians and Dorians, but also the great mass of the Bœotians, with their chief town Thebes, all except Thespiæ and Plataea, now joined him.² Demaratus, his Spartan companion, moved forward to Thebes to renew an ancient tie of hospitality with the Theban oligarchical leader Attagnus, while small garrisons were sent by Alexander of Macedon to most of the Bœotian towns,³ as

Surprise and terror of the Greeks immediately after the battle of Thermopylæ.

¹ Herodot. viii. 40, 71, 73.

² Herodot. viii. 66. Diodorus calls the battle of Thermopylæ a *Kadmeian* victory for Xerxes, which is true only in the letter, but not in the spirit; he doubtless lost a greater number of men in the pass than the Greeks, but the

advantage which he gained was prodigious (Diodor. xi. 12); and Diodorus himself sets forth the terror of the Greeks after the event (xi. 13-15).

³ Plutarch, De Herodot. Malignit. p. 864; Herodot. viii. 34.

well to protect them from plunder as to ensure their fidelity. The Thespians on the other hand abandoned their city and fled into Peloponnesus; while the Platæans, who had been serving aboard the Athenian ships at Artemisium,¹ were disembarked at Chalkis as the fleet retreated, for the purpose of marching by land to their city and removing their families. It was not only the land force of Xerxes which had been thus strengthened. His fleet also had received some accessions from Karystus in Eubœa, and from several of the Cyclades—so that the losses sustained by the storm at Sêpias and the fights at Artemisium, if not wholly made up, were at least in part repaired, while the fleet remained still prodigiously superior in number to that of the Greeks.²

At the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, near fifty years after these events, the Corinthian envoys reminded Sparta that she had allowed Xerxes time to arrive from the extremity of the earth at the threshold of Peloponnesus, before she took any adequate precautions against him: a reproach true almost to the letter.³ It was only when roused and terrified by the news of the death of Leonidas, that the Lacedæmonians and the other Peloponnesians began to put forth their full strength. But it was then too late to perform the promise made to Athens of taking up a position in Bœotia so as to protect Attica. To defend the Isthmus of Corinth was all that they now thought of, and seemingly all that was now open to them. Thither they rushed with all their available population under the conduct of Kleombrotus king of Sparta (brother of Leonidas), and began to draw fortifications across it, as well as to break up the Skironian road from Megara to Corinth, with every mark of anxious energy. The Lacedæmonians, Arcadians, Elcians, Corinthians, Sikyonians, Epidaurians, Phliasians, Træzenians, and Hermionians, were all present here in full numbers; many myriads of men (bodies of 10,000 each) working and bringing materials night and day.⁴ As a defence to themselves against attack by land, this was an excellent position: they considered it as their last chance,⁵

No ulterior plan of defence formed—no new position to be found capable of defending Attica—the Peloponnesians crowd to fortify the Isthmus of Corinth.

¹ Herodot. viii. 44, 50.

² Herodot. viii. 66.

³ Thucyd. i. 69. τὸν τε γὰρ Μῆδον αὐτοὶ ἴσμεν ἀπὸ περάτων γῆς πρότερον

ἐπὶ Πελοπόννησον ἐλθόντα, πρὶν τὰ παρ' ὡμῶν ἀξίως προσηκασθῆσαι.

⁴ Herodot. viii. 71. συνδραμόντες ἐκ τῶν πόλεων. ⁵ Herodot. viii. 74.

abandoning all hope of successful resistance at sea. But they forgot that a fortified isthmus was no protection even to themselves against the navy of Xerxes,¹ while it professedly threw out not only Attica, but also Megara and Ægina. And thus arose a new peril to Greece from the loss of Thermopylæ: no other position could be found which, like that memorable strait, comprehended and protected at once all the separate cities. The disunion thus produced brought them within a hair's breadth of ruin.

If the causes of alarm were great for the Peloponnesians, yet more desperate did the position of the Athenians appear. Expecting, according to agreement, that there would be a Peloponnesian army in Bœotia ready to sustain Leonidas, or at any rate to co-operate in the defence of Attica, they had taken no measures to remove their families or property. But they saw with indignant disappointment as well as dismay, on retreating from Artemisium, that the conqueror was in full march from Thermopylæ, that the road to Attica was open to him, and that the Peloponnesians were absorbed exclusively in the defence of their own isthmus and their own separate existence.² The fleet from Artemisium had been directed to muster at the harbour of Trœzen, there to await such reinforcements as could be got together: but the Athenians entreated Eurybiadēs to halt at Salamis, so as to allow them a short time for consultation in the critical state of their affairs, and to aid them in the transport of their families. While Eurybiadēs was thus staying at Salamis, several new ships which had reached Trœzen came over to join him; and in

Hopeless situation of the Athenians—no measures yet taken to remove their families from Attica.

¹ Herodot. vii. 139.

² Plutarch, Themistoklēs, c. 9. ἅμα μὲν ὀργή τῆς προδοσίας εἶχε τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, ἅμα δὲ δυσθυμία καὶ κατῆθεια μεμνημένοι.

Herodot. viii. 40. δοκόντες γὰρ εὐρήσειν Πελοποννησίους πανδημὴν ἐν τῇ Βοιωτίῃ ὑποκατημένους τὸν βάρβαρον, τῶν μὲν εὖρον οὐδὲν ἶδον, οἱ δὲ ἐκυνθάνοντο τὸν ἱσθμὸν αὐτοὺς τειχίζοντας ἐς τὴν Πελοπόννησον, περὶ πλείστου δὲ ποιομένους περιεῖναι, καὶ ταύτην ἔχοντας ἐν φυλακῇ, τὰ τε ἄλλα ἀπιέναι.

Thucyd. i. 74. ὅτε γοῦν ἤμεν (we Athenians) ἔτι σώοι, οὐ παρέγενεσθε (Spartans).

Both Lysias (Oratio Funebr. c. 8) and Isokratēs take pride in the fact that the Athenians, in spite of being thus betrayed, never thought of making separate terms for themselves with Xerxes (Panegyric, Or. iv. p. 60). But there is no reason to believe that Xerxes would have granted them separate terms: his particular vengeance was directed against them. Isokratēs has confounded in his mind the conduct of the Athenians when they refused the offers of Mardonius in the year following the battle of Salamis, with their conduct before the battle of Salamis against Xerxes.

this way Salamis became for a time the naval station of the Greeks, without any deliberate intention beforehand.¹

Meanwhile Themistoklēs and the Athenian seamen landed at Phalērum, and made their mournful entry into Athens. Gloomy as the prospect appeared, there was little room for difference of opinion,² and still less room for delay. The authorities and the public assembly at once issued a proclamation, enjoining every Athenian to remove his family out of the country in the best way he could. We may conceive the state of tumult and terror which followed on this unexpected proclamation, when we reflect that it had to be circulated and acted upon throughout all Attica, from Sunium to Orōpus, within the narrow space of less than six days; for no longer interval elapsed before Xerxes actually arrived at Athens, where indeed he might have arrived even sooner.³ The whole Grecian fleet was doubtless employed in carrying out the helpless exiles; mostly to Træzen, where a kind reception and generous support were provided for them (the Træzenian population being seemingly semi-Ionic, and having ancient relations of religion as well as of traffic with Athens)—but in part also to Ægina: there were however many who could not or would not go farther than Salamis. Themistoklēs impressed upon the sufferers that they were only obeying the oracle, which had directed them to abandon the city and to take refuge behind the wooden walls; and either his policy, or the mental depression of the time, gave circulation to other stories, intimating that even the divine inmates of the acropolis were for a while deserting it. In the ancient temple of Athênē Polias on that rock, there dwelt, or was believed to dwell, as guardian to the sanctuary and familiar attendant of the goddess, a sacred serpent, for whose nourishment a honey-cake was placed once in the month. The honey-cake had been hitherto regularly consumed; but at this fatal moment the priestess announced that it remained untouched: the sacred guardian had thus set the example of quitting the acropolis, and it behoved the citizens to follow the example,

The Athenians abandon Attica, removing their families and property to Salamis, Ægina, Træzen, &c.

¹ Herodot. viii. 40-42.

² Plato, Legg. iii. p. 699.

³ Herodot. viii. 66, 67. There was therefore but little time for the breaking

up and carrying away of furniture, alluded to by Thucydides, i. 18—*διανοηθέντες ἐκλείπειν τὴν πόλιν καὶ ἀνασκευασμένοι, &c.*

confiding in the goddess herself for future return and restitution.

The migration of so many ancient men, women, and children, was a scene of tears and misery inferior only to that which would have ensued on the actual capture of the city.¹ Some few individuals, too poor to hope for maintenance, or too old to care for life, elsewhere—confiding moreover in their own interpretation² of the wooden-wall which the Pythian priestess had pronounced to be inexpugnable—shut themselves up in the acropolis along with the administrators of the temple, obstructing the entrance or western front with wooden doors and palisades.³ When we read how great were the sufferings, of the population of Attica near half a century afterwards, compressed for refuge within the spacious fortifications of Athens at the first outbreak of the Peloponnesian war,⁴ we may form some faint idea of the incalculably greater misery which overwhelmed an emigrant population, hurrying, they

Unavoidable
hurry and
sufferings of
the emi-
grants.

¹ Herodot. viii. 41: Plutarch, Themistoklēs, c. x.

In the years 1821 and 1822, during the struggle which preceded the liberation of Greece, the Athenians were forced to leave their country and seek refuge in Salamis three several times. These incidents are sketched in a manner alike interesting and instructive by Dr. Waddington, in his visit to Greece (London, 1825), Letters vi. viii. x. He states, p. 92, "Three times have the Athenians emigrated in a body, and sought refuge from the sabre among the houseless rocks of Salamis. Upon these occasions, I am assured, that many have dwelt in caverns, and many in miserable huts, constructed on the mountain side by their own feeble hands. Many have perished too from exposure to an intemperate climate; many from diseases contracted through the loathsomeness of their habitations; many from hunger and misery. On the retreat of the Turks, the survivors returned to their country. But to what a country did they return? To a land of desolation and famine; and in fact, on the first re-occupation of Athens, after the departure of Omer Brioni, several persons are known to have subsisted for some time on grass, till a supply of corn reached the Piræus from Syra and

Hydra."

A century and a half ago, also, in the war between the Turks and Venetians, the population of Attica was forced to emigrate to Salamis, Ægina, and Corinth. M. Buchon observes, "Les troupes Albanaises, envoyées en 1688 par les Turcs (in the war against the Venetians) se jetèrent sur l'Attique, mettant tout à feu et à sang. En 1688, les chroniques d'Athènes racontent que ses malheureux habitants furent obligés de se réfugier à Salamine, à Egine, et à Corinthe, et que ce ne fut qu'après trois ans qu'ils purent rentrer en partie dans leur ville et dans leurs champs. Beaucoup de villages de l'Attique sont encore habités par les descendants de ces derniers envahisseurs, et avant la dernière révolution, on n'y parloit que la langue albanaise; mais leur physionomie diffère autant que leur langue de la physionomie de la race Grecque." (Buchon, la Grèce Continentale et la Morée. Paris, 1843, ch. ii. p. 82.)

² Pausanias seems to consider these poor men somewhat presumptuous for pretending to understand the oracle better than Themistoklēs—*Ἀθηναίων τοὺς πλέον τι ἐς τὸν χρησμὸν ἢ Θεμιστοκλῆς εἰδέναι νομίζοντας* (i. 18, 2).

³ Herodot. viii. 50.

⁴ Thucyd. ii. 16, 17.

knew not whither, to escape the long arm of Xerxes. Little chance did there seem that they would ever revisit their homes except as his slaves.

In the midst of circumstances thus calamitous and threatening, neither the warriors nor the leaders of Athens lost their energy: arm as well as mind was strung to the loftiest pitch of human resolution. Political dissensions were suspended; Themistoklès proposed to the people a decree, and obtained their sanction, inviting home all who were under sentence of temporary banishment: moreover he not only included, but even specially designated among them, his own great opponent Aristeidès, now in the third year of ostracism. Xanthippus the accuser, and Kimon the son, of Miltiadès, were partners in the same emigration. The latter, enrolled by his scale of fortune among the horsemen of the state, was seen with his companions cheerfully marching through the Kerameikus to dedicate their bridles in the acropolis, and to bring away in exchange some of the sacred arms there suspended, thus setting an example of ready service on shipboard, instead of on horseback.¹ It was absolutely essential to obtain supplies of money, partly for the aid of the poorer exiles, but still more for the equipment of the fleet: yet there were no funds in the public treasury. But the senate of Areiopagus, then composed in large proportion of men from the wealthier classes, put forth all its public authority as well as its private contributions and example to others,² and thus succeeded in raising the sum of eight drachms for every soldier serving.

This timely help was indeed partly obtained by the inexhaustible resource of Themistoklès, who, in the hurry of embarkation, either discovered or pretended that the Gorgon's head from the statue of Athênê was lost, and directing upon this ground every man's baggage to be searched, rendered any treasures, which private citizens might be carrying away, available to the public service.³ By the most strenuous efforts, these few important days were made to suffice for

¹ Plutarch, Themistoklès, c. 10, 11; and Kimon, c. 5.

² Whether this be the incident which

Aristotle (*Politie.* v. 3, 5) had in his mind, we cannot determine.

³ Plutarch, Themistoklès, c. x.

removing the whole population of Attica—those of military competence to the fleet at Salamis,—the rest to some place of refuge,—together with as much property as the case admitted. So complete was the desertion of the country that the host of Xerxes, when it became master, could not seize and carry off more than five hundred prisoners.¹ Moreover the fleet itself, which had been brought home from Artemisium partially disabled, was quickly repaired, so that by the time the Persian fleet arrived, it was again in something like fighting condition.

The combined fleet which had now got together at Salamis consisted of 366 ships—a force greater than at Artemisium. Of these, no less than 200 were Athenian; twenty among which, however, were lent to the Chalkidians and manned by them. Forty Corinthian ships, thirty Æginetan, twenty Megarian, sixteen Lacedæmonian, fifteen Sikyonian, ten Epidaurian, seven from Ambrakia and as many from Eretria, five from Trœzen, three from Hermionê, and the same number from Leukas; two from Keos, two from Styra, and one from Kythnos; four from Naxos, despatched as a contingent to the Persian fleet, but brought by the choice of their captains and seamen to Salamis;—all these triremes, together with a small squadron of the inferior vessels called pentekonters, made up the total. From the great Grecian cities in Italy there appeared only one trireme, a volunteer, equipped and commanded by an eminent citizen named Phayllus, thrice victor at the Pythian games.² The entire fleet was thus a trifle larger than the combined force (358 ships) collected by the Asiatic Greeks at Lade, fifteen years earlier, during the Ionic revolt. We may doubt however whether this total, borrowed from Herodotus, be not larger than that which actually fought a little afterwards at the battle of Salamis, and which Æschylus gives decidedly as consisting of 300 sail, in addition to ten prime and chosen ships. That great poet, himself one of the combatants, and speaking in a drama represented only seven years after the battle, is better authority on the point even than Herodotus.³

Numbers
and composition
of the
combined
Greek fleet
at Salamis.

¹ Herodot. ix. 99.

² Herodot. viii. 43-48.

³ Æschylus, *Persæ*, 347; Herodot.

viii. 48; vi. 9; Pausanias, i. 14, 4. The total which Herodotus announces is 378; but the items which he gives

Hardly was the fleet mustered at Salamis, and the Athenian population removed, when Xerxes and his host overran the deserted country; his fleet occupying the roadstead of Phalærum with the coast adjoining. His land force had been put in motion under the guidance of the Thessalians, two or three days after the battle of Thermopylæ; and he was assured by some Arcadians who came to seek service, that the Peloponnesians were, even at that moment, occupied with the celebration of the Olympic games. "What prize does the victor receive?" he asked. Upon the reply made, that the prize was nothing

amount, when summed up, only to 366. There seems no way of reconciling this discrepancy except by some violent change which we are not warranted in making.

Ktesias represents that the numbers of the Persian war-ships at Salamis were above 1000, those of the Greeks 700 (Persica, c. 26).

The Athenian orator in Thucydides (i. 74) calls the total of the Grecian fleet at Salamis "nearly 400 ships, and the Athenian contingent somewhat less than *two parts* of this total (*ναῦς μὲν γὰρ ἐς τὰς τετρακοσίας ὀλίγη, ἑλάνσους τῶν δύο μοιρῶν*)."

The Scholiast, with Poppo and most of the commentators on this passage, treat τῶν δύο μοιρῶν as meaning unquestionably *two parts out of three*: and if this be the sense, I should agree with Dr. Arnold in considering the assertion as a mere exaggeration of the orator, not at all carrying the authority of Thucydides himself. But I cannot think that we are here driven to such a necessity; for the construction of Didot and Götter (though Dr. Arnold pronounces it "a most undoubted error") appears to me perfectly admissible. They maintain that αἱ δύο μοῖραι does not of necessity mean *two parts out of three*: in Thucyd. i. 10, we find καίτοι Πελοποννήσου τῶν πέντε τὰς δύο μοῖρας νέμονται, where the words mean *two parts out of five*. Now in the passage before us, we have ναῦς μὲν γὰρ ἐς τὰς τετρακοσίας ὀλίγη ἑλάνσους τῶν δύο μοιρῶν: and Didot and Götter contend, that in the word τετρακοσίας is implied a quaternary division of the whole number—*four hundreds or hundredth parts*: so that the whole meaning would be—"To the aggregate *four*

hundreds of ships we contributed something less than *two*." The word τετρακοσίας, equivalent to τέσσαρες ἑκατοντάδας, naturally includes the general idea of τέσσαρες μοῖραι: and this would bring the passage into exact analogy with the one cited above—τῶν πέντε τὰς δύο μοῖρας. With every respect to the judgement of Dr. Arnold on an author whom he had so long studied, I cannot enter into the grounds on which he has pronounced this interpretation of Didot and Götter to be "an undoubted error." It has the advantage of bringing the assertion of the orator in Thucydides into harmony with Herodotus, who states the Athenians to have furnished 180 ships at Salamis.

Wherever such harmony can be secured by an admissible construction of existing words, it is an unquestionable advantage, and ought to count as a reason in the case, if there be a doubt between two different constructions. But on the other hand, I protest against altering numerical statements in one author, simply in order to bring him into accordance with another, and without some substantive ground in the text itself. Thus, for example, in this very passage of Thucydides, Bloomfield and Poppo propose to alter τετρακοσίας into τριακοσίας, in order that Thucydides may be in harmony with Æschylus and other authors, though not with Herodotus; while Didot and Götter would alter τριακοσίῳν into τετρακοσίῳν in Demosthenes de Coronâ (c. 70), in order that Demosthenes may be in harmony with Thucydides. Such emendations appear to me inadmissible in principle; we are not to force different witnesses into harmony by retouching their statements.

more than a wreath of the wild olive, Tritantæchmēs son of the monarch's uncle Artabanus is said to have burst forth, notwithstanding the displeasure both of the monarch himself and of the bystanders—"Heavens, Mardonius, what manner of men are these against whom thou hast brought us to fight! men who contend not for money, but for honour!"¹ Whether this be a remark really delivered, or a dramatic illustration imagined by some contemporary of Herodotus, it is not the less interesting as bringing to view a characteristic of Hellenic life, which contrasts not merely with the manners of contemporary Orientals, but even with those of the earlier Greeks themselves during the Homeric times.

Among all the various Greeks between Thermopylæ and the borders of Attica, there were none except the Phokians disposed to refuse submission; and they refused only because the paramount influence of their bitter enemies the Thessalians made them despair of obtaining favourable terms.² Nor would they even listen to a proposition of the Thessalians, who, boasting that it was in their power to guide as they pleased the terrors of the Persian host, offered to ensure lenient treatment to the territory of Phokis, provided a sum of fifty talents were paid to them.³ The proposition being indignantly refused, they conducted Xerxes through the little territory of Doris, which *medised* and escaped plunder, into the upper valley of the Kephissus, among the towns of the inflexible Phokians. All of them were found deserted; the inhabitants having previously escaped either to the wide-spreading summit of Parnassus called Tithorea, or even still farther, across that mountain into the territory of the Ozolian Lokrians. Ten or a dozen small Phokian towns, the most considerable of which were Elateia and Hyampolis, were sacked and destroyed by the invaders. Even Abæ, with its temple and oracle of Apollo, was no better treated than the rest: all the sacred treasures were pillaged, and it was then burnt. From Panopeus Xerxes detached a body of men to plunder Delphi, marching with his main army through

The Persian army ravage the Phokian townships in their march from Thermopylæ to Attica—pillage of the temple at Abæ.

¹ Herodot. viii. 26. Παπαί, Μαρδόνιε, κοίλους ἐπ' ἄνδρας ἤγαγες μαχησομένους ἡμέας. οἱ οὐ περὶ χρημάτων τὸν ἀγῶνα ποιεῦνται, ἀλλὰ περὶ ἀρετῆς.

² Herodot. viii. 30.

³ Herodot. viii. 28, 29.

Bœotia, in which country he found all the towns submissive and willing, except Thespiæ and Plataea; both of them had been deserted by their citizens, and both were now burnt. From hence he conducted his army into the abandoned territory of Attica, reaching without resistance the foot of the acropolis at Athens.¹

Very different was the fate of that division which he had detached from Panopeus against Delphi. Apollo defended his temple here more vigorously than at Abæ. The cupidity of the Persian king was stimulated by accounts of the boundless wealth accumulated at Delphi, especially the profuse donations of Cræsus. The Delphians, in the extreme of alarm, while they sought safety for themselves on the heights of Parnassus and for their families by transport across the Gulf into Achaia, consulted the oracle whether they should carry away or bury the sacred treasures. Apollo directed them to leave the treasures untouched, saying that he was competent himself to take care of his own property. Sixty Delphians alone ventured to remain, together with Akératus, the religious superior: but evidences of superhuman aid soon appeared to encourage them. The sacred arms suspended in the interior cell, which no mortal hand was ever permitted to touch, were seen lying before the door of the temple; and when the Persians, marching along the road called Schistê up that rugged path under the steep cliffs of Parnassus which conducts to Delphi, had reached the temple of Athênê Pronæa,—on a sudden, dreadful thunder was heard—two vast mountain crags detached themselves and rushed down with deafening noise among them, crushing many to death—the war-shout was also heard from the interior of the temple of Athênê. Seized with a panic terror, the invaders turned round and fled; pursued not only by the Delphians, but also (as they themselves affirmed) by two armed warriors of superhuman stature and destructive arm. The triumphant Delphians confirmed this report, adding that the two auxiliaries were the Heroes Phylakus and Autonôus, whose sacred precincts were close adjoining: and Herodotus himself, when he visited Delphi, saw in the sacred ground of

Persian division detached against the temple of Delphi.

Failure, flight, and ruin of the detachment.

¹ Herodot. viii. 32-34.

Athênê the identical masses of rock which had overwhelmed the Persians.¹ Thus did the god repel these invaders from his Delphian sanctuary and treasures, which remained inviolate until 130 years afterwards, when they were rifled by the sacrilegious hands of the Phokian Philomêlus. On this occasion, as will be seen presently, the real protectors of the treasures were the conquerors at Salamis and Plataea.

Four months had elapsed, since the departure from Asia, when Xerxes reached Athens, the last term of his advance. He brought with him the members of the Peisistratid family, who doubtless thought their restoration already certain—and a few Athenian exiles attached to their interest. Though the country was altogether deserted, the handful of men collected in the acropolis ventured to defy him; nor could all the persuasions of the Peisistratids, eager to preserve the holy place from pillage, induce them to surrender.² The Athenian acropolis—a craggy rock rising abruptly about 150 feet with a flat summit of about 1000 feet long from east to west, by 500 feet broad from north to south—had no practicable access except on the western side:³ moreover in all parts where there seemed any possibility of climbing up, it was defended by the ancient

Xerxes with the Peisistratids in Athens—the acropolis holds out—is taken and sacked.

¹ Herodot. viii. 38, 39; Diodor. xi. 14; Pausan. x. 8, 4.

Compare the account given in Pausanias (x. 23) of the subsequent repulse of Brennus and the Gauls from Delphi: in his account, the repulse is not so exclusively the work of the gods as in that of Herodotus; there is a larger force of human combatants in defence of the temple, though greatly assisted by divine intervention: there is also loss on both sides. A similar descent of crags from the summit is mentioned.

See for the description of the road by which the Persians marched, and the extreme term of their progress, Ulrichs, *Reisen und Forschungen in Griechenland*, ch. iv. p. 46; ch. x. p. 146.

Many great blocks of stone and cliff are still to be seen near the spot, which have rolled down from the top, and which remind the traveller of these passages.

The attack here described to have been made by order of Xerxes upon the Delphian temple, seems not easy to

reconcile with the words of Mardonius, Herodot. ix. 42; still less can it be reconciled with the statement of Plutarch (Numa, c. 9), who says that the Delphian temple was burnt by the Medes.

² Herodot. viii. 52.

³ Pausanias, i. 22, 4: Kruse, *Hellas*, vol. ii. ch. vi. p. 76. Ernst Curtius (*Die Akropolis von Athen*, p. 5, Berlin, 1844) says that the plateau of the acropolis is rather less than 400 feet higher than the town: Fiedler states it to be 178 fathoms or 1068 feet above the level of the sea (*Reise durch das Königreich Griechenland*, i. p. 2); he gives the length and breadth of the plateau in the same figures as Kruse, whose statement I have copied in the text. In Colonel Leake's *Topography of Athens*, I do not find any distinct statement about the height of the acropolis. We must understand Kruse's statement (if he and Curtius are both correct) to refer only to the precipitous impracticable portion of the whole rock.

fortification called the Pelasgic wall. Obligated to take the place by force, the Persian army were posted around the northern and western sides, and commenced their operations from the eminence immediately adjoining on the north-west, called Areopagus :¹ from whence they bombarded (if we may venture upon the expression) with hot missiles the wood-work before the gates ; that is, they poured upon it multitudes of arrows with burning tow attached to them. The wooden palisades and boarding presently took fire and were consumed : but when the Persians tried to mount to the assault by the western road leading up to the gate, the undaunted little garrison still kept them at bay, having provided vast stones, which they rolled down upon them in the ascent. For a time the Great King seemed likely to be driven to the slow process of blockade ; but at length some adventurous men among the besiegers tried to scale the precipitous rock before them on its northern side, hard by the temple or chapel of Aglaurus, which lay nearly in front of the Persian position, but behind the gates and the western ascent. Here the rock was naturally so inaccessible, that it was altogether unguarded, and seemingly even unfortified :² moreover the attention of the little garrison was all concentrated on the host which fronted the gates. Hence the separate escalading party were enabled to accomplish their object unobserved, and to reach the summit in the rear of the garrison ; who, deprived of their last hope, either cast themselves headlong from the walls, or fled for safety to the inner temple. The successful escaladers opened

¹ Athenian legend represented the Amazons as having taken post on the Areopagus and fortified it as a means of attacking the acropolis—*ἀντεπύργωσαν* (Æschyl. Eumenid. 638).

² Herodot. viii. 52, 53 . . . *ἔμπροσθε ἂν πρὸ τῆς ἀκροπόλεως, ὅπισθε δὲ τῶν πύλων καὶ τῆς ἀνάδου, τῇ δὲ οὕτε τις ἐφύλασσε, οὐτ' ἂν ἤλπισε μὴ κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ ἀναβαλεῖν ἀνθρώπων, ταύτῃ ἀνέβησαν τινες κατὰ τὸ ἴσον τῆς Κίρκου τοῦ γατρὸς, Ἀγλαύρου, καίτοι περ ἀποκρήμνου ὄντος τοῦ χώρου.*

That the Aglaurion was on the north side of the acropolis, appears clearly made out ; see Lenke, Topography of Athens, ch. v. p. 261 ; Kruse, Hellas, vol. ii. ch. vi. p. 119 ; Forchhammer, Topographie Athens, p. 365, 366 ; in

Kieler Philologische Studien, 1841. Siebelis (in the plan of Athens prefixed to his edition of Pausanias, and in his note on Pausanias, i. 18, 2) places the Aglaurion erroneously on the eastern side of the acropolis.

The expressions *ἔμπροσθε πρὸ τῆς ἀκροπόλεως* appear to refer to the position of the Persian army, who would naturally occupy the northern and western fronts of the acropolis ; since they reached Athens from the north—and the western side furnished the only regular access. The hill called Areopagus would thus be nearly in the centre of their position. Forchhammer explains these expressions unsatisfactorily.

the gates to the entire Persian host, and the whole acropolis was presently in their hands. Its defenders were slain, its temples pillaged, and all its dwellings and buildings, sacred as well as profane, consigned to the flames.¹ The citadel of Athens fell into the hands of Xerxes by a surprise, very much • the same as that which had placed Sardis in those of Cyrus.²

Thus was divine prophecy fulfilled: Attica passed entirely into the hands of the Persians, and the conflagration of Sardis was retaliated upon the home and citadel of its captors, as it also was upon their sacred temple of Eleusis. Xerxes immediately despatched to Susa intelligence of the fact, which is said to have excited unmeasured demonstrations of joy, confuting seemingly the gloomy predictions of his uncle Artabanus.³ On the next day but one, the Athenian exiles in his suite received his orders, or perhaps obtained his permission, to go and offer sacrifice amidst the ruins of the acropolis, and atone, if possible, for the desecration of the ground. They discovered that the sacred olive-tree near the chapel of Erechtheus, the especial gift of the goddess Athênê, though burnt to the ground by the recent flames, had already thrown out a fresh shoot of one cubit long; at least the piety of restored Athens afterwards believed this encouraging portent,⁴ as well as that which was said to have been seen by Dikæus (an Athenian companion of the Peisistratids) in the Thriasian plain. It was now the day set apart for the celebration of the Eleusinian mysteries; and though in this sorrowful year there was no celebration nor any Athenians in the territory, Dikæus still fancied that he beheld the dust and heard the loud multitudinous chant which was wont to accompany in ordinary times the processional march from Athens to Eleusis. He would even have⁵ revealed the fact to Xerxes himself, had not Demaratus deterred him from doing so: but he construed it as an evidence that the goddesses themselves were passing over from Eleusis to help the Athenians at Salamis. Yet whatever may have been received in after times, on that day certainly no man could believe in the speedy resurrection of

Atoning
visit of the
Peisistratids
to the ruined
acropolis.

¹ Herodot. viii. 52, 53.

² Herodot. i. 84.

³ Herodot. v. 102; viii. 53-99; ix. 65.

Ἰβει γὰρ κατὰ τὸ θεοπρόκτιον πᾶσαν τὴν Ἀττικὴν τὴν ἐν τῇ ἡπείρῳ γενέσθαι ὑπὸ Πέρσας.

⁴ Herodot. viii. 55-65.

conquered Athens as a free city; not even if he had witnessed the portent of the burnt olive-tree suddenly sprouting afresh with preternatural vigour. So hopeless did the circumstances of the Athenians then appear, not less to their confederates assembled at Salamis than to the victorious Persians.

About the time of the capture of the acropolis, the Persian fleet also arrived safely in the bay of Phalærum, reinforced by ships from Karystus as well as from various islands of the Cyclades, so that Herodotus reckons it to have been as strong as before the terrible storm at Sêpias Aktê; an estimate certainly not admissible.¹

Soon after their arrival Xerxes himself descended to the shore to inspect the fleet, as well as to take counsel with the various naval leaders about the expediency of attacking the hostile fleet, now so near him in the narrow strait between Salamis and the coasts of Attica. He invited them all to take their seats in an assembly, wherein the king of Sidon occupied the first place, and the king of Tyre the second. The question was put to each of them separately by Mardonius, and when we learn that all pronounced in favour of immediate fighting, we may be satisfied that the decided opinion of Xerxes himself must have been well known to them beforehand. One exception alone was found to this unanimity—Artemisia, queen of Halikarnassus in Karia: into whose mouth Herodotus puts a speech of some length, deprecating all idea of fighting in the narrow strait of Salamis—predicting that if the land force were moved forward to attack Peloponnesus, the Peloponnesians in the fleet at Salamis would return for the protection of their own homes, and that thus the fleet would disperse, the rather as there was little or no food in the island—and intimating, besides, unmeasured contempt for the efficacy of the Persian fleet and seamen as

Xerxes reviews his fleet at Phalærum—debate about the policy of fighting a naval battle at Salamis—prudent counsel of Queen Artemisia.

¹ Herodot. viii. 66. Colonel Leake observes upon this statement (Athens and the Demi of Attica, App. vol. ii. p. 250), "*About 1000 ships* is the greatest accuracy we can pretend to, in stating the strength of the Persian fleet at Salamis: and from these are to be deducted, in estimating the number of ships engaged in the battle, those which

were sent to occupy the Megaric strait of Salamis, 200 in number."

The estimate of Colonel Leake appears somewhat lower than the probable reality. Nor do I believe the statement of Diodorus, that ships were detached to occupy the Megaric strait; see a note shortly following.

compared with the Greek, as well as for the subject contingents of Xerxes generally. That Queen Artemisia gave this prudent counsel there is no reason to question ; and the historian of Halikarnassus may have had means of hearing the grounds on which her opinion rested. But I find a difficulty in believing that she can have publicly delivered any such estimate of the maritime subjects of Persia ; an estimate not merely insulting to all who heard it, but at the time not just—though it had come to be nearer the truth at the time when Herodotus wrote,¹ and though Artemisia herself may have lived to entertain the conviction afterwards. Whatever may have been her reasons, the historian tells us that friends as well as rivals were astonished at her rashness in dissuading the monarch from a naval battle, and expected that she would be put to death. But Xerxes heard the advice with perfect good temper and even esteemed the Karian queen the more highly ; though he resolved that the opinion of the majority, or his own opinion, should be acted upon. Orders were accordingly issued for the fleet to attack the next day,² and for the land force to move forward towards Peloponnesus.

Resolution
taken by
Xerxes to
fight at
Salamis.

Whilst, on the shore of Phalærum, an omnipotent will compelled seeming unanimity, and precluded all real deliberation—great indeed was the contrast presented by the neighbouring Greek armament at Salamis ; among the members of which unmeasured dissension had been reigning. It has already been stated that the Greek fleet had originally got together at that island, not with any view of making it a naval station but simply in order to cover and assist the emigration of the Athenians. This object being accomplished, and Xerxes being already in Attica, Eurybiadès convoked the chiefs to consider what position was the fittest for a naval engagement. Most of them, especially those from Peloponnesus, were averse to remaining at Salamis, and proposed that the fleet should be transferred to the Isthmus of Corinth, where it would be in immediate communication with the Peloponnesian

Dissensions
among the
Greeks in
the fleet at
Salamis.
Resolution
taken to
remove the
fleet to the
Isthmus.

¹ The picture drawn in the *Cyropædia* of Xenophon represents the subjects of Persia as spiritless and untrained to war (*ἀνάλκιδες καὶ ἀσύρτακτοι*), and

even designedly kept so, forming a contrast to the native Persians (Xenophon, *Cyropæd.* viii. 1, 45).

² Herodot. viii. 68, 69, 70.

land-force, so that in case of defeat at sea, the ships would find protection on shore and the men would join in the land service—while if worsted in a naval action near Salamis, they would be enclosed in an island from whence there were no hopes of escape.¹ In the midst of the debate, a messenger arrived with news of the capture and conflagration of Athens and her acropolis by the Persians. Such was the terror produced by this intelligence, that some of the chiefs, without even awaiting the conclusion of the debate and the final vote, quitted the council forthwith, and began to hoist sail, or prepare their rowers for departure. The majority came to a formal vote for removing to the Isthmus; but as night was approaching, actual removal was deferred until the next morning.²

Now was felt the want of a position like that of Thermopylæ, which had served as a protection to all the Greeks at once, so as to check the growth of separate fears and interests. We can hardly wonder that the Peloponnesian chiefs—the
Ruinous consequences if that resolution had been executed.
Corinthians in particular, who furnished so large a naval contingent, and within whose territory the land-battle at the isthmus seemed about to take place—should manifest such an obstinate reluctance to fight at Salamis, and should insist on removing to a position where, in case of naval defeat, they could assist, and be assisted by, their own soldiers on land. On the other hand, Salamis was not only the most favourable position, in consequence of its narrow strait, for the inferior numbers of the Greeks, but could not be abandoned without breaking up the unity of the allied fleet; since Megara and Ægina would thus be left uncovered, and the contingents of each would immediately retire for the defence of their own homes,—while the Athenians also, a large portion of whose expatriated families were in Salamis and Ægina, would be in like manner distracted from combined maritime efforts at the Isthmus. If transferred to the latter place, probably not even the Peloponnesians themselves would have remained in one body; for the squadrons of Epidaurus, Trœzen, Hermionê, &c., each fearing that the Persian fleet might make a descent on one or other of these separate ports, would go home to

¹ Herodot. viii. 70.

² Herodot. viii. 49, 50, 56.

repel such a contingency, in spite of the efforts of Eurybiadês to keep them together. Hence the order for quitting Salamis and repairing to the Isthmus was nothing less than a sentence of extinction for all combined maritime defence; and it thus became doubly abhorrent to all those who, like the Athenians, Æginetans, and Megarians, were also led by their own separate safety to cling to the defence of Salamis. In spite of all such opposition, however, and in spite of the protest of Themistoklês, the obstinate determination of the Peloponnesian leaders carried the vote for retreat, and each of them went to his ship to prepare for it on the following morning.

When Themistoklês returned to his ship, with the gloom of this melancholy resolution full upon his mind, and with the necessity of providing for removal of the expatriated Athenian families in the island as well as for that of the squadron—he found an Athenian friend named Mnêsiphilus, who asked him what the synod of chiefs had determined. Concerning this Mnêsiphilus, who is mentioned generally as a sagacious practical politician, we unfortunately have no particulars: but it must have been no common man whom fame selected, truly or falsely, as the inspiring genius of Themistoklês. On learning what had been resolved, Mnêsiphilus burst out into remonstrance on the utter ruin which its execution would entail: there would presently be neither any united fleet to fight, nor any aggregate cause and country to fight for.¹ He vehemently urged Themistoklês again to open the question, and to press by every means in his power for a recall of the vote in favour of retreat, as well as for a positive resolution to stay and fight at Salamis. Themistoklês had already in vain tried to enforce the same view: but though he was disheartened by ill-success, the remonstrances of a respected friend struck him so forcibly as to induce him to renew his efforts. He went instantly to the ship of Eurybiadês, asked permission to speak with him, and being invited aboard, reopened with him alone the whole subject of the past discussion, enforcing his own views as emphatically as he could.

Themistoklês opposes the resolution, persuades Eurybiadês, and prevails upon him to reopen the debate.

¹ Herodot. viii. 57. Οὔτοι ἄρα ἦν ἀπαίρωσι τὰς νῆας ἀπὸ Σαλαμῖνος, περὶ οὐδεμῆς ἔτι πατρίδος ναυμαχῆσεως· κατὰ γὰρ πόλιν ἕκαστοι τρέφονται, &c. Compare vii. 139, and Thucyd. i. 73.

In this private communication, all the arguments bearing upon the case were more unsparingly laid open than it had been possible to do in an assembly of the chiefs, who would have been insulted if openly told that they were likely to desert the fleet when once removed from Salamis. Speaking thus freely and confidentially, and speaking to Eurybiadēs alone, Themistoklēs was enabled to bring him partially round, and even prevailed upon him to convene a fresh synod. So soon as this synod had assembled, even before Eurybiadēs had explained the object and formally opened the discussion, Themistoklēs addressed himself to each of the chiefs separately, pouring forth at large his fears and anxiety as to the abandonment of Salamis: insomuch that the Corinthian Adeimantus rebuked him by saying—"Themistoklēs, those who in the public festival-matches rise up before the proper signal, are scourged." "True (rejoined the Athenian), but those who lag behind the signal win no crowns."¹

¹ Herodot. viii. 58, 59. The account given by Herodotus, of these memorable debates which preceded the battle of Salamis, is in the main distinct, instructive and consistent. It is more probable than the narrative of Diodorus (xi. 15, 16), who states that Themistoklēs succeeded in fully convincing both Eurybiadēs and the Peloponnesian chiefs of the propriety of fighting at Salamis, but that, in spite of all their efforts, the armament would not obey them, and insisted on going to the Isthmus. And it deserves our esteem still more, if we contrast it with the loose and careless accounts of Plutarch and Cornelius Nepos. As Plutarch (Themist. c. 11) describes the scene, Eurybiadēs was the person who desired to restrain the forwardness and oratory of Themistoklēs, and with that view, first made to him the observation given in my text out of Herodotus, which Themistoklēs followed up by the same answer—next, lifted up his stick to strike Themistoklēs, upon which the latter addressed to him the well-known observation—"Strike, but hear me" (πάταγον μὲν, ἀκούσον δέ). Larcher expresses his surprise that Herodotus should have suppressed so impressive an anecdote as this latter: but we may see plainly from the tenor of his narrative that he cannot have heard it. In the narrative of Herodotus,

Themistoklēs gives no offence to *Eurybiadēs*, nor is the latter at all displeased with him: nay, Eurybiadēs is even brought over by the persuasion of Themistoklēs, and disposed to fall in with his views. The persons whom Herodotus represents as angry with Themistoklēs are, the Peloponnesian chiefs, especially Adeimantus the Corinthian. They are angry too (let it be added), not without plausible reason: a formal vote has just been taken by the majority, after full discussion; and here is the chief of the minority who persuades Eurybiadēs to reopen the whole debate; not an unreasonable cause for displeasure. Moreover it is *Adeimantus*, not *Eurybiadēs*, who addresses to Themistoklēs the remark that "persons who rise before the proper signal are scourged:" and he makes the remark because Themistoklēs goes on speaking to, and trying to persuade, the various chiefs, *before* the business of the assembly has been formally opened. Themistoklēs draws upon himself the censure by sinning against the forms of business, and talking before the proper time. But Plutarch puts the remark into the mouth of Eurybiadēs, without any previous circumstance to justify it, and without any fitness. His narrative represents Eurybiadēs as the person who was anxious both to transfer the

Eurybiadès then explained to the synod that doubts had arisen in his mind, and that he called them together to reconsider the previous resolve: upon which Themistoklès began the debate. He vehemently enforced the necessity of fighting in the narrow sea of Salamis and not in the open waters at the Isthmus—as well as of preserving Megara and Ægina; contending that a naval victory at Salamis would be not less effective for the defence of Peloponnesus than if it took place at the Isthmus; whereas, if the fleet were withdrawn to the latter point, they would only draw the Persians after them. Moreover, he did not omit to add that the Athenians had a prophecy assuring to them victory in this, their own island. But his speech made little impression on the Peloponnesian chiefs; who were even exasperated at being again summoned, to reopen a debate already concluded,—and concluded in a way which they deemed essential to their safety. In the bosom of the Corinthian Adeimantus, especially, this feeling of anger burst all bounds. He sharply denounced the presumption of Themistoklès, and bade him be silent as a man who had now no free Grecian city to represent—Athens being in the power of the enemy. Nay, he went so far as to contend that Eurybiadès had no right to count the vote of Themistoklès until the latter could produce some free city as accrediting him to the synod. Such an attack, alike ungenerous and insane, upon the leader of more than half of the whole fleet, demonstrates the ungovernable impatience of the Corinthians to carry away the fleet to their Isthmus. It provoked a bitter retort against them from Themistoklès, who reminded them that while he had around him 200 well-manned ships, he could procure for himself anywhere both city and territory as good or better than Corinth. But he now saw clearly that it was hopeless to think of

Synod of
Grecian
chiefs again
convened—
Themisto-
klès tries to
get the
former
resolution
rescinded—
the Pelopo-
nnesians ad-
here to it—
angry words.

ships to the Isthmus, and to prevent Themistoklès from offering any opposition to it; though such an attempt to check argumentative opposition from the commander of the Athenian squadron is no way credible.

Dr. Blomfield (ad Æschyl. Pers. 728) imagines that the story about Eurybiadès threatening Themistoklès with his stick

grew out of the story as related in Herodotus, though to Herodotus himself it was unknown. I cannot think that this is correct, since the story will not fit on to the narrative of that historian: it does not consist with his conception of the relations between Eurybiadès and Themistoklès.

enforcing his policy by argument, and that nothing would succeed except the direct language of intimidation. Turning to Eurybiadēs, and addressing him personally, he said—"If thou wilt stay here, and fight bravely here, all will turn out well; but if thou wilt not stay, thou wilt bring Hellas to ruin.¹ For with us, all our means of war are contained in our ships. Be thou yet persuaded by me. If not, we Athenians shall migrate with our families on board, just as we are, to Siris in Italy, which is ours from of old, and which the prophecies announce that we are one day to colonize. You chiefs then, when bereft of allies like us, will hereafter recollect what I am now saying."

Eurybiadēs had before been nearly convinced by the impressive pleading of Themistoklēs. But this last downright menace clenched his determination, and probably struck dumb even the Corinthian and Peloponnesian opponents: for it was but too plain, that without the Athenians the fleet was powerless. He did not however put the question again to vote, but took upon himself to rescind the previous resolution, and to issue orders for staying at Salamis to fight. In this order all acquiesced, willing or unwilling.² The succeeding dawn saw them preparing for fight instead of for retreat, and invoking the protection and companionship of the Æakid heroes of Salamis—Telamon and Ajax: they even sent a trireme to Ægina to implore Æakus himself and the remaining Æakids. It seems to have been on this same day, also, that the resolution of fighting at Salamis was taken by Xerxes, whose fleet was seen in motion towards the close of the day, preparing for attack the next morning.

But the Peloponnesians, though not venturing to disobey the orders of the Spartan admiral, still retained unabated their former fears and reluctance, which began again after a short interval to prevail over the formidable menace of Themistoklēs, and were further strengthened by the advices from the Isthmus. The messenger from that quarter depicted the trepidation and affright of their absent brethren while

Menace of Themistoklēs to retire with the Athenian squadron, unless a battle were to be fought at Salamis—Eurybiadēs takes upon him to adopt this measure.

¹ Herodot. viii. 61, 62. Ἰὸ εἰ μενείεις αὐτοῦ, καὶ μένων ἔσσαι ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός· εἰ δὲ μὴ, ἀνατρέψεις τὴν Ἑλλάδα.

² Herodot. viii. 64. Οὕτω μὲν οἱ περὶ

Σαλαμίνα, ἔπεισι ἀκροβολισάμενοι, ἐπεὶ τε Εὐρυβιάδῃ ἔδοξε, αὐτοῦ παρεσκευάζοντο ὡς ναυμαχεῖσσοιτες.

constructing their cross wall at that point, to resist the impending land invasion. Why were *they* not there also, to join hands and to help in the defence,—even if worsted at sea,—at least on land, instead of wasting their efforts in defence of Attica, already in the hands of the enemy? Such were the complaints which passed from man to man, with many a bitter exclamation against the insanity of Eurybiadês: at length the common feeling broke out in public and mutinous manifestation, and a fresh synod of the chiefs was demanded and convoked.¹ Here the same angry debate, and the same irreconcilable difference, was again renewed; the Peloponnesian chiefs clamouring for immediate departure, while the Athenians, Æginetans,² and Megarians, were equally urgent in favour of staying to fight. It was evident to Themistoklês that the majority of votes among the chiefs would be against him, in spite of the orders of Eurybiadês; and the disastrous crisis, destined to deprive Greece of all united maritime defence, appeared imminent—when he resorted to one last stratagem to meet the desperate emergency by rendering flight impossible. Contriving a pretext for stealing away from the synod, he despatched a trusty messenger across the strait with a secret communication to the Persian generals. Sikinnus his slave—seemingly an Asiatic Greek³ who understood Persian and had perhaps been sold during the late Ionic revolt, but whose superior qualities are marked by the fact that he had the care and teaching of the children of his master—was instructed to acquaint them privately in the name of Themistoklês, who was represented as wishing success at heart to the Persians, that the Greek fleet was not only in the utmost alarm, meditating imme-

The Peloponnesian chiefs, silenced for the moment, afterwards refuse obedience. Third synod convened—renewed disputes; the majority opposed to Themistoklês and determined on retreating to the Isthmus.

Desperate stratagem of Themistoklês—he sends a private message across to Xerxes, persuading him to surround the Greek fleet in the night, and thus render retirement impossible.

¹ Herodot. viii. 74. ἔως μὲν δὴ αὐτῶν ἀνὴρ ἀνδρὶ παρίστατο, θάυμα ποιεῖμενοι τὴν Εὐρυβιάδῃ βουλήν· τέλος δὲ, ἐξερβῆγη ἐς τὸ μέσον, σύλλογός τε δὴ ἐγένετο, καὶ πολλὰ ἐλέγετο περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν, &c. Compare Plutarch, Themist. c. 12.

² Lykurgus (cont. Leokrat. c. 17, p. 185) numbers the Æginetans among those who were anxious to escape from Salamis during the night, and

were only prevented from doing so by the stratagem of Themistoklês. This is a great mistake, as indeed these orators are perpetually misconceiving the facts of their past history. The Æginetans had an interest not less strong than the Athenians in keeping the fleet together and fighting at Salamis.

³ Plutarch (Themistoklês, c. 12) calls Sikinnus a *Persian by birth*, which cannot be true.

diate flight, but that the various portions of it were in such violent dissension that they were more likely to fight against each other than against any common enemy. A splendid opportunity (it was added) was thus opened to the Persians, if they chose to avail themselves of it without delay, first to enclose and prevent their flight, and then to attack a disunited body, many of whom would, when the combat began, openly espouse the Persian cause.¹

Such was the important communication despatched by Themistoklēs across the narrow strait (only a quarter of a mile in breadth at the narrowest part) which divides Salamis from the neighbouring continent on which the enemy were posted. It was delivered with so much address as to produce the exact impression which he intended, and the glorious success which followed caused it to pass for a splendid stratagem: had defeat ensued, his name would have been covered with infamy. What surprises us the most is, that after having reaped signal honour from it in the eyes of the Greeks as a stratagem, Themistoklēs lived to take credit for it, during the exile of his latter days,² as a capital service rendered to the Persian monarch. It is not improbable, when we reflect upon the desperate condition of Grecian affairs at the moment, that such facility of double interpretation was in part his inducement for sending the message.

It appears to have been delivered to Xerxes shortly after he had issued his orders for fighting on the next morning: and he entered so greedily into the scheme, as to direct his generals to close up the strait of Salamis on both sides during the night, to the north as well as to the south of the town of Salamis, at the risk of their heads if any opening were left for the Greeks to escape.³ The station of the numerous

Impatient
haste of
Xerxes to
prevent any
of the
Greeks from
escaping—
his fleet en-
closes the
Greeks dur-
ing the night.

¹ Herodot. viii. 75.

² Thucyd. i. 137. It is curious to contrast this with Æschylus, *Persæ*, 351 seq. See also Herodot. viii. 109, 110.

Isokratēs might well remark about the ultimate rewards given by the Persians to Themistoklēs—*Θεμιστοκλέα δ', ὅς ἐκ τῆς Ἑλλάδος αὐτοὺς καταναμάχησε, τῶν μεγίστων θυρίων ἤλιυσαν* (Panegyric, Or. iv. p. 74)—though that

orator speaks as if he knew nothing about the stratagem by which Themistoklēs compelled the Greeks to fight at Salamis against their will. See the same Oration, c. 27, p. 61.

³ Æschylus, *Persæ*, 370.

Herodotus does not mention this threat to the generals, nor does he even notice the personal interference of Xerxes in any way, so far as regards the night-movement of the Persian fleet. He

Persian fleet was along the coast of Attica—its head quarters were in the bay of Phalêrum, but doubtless parts of it would occupy those three natural harbours, as yet unimproved by art, which belonged to the deme of Peiræus—and would perhaps extend besides to other portions of the western coast southward of Phalêrum; while the Greek fleet was in the harbour of the town called Salamis, in the portion of the island facing Mount Ægaleos in Attica. During the night,¹ a portion of the Persian fleet, sailing from Peiræus northward along the western coast of Attica, closed round to the north of the town and harbour of Salamis, so as to shut up the northern issue from the strait on the side of Eleusis; while another portion blocked up the other issue between Peiræus and the south-eastern corner of the island, landing a detachment of troops on the desert island of Psyttaleia near to that corner.² These

treats the communication of Sikinnus as having been made to the Persian generals, and the night-movement as undertaken by them. The statement of the contemporary poet seems the more probable of the two: but he omits, as might be expected, all notice of the perilous dissensions in the Greek camp.

¹ Diodorus (xi. 17) states that the Egyptian squadron in the fleet of Xerxes was detached to block up the outlet between Salamis and the Megarid; that is, to sail round the south-western corner of the island to the north-western strait, where the north-western corner of the island is separated by a narrow strait from Megara, near the spot where the fort of Budorum was afterwards situated, during the Peloponnesian war.

Herodotus mentions nothing of this movement, and his account evidently implies that the Greek fleet was enclosed to the north of the town of Salamis, the Persian right wing having got between that town and Eleusis. The movement announced by Diodorus appears to me unnecessary and improbable. If the Egyptian squadron had been placed there, they would have been far indeed removed from the scene of the action, but we may see that Herodotus believed them to have taken actual part in the battle along with the rest (viii. 100).

² Herodot. viii. 76. *Τοῖσι δὲ ὡς πιστὰ ἔγινετο τὰ ἀγγελλόμενα, τοῦτο μὲν, ἐς τὴν*

νησίδα τὴν Ψυττάλειαν, μεταξύ Σαλαμῖνος τε κειμένην καὶ τῆς ἡείρου, πολλοὺς τῶν Περσέων ἀπεβίβασαν· τοῦτο δὲ, ἐπειδὴ ἐγίνοντο μέσαι νύκτες, ἀνήγον μὲν τὸ ἀπ' ἐσπέρης κέρας κυκλοῦμενοι πρὸς τὴν Σαλαμῖνα· ἀνήγον δὲ οἱ ἀμφὶ τὴν Κίον τε καὶ τὴν Κυνόσουραν τεταγμένοι, κατεχόν τε μέχρι Μουνυχίης πάντα τὸν πορθμὸν τῆσι νῆσσι.

He had previously stated Phalêrum as the main station of the Persian fleet; not necessarily meaning that the whole of it was there. The passage which I have just transcribed intimates what the Persians did to accomplish their purpose of surrounding the Greeks in the harbour of Salamis; and the first part of it, wherein he speaks of the western (more properly north-western) wing, presents no extraordinary difficulty, though we do not know how far the western wing extended before the movement was commenced. Probably it extended to the harbour of Peiræus, and began from thence its night-movement along the Attic coast to get beyond the town of Salamis. But the second part of the passage is not easy to comprehend, where he states that "those who were stationed about Keos and Kynosura also moved, and beset with their ships the whole strait as far as Munychia." What places are Keos and Kynosura, and where were they situated? The only known places of those names, are, the island of Keos, not far south of Cape Sunium in Attica—and

measures were all taken during the night, to prevent the anticipated flight of the Greeks, and then to attack them in the narrow strait close on their own harbour, the next morning.

Meanwhile that angry controversy among the Grecian chiefs, in the midst of which Themistoklēs had sent over his secret envoy, continued without abatement and without decision. It was the interest of the Athenian general to prolong the debate, and to prevent any concluding vote, until the effect of his stratagem should have rendered retreat impossible. Such prolongation was nowise difficult in a case so critical, where the majority of chiefs was on one side, and that of naval force on the other—especially as Eurýbiadēs himself was favourable to the view of Themistoklēs. Accordingly the debate was still unfinished at nightfall, and either continued all night, or was adjourned to an hour before daybreak on the following morning—when an incident, interesting as well as important, gave to it a new turn. The ostracised Aristeidēs arrived at Salamis from Ægina. Since the revocation of his sentence—a revocation proposed by Themistoklēs himself—he had had no opportunity of revisiting Athens, and he now for the first time rejoined his countrymen

Aristeidēs comes in the night to the Greek fleet from Ægina—informs the chiefs that they are enclosed by the Persians, and that escape has become impossible.

the promontory Kynosura, on the north-eastern coast of Attica, immediately north of the bay of Marathon. It seems hardly possible to suppose that Herodotus meant this latter promontory, too distant to render the movement which he describes at all practicable: even the island of Keos is somewhat open to the same objection, though not in so great a degree, of being too distant. Hence Barthélemy, Kruse, Bähr, and Dr. Thirlwall, apply the names Keos and Kynosura to two promontories (the southernmost and the south-easternmost) of the island of Salamis; and Kiepert has realised their idea in his newly published maps. But in the first place, no authority is produced for giving these names to two promontories in the island, and the critics only do it because they say it is necessary to secure a reasonable meaning to this passage of Herodotus. In the next place, if we admit their supposition, we must suppose that *before this night-movement*

commenced, the Persian fleet was already stationed in part off *the island of Salamis*; which appears to me highly improbable. Whatever station that fleet occupied before the night-movement, we may be very sure that it was not upon an island then possessed by the enemy: it was somewhere on the coast of Attica: and the names Keos and Kynosura must belong to some unknown points in Attica, not in Salamis. I cannot therefore adopt the supposition of these critics, though on the other hand Larcher is not satisfactory in his attempt to remove the objections which apply to the supposition of Keos and Kynosura as commonly understood. It is difficult in this case to reconcile the statement of Herodotus with geographical considerations, and I rather suspect that on this occasion the historian has been himself misled by too great a desire to find the oracle of Bakis truly fulfilled. It is from Bakis that he copies the name Kynosura (viii. 77).

in their exile at Salamis; not uninformed of the dissensions raging, and of the impatience of the Peloponnesians to retire to the Isthmus. He was the first to bring the news that such retirement had become impracticable from the position of the Persian fleet, which his own vessel in coming from Ægina had only eluded under favour of night. He caused Themistoklēs to be invited out from the assembled synod of chiefs; and after a generous exordium wherein he expressed his hope that their rivalry would for the future be only a competition in doing good to their common country, apprised him that the new movement of the Persians excluded all hope of now reaching the Isthmus, and rendered farther debate useless. Themistoklēs expressed his joy at the intelligence; communicating his own secret message whereby he had himself brought the movement about, in order that the Peloponnesian chiefs might be forced to fight at Salamis even against their own consent. He moreover desired Aristeidēs to go himself into the synod, and communicate the news; for if it came from the lips of Themistoklēs, the Peloponnesians would treat it as a fabrication. So obstinate indeed was their incredulity that they would not accept it as truth even on the assertion of Aristeidēs: nor was it until the arrival of a Tenian vessel, deserting from the Persian fleet, that they at last brought themselves to credit the actual posture of affairs and the entire impossibility of retreat. Once satisfied of this fact, they prepared themselves at dawn for the impending battle.¹

Having caused his land-force to be drawn up along the shore opposite to Salamis, Xerxes had erected for himself a lofty seat or throne, upon one of the projecting declivities of Mount Ægaleos—near the Herakleion and immediately overhanging the sea.²

Position of
Xerxes—
order of the
fleets, and
plan of
attack.

¹ Herodot. viii. 79, 80.

Herodotus states, doubtless correctly, that Aristeidēs, immediately after he had made the communication to the synod, went away, not pretending to take part in the debate: Plutarch represents him as present and as taking part in it (Aristeidēs, c. 9). According to Plutarch, Themistoklēs desires Aristeidēs to assist him in persuading Eurybiadēs: according to Herodotus, Eurybiadēs was already persuaded: it was the Peloponnesian chiefs who stood out.

The details of Herodotus will be found throughout both more credible and more consistent than those of Plutarch and the later writers.

² Æschylus, Pers. 473: Herodot. viii. 90. The throne with silver feet, upon which Xerxes had sat, was long preserved in the acropolis of Athens—having been left at his retreat. Harpokration, 'Ἀργυρόπους θρόνος'.

A writer, to whom Plutarch refers,—Akestodōrus—affirmed that the seat of Xerxes was erected, not under Mount

from whence he could plainly review all the phases of the combat and the conduct of his subject troops. He was persuaded that they had not done their best at Artemisium, in consequence of his absence, and that his presence would inspire them with fresh valour: moreover his royal scribes stood ready by his side to record the names both of the brave and of the backward combatants. On the right wing of his fleet, which approached Salamis on the side of Eleusis, and was opposed to the Athenians on the Grecian left,—were placed the Phœnicians and Egyptians; on his left wing the Ionians¹—approaching from the side of Peiræus, and opposed to the Lacedæmonians, Æginetans, and Megarians. The seamen of the Persian fleet, however, had been on ship-board all night, in making that movement which had brought them into their actual position; while the Greek seamen now began without previous fatigue, fresh from the animated harangues of Themistoklēs and the other leaders. Just as they were getting on board, they were joined by the trireme which had been sent to Ægina to bring to their aid Æakus with the other Æakid heroes. Honoured with this precious heroic aid, which tended so much to raise the spirits of the Greeks, the Æginetan trireme now arrived just in time to take her post in the line, having eluded pursuit from the intervening enemy.²

The Greeks rowed forward from the shore to attack, with

Ægaleos, but much farther to the north-west, on the borders of Attica and the Megarid, under the mountains called Kerata (Plutarch, Themistoklēs, 13). If this writer was acquainted with the topography of Attica, we must suppose him to have ascribed an astonishingly long sight to Xerxes: but we may probably take the assertion as a sample of that carelessness in geography which marks so many ancient writers. Ktesias recognises the Ἡρακλεῖον (Persica, c. 26).

¹ Herodot. viii. 85; Diodor. xi. 16.

² Herodot. viii. 83; Plutarch (Themistoklēs, c. 13; Aristeidēs, c. 9; Pelopidas, c. 21). Plutarch tells a story out of Phantias, respecting an incident in the moment before the action, which it is pleasing to find sufficient ground for rejecting. Themistoklēs, with the prophet Euphrantidēs, was offering sacrifice by the side of the admiral's galley,

when three beautiful youths, nephews of Xerxes, were brought in prisoners. As the fire was just then blazing brilliantly, and sneezing was heard from the right, the prophet enjoined Themistoklēs to offer these three prisoners as a propitiatory offering to Dionysus Ὀμηστής; which the clamour of the bystanders compelled him to do against his will. This is what Plutarch states in his life of Themistoklēs; in his life of Aristeidēs, he affirms that these youths were brought prisoners from Psytaleia, when Aristeidēs attacked it *at the beginning of the action*. Now Aristeidēs did not attack Psytaleia until the naval combat was nearly over, so that no prisoners can have been brought from thence at the commencement of the action: there could therefore have been no Persian prisoners to sacrifice, and the story may be dismissed as a fiction.

the usual *pæan* or war-shout, which was confidently returned by the Persians. Indeed the latter were the most forward of the two to begin the fight. The Greek seamen, on gradually nearing the enemy, became at first disposed to hesitate—and even backed water for a space, so that some of them touched ground on their own shore; until the retrograde movement was arrested by a supernatural feminine figure hovering over them, who exclaimed with a voice that rang through the whole fleet—"Ye worthies, how much farther are ye going to back water?" The very circulation of this fable attests the dubious courage of the Greeks at the commencement of the battle.¹ The brave Athenian captains Ameinias and Lykomêdês (the former, brother of the poet *Æschylus*) were the first to obey either the feminine voice or the inspirations of their own ardour; though, according to the version current at *Ægina*, it was the *Æginetan* ship, the carrier of the *Æakid* heroes, which first set this honourable example.² The *Naxian Demokritus* was celebrated by *Simonides* as the third ship in action. Ameinias, darting forth from the line, charged with the beak of his ship full against a Phœnician, and the two became entangled so that he could not again get clear: other ships came in aid on both sides, and the action thus became general.

Herodotus, with his usual candour, tells us that he could procure few details about the action, except as to what concerned *Artemisia*, the queen of his own city: so that we know hardly anything beyond the general facts. But it appears that, with the exception of the *Ionic* Greeks, many of whom (apparently a greater number than Herodotus likes to acknowledge) were lukewarm, and some even averse³—the subjects

¹ Herodot. viii. 84. *φανείσαν δὲ διακελεύσασθαι, ὥστε καὶ ἅπαν ἀκούσαι τὸ τῶν Ἑλλήνων στρατόπεδον, ὀνειδίσασαν πρότερον τὰδε: "ὦ δαίμονιοι, μέχρι πόσου ἔτι πρόμην ἀνακρούεσθε;*

Æschylus (Pers. 396-415) describes finely the war-shout of the Greeks and the response of the Persians: for very good reasons, he does not notice the incipient backwardness of the Greeks, which Herodotus brings before us.

The war-shout here described by *Æschylus*, a warrior actually engaged, shows us the difference between a naval combat of that day and the improper

tactics of the Athenians fifty years afterwards, at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war. Phormion especially enjoins on his men the necessity of silence (*Thucyd.* ii. 89).

² *Simonides*, Epigram 138, Bergk; *Plutarch*, *De Herodot.* Malignitate, c. 33.

According to *Plutarch* (*Themist.* 12) and *Diodorus* (xi. 17), it was the Persian admiral's ship which was first charged and captured: if the fact had been so, *Æschylus* would probably have specified it.

³ Herodot. viii. 85; *Diodor.* xi. 16.

of Xerxes conducted themselves generally with great bravery : Phœnicians, Cyprians, Kilikians, Egyptians, vied with the Persians and Medes serving as soldiers on shipboard, in trying to satisfy the exigent monarch who sat on shore watching their behaviour. Their signal defeat was not owing to any want of courage—but, first, to the narrow space which rendered their superior number a hindrance rather than a benefit : next, to their want of orderly line and discipline as compared with the Greeks : thirdly, to the fact that when once fortune seemed to turn against them, they had no fidelity or reciprocal attachment, and each ally was willing to sacrifice or even to run down others, in order to effect his own escape. Their numbers and absence of concert threw them into confusion and caused them to run foul of each other. Those in the front could not recede, nor could those in the rear advance :¹ the oar-blades were broken by collision—the steersmen lost control of their ships, and could no longer adjust the ship's course so as to strike that direct blow with the beak which was essential in ancient warfare. After some time of combat, the whole Persian fleet was driven back and became thoroughly unmanageable, so that the issue was no longer doubtful, and nothing remained except the efforts of individual bravery to protract the struggle. While the Athenian squadron on the left, which had the greatest resistance to surmount, broke up and drove before them the Persian right, the Æginetans on the right intercepted the flight of the fugitives to Phalærum :² Demokritus the Naxian captain was said to have captured five ships of the Persians with his own single trireme. The chief admiral Ariabignês, brother of Xerxes, attacked at once by two Athenian triremes, fell gallantly trying to board one of them, and the number of distinguished Persians and Medes who shared his fate was very great ;³ the more so, as

Æschylus in the *Persæ*, though he gives a long list of the names of those who fought against Athens, does not make any allusion to the Ionic or to any other Greeks as having formed part of the catalogue. See *Blomfield ad Æschyl. Pers. 42*. Such silence easily admits of explanation.

¹ *Herodot. viii. 86 ; Diodor xi. 17*. The testimony of the former, both to the courage manifested by the Persian fleet,

and to their entire want of order and system, is decisive, as well as to the effect of the personal overlooking of Xerxes.

² *Simonides, Epigr. 138, Bergk.*

³ The many names of Persian chiefs whom *Æschylus* reports as having been slain, are probably for the most part inventions of his own, to please the ears of his audience. See *Blomfield, Præfat. ad Æschyl. Pers. p. xii.*

few of them knew how to swim, while among the Greek seamen who were cast into the sea, the greater number were swimmers, and had the friendly shore of Salamis near at hand.

It appears that the Phœnician seamen of the fleet threw the blame of defeat upon the Ionic Greeks; and some of them, driven ashore during the heat of the battle under the immediate throne of Xerxes, excused themselves by denouncing the others as traitors. The heads of the Ionic leaders might have been endangered if the monarch had not seen with his own eyes an act of surprising gallantry by one of their number. An Ionic trireme from Samothrace charged and disabled an Attic trireme, but was herself almost immediately run down by an Æginetan. The Samothracian crew, as their vessel lay disabled on the water, made such excellent use of their missile weapons, that they cleared the decks of the Æginetan, sprung on board, and became masters of her. This exploit, passing under the eyes of Xerxes himself, induced him to treat the Phœnicians as dastardly calumniators, and to direct their heads to be cut off. His wrath and vexation (Herodotus tells us) were boundless, and he scarcely knew on whom to vent the feelings.¹

In this disastrous battle itself, as in the debate before the battle, the conduct of Artemisia of Halikarnassus was such as to give him full satisfaction. It appears that this queen maintained her full part in the battle until the disorder had become irretrievable. She then sought to escape, pursued by the Athenian trierarch Ameinias, but found her progress obstructed by the number of fugitive or embarrassed comrades before her. In this dilemma she preserved herself from pursuit by attacking one of her own comrades; she charged the trireme of the Karian prince Damasithymus of Kalyndus, ran it down and sunk it, so that the prince with all his crew perished. Had Ameinias been aware that the vessel which he was following was that of Artemisia, nothing would have induced him to relax in the pursuit—for the Athenian captains were all indignant at the idea of a female invader assailing their city.² But knowing

*Distinguished
gallantry
of Queen
Artemisia.*

¹ Herodot. viii. 90.

² Compare the indignant language of Demosthenes a century and a quarter afterwards, respecting the second Arte-

her ship only as one among the enemy, and seeing her thus charge and destroy another enemy's ship, he concluded her to be a deserter, turned his pursuit elsewhere, and suffered her to escape. At the same time, it so happened that the destruction of the ship of Damasithymus happened under the eyes of Xerxes and of the persons around him on shore, who recognised the ship of Artemisia, but supposed the ship destroyed to be a Greek. Accordingly they remarked to him, "Master, seest thou not how well Artemisia fights, and how she has just sunk an enemy's ship?" Assured that it was really her deed, Xerxes is said to have replied, "My men have become women; my women, men." Thus was Artemisia not only preserved, but exalted to a higher place in the esteem of Xerxes by the destruction of one of his own ships; among the crew of which not a man survived to tell the true story.¹

Of the total loss of either fleet, Herodotus gives us no estimate; but Diodorus states the number of ships destroyed on the Grecian side as forty, on the Persian side as two hundred; independent of those which were made prisoners with all their crews. To the Persian loss is to be added, the destruction of all those troops whom they had landed before the battle in the island of Psyttaleia. As soon as the Persian fleet was put to flight, Aristeidēs carried over some Grecian hoplites to that island, overpowered the enemy, and put them to death to a man. This loss appears to have been much

misia queen of Karia, as the enemy of Athens—*ὅπερ δ' ὅρτες Ἀθηναῖοι βάρβαρον ἑσθάρων, καὶ ταῦτα γυναικᾶ, φοβηθήσεσθε* (Demosthenēs, de Rhodior. Libertat. c. x. p. 197).

¹ Herodot. viii. 87, 88, 93. The story here given by Herodotus respecting the stratagem whereby Artemisia escaped, seems sufficiently probable; and he may have heard it from fellow-citizens of his own who were aboard her vessel. Though Plutarch accuses him of extravagant disposition to compliment this queen, it is evident that he does not himself like the story, nor consider it to be complimentary; for he himself insinuates a doubt, "I do not know whether she ran down the Kalyndian ship intentionally, or came accidentally into collision with it." Since the shock was so destructive that the Kalyndian

ship was completely run down and sunk, so that every man of her crew perished, we may be pretty sure that it was intentional; and the historian merely suggests a possible hypothesis to palliate an act of great treachery. Though the story of the sinking of the Kalyndian ship has the air of truth, however, we cannot say the same about the observation of Xerxes, and the notice which he is reported to have taken of the act: all this reads like nothing but romance.

We have to regret (as Plutarch observes, De Malig. Herodot. p. 873) that Herodotus tells us so much less about others than about Artemisia; but he doubtless *heard* more about her than about the rest, and perhaps his own relatives may have been among her contingent.

deplored, as they were choice troops ; in great proportion, the native Persian guards.¹

Great and capital as the victory was, there yet remained after it a sufficient portion of the Persian fleet to maintain even maritime war vigorously, not to mention the powerful land-force, as yet unshaken. And the Greeks themselves—immediately after they had collected in their island, as well as could be done, the fragments of shipping and the dead bodies—made ready for a second engagement.² But they were relieved from this necessity by the pusillanimity³ of the invading monarch, in whom the defeat had occasioned a sudden revulsion from contemptuous confidence, not only to rage and disappointment, but to the extreme of alarm for his own personal safety. He was possessed with a feeling of mingled wrath and distrust against his naval force, which consisted entirely of subject nations—Phœnicians, Egyptians, Kilikians, Cyprians, Pamphilians, Ionic Greeks, &c., with a few Persians and Medes serving on board, in a capacity probably not well-suited to them. None of these subjects had any interest in the success of the invasion, or any other motive for service except fear ; while the sympathies of the Ionic Greeks were even decidedly against it. Xerxes now came to suspect the fidelity, or undervalue the courage, of all these naval subjects.⁴ He fancied that they could make no resistance to the Greek fleet, and dreaded lest the latter should sail forthwith to the Hellespont, so as to break down the bridge and intercept his personal retreat ; for upon the maintenance of that bridge he conceived his own safety to turn, not less than that of his father Darius, when retreating from Scythia, upon the preservation of the bridge over the Danube.⁵ Against the Phœnicians, from whom he had expected most, his rage broke out in such fierce threats, that they stole away from the fleet

Expectations of the Greeks that the conflict would be renewed—fears of Xerxes for his own personal safety—he sends his fleet away to Asia.

¹ Herodot. viii. 95 ; Plutarch, Aristid. c. 9 ; Æschyl. Pers. 454-470 ; Diodor. xi. 19.

² Herodot. viii. 96.

³ The victories of the Greeks over the Persians were materially aided by the personal timidity of Xerxes, and of Darius Codomannus at Issus and Arbela (Arrian, ii. 11, 6 ; iii. 14, 3).

⁴ See this feeling especially in the language of Mardonius to Xerxes (Herodot. viii. 100), as well as in that put into the mouth of Artemisia by the historian (viii. 68), which indicates the general conception of the historian himself, derived from the various information which reached him.

⁵ Herodot. vii. 10.

in the night, and departed homeward.¹ Such a capital desertion made future naval struggle still more hopeless, and Xerxes, though at first breathing revenge, and talking about a vast mole or bridge to be thrown across the strait to Salamis, speedily ended by giving orders to the whole fleet to leave Phalêrum in the night—not without disembarking, however, the best soldiers who served on board.² They were directed to make straight for the Hellespont, and there to guard the bridge against his arrival.³

This resolution was prompted by Mardonius, who saw the real terror which beset his master, and read therein sufficient evidence of danger to himself. When Xerxes despatched to Susa intelligence of his disastrous overthrow, the feeling at home was not simply that of violent grief for the calamity, and fear for the personal safety of the monarch: it was farther embittered by anger against Mardonius, as the instigator of this ruinous enterprise. That general knew full well that there was no safety for him⁴ in returning to Persia with the shame of failure on his head. It was better for him to take upon himself the chance of subduing Greece, which he had good hopes of being yet able to do—and to advise the return of Xerxes himself to a safe and easy residence in Asia. Such counsel was eminently palatable to the present

Xerxes resolves to go back himself to Asia—advice and recommendation of Mardonius, who is left behind as general to finish the conquest of Greece.

¹ This important fact is not stated by Herodotus, but it is distinctly given in Diodorus, xi. 19. It seems probable enough.

If the tragedy of Phrynichus, entitled *Phœnissæ*, had been preserved, we should have known more about the position and behaviour of the Phœnician contingent in this invasion. It was represented at Athens only three years after the battle of Salamis, in B.C. 477 or 476, with Themistoklēs as choregus, four years earlier than the Persæ of Æschylus, which was affirmed by Glaucus to have been (*παρωροισθῆαι*) altered from it. The Chorus in the *Phœnissæ* consisted of Phœnician women, possibly the widows of those Phœnicians whom Xerxes had caused to be beheaded after the battle (Herodot. viii. 90, as Dr. Blomfield supposes, *Præf. ad Æsch. Pers. p. ix.*), or only of Phœnicians absent on the expedition. The fragments remaining of this tragedy, which

gained the prize, are too scanty to sustain any conjectures as to its scheme or details (see Weleker, *Griechische Tragœd. vol. i. p. 26*; and Droysen, *Phrynichos, Æschylos, und die Trilogie*, p. 4-6).

² Herodot. ix. 32.

³ Herodot. viii. 97-107. Such was the terror of these retreating seamen, that they are said to have mistaken the projecting cliffs of Cape Zôstēr (about halfway between Peiræus and Sunium) for ships, and redoubled the haste of their flight as if an enemy were after them—a story which we can treat as nothing better than silly exaggeration in the Athenian informants of Herodotus.

Ktesias, *Pers. c. xxvi.*; Strabo, ix. p. 395; the two latter talk about the intention to carry a mole across from Attica to Salamis, as if it had been conceived before the battle.

⁴ Compare Herodot. vii. 10.

alarm of the monarch, while it opened to Mardonius himself a fresh chance not only of safety, but of increased power and glory. Accordingly he began to re-assure his master by representing that the recent blow was after all not serious—that it had only fallen upon the inferior part of his force, and upon worthless foreign slaves, like Phœnicians, Egyptians, &c., while the native Persian troops yet remained unconquered and unconquerable, fully adequate to execute the monarch's revenge upon Hellas—that Xerxes might now very well retire with the bulk of his army, if he were disposed, and that he (Mardonius) would pledge himself to complete the conquest, at the head of 300,000 chosen troops. This proposition afforded at the same time consolation for the monarch's wounded vanity, and safety for his person. His confidential Persians, and Artemisia herself on being consulted, approved of the step. The latter had acquired his confidence by the dissuasive advice which she had given before the recent deplorable engagement, and she had every motive now to encourage a proposition indicating solicitude for his person, as well as relieving herself from the obligation of farther service. "If Mardonius desires to remain (she remarked contemptuously¹) by all means let him have the troops: should he succeed, thou wilt be the gainer; should he even perish, the loss of some of thy slaves is trifling, so long as thou remainest safe, and thy house in power. Thou hast already accomplished the purpose of thy expedition, in burning Athens." Xerxes, while adopting this counsel and directing the return of his fleet, showed his satisfaction with the Halikarnassian queen by entrusting to her some of his children, with directions to transport them to Ephesus.

The Greeks at Salamis learnt with surprise and joy the departure of the hostile fleet from the bay of Phalærum, and immediately put themselves in pursuit; following as far as the island of Andros without success. Themistoklēs and the Athenians are even said to have been anxious to push on forthwith to the Hellespont, and there break down the bridge of boats, in order to prevent the escape of Xerxes—had they not been restrained by the caution of Eurybiadēs

The Greeks pursue the Persian fleet as far as Andros—second stratagem of Themistoklēs by secret message to Xerxes.

¹ Herodot. viii. 101, 102.

and the Peloponnesians, who represented that it was dangerous to detain the Persian monarch in the heart of Greece. Themistoklēs readily suffered himself to be persuaded, and contributed much to divert his countrymen from the idea; while he at the same time sent the faithful Sikinnus a second time to Xerxes, with the intimation that he (Themistoklēs) had restrained the impatience of the Greeks to proceed without delay and burn the Hellespontic bridge—and that he had thus, from personal friendship to the monarch, secured for him a safe retreat.¹ Though this is the story related by Herodotus, we can hardly believe that with the great Persian land-force in the heart of Attica, there could have been any serious idea of so distant an operation as that of attacking the bridge at the Hellespont. It seems more probable that Themistoklēs fabricated the intention, with a view of frightening Xerxes away, as well as of establishing a personal claim upon his gratitude in reserve for future contingencies.

Such crafty manœuvres, and long-sighted calculations of possibility, seem extraordinary: but the facts are sufficiently attested—since Themistoklēs lived to claim as well as to receive fulfilment of the obligation thus conferred. Though extraordinary, they will not appear inexplicable, if we reflect, first, that the Persian game, even now after the defeat of Salamis, was not only not desperate, but might perfectly well have succeeded, if it had been played with reasonable prudence: next, that there existed in the mind of this eminent man an almost unparalleled combination of splendid patriotism, long-sighted cunning, and selfish rapacity. Themistoklēs knew better than any one else that the cause of Greece had appeared utterly desperate, only a few hours before the late battle; moreover, a clever man tainted with such constant guilt might naturally calculate on being one day detected and punished, even if the Greeks proved successful.

He now employed the fleet among the islands of the

¹ Herodot. viii. 109, 110; Thucyd. i. 137. The words *ἐν φεῦδ' ἡ προσπειθή-σατο* may probably be understood in a sense somewhat larger than that which they naturally bear in Thucydides. In point of fact—not only was it false, that

Themistoklēs was the person who dissuaded the Greeks from going to the Hellespont—but it was also false, that the Greeks had ever any serious intention of going there. Compare Cornelius Nepos, Themistokl. c. 5.

Cycladês, for the purpose of levying fines upon them as a punishment for adherence to the Persians. He first laid siege to Andros, telling the inhabitants that he came to demand their money, bringing with him two great gods—Persuasion and Necessity. To which the Andrians replied, that "Athens was a great city and blest with excellent gods: but that *they* were miserably poor, and that there were two unkind gods who always stayed with them and would never quit the island—Poverty and Helplessness.¹ In these gods the Andrians put their trust, refusing to deliver the money required; for the power of Athens could never overcome their inability." While the fleet was engaged in contending against the Andrians with their sad protecting deities, Themistoklês sent round to various other cities, demanding from them private sums of money on condition of securing them from attack. From Karystus, Paros, and other places, he thus extorted bribes for himself apart from the other generals,² but it appears that Andros was found unproductive, and after no very long absence the fleet was brought back to Salamis.³

Themistoklês with the fleet—levying money in the Cycladês.

The intimation sent by Themistoklês perhaps had the effect of hastening the departure of Xerxes, who remained in Attica only a few days after the battle of Salamis, and then withdrew his army through Bœotia into Thessaly, where Mardonius made choice of the troops to be retained for his future operations. He retained the Persians, Medes, Sakæ, Baktrians, and Indians, horse as well as foot, together with select detachments of the remaining contingents; making in all, according to Herodotus, 300,000 men. But as it was now the beginning of September, and as 60,000 out of his forces, under Artabazus, were destined to escort Xerxes himself to the Hellespont, Mardonius proposed to winter in Thessaly, and to postpone farther military operations until the ensuing spring.⁴

Xerxes evacuates Attica and returns home by land with the larger portion of his army.

Having left most of these troops under the orders of

¹ Herodot. viii. 111. *ἔπει' Ἀνδρίους γε εἰσι γενομένης ἐς τὰ μέγιστα ἀνήκοντες, καὶ θεοὺς δύο ἀχρήστους οὐκ ἐκλείπειν σφέων τὴν νῆσον, ἀλλ' αἰεὶ φιλοχωρεῖν. . . . Περὶ γὰρ τε καὶ Ἀμνηστῆν.*

Compare Alkæus, *Fragn.* 90, ed. Bergk, and Herodot. vii. 172.

² Herodot. viii. 112; Plutarch, Themistoklês, c. 21—who cites a few bitter lines from the contemporary poet Timokreon.

³ Herodot. viii. 112-121.

⁴ Herodot. viii. 114-126.

Mardonius in Thessaly, Xerxes marched away with the rest to the Hellespont, by the same road as he had taken in his advance a few months before. Respecting his retreat a plentiful stock of stories were circulated¹—inconsistent with each other, fanciful, and even incredible. Grecian imagination, in the contemporary poet Æschylus, as well as in the

¹ The account given by Æschylus of this retreating march appears to me exaggerated, and in several points incredible (Persæ, 482-513). That they suffered greatly during the march from want of provisions, is doubtless true, and that many of them died of hunger. But we must consider in deduction—1. That this march took place in the months of October and November, therefore not very long after the harvest. 2. That Mardonius maintained a large army in Thessaly all the winter and brought them out in fighting condition in the spring. 3. That Artabazus also with another large division was in military operation in Thrace all the winter, after having escorted Xerxes into safety.

When we consider these facts, it will seem that the statements of Æschylus even as to the sufferings by famine must be taken with great allowance. But his statement about the passage of the Strymon appears to me incredible, and I regret to find myself on this point differing from Dr. Thirlwall, who considers it an undoubted fact (Hist. of Greece, ch. xv. p. 351, 2nd ed.). "The river had been frozen in the night hard enough to bear those who arrived first. But the ice suddenly gave way under the morning sun, and numbers perished in the waters"—so Dr. Thirlwall states, after Æschylus—adding in a note, "It is a little surprising that Herodotus, when he is describing the miseries of the retreat, does not notice this disaster, which is so prominent in the narrative of the Persian messenger in Æschylus. There can however be no doubt as to the fact: and perhaps it may furnish a useful warning, not to lay too much stress on the silence of Herodotus, as a ground for rejecting even important and interesting facts which are only mentioned by later writers," &c.

That a large river such as the Strymon near its mouth (180 yards broad, and in latitude about N. 40° 50'), at a period which could not have been later than the beginning of November, should

have been frozen over in one night so hardly and firmly as to admit of a portion of the army marching over it at daybreak—before the sun became warm—is a statement which surely requires a more responsible witness than Æschylus to avouch it. In fact, he himself describes it as a "frost out of season" (χειμῶν' ἄνωγ) brought about by a special interposition of the gods. If he is to be believed, none of the fugitives were saved, except such as were fortunate enough to cross the Strymon on the ice during the interval between break of day and the sun's heat. One would imagine that there was a pursuing enemy on their track, leaving them only a short time for escape; whereas in fact, they had no enemy to contend with—nothing but the difficulty of finding subsistence. During the advancing march of Xerxes, a bridge of boats had been thrown over the Strymon, nor can any reason be given why that bridge should not still have been subsisting; Artabazus must have recrossed it after he had accompanied the monarch to the Hellespont. I will add, that the town and fortress of Eion, which commanded the mouth of the Strymon, remained as an important stronghold of the Persians some years after this event, and was only captured, after a desperate resistance, by the Athenians and their confederates under Kimon.

The Athenian auditors of the Persæ, would not criticise nicely the historical credibility of that which Æschylus told them about the sufferings of their retreating foe, nor his geographical credibility when he placed Mount Pangæus on the hither side of the Strymon, to persons marching out of Greece (Persæ, 494). But I must confess, that, to my mind, his whole narrative of the retreat bears the stamp of the poet and the religious man, not of the historical witness. And my confidence in Herodotus is increased when I compare him on this matter with Æschylus—as well in what he says as in what he does not say.

Latin moralizers Seneca or Juvenal,¹ delighted in handling this invasion with the maximum of light and shadow; magnifying the destructive misery and humiliation of the retreat so as to form an impressive contrast with the super-human pride of the advance, and illustrating that antithesis with unbounded licence of detail. The sufferings from want of provision were doubtless severe, and are described as frightful and death-dealing. The magazines stored up for the advancing march had been exhausted, so that the retiring army were now forced to seize upon the corn of the country through which they passed—an insufficient maintenance, eked out by leaves, grass, the bark of trees, and other wretched substitutes for food. Plague and dysentery aggravated their misery, and occasioned many to be left behind among the cities through whose territory the retreat was carried; strict orders being left by Xerxes that these cities should maintain and tend them. After forty-five days' march from Attica, he at length found himself at the Hellespont, whither his fleet, retreating from Salamis, had arrived long before him.² But the short-lived bridge had already been knocked to pieces by a storm, so that the army was transported on shipboard across to Asia, where it first obtained comfort and abundance, and where the change from privation to excess engendered new maladies. In the time of Herodotus, the citizens of Abdéra still showed the gilt scimitar and tiara, which Xerxes had presented to them when he halted there in his retreat, in token of hospitality and satisfaction. They even went the length of affirming that never since his departure from Attica had he loosened his girdle until he reached their city. So fertile was Grecian fancy in magnifying the terror of the repulsed invader! who re-entered Sardis with a broken army and humbled spirit only eight months after he had left it as the presumed conqueror of the western world.³

Retreating
march of
Xerxes to
the Helles-
pont—suf-
ferings of
his troops.
He finds
the bridge
broken, and
crosses the
strait on
shipboard
into Asia.

¹ Juvenal, Satir. x. 178.

Ille tamen qualis rediit, Salaminæ relictâ.
In Caurum atque Eurum solitus sævire flagellis,
&c.

² Herodot. viii. 130.

³ See the account of the retreat of Xerxes in Herodotus, viii. 115-120, with many stories which he mentions only to

reject. The description given in the Persæ of Æschylus (v. 486, 515, 570) is conceived in the same spirit. The strain reaches its loudest pitch in Justin (ii. 13), who tells us that Xerxes was obliged to cross the strait in a fishing-boat. "Ipse cum paucis Abydon contendit. Ubi cum solutum pontem hibernis tem-

Meanwhile the Athenians and Peloponnesians, liberated from the immediate presence of the enemy either on land or sea, and passing from the extreme of terror to sudden ease and security, indulged in the full delight and self-congratulation of unexpected victory. On the day before the battle, Greece had seemed irretrievably lost: she was now saved even against all reasonable hope, and the terrific cloud impending over her was dispersed.¹ At the division of the booty, the Æginetans were adjudged to have distinguished themselves most in the action, and to be entitled to the choice lot; while various tributes of gratitude were also set apart for the gods. Among them were three Phœnician triremes, which were offered in dedication to Ajax at Salamis, to Athênê at Sunium, and to Poseidon at the Isthmus of Corinth. Farther presents were sent to Apollo at Delphi, who, on being asked whether he was satisfied, replied that all had done their duty to him except the Æginetans: from them he required additional munificence on account of the prize awarded to them, and they were constrained to dedicate in the temple four golden stars upon a staff of brass, which Herodotus himself saw there. Next to the Æginetans, the second place of honour was awarded to the Athenians; the Æginetan Polykritus, and the Athenians Eumenes and Ameinias, being ranked first among the individual combatants.² Respecting the behaviour of Adeimantus and the Corinthians in the battle, the Athenians of the time of Herodotus drew the most unfavourable picture, representing them to have fled at the commencement and to have been only brought back by the information that the Greeks were gaining the victory. Considering the character of the debates which had preceded, and the impatient eagerness manifested by the Corinthians to fight at the Isthmus instead of at Salamis, some such backwardness on their part, when forced into a battle at the latter place, would not be in itself improbable. Yet in this case it seems that not only the

pestatibus offendisset, piscatoriâ scaphâ trepidus trajecit. Erat res spectaculo digna, et, estimatione sortis humanæ, rerum varietate miranda—in exiguo latentem videre navigio, quem paulo ante vix æquor omne capiebat: carentem etiam omni servorum ministerio, cujus

exercitus propter multitudinem terris graves erant."

¹ Herodot. viii. 109. *ἡμεῖς δέ, εὖρημα γὰρ εὐρήκαμεν ἡμῶς αὐτοὺς καὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα, μὴ διώκωμεν ἄνδρας φεύγοντας.*

² Herodot. viii. 93-122; Diodor. xi. 27.

Joy of the
Greeks—
distribution
of honours
and prizes.

Corinthians themselves, but also the general voice of Greece, contradicted the Athenian story, and defended them as having behaved with bravery and forwardness. We must recollect that at the time when Herodotus probably collected his information, a bitter feeling of hatred prevailed between Athens and Corinth, and Aristeus son of Adeimantus was among the most efficient enemies of the former.¹

Besides the first and second prizes of valour, the chiefs at the Isthmus tried to adjudicate among themselves the first and second prizes of skill and wisdom. Each of them deposited two names on the altar of Poseidōn : and when these votes came to be looked at, it was found that each man had voted for himself as deserving the first prize, but that Themistoklēs had a large majority of votes for the second.² The result of such voting allowed no man to claim the first prize, nor could the chiefs give a second prize without it ; so that Themistoklēs was disappointed of his reward, though exalted so much the higher, perhaps through that very disappointment, in general renown. He went shortly afterwards to Sparta, where he received from the Lacedæmonians honours such as were never paid, before nor afterwards, to any foreigner. A crown of olive was indeed given to Eurybiadēs as the first prize, but a like crown was at the same time conferred on Themistoklēs as a special reward for unparalleled sagacity ; together with a chariot, the finest which the city afforded. Moreover, on his departure, the 300

Honours rendered to Themistoklēs.

¹ Herodot. viii. 94 ; Thucyd. i. 42, 103. τὸ σφοδρὸν μῖσος from Corinth towards Athens. About Aristeus, Thucyd. ii. 67.

Plutarch (De Herodot. Malignat. p. 870) employs many angry words in refuting this Athenian scandal, which the historian himself does not uphold as truth. The story advanced by Dio Chrysostom (Or. xxxvii. p. 456), that Herodotus asked for a reward from the Corinthians, and on being refused, inserted this story into his history for the purpose of being revenged upon them, deserves no attention without some reasonable evidence : the statement of Diyllus, that he received ten talents from the Athenians as a reward for his history, would be much less improbable, so far as the fact of pecuniary reward,

apart from the magnitude of the sum : but this also requires proof. Dio Chrysostom is not satisfied with rejecting this tale of the Athenians, but goes the length of affirming that the Corinthians carried off the palm of bravery and were the cause of the victory. The epigrams of Simonides, which he cites, prove nothing of the kind (p. 459). Marcellinus (Vit. Thucyd. p. xvi.) insinuates a charge against Herodotus, something like that of Plutarch and Dio.

² Herodot. viii. 123. Plutarch (Themist. c. 17 : compare De Herodot. Malign. p. 871) states that *each individual chief* gave his second vote to Themistoklēs. The more we test Herodotus by comparison with others, the more we shall find him free from the exaggerating spirit.

select youths called Hippeis, who formed the active guard and police of the country, all accompanied him in a body as escort of honour to the frontiers of Tegea.¹ Such demonstrations were so astonishing, from the haughty and immoveable Spartans, that they were ascribed by some authors to their fear lest Themistoklēs should be offended by being deprived of the general prize: and they are even said to have excited the jealousy of the Athenians so much, that he was displaced from his place of general, to which Xanthippus was nominated.² Neither of these last reports is likely to be true, nor is either of them confirmed by Herodotus. The fact that Xanthippus became general of the fleet during the ensuing year, is in the regular course of Athenian change of officers, and implies no peculiar jealousy of Themistoklēs.

¹ Herodot. viii. 124 ; Plutarch, Themist. c. 17.

² Diodor. xi. 27 : compare Herodot. viii. 125, and Thucyd. i. 74.

CHAPTER XLII.

BATTLES OF PLATÆA AND MYKALÆ.—FINAL REPULSE OF THE PERSIANS.

THOUGH the defeat at Salamis deprived the Persians of all hope from farther maritime attack of Greece, they still anticipated success by land from the ensuing campaign of Mardonius. Their fleet, after having conveyed the monarch himself with his accompanying land-force across the Hellespont, retired to winter at Kymē and Samos; in the latter of which places large rewards were bestowed upon Theomēstor and Phylakus, two Samian captains who had distinguished themselves in the late engagement. Theomēstor was even nominated despot of Samos under Persian protection.¹ Early in the spring they were reassembled—to the number of 400 sail, but without the Phœnicians—at the naval station of Samos, intending however only to maintain a watchful guard over Ionia, and hardly supposing that the Greek fleet would venture to attack them.²

The Persian fleet, after retiring from Greece, winters at Kymē, and collects in the spring at Samos.

For a long time, the conduct of that fleet was such as to justify such belief in its enemies. Assembled at Ægina in the spring, to the number of 110 ships, under the Spartan king Leotychidēs, it advanced as far as Delos, but not farther eastward: nor could all the persuasions of Chian and other Ionian envoys, despatched both to the Spartan authorities and to the fleet, and promising to revolt from Persia as soon as the Grecian fleet should appear, prevail upon Leotychidēs to hazard any aggressive enterprise. Ionia and the eastern waters of the Ægean had now been for fifteen years completely under the Persians, and so little visited by the Greeks, that a voyage thither appeared especially to the maritime inex-

n.c. 479. The Greek fleet assembles in the spring at Ægina.

¹ Herodot. viii. 85.

² Herodot. viii. 130; Diodor. xi. 27.

perience of a Spartan king, like going to the Pillars of Heraklēs:¹ not less venturesome than the same voyage appeared, fifty-two years afterwards, to the Lacedæmonian admiral Alkidas, when he first hazarded his fleet amidst the preserved waters of the Athenian empire.

Meanwhile the hurried and disastrous retreat of Xerxes had produced less disaffection among his subjects and allies than might have been anticipated. Alexander king of Macedon, the Thessalian Aleuada,² and the Bœotian leaders, still remained in hearty co-operation with Mardonius: nor were there any, except the Phokians, whose fidelity to him appeared questionable, among all the Greeks northwest of the boundaries of Attica and Megaris. It was only in the Chalkidic peninsula, that any actual revolt occurred. Potidæa, situated on the Isthmus of Pallênê, as well as the neighbouring towns in the long tongue of Pallênê, declared themselves independent: and the neighbouring town of Olynthus, occupied by the semi-Grecian tribe of Bottiæans, was on the point of following their example. The Persian general Artabazus, on his return from escorting Xerxes to the Hellespont, undertook the reduction of these towns, and succeeded perfectly with Olynthus. He took the town, slew all the inhabitants, and handed it over to a fresh population, consisting of Chalkidic Greeks under Kritobulus of Torônê. It was in this manner that Olynthus, afterwards a city of so much consequence and interest, first became Grecian and Chalkidic. But Artabazus was not equally successful in the siege of Potidæa, the defence of which was aided by citizens

General adherence of the medising Greeks to Mardonius—revolt of Potidæa—which is besieged in vain by Artabazus.

¹ Herodot. viii. 131, 132: compare Thucyd. iii. 29-32.

Herodotus says, that the Chian envoys had great difficulty in inducing Leotychidês to proceed even as far as Delos—τὸ γὰρ προσστέρω πᾶν δεῦν ἦν τοῖσι "Ελλήσι, οὐτε τῶν χάρων ἰούσι ἑμπεύροισι, στρατιῇ τε πάντα πλὴν ἰδέσθαι εἶναι τὴν δὲ Σάμον ἐπιστάτο δόξῃ καὶ Ἡρακλῆας στήλας ἴσον ἀπείχει.

This last expression of Herodotus has been erroneously interpreted by some of the commentators as if it were a measure of the geographical ignorance, either of Herodotus himself, or of those whom he is describing. In my

judgement, no inferences of this kind ought to be founded upon it: it marks fear of an enemy's country which they had not been accustomed to visit, and where they could not calculate the risk beforehand—rather than any serious comparison between one distance and another. Speaking of our forefathers, such of them as were little used to the sea, we might say—"A voyage to Bordeaux or Lisbon seemed to them as distant as a voyage to the Indies,"—by which we should merely affirm something as to their state of feeling, not as to their geographical knowledge.

² Herodot. ix. 1, 2, 67; viii. 136.

from the other towns in Pallênê. A plot which he concerted with Timoxenus, commander of the Skiônæan auxiliaries in the town, became accidentally disclosed : a considerable body of his troops perished while attempting to pass at low tide under the walls of the city, which were built across the entire breadth of the narrow isthmus joining the Pallênæan peninsula to the mainland : and after three months of blockade, he was forced to renounce the enterprise, withdrawing his troops to rejoin Mardonius in Thessaly.¹

Mardonius, before he put himself in motion for the spring campaign, thought it advisable to consult the Grecian oracles, especially those within the limits of Bœotia and Phokis. He sent a Karian named Mys, familiar with the Greek as well as the Karian language, to consult Trophônus at Lebadeia, Amphiaras and the Ismenian Apollo at Thebes, Apollo at Mount Ptôon near Akræphiæ, and Apollo at the Phokian Abæ. This step was probably intended as a sort of ostentatious respect towards the religious feelings of allies upon whom he was now very much dependent. But neither the questions put, nor the answers given, were made public. The only remarkable fact which Herodotus had heard, was, that the priest of the Ptôian Apollo delivered his answer in Karian, or at least in a language intelligible to no person present except the Karian Mys himself.² It appears however that at this period, when Mardonius was seeking to strengthen himself by oracles, and laying his plans for establishing a separate peace and alliance with Athens against the Peloponnesians, some persons in his interest circulated predictions, that the day was approaching when the Persians and the Athenians jointly would expel the Dorians from Peloponnesus.³ The way was thus paved for him to send an envoy

Mardonius, after wintering in Thessaly, resumes operations in the spring in Bœotia. He consults the Bœotian oracles.

¹ Herodot. viii. 128, 129.

² Herodot. viii. 134, 135 ; Pausanias, ix. 24, 3.

³ Herodot. viii. 141. Λακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ, . . . ἀναμνησθέντες τῶν λόγων, ὥς σφας χρεὶν ὅτι ἔμα τοῖσι ἑλλοισι Δωριεῦσι ἐκπίπτειν ἐκ Πελοποννήσου ὑπὸ Μήδων τε καὶ Ἀθηναίων, κάρτα τε εἰσεσθαι μὴ ὁμολογήσωσι τῷ Πέρσῃ Ἀθηναίοι, &c.

Such oracles must have been gene-

rated by the hopes of the *medizing* party in Greece at this particular moment : there is no other point of time to which they could be at all adapted—no other, in which expulsion of all the Dorians from Peloponnesus, by united Persians and Athenians, could be even dreamt of. The Lacedæmonians are indeed said here “to call to mind the prophecies,”—as if these latter were old, and not now produced for the first time.

to Athens—Alexander king of Macedon; who was instructed to make the most seductive offers—to promise reparation of all the damage done in Attica, as well as the active future friendship of the Great King—and to hold out to the Athenians a large acquisition of new territory as the price of their consent to form with him an equal and independent alliance.¹ The Macedonian prince added warm expressions of his own interest in the welfare of the Athenians, recommending them as a sincere friend to embrace propositions so advantageous as well as so honourable: especially as the Persian power must in the end prove too much for them, and Attica lay exposed to Mardonius and his Grecian allies, without being covered by any common defence as Peloponnesus was protected by its Isthmus.²

This offer, despatched in the spring, found the Athenians re-established wholly or partially in their half-ruined city. A simple tender of mercy and tolerable treatment, if despatched by Xerxes from Thermopylæ the year before, might perhaps have gone far to detach them from the cause of Hellas: and even at the present moment, though the pressure of overwhelming terror had disappeared, there were many inducements for them to accede to the proposition of Mardonius. The alliance of Athens would ensure to the Persian general unquestionable predominance in Greece, and to Athens herself protection from farther ravage as well as the advantage of playing a winning game: while his force, his position, and his alliances, even as they then stood, threatened a desolating and doubtful war, of which Attica would bear the chief brunt. Moreover the Athenians were at this time suffering privations of the severest character; for not only did their ruined houses and temples require to be restored, but they had lost the harvest of the past summer together with the seed of the past autumn.³ The prudential view of the case being thus favour-

But we must recollect that a fabricator of prophecies, such as Onomakritus, would in all probability at once circulate them as old; that is, as forming part of some old collection like that of Bakis or Musæus. And Herodotus doubtless himself believed them to be old, so that he would naturally give

credit to the Lacedæmonians for the same knowledge, and suppose them to be alarmed by "calling these prophecies to mind."

¹ Herodot. ix. 7.

² Herodot. viii. 142.

³ Herodot. viii. 142. Πιεζομένοις μὲντοι ὑμῖν συναχθόμεθα (say the Spar-

able to Mardonius rather than otherwise, and especially strengthened by the distress which reigned at Athens, the Lacedæmonians were so much afraid lest Alexander should carry his point, that they sent envoys to dissuade the Athenians from listening to him, as well as to tender succour during the existing poverty of the city. After having heard both parties, the Athenians delivered their reply in terms of solemn and dignified resolution, which their descendants delighted in repeating. To Alexander they said: "Cast not in our teeth that the power of the Persian is many times greater than ours: we too know *that*, as well as thou: but we nevertheless love freedom well enough to resist him in the best manner we can. Attempt not the vain task of talking us over into alliance with him. Tell Mardonius that as long as the sun shall continue in his present path, we will never contract alliance with Xerxes: we will encounter him in our own defence, putting our trust in the aid of those gods and heroes to whom he has shown no reverence, and whose houses and statues he has burnt. Come thou not to us again with similar propositions, nor persuade us even in the spirit of good-will, into unholy proceedings: thou art the guest and friend of Athens, and we would not that thou shouldst suffer injury at our hands."¹

Temptation to Athens to accept this offer—fear of the Lacedæmonians that she would accept it—Lacedæmonian envoys sent to Athens to prevent it.

To the Spartans, the reply of the Athenians was of a similar decisive tenor; protesting their unconquerable devotion to the common cause and liberties of Hellas, and promising that no conceivable temptations, either of money or territory, should induce them to desert the ties of brotherhood, common language, and religion. So long as a single Athenian survived, no alliance should ever be made with Xerxes.

Resolute reply of the Athenians, and determination to carry on the war, in spite of great present suffering.

tan envoys to the Athenians), καὶ ὅτι καρπῶν ἐστερήθητε διζῶν ἥδη, καὶ ὅτι οἰκοφθόρησθε χρόνον ἥδη πολλόν. Seeing that this is spoken before the invasion of Mardonius, the loss of *two crops* must include the seed of the preceding autumn: and the advice of Themistoklēs to his countrymen—καὶ τις οἰκίην τε ἀναπλασάσθω, καὶ σπόρου ἀνακῶς ἐχέτω (viii. 109)—must have been found impracticable in most cases to carry into

effect.

¹ Lykurgus the Athenian orator, in alluding to this incident a century and a half afterwards, represents the Athenians as having been "on the point of stoning Alexander"—μικροῦ δεῖν κατέλευσαν (Lykurg. cont. Leokrat. c. 17, p. 186)—one among many specimens of the careless manner in which these orators deal with past history.

They then thanked the Spartans for offering them aid during the present privations: but while declining such offers, they reminded them that Mardonius, when apprised that his propositions were refused, would probably advance immediately, and they therefore earnestly desired the presence of a Peloponnesian army in Bœotia to assist in the defence of Attica.¹ The Spartan envoys, promising fulfilment of this request,² and satisfied to have ascertained the sentiments of Athens, departed.

Such unshaken fidelity on the part of the Athenians to the general cause of Greece, in spite of present suffering combined with seductive offers for the future, was the just admiration of their descendants and the frequent theme of applause by their orators.³ But among the contemporary Greeks it was hailed only as a relief from danger, and repaid by a selfish and ungenerous neglect. The same feeling of indifference towards all Greeks outside of their own Isthmus, which had so deeply endangered the march of affairs before the battle of Salamis, now manifested itself a second time among the Spartans and Peloponnesians. The wall across the Isthmus, which they had been so busy in constructing and on which they had relied for protection against the land-force of Xerxes, had been intermitted and left unfinished when he retired: but it was resumed as soon as the forward march of Mardonius was anticipated. It was however still unfinished at the time of the embassy of the Macedonian prince to Athens, and this incomplete condition of their special defence was one reason of their alarm lest the Athenians should accept terms proposed. That danger being for the time averted, they

¹ Herodot. viii. 143, 144; Plutarch, Aristeidēs, c. 10. According to Plutarch, it was Aristeidēs who proposed and prepared the reply to be delivered. But here as elsewhere, the loose, exaggerating style of Plutarch contrasts unfavourably with the simplicity and directness of Herodotus.

² Herodot. ix. 7. *συνθέμενοι δὲ ἡμῖν τὴν Πέρσιν ἀντίσσεσθαι ἐς τὴν Βοιωτίαν*, &c.

Diodorus gives the account of this embassy to Athens substantially in the same manner, coupling it however with

some erroneous motives (xi. 28).

³ Herodot. ix. 7. *ἐπιστάμενοι τε ὅτι κερθαλιώτερόν ἐστι δημολογεῖν τῇ Πέρσιν μᾶλλον ἢ πολεμεῖν*, &c.

The orators are not always satisfied with giving to Athens the credit which she really deserved: they venture to represent the Athenians as having refused these brilliant offers from Xerxes on his first invasion, instead of from Mardonius in the ensuing summer. Xerxes never made any offers to them. See Isokratēs, Or. iv. Panegyric. c. 27, p. 61.

Selfish indifference displayed by Sparta and the Peloponnesians towards Athens.

redoubled their exertions at the Isthmus, so that the wall was speedily brought into an adequate state of defence and the battlements along the summit were in course of being constructed. Thus safe behind their own bulwark, they thought nothing more of their promise to join the Athenians in Bœotia and to assist in defending Attica against Mardonius. Indeed their king Kleombrotus, who commanded the force at the Isthmus, was so terrified by an obscuration of the sun at the moment when he was sacrificing to ascertain the inclinations of the gods in reference to the coming war, that he even thought it necessary to retreat with the main force to Sparta, where he soon after died.¹ Besides these two reasons—indifference and unfavourable omens—which restrained the Spartans from aiding Attica, there was also a third: they were engaged in celebrating the festival of the Hyakinthia, and it was their paramount object (says the historian)² to fulfil "the exigences of the god." As the Olympia and the Karneia in the preceding year, so now did the Hyakinthia, prevail over the necessities of defence, putting out of sight both the duties of fidelity towards an exposed ally, and the bond of an express promise.

Meanwhile Mardonius, informed of the unfavourable reception which his proposals had received at Athens, put his army in motion forthwith from Thessaly, joined by all his Grecian auxiliaries, and by fresh troops from Thrace and Macedonia. As he marched through Bœotia, the Thebans, who heartily espoused his cause, endeavoured to dissuade him from farther military operations against the united force of his enemies—urging him to try the efficacy of bribes, presented to the leading men in the different cities, for the purpose of disuniting them. But Mardonius, eager to repossess himself of Attica, heeded not their advice. About ten months after the retreat of Xerxes, he entered the country without re-

The Spartans having fortified the Isthmus, leave Attica undefended: Mardonius occupies Athens a second time.

¹ Herodot. ix. 10.

² Herodot. ix. 7. Οἱ γὰρ δὴ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ὄρταζόν τε τοῦτον τὸν χρόνον καὶ σφί ἦν 'Τακίνθια' περὶ πλείστου δ' ἦγον τὰ τοῦ θεοῦ πορσύνειν ἅμα δὲ τὸ τεῖχος σφί τὸ ἐν τῇ 'Ισθμῷ ἐτείχεον, καὶ εἴθ' ἐπάλξεις ἐλάμβανε.

Nearly a century after this, we are told that it was always the practice for the Amyklæan hoplites to go home for the celebration of the Hyakinthia, on whatever expedition they might happen to be employed (Xenoph. Hellen. iv. 5, 11).

sistance, and again established the Persian head-quarters in Athens (May or June—479 B.C.).¹

Before he arrived, the Athenians had again removed to Salamis, under feelings of bitter disappointment and indignation. They had in vain awaited the fulfilment of the Spartan promise that a Peloponnesian army should join them in Bœotia for the defence of their frontier; at length, being unable to make head against the enemy alone, they found themselves compelled to transport their families across to Salamis.² The migration was far less terrible than that of the preceding summer, since Mardonius had no fleet to harass them. But it was more gratuitous, and might have been obviated had the Spartans executed their covenant, which would have brought about the battle of Plataea two months earlier than it actually was fought.

Mardonius, though master of Athens, was so anxious to conciliate the Athenians, that he at first abstained from damaging either the city or the country, and despatched a second envoy to Salamis to repeat the offers made through Alexander of Macedon. He thought that they might now be listened to, since he could offer the exemption of Attica from ravage, as an additional temptation. Murychidês, a Hellespontine Greek, was sent to renew these propositions to the Athenian senate at Salamis; but he experienced a refusal, not less resolute than what had been returned to Alexander of Macedon, and all but unanimous. One unfortunate senator, Lykidas, made an exception to this unanimity, venturing to recommend acceptance of the propositions of Murychidês. So furious was the wrath, or so strong the suspicion of corruption, which his single-voiced negative provoked, that senators and people both combined to stone him to death; while the Athenian women in Salamis, hearing what had passed, went of their own accord to the house of Lykidas, and stoned to death his wife and children. In the desperate pitch of resolution to which the Athenians were now wound up, an opponent passed

¹ Diodor. xi. 28; Herodot. ix. 2, 3, 17. οἱ μὲν ἄλλοι πάντες παρείχον στρατὸν καὶ συνεσέβαλον ἐς Ἀθήνας ὅσοι περ

ἐμήδιζον Ἑλλήνων τῶν ταύτῃ οἰκημένων, &c.

² Herodot. ix. 4.

for a traitor; unanimity, even though extorted by terror, was essential to their feelings.¹ Murychidēs, though his propositions were refused, was dismissed without injury.

While the Athenians thus gave renewed proofs of their steadfast attachment to the cause of Hellas, they at the same time sent envoys, conjointly with Megara and Plataea, to remonstrate with the Spartans on their backwardness and breach of faith, and to invoke them even thus late to come forth at once and meet Mardonius in Attica; not omitting to intimate, that if they were thus deserted, it would become imperatively necessary for them, against their will, to make terms with the enemy. So careless, however, were the Spartan Ephors respecting Attica and the Megarid, that they postponed giving an answer to these envoys for ten successive days, while in the mean time they pressed with all their efforts the completion of the Isthmic fortifications. And after having thus amused the envoys as long as they could, they would have dismissed them at last with a negative answer—such was their fear of adventuring beyond the Isthmus—had not a Tegean named Chileos, whom they much esteemed and to whom they communicated the application, reminded them that no fortifications at the Isthmus would suffice for the defence of Peloponnesus, if the Athenians became allied with Mardonius, and thus laid the peninsula open by sea.

Remonstrance sent by the Athenians to Sparta—ungenerous slackness of the Spartans.

The strong opinion of this respected Tegean, proved to the Ephors that their selfish policy would not be seconded by

¹ Herodot. ix. 5. I dare not reject this story about Lykidas (see Lykurgus cont. Leokrat. c. 30, p. 222), though other authors recount the same incident as having happened to a person named Kysilus, during the preceding year, when the Athenians quitted Athens: see Demosthen. de Coronâ, p. 296, c. 59; and Cicero de Officiis, iii. 11. That two such acts were perpetrated by the Athenians is noway probable; and if we are to choose between the two, the story of Herodotus is far the more probable. In the migration of the preceding year, we know that a certain number of Athenians actually did stay behind in the acropolis, and Kysilus might have been among them, he had chosen. Moreover Xerxes

held out no offers, and gave occasion to no deliberation; while the offers of Mardonius might really appear to a well-minded citizen deserving of attention.

Isokratēs (Or. iv. Panegyric. s. 184, c. 42) states that the Athenians condemned many persons to death for *mediism* (in allusion doubtless to Themistoklēs as one), but he adds—"even now they imprecate curses on any citizen who enters into amicable negotiation with the Persians"—*ἐν δὲ τοῖς συλλόγοις ἐστὶ καὶ νῦν ἀρὰς ποιοῦνται, εἰ τις ἐπικηρυκεῖται Πέρσας τῶν πολιτῶν*. This must have been an ancient custom, continued after it had ceased to be pertinent or appropriate.

their chief Peloponnesian allies; and brought to their attention, probably for the first time, that danger by sea might again be renewed, though the Persian fleet had been beaten in the preceding year, and was now at a distance from Greece. It changed their resolution, not less completely than suddenly; so that they despatched forthwith in the night 5000 Spartan citizens to the Isthmus—each man with seven Helots attached to him. And when the Athenian envoys, ignorant of this sudden change of policy, came on the next day to give peremptory notice that Athens would no longer endure such treacherous betrayal, but would forthwith take measures for her own security and separate pacification—the Ephors affirmed on their oath that the troops were already on their march, and were probably by this time out of the Spartan territory.¹ Considering that this step was an expiation, imperfect, tardy, and reluctant, for foregoing desertion and breach of promise—the Ephors may probably have thought that the mystery of the night march, and the sudden communication of it as an actual fact to the envoys, in the way of reply, would impress more emphatically the minds of the latter; who returned with the welcome tidings to Salamis, and prepared their countrymen for speedy action. Five thousand Spartan citizens, each with seven light-armed Helots as attendants, were thus on their march to the theatre of war. Throughout the whole course of Grecian history, we never hear of any number of Spartan citizens at all approaching to 5000 being put on foreign service at the same time. But this was not all: 5000 Lacedæmonian

¹ Herodot. ix. 10, 11; Plutarch, Aristeidēs, c. 10. Plutarch had read a decree ascribed to Aristeidēs, in which Kimon, Xanthippus, and Myrōnidēs, were named envoys to Sparta. But it is impossible that Xanthippus could have taken part in the embassy, seeing that he was now in command of the fleet.

Probably the Helots must have followed: one hardly sees how so great a number could have been all suddenly collected, and marched off in one night, no preparations having been made beforehand.

Dr. Thirlwall (*Hist. Gr.* ch. xvi. p. 366) suspects the correctness of the

narrative of Herodotus, on grounds which do not appear to me convincing. It seems to me that, after all, the literal narrative is more probable than anything which we can substitute in its place. The Spartan foreign policy all depended on the five Ephors: there was no public discussion or criticism. Now the conduct of these Ephors is consistent and intelligible—though selfish, narrow-minded, and insensible to any dangers except what are present and obvious. Nor can I think (with Dr. Thirlwall) that the manner of communication ultimately adopted is of the nature of a jest.

Periœki, each with one light-armed Helot to attend him, were also despatched to the Isthmus, to take part in the same struggle. Such unparalleled efforts afford sufficient measure of the alarm which, though late yet real, now reigned at Sparta. Other Peloponnesian cities followed the example, and a large army was thus collected under the Spartan Pausanias.

Large Spartan force collected under Pausanias at the Isthmus.

It appears that Mardonius was at this moment in secret correspondence with the Argeians, who, though professing neutrality, are said to have promised him that they would arrest the march of the Spartans beyond their own borders.¹ If they ever made such

Mardonius, after ravaging Attica, retires into Bœotia.

a promise, the suddenness of the march, as well as the greatness of the force, prevented them from fulfilling it, and may perhaps have been so intended by the Ephors, under the apprehension that resistance might possibly be offered by the Argeians. At any rate, the latter were forced to content themselves with apprising Mardonius instantly of the fact, through their swiftest courier. It determined that general to evacuate Attica, and to carry on the war in Bœotia—a country in every way more favourable to him. He had for some time refrained from committing devastations in or round Athens, hoping that the Athenians might be induced to listen to his propositions; but the last days of his stay were employed in burning and destroying whatever had been spared by the host of Xerxes during the preceding summer. After a fruitless attempt to surprise a body of 1000 Lacedæmonians which had been detached for the protection of Megara,² he withdrew all his army into Bœotia, not taking either the straight road to Plataea, through Eleutheræ, or to Thebes through Phylæ, both which roads were mountainous and inconvenient for cavalry, but marching in the north-easterly direction to Dekleia, where he was met by some guides from the adjoining regions near the river Asôpus, and conducted through the deme of Sphendaleis to Tanagra. He thus found himself after a route longer but easier, in Bœotia on the plain of the Asôpus; along which river he next day marched west-

¹ Herodot. ix. 12.

² There were stories current at Megara, even in the time of Pausanias, respecting some of these Persians, who

were said to have been brought to destruction by the intervention of Artemis (Pausan. i. 40, 2).

ward to Skôlus, a town in the territory of Thebes seemingly near to that of Plataea.¹ He then took up a position not far off, in the plain on the left bank of the Asôpus: his left wing over against Erythræ, his centre over against Hysiaë, and his right in the territory of Plataea: and he employed his army in constructing a fortified camp² of ten furlongs square, defended by wooden walls and towers, cut from trees in the Theban territory.

Mardonius found himself thus with his numerous army, in a plain favourable for cavalry; with a camp more or less defensible,—the fortified city of Thebes³ in his rear,—and a considerable stock of provisions as well as a friendly region behind him from whence to draw more. Few among his army, however, were either hearty in the cause or confident of success:⁴ even the native Persians had been disheartened by the flight of the monarch the year before, and were full of melancholy auguries.

A splendid banquet to which the Theban leader Attaginus invited Mardonius along with fifty Persian and fifty Theban or Bœotian guests, exhibited proofs of this depressed feeling, which were afterwards recounted to Herodotus himself by one of the guests present—an Orchomenian citizen of note named Thersander. The banquet being so arranged that each couch was occupied by one Persian and one Theban, this man was accosted in Greek by his Persian neighbour, who inquired to what city he belonged; and upon learning that he was an Orchomenian,⁵ continued thus:

¹ Herodot. ix. 15. The situation of the Attic deme Sphendalê or Sphendaleis seems not certainly known (Ross, Ueber die Demen von Attika, p. 138): but Colonel Leake and Mr. Finlay think that it stood "near Aio Merkurio, which now gives name to the pass leading from Dekelia through the ridges of Parnes into the extremity of the Tanagrian plain, at a place called Malakasa." (Leake, Athens and the Demi of Attica, vol. ii. sect. iv. p. 123.)

Mr. Finlay (Oropus and Diakria, p. 38) says that "Malakasa is the only place on this road where a considerable body of cavalry could conveniently halt."

It appears that the Bœotians from the neighbourhood of the Asôpus were

necessary as guides for this road. Perhaps even the territory of Orôpus was at this time still a part of Bœotia: we do not certainly know at what period it was first conquered by the Athenians.

The combats between Athenians and Bœotians will be found to take place most frequently in this south-eastern region of Bœotia,—Tanagra, Cœnophyta, Delium, &c.

² Herodot. ix. 15.

³ The strong town of Thebes was of much service to him (Thucyd. i. 90).

⁴ Herodot. ix. 40, 45, 67; Plutarch, Aristeidês, c. 18.

⁵ Herodot. ix. 16. Thersander, though an Orchomenian, passes as a Theban—Πέρσην τε καὶ Θηβαίων ἐν κλίτρῳ

"Since thou hast now partaken with me in the same table and cup, I desire to leave with thee some memorial of my convictions; the rather in order that thou mayest be thyself forewarned so as to take the best counsel for thine own safety. Seest thou these Persians here feasting, and the army which we left yonder encamped near the river? Yet a little while, and out of all these, thou shalt behold but few surviving." Thersander listened to these words with astonishment, spoken as they were with strong emotion and a flood of tears, and replied—"Surely thou art bound to reveal this to Mardonius, and to his confidential advisers:" but the Persian rejoined—"My friend, man cannot avert that which God hath decreed to come: no one will believe the revelation, sure though it be. Many of us Persians know this well, and are here serving only under the bond of necessity. And truly this is the most hateful of all human sufferings—to be full of knowledge, and at the same time to have no power over any result."¹—"This (observes Herodotus) I heard myself from the Orchomenian Thersander, who told me farther that he mentioned the fact to several persons about him even before the battle of Plataea." It is certainly one of the most curious revelations in the whole history; not merely as it brings forward the historian in his own personality, communicating with a personal friend of the Theban leaders, and thus provided with good means of information as to the general events of the campaign—but also as it discloses to us, on testimony not to be suspected, the real temper of the native Persians, and even of the chief men among them. If so many of these chiefs were not merely apathetic, but despondent, in the cause, much more decided would be the same absence of will and hope in their followers and the subject allies. To follow the monarch in his over-

ἰκδσση—a proof of the intimate connexion between Thebes and Orchomenus at this time, which is farther illustrated by Pindar, *Isthm. i.* 51 (compare the *Scholia ad loc.* and at the beginning of the *Ode*), respecting the Theban family of Herodotus and Asōpodōrus. The ancient mythical feud appears to have gone to sleep, but a deadly hatred will be found to grow up in later times between these two towns.

¹ Herodot. ix. 16, 17. The last observation here quoted is striking and

emphatic—*ἐχθίστη δὲ δόξη ἐστὶ τῶν ἐν ἀνθρώποις αὕτη, πολλὰ φρονίοντα μηδενὸς κρατεῖν*. It will have to be more carefully considered at a later period of this history, when we come to touch upon the scientific life of the Greeks, and upon the philosophy of happiness and duty as conceived by Aristotle. If carried fully out, this position is the direct negative of what Aristotle lays down in his *Ethics* as to the superior happiness of the *βίος θεωρητικὸς* or life of scientific observation and reflection.

whelming march of the preceding year, was gratifying in many ways to the native Persians: but every man was sick of the enterprise as now cut down under Mardonius: and Artabazus, the second in command, was not merely slack, but jealous of his superior.¹ Under such circumstances we shall presently not be surprised to find the whole army disappearing forthwith, the moment Mardonius is slain.

Among the Grecian allies of Mardonius, the Thebans and Bœotians were active and zealous, most of the remainder lukewarm, and the Phokians even of doubtful fidelity. Their contingent of 1000 hoplites, under Harmokydês, had been tardy in joining him, having only come up since he retired from Attica into Bœotia: and some of the Phokians even remained behind in the neighbourhood of Parnassus, prosecuting manifest hostilities against the Persians. Aware of the feeling among this contingent, which the Thessalians took care to place before him in an unfavourable point of view, Mardonius determined to impress upon them a lesson of intimidation. Causing them to form in a separate body on the plain, he brought up his numerous cavalry all around them; while the Phémê, or sudden simultaneous impression, ran through the Greek allies as well as the Phokians themselves, that he was about to shoot them down.² The general Harmokydês, directing his men to form a square and close their ranks, addressed to them short exhortations to sell their lives dearly, and to behave like brave Greeks against barbarian assassins—when the cavalry rode up apparently to the charge, and advanced close to the square, with uplifted javelins and arrows on the string, some few of which were even actually discharged. The Phokians maintained, as enjoined, steady ranks with a firm countenance, and the cavalry wheeled about without any actual attack or damage. After this mysterious demonstration, Mardonius condescended to compliment the Phokians on their courage, and to assure them by means of a herald that he had been greatly misinformed respecting them. He at the

¹ Herodot. ix. 66.

² Herodot. ix. 17. διεξῆλθε φήμη, ὡς κατακοντιεῖ σφέας. Respecting φήμη, see a note a little farther on, at the battle of Mykalê, in this same chapter.

Compare the case of the Delians at

Adramyttium, surrounded and slain with missiles by the Persian satrap, though not his enemies—περιστήσας τοὺς ἐαυτοῦ κατακόντισε (Thucyd. viii. 108).

same time exhorted them to be faithful and forward in service for the future, and promised that all good behaviour should be amply recompensed. Herodotus seems uncertain,—difficult as the supposition is to entertain,—whether Mardonius did not really intend at first to massacre the Phokians in the field, and desisted from the intention only on seeing how much blood it would cost to accomplish. However this may be, the scene itself was a remarkable reality, and presented one among many other proofs of the lukewarmness and suspicious fidelity of the army.¹

Conformably to the suggestion of the Thebans, the liberties of Greece were now to be disputed in Bœotia: and not only had the position of Mardonius already been taken, but his camp also fortified, before the united Grecian army approached Kithæron in its forward march from the Isthmus. After the full force of the Lacedæmonians had reached the Isthmus, they had to await the arrival of their Peloponnesian and other confederates. The hoplites who joined them were as follows: from Tegea, 1500; from Corinth, 5000, besides a small body of 300 from the Corinthian colony of Potidæa; from the Arcadian Orchomenus, 600; from Sikyon, 3000; from Epidaurus, 800; from Træzen, 1000; from Lepreon, 200; from Mykênæ and Tiryns, 400; from Phlius, 1000; from Hermione, 300; from Eretria and Styra, 600; from Chalkis, 400; from Ambrakia, 500; from Leukas and Anaktorium, 800; from Palé in Kephallenia, 200; from Ægina, 500. On marching from the Isthmus to Megara, they took up 3000 Megarian hoplites; and as soon as they reached Eleusis in their forward progress, the army was completed by the junction of 8000 Athenian hoplites, and 600 Platæan, under Aristeidês, who passed over from Salamis.²

Numbers of
the Greeks
collected
under Pau-
sanias.

¹ Οὐκ ἔχω ἀτρεκέως εἰπεῖν, ὅτε εἰ ἄλθον μὲν ἀπολλόντες τοὺς Φωκίας, δεηθέντων τῶν Θεσσαλῶν, &c. (Herodot. ix. 18).

This confession of uncertainty as to motives and plans, distinguishing between them and the visible facts which he is describing, is not without importance as strengthening our confidence in the historian.

² Compare this list of Herodotus with the enumeration which Pausanias read inscribed on the statue of Zeus, erected

at Olympia by the Greeks who took part in the battle of Platæa (Pausan. v. 23. 1).

Pausanias found inscribed all the names here indicated by Herodotus, except the Palæ of Kephallenia; and he found in addition the Eleians, Keans, Kythnians, Tenians, Naxians, and Mælians. The five last names are islanders in the Ægean: their contingents sent to Platæa must at all events have been very small, and it is surprising to hear that they sent any—especially when we

The total force of hoplites or heavy-armed troops was thus 38,700 men. There were no cavalry, and but very few bowmen—but if we add those who are called light-armed or unarmed generally, some perhaps with javelins or swords, but none with any defensive armour—the grand total was not less than 110,000 men. Of these light-armed or unarmed, there were, as computed by Herodotus, 35,000 in attendance on the 5000 Spartan citizens, and 34,500 in attendance on the other hoplites; together with 1800 Thespians who were properly hoplites, yet so badly armed as not to be reckoned in the ranks.¹

Such was the number of Greeks present or near at hand in the combat against the Persians at Plataea, which took place some little time afterwards. But it seemed that the contin-

gents were not at first completely full, and that new additions² continued to arrive until a few days before the battle, along with the convoys of cattle and provisions which came for the subsistence of the army.

Pausanias marched first from the Isthmus to Eleusis, where he was joined by the Athenians from Salamis. At Eleusis as well as at the Isthmus, the sacrifices were found encouraging, and the united army then advanced across the ridge of Kithæron, so as to come within sight of the Persians. When Pausanias saw them occupying the line of the Asôpus in the plain beneath, he kept his own army on the mountain declivity near Erythræ, without choosing to adventure himself in the level ground. Mardonius, finding them not disposed to seek battle in the plain, despatched his numerous and excellent cavalry under Masistius, the most distinguished officer in his

recollect that there was a Greek fleet at this moment on service, to which it would be natural that they should join themselves in preference to land-service.

With respect to the name of the Eleians, the suspicion of Brøndstedt is plausible, that Pausanias may have mistaken the name of the Palæ of Kephallenia for theirs, and may have fancied that he read ΠΑΛΕΙΟΙ when it was really written ΠΑΛΕΙΣ, in an inscription at that time about 600 years old. The place in the series wherein Pausanias places the name of the Eleians strengthens this suspicion.


Unless it be admitted, we shall be driven, as the most probable alternative, to suppose a fraud committed by the vanity of the Eleians, which may easily have led them to alter a name originally belonging to the Palæ. The reader will recollect that the Eleians were themselves the superintendents and curators at Olympia.

Plutarch seems to have read the same inscription as Pausanias (*De Herodoti Malignit.* p. 873).

¹ Herodot. ix. 19, 28, 29.

² Herodot. ix. 28. οἱ ἐπιφοιτῶντες τε καὶ οἱ ἀρχὴν λαβόντες Ἕλληνας.

March of
Pausanias
over Kithæ-
ron into
Bœotia.



army, to attack them. For the most part, the ground was so uneven as to check their approach : but the Megarian contingent, which happened to be more exposed than the rest, were so hard pressed that they were forced to send to Pausanias for aid. They appear to have had not only no cavalry, but no bowmen or light-armed troops of any sort with missile weapons ; while the Persians, excellent archers and darters, using very large bows and trained in such accomplishments from their earliest childhood, charged in successive squadrons and overwhelmed the Greeks with darts and arrows—not omitting contemptuous taunts on their cowardice for keeping back from the plain.¹ So general was then the fear of the Persian cavalry, that Pausanias could find none of the Greeks, except the Athenians, willing to volunteer and go to the rescue of the Megarians. A body of Athenians, however, especially 300 chosen troops under Olympiodorus, strengthened with some bowmen, immediately marched to the spot and took up the combat with the Persian cavalry. For some time the struggle was sharp and doubtful : at length the general Masistius,—a man renowned for bravery, lofty in stature, clad in conspicuous armour, and mounted on a Nisæan horse with golden trappings—charging at the head of his troops, had his horse struck by an arrow in the side. The animal immediately reared and threw his master on the ground, close to the ranks of the Athenians, who, rushing forward, seized the horse, and overpowered Masistius before he could rise. So impenetrable were the defences of his helmet and breastplate² however, that they had considerable difficulty in killing him, though he was in their power : at length a spearman pierced him in the eye. The death of the general passed unobserved by the Persian cavalry, but as soon as they missed him and became aware of the loss, they charged furiously and in one mass, to recover the dead body. At first the Athenians, too few in number to resist the onset, were compelled for a time to give way, abandoning the body ; but reinforcements presently arriving at

He is attacked by the Persian cavalry under Masistius, and much harassed—superior efficiency of the Athenians against cavalry—Masistius is slain.

¹ About the missile weapons and skill of the Persians, see Herodot. i. 136 ; Xenophon, *Anab.* iii. 4, 17.

Cyrus the younger was eminent in the use both of the bow and the javelin

(Xenoph. *Anab.* i. 8, 26 ; i. 9, 5 ; compare *Cyropæd.* i. 2, 4).

² See Quintus Curtius, iii. 11, 15 ; and the note of Müttel.

their call, the Persians were driven back with loss, and it finally remained in their possession.¹

The death of Masistius, coupled with that final repulse of the cavalry which left his body in possession of the Greeks, produced a strong effect on both armies, encouraging the one as much as it disheartened the other. Throughout the camp of Mardonius, the grief was violent and unbounded, manifested by wailing so loud as to echo over all Bœotia ; while the hair of men, horses, and cattle, was abundantly cut in token of mourning. The Greeks, on the other hand, overjoyed at their success, placed the dead body in a cart and paraded it round the army : even the hoplites ran out of their ranks to look at it ; not only hailing it as a valuable trophy, but admiring its stature and proportions.²

So much was their confidence increased, that Pausanias now ventured to quit the protection of the mountain-ground, inconvenient from its scanty supply of water, and to take up his position in the plain beneath, interspersed only with low hillocks. Marching from Erythræ in a westerly direction along the declivities of Kithæron, and passing by Hysiaë, the Greeks occupied a line of camp in the Platæan territory along the Asôpus and on its right bank ; with their right wing near to the fountain called Gargaphia,³ and their left wing near to the chapel,

¹ Herodot. ix. 21, 22, 23 ; Plutarch, Aristeidês, c. 14.

² Herodot. ix. 24, 25. *οἰμωγῇ τε χρωόμενοι ἀπλῆτες ἄσασαν γὰρ τὴν Βοιωτίην κατείχε ἡχώ, &c.*

The exaggerated demonstrations of grief, ascribed to Xerxes and Atossa in the Persæ of Æschylus, have often been blamed by critics : we may see from this passage how much they are in the manners of Orientals of that day.

³ Herodot. ix. 25-30 ; Plutarch, Aristeidês, c. 11. *τὸ τοῦ Ἀνδροκράτους ἥρως ἔγγυς ἔλασι πικρῶν καὶ συσκιῶν δύνδρων περιεχόμενον.*

The expression of Herodotus respecting this position taken by Pausanias, *οὗτοι μὲν οὖν ταχθέντες ἐπὶ τῇ Ἀσωπῷ ἱστρατοπεδεύοντο*, as well as the words which follow in the next chapter (31) — *Οἱ βάρβαροι, πυθόμενοι εἶναι τοὺς Ἕλληνας ἐν Πλαταιῶσι, παρεῖσαν καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐπὶ τὸν Ἀσωπὸν τὸν ταύτην ῥέοντα*—show plainly that the Grecian troops were

encamped along the Asôpus on the Platæan side, while the Persians in their second position occupied the ground on the opposite or Theban side of the river. Whichever army commenced the attack had to begin by passing the Asôpus (c. 36-59).

For the topography of this region, and of the positions occupied by the two armies, compare Squire, in Walpole's Turkey, p. 338 ; Kruse, *Hellas*, vol. ii. ch. vi. p. 9, *seq.*, and ch. viii. p. 592 *seq.* ; and the still more copious and accurate information of Colonel Leake, *Travels in Northern Greece*, ch. xvi. vol. ii. p. 324-360. Both of them have given plans of the region ; that which I annex is borrowed from Kiepert's maps. I cannot but think that the fountain Gargaphia is not yet identified, and that both Kruse and Leake place the Grecian position farther from the river Asôpus than is consistent with the words of Herodotus ; which words seem

surrounded by a shady grove, of the Platæan hero Androkratês. In this position they were marshalled according to nations, or separate fractions of the Greek name—the Lacedæmonians on the right wing, with the Tegeans and Corinthians immediately joining them—and the Athenians on the left wing; a post, which as second in point of dignity, was at first claimed by the Tegeans, chiefly on grounds of mythical exploits, to the exclusion of the Athenians, but ultimately adjudged by the Spartans, after hearing both sides, to Athens.¹ In the field even Lacedæmonians followed those democratical forms which pervaded so generally Grecian military operations: in this case, it was not the generals, but the Lacedæmonian troops in a body, who heard the argument and delivered the verdict by unanimous acclamation.

Mardonius, apprised of this change of position, marched his army also a little farther to the westward, and posted himself opposite to the Greeks, divided from them by the river Asôpus. At the suggestion of the Thebans, he himself with his Persians and Medes, the picked men of his army, took post on the left wing, immediately opposite to the Lacedæmonians on the Greek right, and even extending so far as to cover the Tegean ranks on the left of the Lacedæmonians: Baktrians, Indians, Sakæ, with other Asiatics and Egyptians, filled the centre; and the Greeks and Macedonians in the service of Persia, the right—over against the hoplites of Athens. The numbers of these last-mentioned Greeks Herodotus could not learn, though he estimates them conjecturally at 50,000:² nor

Mardonius alters his position, and posts himself nearly opposite to the Greeks on the other side of the Asôpus.

to specify points near the two extremities, indicating that the fountain of Gargaphia was *near* the river towards the right of the Grecian position, and the chapel of Androkratês also *near* the river towards the left of that position, where the Athenians were posted. Nor would such a site for a chapel of Androkratês be inconsistent with Thucydidês (iii. 24), who merely mentions that chapel as being on the right-hand of the first mile of road from Platæa to Thebes.

Considering the length of time which has elapsed since the battle, it would not be surprising if the spring of Gargaphia were no longer recognisable. At any rate, neither the fountain pointed

out by Colonel Leake (p. 332) nor that of Vergutiani which had been supposed by Colonel Squire and Dr. Clarke, appear to be suitable for Gargaphia.

The errors of that plan of the battle of Platæa which accompanies the Voyage d'Anacharsis, are now well understood.

¹ Herodot. ix. 26-29. Judging from the battles of Corinth (B.C. 396) and Mantinea (B.C. 418), the Tegeans seem afterwards to have dropped this pretension to occupy the left wing, and to have preferred the post in the line next to the Lacedæmonians (Xenoph. Hellen. iv. 2, 19).

² Herodot. ix. 31, 32.

can we place any confidence in the total of 300,000 which he gives as belonging to the other troops of Mardonius, though probably it cannot have been much less.

In this position lay the two armies, separated only by a narrow space including the river Asôpus, and each expecting a battle, whilst the sacrifices on behalf of each were offered up. Pausanias, Mardonius, and the Greeks in the Persian army, had each a separate prophet to offer sacrifice, and to ascertain the dispositions of the gods; the two first had men from the most distinguished prophetic families in Elis—the latter invited one from Leukas.¹ All received large pay, and the prophet of Pausanias had indeed been honoured with a recompense above all pay—the gift of full Spartan citizenship for himself as well as for his brother. It happened that the prophets on both sides delivered the same report of their respective sacrifices; favourable for resistance if attacked—unfavourable for beginning the battle. At a moment when doubt and indecision was the reigning feeling on both sides, this was the safest answer for the prophet to give, and the most satisfactory for the soldiers to hear. And though the answer from Delphi had been sufficiently encouraging, and the kindness of the patron-heroes of Platæa² had been solemnly invoked, yet Pausanias did not venture to cross the Asôpus and begin the attack, in the face of a pronounced declaration from his prophet. Nor did even Hegesistratus, the prophet employed by Mardonius, choose on his side to urge an aggressive movement, though he had a deadly personal hatred against the Lacedæmonians, and would have been delighted to see them worsted. There arose commencements of conspiracy, perhaps encouraged by promises or bribes from the enemy, among the wealthier Athenian hoplites, to establish an oligarchy at Athens under Persian supremacy, like that which now existed at Thebes,—a conspiracy full of danger at such a moment, though fortunately repressed³ by Aristeidês, with a hand at once gentle and decisive.

¹ Herodot. ix. 36, 38. *μεμισθωμένοις* *οὐκ ὀλίγου*.

These prophets were men of great individual consequence, as may be seen by the details which Herodotus gives

respecting their adventures: compare also the history of Euenius, ix. 93.

² Plutarch, Aristeidês, c. xi.; Thucyd. ii. 74.

³ Plutarch, Aristeidês, c. 13.

The annoyance inflicted by the Persian cavalry, under the guidance of the Thebans, was incessant. Their constant assaults and missile weapons from the other side of the Asôpus, prevented the Greeks from using the river for supplies of water, so that the whole army was forced to water at the fountain Gargaphia, at the extreme right of the position,¹ near the Lacedæmonian hoplites. Moreover the Theban leader Timegenidas, remarking the convoys which arrived over the passes of Kithæron in the rear of the Grecian camp, and the constant reinforcements of hoplites which accompanied them, prevailed upon Mardonius to employ his cavalry in cutting off such communication. The first movement of this sort, undertaken by night against the pass called the Oak Heads, was eminently successful. A train of 500 beasts of burden with supplies, was attacked descending into the plain with its escort, all of whom were either slain or carried prisoners to the Persian camp; so that it became unsafe for any further convoys to approach the Greeks.² Eight days had already been passed in inaction before Timegenidas suggested, or Mardonius executed this manœuvre; which it is fortunate for the Greeks that he did not attempt earlier, and which afforded clear proof how much might be hoped from an efficient employment of his cavalry, without the ruinous risk of a general action. Nevertheless, after waiting two days longer, his impatience became uncontrollable, and he determined on a general battle forthwith.³ In vain did Artabazus endeavour to dissuade him from the step; taking the same view as the Thebans, that in a pitched battle the united Grecian army was invincible, and that the only successful policy was that of delay and corruption to disunite them. He recommended standing

Mardonius annoys the Greeks with his cavalry, and cuts off their supplies in the rear.

¹ Herodot. ix. 40, 49, 50. τὴν τε κρήνην τὴν Γαργαφίην, ἀπ' ἧς ὕδρευετο πᾶν τὸ στράτευμα τὸ Ἑλληνικόν—ἐρυκόμενοι δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ Ἀσωποῦ, οὕτω δὲ ἐπὶ τὴν κρήνην ἐφοίτεον ἀπὸ τοῦ ποταμοῦ γὰρ σφί οὐκ ἐπὶν ὕδωρ φορέεσθαι, ὑπὸ τε τῶν ἰππίων καὶ τοξευμάτων.

Diodorus (xi. 30) affirms that the Greek position was so well defended by the nature of the ground, and so difficult of attack, that Mardonius was prevented from making use of his superior numbers. It is evident from the account of

Herodotus that this is quite incorrect. The position seems to have had no protection except what it derived from the river Asôpus, and the Greeks were ultimately forced to abandon it by the incessant attacks of the Persian cavalry. The whole account, at once diffuse and uninteresting, given by Diodorus of this battle (xi. 30-36) forms a strong contrast with the clear, impressive, and circumstantial narrative of Herodotus.

² Herodot. ix. 38, 39.

³ Herodot. ix. 40, 41.

on the defensive, by means of Thebes, well fortified and amply provisioned : so as to allow time of distributing effective bribes among the leading men throughout the various Grecian cities. This suggestion, which Herodotus considers as wise and likely to succeed, was repudiated by Mardonius as cowardly and unworthy of the recognized superiority of the Persian arms.¹

But while he overruled, by virtue of superior authority, the objections of all around him, Persians as well as Greeks, he could not but feel daunted by their reluctant obedience, which he suspected to arise from their having heard oracles or prophecies of unfavourable augury. He therefore summoned the chief officers, Greek as well as Persian, and put the question to them whether they knew any prophecy announcing that the Persians were doomed to destruction in Greece. All were silent : some did not know the prophecies, but others (Herodotus intimates) knew them full well, though they did not dare to speak. Receiving no answer, Mardonius said, "Since ye either do not know, or will not tell, I who know well will myself speak out. There is an oracle to the effect, that Persian invaders of Greece shall plunder the temple of Delphi, and shall afterwards all be destroyed. Now we, being aware of this, shall neither go against that temple, nor try to plunder it : on that ground therefore we shall not be destroyed. Rejoice ye therefore, ye who are well-affected to the Persians—we shall get the better of the Greeks." With that he gave orders to prepare everything for a general attack and battle on the morrow.²

It is not improbable that the Orchomenian Thersander was present at this interview, and may have reported it to Herodotus. But the reflection of the historian himself is not the least curious part of the whole, as illustrating the manner in which these prophecies sunk into men's minds, and determined their judgements. Herodotus knew (though he does not cite it) the particular prophecy to which Mardonius made allusion ; and he pronounces, in the most affirmative tone,³ that it had

¹ Herodot. ix. 42.

² Herodot. ix. 42.

³ Herodot. ix. 43. Τοῦτον δ' ἔγωγε τὸν χρησμὸν τὸν Μαρδόνιος εἶπε ἐς Πέρσας ἔχειν, ἐς ἑλλήνους τε καὶ τὸν Ἑγχέ-

λέων στρατὸν οἷδα πεποιημένον, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐς Πέρσας. Ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν Βάκιδι ἐς ταύτην τὴν μάχην ἔστι πεποιημένα, &c.

no reference to the Persians : it referred to an ancient invasion of Greece by the Illyrians and the Encheleis. But both Bakis (from whom he quotes four lines) and Musæus had prophesied, in the plainest manner, the destruction of the Persian army on the banks of the Thermôdon and Asôpus. And these are the prophecies which we must suppose the officers convoked by Mardonius to have known also, though they did not dare to speak out : it was the fault of Mardonius himself that he did not take warning.

The attack of a multitude like that of Mardonius was not likely under any circumstances to be made so rapidly as to take the Greeks by surprise ; but the latter were forewarned of it by a secret visit from Alexander king of Macedon ; who, riding up to the Athenian advanced posts in the middle of the night, desired to speak with Aristeidês and the other generals. Announcing to them alone his name, and proclaiming his earnest sympathy for the Grecian cause, as well as the hazard which he incurred by this nightly visit—he apprised them that Mardonius, though eager for a battle long ago, could not by any effort obtain favourable sacrifices, but was nevertheless, even in spite of this obstacle, determined on an attack the next morning. “Be ye prepared accordingly ; and if ye succeed in this war (said he), remember to liberate me also from the Persian yoke ; I too am a Greek by descent, and thus risk my head because I cannot endure to see Greece enslaved.”¹

His intention communicated to the Athenians in the night by Alexander of Macedon.

The communication of this important message, made by Aristeidês to Pausanias, elicited from him a proposal not a little surprising as coming from a Spartan general. He requested the Athenians to change places with the Lacedæmonians in the line. “We Lacedæmonians (said he) now stand opposed to the Persians and Medes against whom we have never yet contended, while ye Athenians have fought and conquered them at Marathon. March ye then over to the right wing and take our places, while we will take yours in the left wing against the Bœotians and Thessalians, with whose arms and attack we are familiar.”

Pausanias changes places in the line between the Spartans and Athenians.

¹ Herodot. ix. 44-45. The language about the sacrifices is remarkable—λέγω δὲ ὅτι Μαρδονίου τε καὶ τῆ στρατιῇ οὐ δοῦνται τὰ σφέγια καταθύμια

γείσθαι· πᾶσαι γὰρ ἂν ἐμάχασθε, &c.

Mardonius had tried many unavailing efforts to procure better sacrifices : it could not be done.

The Athenians readily acceded, and the reciprocal change of order was accordingly directed. It was not yet quite completed when day broke and the Theban allies of Mardonius immediately took notice of what had been done. That general commanded a corresponding change in his own line, so as to place the native Persians once more over against the Lacedæmonians; upon which Pausanias, seeing that his manœuvre had failed, led back his Lacedæmonians to the right wing, while a second movement on the part of Mardonius replaced both armies in the order originally observed.¹

No incident similar to this will be found throughout the whole course of Lacedæmonian history. To evade encountering the best troops in the enemy's line, and to depart for this purpose from their privileged post on the right wing, was a step well calculated to lower them in the eyes of Greece, and could hardly have failed to produce that effect, if the intention had been realized. It is at the same time no mean compliment to the formidable reputation of the native Persian troops—a reputation recognized by Herodotus, and well-sustained at least by their personal bravery.² Nor can we wonder that this publicly manifested reluctance on the part of the leading troops in the Grecian army contributed much to exalt the rash confidence of Mardonius: a feeling which Herodotus, in Homeric style,³ casts into the speech of a Persian herald sent to upbraid the Lacedæmonians, and challenge them to a "single combat with champions of equal numbers, Lacedæmonians against Persians." This herald, whom no one heard or cared for, and who serves but as a mouthpiece for bringing out the feelings belonging to the moment, was followed by something very real and terrible—a vigorous attack on the Greek line by the Persian cavalry; whose rapid motions, and showers of arrows and javelins, annoyed the Greeks on this day more than ever. The latter (as has been before stated) had no cavalry whatever; nor do their light troops, though sufficiently numerous, appear to have rendered any service, with the exception of the Athenian bowmen. How great was the ad-

Mardonius again attacks them with his cavalry.

¹ Herodot. ix. 47; Plutarch, Aristeides, c. 16. Here, as on many other occasions, Plutarch rather spoils than assists the narrative of Herodotus.

² Herodot. ix. 71.

³ Compare the reproaches of Hektor to Diomèdes (Iliad, viii. 161).

vantage gained by the Persian cavalry, is shown by the fact that they for a time drove away the Lacedæmonians from the fountain of Gargaphia, so as to choke it up, and render it unfit for use. As the army had been prevented by the cavalry from resorting to the river Asôpus, this fountain had been of late the only watering-place; and without it the position which they then occupied became untenable—while their provisions also were exhausted, inasmuch as the convoys, from fear of the Persian cavalry, could not descend from Kithæron to join them.¹

In this dilemma, Pausanias summoned the Grecian chiefs to his tent. After an anxious debate, the resolution was taken, in case Mardonius should not bring on a general action in the course of the day, to change their position during the night, when there would be no interruption from the cavalry; and to occupy the ground called the Island, distant about ten furlongs in a direction nearly west, and seemingly north of the town of Platæa, which was itself about twenty furlongs distant. This island, improperly so denominated, included the ground comprised between two branches of the river Oeroë;² both of which flow from Kithæron, and after flowing for a certain time in channels about three furlongs apart, form a junction and run in a north-westerly direction towards one of the recesses of the Gulf of Corinth—quite distinct from the Asôpus, which, though also rising near at hand in the lowest declivities under Kithæron, takes an easterly direction, and discharges itself into the sea opposite Eubœa. When encamped in this so-called Island, the army would be secure of water from the stream in their rear; nor would they, as now, expose an extended breadth of front to a numerous hostile cavalry separated from them only by the Asôpus.³ It was farther resolved, that so soon as the army should once be in occupation of the

In consequence of the annoyance of the Persian cavalry, Pausanias determines to move in the night into the Island.

¹ Herodot. ix. 49, 50. Pausanias mentions that the Platæans restored the fountain of Gargaphia after the victory (τὸ ὕδωρ ἀνεσώσαντο); but he hardly seems to speak as if he had himself seen it (ix. 4, 2).

² See a good description of the ground in Colonel Leake, Travels in Northern Greece, ch. xvi. vol. ii. p. 358.

³ Herodot. ix. 51. 'Ἐς τοῦτον δὴ τὸν χρόνον ἰβουλίσαντο μεταστῆναι, ὥστε καὶ ἔχουσι χρεῖσθαι ἀφ' ὧν, καὶ οἱ ἱππεῖς σφίσι μὴ σινολάτο, ὥσπερ κατ' ἰθὺς ἴδοντες.

The last words have reference to the position of the two hostile armies, extended front to front along the course of the Asôpus.

Island, half of the troops should forthwith march onward to disengage the convoys blocked up on Kithæron, and conduct them to the camp. Such was the plan settled in council among the different Grecian chiefs; the march was to be commenced at the beginning of the second night-watch, when the enemy's cavalry would have completely withdrawn.

In spite of what Mardonius is said to have determined, he passed the whole day without any general attack. But his cavalry, probably elated by the recent demonstration of the Lacedæmonians, were on that day more daring and indefatigable than ever, and inflicted much loss as well as severe suffering;¹ insomuch that the centre of the Greek force (Corinthians, Megarians, &c., between the Lacedæmonians and Tegeans on the right, and the Athenians on the left), when the hour arrived for retiring to the Island, commenced their march indeed, but forgot or disregarded the preconcerted plan and the orders of Pausanias in their impatience to obtain a complete shelter against the attacks of the cavalry. Instead of proceeding to the Island, they marched a distance of twenty furlongs directly to the town of Plataea, and took up a position in front of the Heræum or temple of Hêrê, where they were protected partly by the buildings, partly by the comparatively high ground on which the town with its temple stood. Between the position which the Greeks were about to leave and that which they had resolved to occupy (*i.e.*, between the course of Asôpus and that of the Oeroë), there appear to have been a range of low hills. The Lacedæmonians, starting from the right wing, had to march directly over these hills, while the Athenians, from the left, were to turn them and get into the plain on the other side.² Pausanias, apprised that the divisions of the centre had commenced their night-march,

¹ Herodot. ix. 52. κρίνῃ μὲν τὴν ἡμέρην πᾶσαν, προσκειμένης τῆς ἵππου, εἶχον πόνον ἄντρον.

² Herodot. ix. 56. Πausanίης—σημῆρας ἀπῆγε διὰ τῶν κολωνῶν τοὺς λοιποὺς πάντας· εἶποντο δὲ καὶ Τεγεῆται, Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ ταχθέντες ἦσαν τὰ ἑμβαλὶν ἢ Λακεδαιμόνιοι. Οἱ μὲν γὰρ τῶν τε ὄχθων ἀντείχοντο καὶ τῆς ὑπερείης τοῦ Κιθαῖρωνος. Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ κάτω τραφέντες εἰς τὸ πεδῖον.

With which we must combine another passage, c. 59, intimating that the track of the Athenians led them to turn and get behind the hills, which prevented Mardonius from seeing them, though they were marching along the plain:—Μαρδόνιος—ἐπεῖχε ἐπὶ Λακεδαιμόνιους καὶ Τεγεῆτας μόνους. Ἀθηναῖους γὰρ τραπομένους εἰς τὸ πεδῖον ὑπὸ τῶν ὄχθων οὐ κατεώρα.

and concluding of course that they would proceed to the Island according to orders, allowed a certain interval of time in order to prevent confusion, and then directed that the Lacedæmonians and Tegeans should also begin their movement towards that same position. But here he found himself embarrassed by an unexpected obstacle. The movement was retrograde, receding from the enemy, and not consistent with the military honour of a Spartan: nevertheless most of the taxiarchs or leaders of companies obeyed without murmuring, but Amompharetus, lochage or captain of that band which Herodotus calls the lochus of Pitana,¹ obstinately refused. Not having been present at the meeting in which the resolution had been taken, he now heard it for the first time with astonishment and disdain, declaring "that he for one would never so far disgrace Sparta as to run away from the foreigner."² Pausanias, with the second in command Euryanax, exhausted every effort to overcome his reluctance. But they could by no means induce him to retreat; nor did they dare to move without him, leaving his entire lochus exposed alone to the enemy.³

Refusal of the Spartan lochage Amompharetus to obey the order for the night march.

Amidst the darkness of night, and in this scene of indecision and dispute, an Athenian messenger on horseback reached Pausanias, instructed to ascertain what was passing, and to ask for the last directions. For in spite of the resolution taken after formal debate, the Athenian generals still mistrusted the Lacedæmonians, and doubted whether, after all, they would act as they had promised. The movement of the central division having become known to them, they sent at the last moment before they commenced their own march, to assure themselves that the Spartans were about to move also. A profound, and even an exaggerated mistrust, but too well justified by the previous behaviour of the Spartans towards Athens, is visible in this proceeding;⁴ yet it proved fortunate in its results—

Mistrust of Pausanias and the Spartans exhibited by the Athenians.

¹ There is on this point a difference between Thucydides and Herodotus: the former affirms that there never was any Spartan lochus so called (Thucyd. i. 21).

We have no means of reconciling the difference, nor can we be certain that

Thucydides is right in his negative comprehending all past time—*ὅτι οὐδ' ἔγινετο πώποτε*.

² Herodot. ix. 53, 54.

³ Herodot. ix. 52, 53.

⁴ Herodot. ix. 54. Ἀθηναῖοι—εἰχον ἀτρέμας σφίτας αὐτοὺς ἵνα ἐτάχθων,

for if the Athenians, satisfied with executing their part in the preconcerted plan, had marched at once to the Island, the Grecian army would have been severed without the possibility of reuniting, and the issue of the battle might have proved altogether different. The Athenian herald found the Lacedæmonians still stationary in their position, and the generals in hot dispute with Amompharetus, who despised the threat of being left alone to make head against the Persians, and when reminded that the resolution had been taken by general vote of the officers, took up with both hands a vast rock fit for the hands of Ajax or Hektor, and cast it at the feet of Pausanias, saying "This is *my* pebble, wherewith I give my vote not to run away from the strangers." Pausanias denounced him as a madman—desiring the herald to report the scene of embarrassment which he had just come to witness, and to entreat the Athenian generals not to commence their retreat until the Lacedæmonians should also be in march. In the mean time the dispute continued, and was even prolonged by the perverseness of Amompharetus until the morning began to dawn; when Pausanias, afraid to remain longer, gave the signal for retreat—calculating that the refractory captain, when he saw his lochus really left alone, would probably make up his mind to follow. Having marched about ten furlongs, across the hilly ground which divided him from the Island, he commanded a halt; either to await Amompharetus if he chose to follow, or to be near enough to render aid and save him, if he were rash enough to stand his ground single-handed. Happily the latter, seeing that his general had really departed, overcame his scruples, and followed him; overtaking and joining the main body in its first halt near the river Moloeis and the temple of Eleusinian Dêmêtêr.¹ The Athenians, commencing their movement at the same time with Pausanias, got round the hills to the plain on the other side and proceeded on their march towards the Island.

When the day broke, the Persian cavalry were astonished to find the Grecian position deserted. They immediately set themselves to the pursuit of the Spartans, whose march lay

ἐπιστάμενοι τὰ Λακεδαιμονίων φρονήματα, ὡς ἄλλα φρονέοντων καὶ ἄλλα λεγόντων.
¹ Herodot. ix. 56, 57.

along the higher and more conspicuous ground, and whose progress had moreover been retarded by the long delay of Amompharetus: the Athenians on the contrary, marching without halt, and being already behind the hills, were not open to view. To Mardonius, this retreat of his enemy inspired an extravagant and contemptuous confidence which he vented in full measure to the Thessalian Aleuadæ—"These are your boasted Spartans, who changed their place just now in the line, rather than fight the Persians, and have here shown by a barefaced flight what they are really worth!" With that he immediately directed his whole army to pursue and attack with the utmost expedition. The Persians crossed the Asôpus, and ran after the Greeks at their best speed, pell-mell, without any thought of order or preparations for overcoming resistance: the army already rang with shouts of victory, in full confidence of swallowing up the fugitives as soon as they were overtaken.

Astonishment of Mardonius on discovering that the Greeks had retreated during the night—he pursues and attacks them with disorderly impatience.

The Asiatic allies all followed the example of this disorderly rush forward:¹ but the Thebans and the other Grecian allies on the right wing of Mardonius, appear to have maintained somewhat better order.

Pausanias had not been able to retreat farther than the neighbourhood of the Demetrium or temple of Eleusinian Dēmêtêr, where he had halted to take up Amompharetus. Overtaken first by the Persian horse and next by Mardonius with the main body, he sent a horseman forthwith to apprise the Athenians, and to entreat their aid. The Athenians were prompt in complying with his request: but they speedily found themselves engaged in conflict against the Theban allies of the enemy, and therefore unable to reach him.² Accordingly the Lacedæmonians and Tegeans had to encounter the Persians single-handed without any assistance

Battle of Platæa.

¹ Herodot. ix. 59. ἰδίωκον ὡς ποδῶν ἑκαστος εἶχον, οὐτε κόσμος οὐδενὶ κοσμηθέντες, οὐτε τάξι. Καὶ οὗτοι μὲν βοή τε καὶ ὁμίλῳ ἐπήϊσαν, ὡς ἀναρπασόμενοι τοὺς Ἕλληνας.

Herodotus dwells especially on the reckless and disorderly manner in which the Persians advanced: Plutarch, on the contrary, says of Mardonius—ἔχων συνετεταγμένην τὴν δύναμιν ἐπεφύ-

ρετο τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις, &c. (Plutarch Aristeid. c. 17).

Plutarch also says that Pausanias ἤγε τὴν ἑλληνὴν δύναμιν πρὸς τὰς Πλαταιὰς, &c.; which is quite contrary to the real narrative of Herodotus. Pausanias intended to march to the Island, not to Platæa: he did not reach either the one or the other.

² Herodot. ix. 60, 61.

from the other Greeks. The Persians, on arriving within bowshot of their enemies, planted in the ground the spiked extremities of their gerrha (or long wicker shields), forming a continuous breastwork, from behind which they poured upon the Greeks a shower of arrows:¹ their bows were of the largest size, and drawn with no less power than skill. In spite of the wounds and distress thus inflicted, Pausanias persisted in the indispensable duty of offering the battlesacrifice, and the victims were for some time unfavourable, so that he did not venture to give orders for advance and close combat. Many were here wounded or slain in the ranks,² among them the brave Kallikratês, the handsomest and strongest man in the army: until Pausanias, wearied out with this compulsory and painful delay, at length raised his eyes to the conspicuous Heræum of the Platæans, and invoked the merciful intervention of Hêrê to remove that obstacle which confined him to the spot. Hardly had he pronounced the words, when the victims changed and became favourable:³ but the Tegeans, while he was yet praying, anticipated the effect and hastened forward against the enemy, followed by the Lacedæmonians as soon as Pausanias gave the word. The wicker breastwork before the Persians was soon overthrown by the Grecian charge: nevertheless the Persians, though thus deprived of their tutelary hedge and having no defensive armour, maintained the fight with individual courage, the more remarkable because it was totally unassisted by discipline or trained collective movement, against the drilled array, the regulated step, the well-defended persons, and the long spears, of the Greeks.⁴ They threw

¹ About the Persian bow, see Xenoph. Anabasis. iii. 4, 17.

² Herodot. ix. 72.

³ Herodot. ix. 62. Καὶ τοῖσι Λακεδαιμονίοισι αὐτίκα μετὰ τὴν εὐχὴν τὴν Πausanias ἐγίνετο θυομένοισι τὰ σφάγια χρηστά. Plutarch exaggerates the long-suffering of Pausanias (Aristot. c. 17, ad finem).

The lofty and conspicuous site of the Heræon, visible to Pausanias at the distance where he was, is plainly marked in Herodotus (ix. 61).

For incidents illustrating the hardships which a Grecian army endured from its reluctance to move without favourable sacrifices, see Xenophon,

Anabasis, vi. 4, 10-25; Hellenic. iii. 2, 17.

⁴ Herodot. ix. 62, 63. His words about the courage of the Persians are remarkable: λήματι μὲν νυν καὶ βῶμῃ οὐκ ἴσσορες ἦσαν οἱ Πέρσαι· ἀνοστοὶ δὲ ὄντες, καὶ πρὸς, ἀνεπιστήμονες ἦσαν, καὶ οὐκ ὁμοῖοι τοῖσι θνατοῖσι σοφίην . . . πλείστον γὰρ σφίσι ἐθελίετο ἢ ἐσθῆς ἐρήμος εὐνοῖα δειλῶν, πρὸς γὰρ δολίταις ὄντες γυμνήτες ἀγῶνα ἐποιεῦντο. Compare the striking conversation between Xerxes and Demaratus (Herodot. vii. 104).

The description given by Herodotus of the gallant rush made by these badly-

themselves upon the Lacedæmonians, seizing hold of their spears, and breaking them: many of them devoted themselves in small parties of ten to force by their bodies a way into the lines, and to get to individual close combat with the short spear and the dagger.¹ Mardonius himself, conspicuous upon a white horse, was among the foremost warriors, and the thousand select troops who formed his body-guard distinguished themselves beyond all the rest. At length he was slain by the hand of a distinguished Spartan named Acimnēstus, his thousand guards mostly perished around him, and the courage of the remaining Persians, already worn out by the superior troops against which they had been long contending, was at last thoroughly broken by the death of their general. They turned their backs and fled, not resting until they got into the wooden fortified camp, constructed by Mardonius behind the Asôpus. The Asiatic allies also, as soon as they saw the Persians defeated, took to flight without striking a blow.²

Great personal bravery of the Persians—they are totally defeated and Mardonius slain.

The Athenians on the left, meanwhile, had been engaged in a serious conflict with the Bœotians; especially the Theban leaders with the hoplites immediately around them, who fought with great bravery, but were at length driven back, after the loss of 300 of their best troops. The Theban cavalry however still maintained a good front, protecting the retreat of the infantry and checking the Athenian pursuit, so that the fugitives were enabled to reach Thebes in safety; a better refuge than the

The Athenians on the left wing defeated the Thebans.

armed Persians, upon the presented line of spears in the Lacedæmonian ranks, may be compared with Livy (xxxii. 17), a description of the Romans attacking the Macedonian phalanx,—and with the battle of Sempach (June, 1386), in which 1400 half-armed Swiss overcame a large body of fully-armed Austrians, with an impenetrable front of projecting spears; which for some time they were unable to break in upon, until at length one of their warriors, Arnold von Winkelried, grasped an armful of spears, and precipitated himself upon them, making a way for his countrymen over his dead body. See Vogelín, *Geschichte der Schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft*, ch. vi. p. 240, or indeed any history of

Switzerland, for a description of this memorable incident.

¹ For the arms of the Persians, see Herodot. vii. 61.

Herodotus states in another place that the Persian troops adopted the Egyptian breastplates (θώρακες): probably this may have been after the battle of Platæa. Even at this battle, the Persian leaders on horseback had strong defensive armour, as we may see by the case of Masistius above narrated: by the time of the battle of Kunaxa, the habit had become more widely diffused (Xenoph. *Anabasis* i. 8, 6; Brisson, *De Regno Persarum*, lib. iii. p. 361), for the cavalry at least.

² Herodot. ix. 64, 65.

Persian fortified camp.¹ With the exception of the Thebans and Bœotians, none of the other *medising* Greeks rendered any real service. Instead of sustaining or reinforcing the Thebans, they never once advanced to the charge, but merely followed in the first movement of flight. So that in point of fact the only troops in this numerous Perso-Grecian army who really fought, were, the native Persians and Sakæ on the left, and the Bœotians on the right; the former against the Lacedæmonians, the latter against the Athenians.²

Nor did even all the native Persians take part in the combat.

A body of 40,000 men under Artabazus, of whom some must doubtless have been native Persians, left the field without fighting and without loss. That general, seemingly the ablest man in the Persian army, had been from the first disgusted with the nomination of Mardonius as commander-in-chief, and had farther incurred his displeasure by deprecating any general action. Apprised that Mardonius was hastening forward to attack the retreating Greeks, he

marshalled his division and led them out towards the scene of action, though despairing of success and perhaps not very anxious that his own prophecies should be proved false. And such had been the headlong impetuosity of Mardonius in his first forward movement,—so complete his confidence of overwhelming the Greeks when he discovered their retreat,—that he took no pains to ensure the concerted action of his whole army. Accordingly before Artabazus arrived at the scene of action, he saw the Persian troops, who had been engaged under the commander-in-chief, already defeated and in flight. Without making the least attempt either to save them or to retrieve the battle, he immediately gave orders to his own division to retreat; not repairing, however, either to the fortified camp or to Thebes, but abandoning at once the whole campaign, and taking the direct road through Phokis to Thessaly, Macedonia, and the Hellespont.³

As the native Persians, the Sakæ, and the Bœotians were the only real combatants on the one side, so also were the

¹ Herodot. ix. 67, 68.

² Herodot. ix. 67, 68. τῶν δὲ ἄλλων Ἑλλήνων τῶν μετὰ βασιλείας ἰθελουκακτόντων . . . καὶ τῶν ἄλλων συμμάχων ὁ

πῶς ὁμιλος οὐτε διαμαχεσάμενος οὐδενὶ οὐτε τι ἀποδεξάμενος ἔφυγεν.

³ Herodot. ix. 66.

Lacedæmonians, Tegeans, and Athenians, on the other. It has already been mentioned that the central troops of the Grecian army, disobeying the general order of march, had gone during the night to the town of Plataea instead of to the Island. They were thus completely severed from Pausanias, and the first thing which they heard about the battle was, that the Lacedæmonians were gaining the victory. Elate with this news, and anxious to come in for some share of the honour, they rushed to the scene of action, without any heed of military order: the Corinthians taking the direct track across the hills, while the Megarians, Phliasians and others, marched by the longer route along the plain, so as to turn the hills, and arrive at the Athenian position. The Theban horse under Asôpodôrus, employed in checking the pursuit of the victorious Athenian hoplites, seeing these fresh troops coming up in thorough disorder, charged them vigorously and drove them back, to take refuge in the high ground, with the loss of 600 men.¹ But this partial success had no effect in mitigating the general defeat.

Small proportion of the armies on each side which really fought.

Following up their pursuit, the Lacedæmonians proceeded to attack the wooden redoubt wherein the Persians had taken refuge. But though they were here aided by all or most of the central Grecian divisions, who had taken no part in the battle, they were yet so ignorant of the mode of assailing walls, that they made no progress, and were completely baffled, until the Athenians arrived to their assistance. The redoubt was then stormed, not without a gallant and prolonged resistance on the part of its defenders. The Tegeans, being the first to penetrate into the interior, plundered the rich tent of Mardonius, whose manger for his horses, made of brass, remained long afterwards exhibited in their temple of Athênê Alea—while his silver-footed throne, and scimitar,² were preserved in the acropolis of Athens, along with the breastplate of Masistius. Once within the wall, effective resistance ceased, and the Greeks slaughtered without mercy as well as without limit; so that if we are to credit

The Greeks attack and carry the fortified camp.

¹ Herodot. ix. 69.

² Herodot. ix. 70; Demosthenés cont. Timokrat. p. 741, c. 33. Pausanias (i. 27, 2) doubts whether this was really

the scimitar of Mardonius, contending that the Lacedæmonians would never have permitted the Athenians to take it.

Herodotus, there survived only 3000 men out of the 300,000 which had composed the army of Mardonius—save and except the 40,000 men who accompanied Artabazus in his retreat.¹

Respecting these numbers, the historian had probably little to give except some vague reports, without any pretence of computation: about the Grecian loss his statement deserves more attention, when he tells us that there perished ninety-one Spartans, sixteen Tegeans, and fifty-two Athenians. Hercin however is not included the loss of the Megarians when attacked by the Theban cavalry, nor is the number of slain Lacedæmonians, not Spartans, specified: while even the other numbers actually stated are decidedly smaller than the probable truth, considering the multitude of Persian arrows and the unshielded right side of the Grecian hoplite. On the whole, the affirmation of Plutarch, that not less than 1360 Greeks were slain in the action appears probable: all doubtless hoplites—for little account was then made of the light-armed, nor indeed are we told that they took any active part in the battle.² Whatever may have been the numerical loss of the Persians, this defeat proved the total ruin of their army: but we may fairly presume that many were spared and sold into slavery,³ while many of the fugitives probably found means to join the retreating division of Artabazus. That general made a rapid march across Thessaly and Macedonia, keeping strict silence about the recent battle, and pretending to be sent on a special enterprise by Mardonius, whom he reported to be himself approaching. If Herodotus is correct (though it may well be doubted whether the change of sentiment in Thessaly and the other *medising*

¹ Herodot. ix. 70: compare Æschyl. Pers. 805-824. He singles out "the Dorian spear" as the great weapon of destruction to the Persians at Platea—very justly. Dr. Blomfield is surprised at this compliment; but it is to be recollected that all the earlier part of the tragedy had been employed in setting forth the glory of Athens at Salamis, and he might well afford to give the Peloponnesians the credit which they deserved at Platea. Pindar distributes the honour between Sparta and Athens in like manner (Pyth. i. 76).

² Plutarch, Aristidēs, c. 19. Klei-

demus, quoted by Plutarch, stated that all the fifty-two Athenians who perished belonged to the tribe Æantis, which distinguished itself in the Athenian ranks. But it seems impossible to believe that no citizens belonging to the other nine tribes were killed.

³ Diodorus indeed states that Pausanias was so apprehensive of the numbers of the Persians, that he forbade his soldiers to give quarter or take any prisoners (xi. 32); but this is hardly to be believed, in spite of his assertion. His statement that the Greeks lost 10,000 men is still less admissible.

Grecian states was so rapid as he implies), Artabazus succeeded in traversing these countries before the news of the battle became generally known, and then retreated by the straightest and shortest route through the interior of Thrace to Byzantium, from whence he passed into Asia. The interior tribes, unconquered and predatory, harassed his retreat considerably; but we shall find long afterwards Persian garrisons in possession of many principal places on the Thracian coast.¹ It will be seen that Artabazus subsequently rose higher than ever in the estimation of Xerxes.

Ten days did the Greeks employ after their victory, first in burying the slain, next in collecting and apportioning the booty. The Lacedæmonians, the Athenians, the Tegeans, the Megarians and the Phliasiens, each buried their dead apart, erecting a separate tomb in commemoration. The Lacedæmonians, indeed, distributed their dead into three fractions, in three several burial-places: one for those champions who enjoyed individual renown at Sparta, and among whom were included the most distinguished men slain in the recent battle, such as Poseidonius, Amompharetus the refractory captain, Philokyon, and Kallikratēs—a second for the other Spartans and Lacedæmonians²—and a third for the Helots. Besides these sepulchral monuments, erected in the neighbourhood of Platæa by those cities whose citizens had really fought and fallen, there were several similar monuments to be seen in the days of Herodotus raised by other cities which falsely pretended to the same honour, with the connivance and aid of the Platæans.³ The

Funeral
obsequies
by the
Greeks—
monuments
—dead body
of Mardo-
nius—distrib-
ution of
booty.

¹ Herodot. ix. 89. The allusions of Demosthenēs to Perdikkas king of Macedonia, who is said to have attacked the Persians on their flight from Platæa, and to have rendered their ruin complete, are too loose to deserve attention; more especially as Perdikkas was *not* then king of Macedonia (Demosthenēs cont. Aristokrat. p. 687, c. 51; and *περί Συντάξεως*, p. 173, c. 9).

² Herodot. ix. 84. Herodotus indeed assigns this second burial-place only to the other *Spartans*, apart from the Select. He takes no notice of the Lacedæmonians not Spartans, either in the battle or in reference to burial, though he had informed us that 5000 of them

were included in the army. Some of them must have been slain, and we may fairly presume that they were buried along with the Spartan citizens generally. As to the word *Ιπείας*, or *είρας*, or *Ιπείας* (the two last being both conjectural readings), it seems impossible to arrive at any certainty: we do not know by what name these select warriors were called.

³ Herodot. ix. 85. *τῶν δ' ἄλλων δοσι καὶ φαίνονται ἐν Πλαταιῇσι ἰόντες τάφοι, τούτους δὲ, ὡς ἐγὼ συνθένομαι, ἐπισχυνομένους τῇ ἀπεστοί τῆς μάχης, ἐκάστους χώματα χάσας κεινὰ, τῶν ἐπιγυνομένων εἵκεν ἀνθρώπων ἐπεὶ καὶ Αἰγινήτων ἐστὶ αὐτόθι καλεόμενοι τάφος,*

body of Mardonius was discovered among the slain, and treated with respect by Pausanias, who is even said to have indignantly repudiated advice offered to him by an Æginetan, that he should retaliate upon it the ignominious treatment inflicted by Xerxes upon the dead Leonidas.¹ On the morrow the body was stolen away and buried; by whom was never certainly known, for there were many different pretenders who obtained reward on this plea from Artyntès, the son of Mardonius. The funereal monument was yet to be seen in the time of Pausanias.²

The spoil was rich and multifarious—gold and silver in Darics as well as in implements and ornaments, carpets, splendid arms and clothing, horses, camels, &c., even the magnificent tent of Xerxes, left on his retreat with Mardonius, was included.³ By order of the general Pausanias, the Helots collected all the valuable articles into one spot for division; not without stealing many of the golden ornaments, which, in ignorance of the value, they were persuaded by the Æginetans to sell as brass. After reserving a tithe for the Delphian Apollo, together with ample offerings for the Olympic Zeus, and the Isthmian Poseidon, as well as for Pausanias as general—the remaining booty was distributed among the different contingents of the army in proportion to their respective num-

τὸν ἐγὼ ἀκούω καὶ δῖκα ἔτεσι ὑστερον μετὰ ταῦτα, βεηθέντων τῶν Ἀἰγινητῶν, χάσαι Κλεόβην τὸν Λυτοδίκου, ἑνδρα Πλαταιῶν, πρόξειον ἔοντα αὐτῶν.

This is a curious statement, derived by Herodotus doubtless from personal inquiries made at Platæa.

¹ Her. ix. 78, 79. This suggestion so abhorrent to Grecian feeling, is put by the historian into the mouth of the Æginetan Lampon. In my preceding note I have alluded to another statement made by Herodotus, not very creditable to the Æginetans: there is moreover a third (ix. 80), in which he represents them as having cheated the Helots in their purchases of the booty. We may presume him to have heard all these anecdotes at Platæa: at the time when he probably visited that place, not long before the Peloponnesian war, the inhabitants were united in the most intimate manner with Athens, and doubtless sympathised in the hatred of the

Athenians against Ægina. It does not from hence follow that the stories are all untrue. I disbelieve, indeed, the advice said to have been given by Lampon to crucify the body of Mardonius—which has more the air of a poetical contrivance for bringing out an honourable sentiment, than of a real incident. But there seems no reason to doubt the truth of the other two stories. Herodotus does but too rarely specify his informants: it is interesting to scent out the track in which his inquiries have been prosecuted.

After the battle of Kunaxa, and the death of Cyrus the younger, his dead body had the head and hands cut off, by order of Artaxerxes, and nailed to a cross (Xenoph. Anab. i. 10, 1; iii. 1, 17).

² Herodot. ix. 84; Pausanias, ix. 2, 2.

³ Herodot. ix. 80, 81: compare vii. 41-83.

bers.¹ The concubines of the Persian chiefs were among the prizes distributed : there were probably however among them many of Grecian birth, restored to their families : and one especially, overtaken in her chariot amidst the flying Persians, with rich jewels and a numerous suite, threw herself at the feet of Pausanias himself, imploring his protection. She proved to be the daughter of his personal friend Hegetoridēs of Kos, carried off by the Persian Pharandatēs ; and he had the satisfaction of restoring her to her father.² Large as the booty collected was, there yet remained many valuable treasures buried in the ground, which the Platæan inhabitants afterwards discovered and appropriated.

The real victors in the battle of Platæa were the Lacedæmonians, Athenians and Tegeans. The Corinthians and others forming part of the army opposed to Mardonius, did not reach the field until the battle was ended, though they doubtless aided both in the assault of the fortified camp and in the subsequent operations against Thebes, and were universally recognized, in inscriptions and panegyrics, among the champions who had contributed to the liberation of Greece.³ It was not till after the taking of the Persian camp that the

¹ Diodorus (xi. 33) states this proportional distribution. Herodotus only says—*ἑλαβον ἕκαστοι τῶν ἄλλοις ἥσαν* (ix. 81).

² Herodot. ix. 76, 80, 81, 82. The fate of these female companions of the Persian grandees, on the taking of the camp by an enemy, forms a melancholy picture here as well as at Issus, and even at Kunaxa : see Diodor. xvii. 35 ; Quintus Curtius, iii. xi. 21 ; Xenoph. Anab. i. 10, 2.

³ Plutarch animadverts severely (De Malign. Herodot. p. 873 ; compare Plut. Aristeid. c. 19) upon Herodotus, because he states that none of the Greeks had any share in the battle of Platæa except the Lacedæmonians, Tegeans, and Athenians : the orator Lysias repeats the same statement (Oratio Funeb. c. 9). If this were the fact (Plutarch asks) how comes it that the inscriptions and poems of the time recognise the exploit as performed by the whole Grecian army, Corinthians and others included ? But these inscriptions do not really contradict what is affirmed

by Herodotus. The actual battle was fought only by a part of the collective Grecian army ; but this happened in a great measure by accident ; the rest were little more than a mile off, and until within a few hours had been occupying part of the same continuous line of position : moreover, if the battle had lasted a little longer, they would have come up in time to render actual help. They would naturally be considered, therefore, as entitled to partake in the glory of the entire result.

When however in after-times a stranger visited Platæa, and saw Lacedæmonian, Tegean, and Athenian tombs, but no Corinthian nor Æginetan, &c., he would naturally enquire how it happened that none of these latter had fallen in the battle, and would then be informed that they were not really present at it. Hence the motive for these cities to erect empty sepulchral monuments on the spot, as Herodotus informs us that they afterwards did or caused to be done by individual Platæans.

contingents of Elis and Mantinea, who may perhaps have been among the convoys prevented by the Persian cavalry from descending the passes of Kithæron, first reached the scene of action. Mortified at having missed their share in the glorious exploit, the new-comers were at first eager to set off in pursuit of Artabazus; but the Lacedæmonian commander forbade them, and they returned home without any other consolation than that of banishing their generals for not having led them forth more promptly.¹

There yet remained the most efficient ally of Mardonius—the city of Thebes; which Pausanias summoned on the eleventh day after the battle, requiring that the *medising* leaders should be delivered up, especially Timægenidas and Attaginus. On receiving a refusal, he began to batter their walls, and to adopt the still more effective measure of laying waste their territory; giving notice that the work of destruction would be continued until these chiefs were given up. After twenty days of endurance, the chiefs at length proposed, if it should prove that Pausanias peremptorily required their persons and refused to accept a sum of money in commutation, to surrender themselves voluntarily as the price of liberation for their country. A negotiation was accordingly entered into with Pausanias, and the persons demanded were surrendered to him, excepting Attaginus, who found means to escape at the last moment. His sons, whom he left behind, were delivered up as substitutes, but Pausanias refused to touch them, with the just remark, which in those times was even generous,² that they were nowise implicated in the *medism* of their father. Timægenidas and the remaining prisoners were carried off to Corinth and immediately put to death, without the smallest discussion or form of trial: Pausanias was apprehensive that if any delay or consultation were granted, their wealth and that of their friends would effectually purchase voices for their acquittal,—indeed the prisoners themselves had been induced to give themselves up partly in that expectation.³ It is remarkable that Pausanias himself only a few years afterwards

Pausanias summons Thebes, requiring the surrender of the leaders—these men give themselves up and are put to death.

¹ Herodot. ix. 77.

² See, a little above in this chapter, the treatment of the wife and children of the Athenian senator Lykidas

(Herodot. ix. 5). Compare also Herodot. iii. 116; ix. 120.

³ Herodot. ix. 87, 88.

when attainted of treason, returned and surrendered himself at Sparta under similar hopes of being able to buy himself off by money.¹ In this hope indeed he found himself deceived, as Timægenidas had been deceived before: but the fact is not the less to be noted as indicating the general impression that the leading men in a Grecian city were usually open to bribes in judicial matters, and that individuals superior to this temptation were rare exceptions. I shall have occasion to dwell upon this recognized untrustworthiness of the leading Greeks when I come to explain the extremely popular cast of the Athenian judicature.

Whether there was any positive vote taken among the Greeks respecting the prize of valour at the battle of Platæa may well be doubted: and the silence of Herodotus goes far to negative an important statement of Plutarch, that the Athenians and Lacedæmonians were on the point of coming to an open rupture, each thinking themselves entitled to the prize—that Aristeidēs appeased the Athenians, and prevailed upon them to submit to the general decision of the allies—and that Megarian and Corinthian leaders contrived to elude the dangerous rock by bestowing the prize on the Platæans, to which proposition both Aristeidēs and Pausanias acceded.² But it seems that the general opinion recognized the Lacedæmonians and Pausanias as bravest among the brave, seeing that they had overcome the best troops of the enemy and slain the general. In burying their dead warriors, the Lacedæmonians singled out for peculiar distinction Philokyon, Poseidonius, and Amompharetus the lochage, whose conduct in the fight atoned for his disobedience to orders. There was one Spartan however who had surpassed them all—Aristodēmus, the single survivor of the troop of Leonidas at Thermopylæ. Having ever since experienced nothing but disgrace and insult from his fellow-citizens, this unfortunate man had become reckless of life, and

Honours and distinctions among the Greek warriors.

¹ Thucyd. i. 131. καὶ πιστεύων χρημασί διαλύσειν τὴν διαβολήν. Compare Thucyd. viii. 45, where he states that the trierarchs and generals of the Lacedæmonian and allied fleet (all except Hermokratēs of Syracuse) received bribes from Tissaphernes to betray the interests both of their seamen and of their

country; also c. 49 of the same book about the Lacedæmonian general Astyochus. The bribes received by the Spartan kings Leotychidēs and Pleistoanax are recorded (Herodot. vi. 72; Thucyd. ii. 21).

² Plutarch, Aristeidēs, c. 20; De Herodot. Malign. p. 873.

at Plataea he stepped forth single-handed from his place in the ranks, performing deeds of the most heroic valour and determined to regain by his death the esteem of his countrymen. But the Spartans refused to assign to him the same funereal honours as were paid to the other distinguished warriors, who had manifested exemplary forwardness and skill, yet without any desperate rashness, and without any previous taint such as to render life a burthen to them. Subsequent valour might be held to efface this taint, but could not suffice to exalt Aristodæmus to a level with the most honoured citizens.¹

But though we cannot believe the statement of Plutarch that the Plataeans received by general vote the prize of valour, it is certain that they were largely honoured and recompensed, as the proprietors of that ground on which the liberation of Greece had been achieved. The market-place and centre of their town was selected as the scene for the solemn sacrifice of thanksgiving, offered up by Pausanias after the battle, to Zeus Eleutherius, in the name and presence of all the assembled allies. The local gods and heroes of the Plataean territory who had been invoked in prayer before the battle, and who had granted their soil as a propitious field for the Greek arms, were made partakers of the ceremony, and witnesses as well as guarantees of the engagements with which it was accompanied.² The Plataeans, now re-entering their city, which the Persian invasion had compelled them to desert, were invested with the honourable duty of celebrating the periodical sacrifice in commemoration of this great victory, as well as of rendering care and religious service at the tombs of the fallen warriors. As an aid to enable them to discharge this obligation, which probably might have pressed hard upon them at a time when their city was half-ruined and their fields unsown, they received out of the prize-money the large allotment of eighty talents, which was partly employed in building and adorning a handsome temple of Athênê—the symbol probably of renewed connexion with Athens. They undertook to render religious honours every year to the tombs

Reverential
tribute to
Plataea, as
the scene of
the victory,
and to the
Plataeans;
solemnities
decreed to be
periodically
celebrated
by the latter,
in honour of
the slain.

¹ Herodot. ix. 71, 72.

² Thucyd. ii. 71, 72. So the Roman Emperor Vitellius, on visiting the field of Bebricum where his troops had

recently been victorious, "instaurabat sacrum Diis loci" (Tacitus, *Hist.* ii. 70).

of the warriors, and to celebrate in every fifth year the grand public solemnity of the Eleutheria with gymnastic matches analogous to the other great festival games of Greece.¹ In consideration of the discharge of these duties, together with the sanctity of the ground, Pausanias and the whole body of allies, bound themselves by oath to guarantee the autonomy of Platæa, and the inviolability of her territory. This was an emancipation of the town from the bond of the Bœotian federation, and from the enforcing supremacy of Thebes as its chief.

But the engagement of the allies appears to have had other objects also, larger than that of protecting Platæa, or establishing commemorative ceremonies. The defensive league against the Persians was again sworn to by all of them, and rendered permanent. An aggregate force of 10,000 hoplites, 1000 cavalry, and 100 triremes, for the purpose of carrying on the war, was agreed to and promised, the contingent of each ally being specified. Moreover the town of Platæa was fixed on as the annual place of meeting, where deputies from all of them were annually to assemble.²

Permanent
Grecian con-
federacy de-
creed by the
victors to
hold meet-
ings at
Platæa.

This resolution is said to have been adopted on the proposition of Aristeidês, whose motives it is not difficult to trace. Though the Persian army had sustained a signal defeat, no one knew how soon it might re-assemble, or be reinforced. Indeed, even later, after the battle of Mykalê had become known, a fresh invasion of the Persians was still regarded as not improbable;³ nor did any one then anticipate that extraordinary fortune and activity whereby the Athenians afterwards organized an alliance such as to throw Persia on the defensive. Moreover, the northern half of Greece was still *medising*, either in reality or in appearance, and new efforts on the part of Xerxes might probably keep

¹ Thucyd. ii. 71; Plutarch, Aristeidês, c. 19-21; Strabo, ix. p. 412; Pausanias, ix. 2, 4.

The Eleutheria were celebrated on the fourth of the Attic month Bœdromion, which was the day on which the battle itself was fought; while the annual decoration of the tombs, and ceremonies in honour of the deceased,

took place on the sixteenth of the Attic month Mæmaktêrion. K. F. Hermann (Gottesdienstliche Alterthümer der Griechen, ch. 63, note 9) has treated these two celebrations as if they were one.

² Plutarch, Aristeidês, c. 21.

³ Thucyd. i. 90.

up his ascendancy in those parts. Now assuming the war to be renewed, Aristeidēs and the Athenians had the strongest interest in providing a line of defence which should cover Attica as well as Peloponnesus; and in preventing the Peloponnesians from confining themselves to their Isthmus, as they had done before. To take advantage for this purpose of the new-born reverence and gratitude which now bound the Lacedæmonians to Platæa, was an idea eminently suitable to the moment; though the unforeseen subsequent start of Athens, combined with other events, prevented both the extensive alliance and the inviolability of Platæa, projected by Aristeidēs, from taking effect.¹

On the same day that Pausanias and the Grecian land army conquered at Platæa, the naval armament under Leotychidēs and Xanthippus was engaged in operations hardly less important at Mykalē on the Asiatic coast. The Grecian commanders of the fleet (which numbered 110 triremes), having advanced as far as Delos, were afraid to proceed farther eastward, or to undertake any offensive operations against the Persians at Samos, for the rescue of Ionia—although Ionian envoys, especially from Chios and Samos, had urgently solicited aid both at Sparta and at Delos. Three Samians, one of them named Hegesistratus, came to assure Leotychidēs, that their countrymen were ready to revolt from the despot Theomēstor,

Proceedings
of the
Grecian
fleet: it
moves to the
rescue of
Samos from
the Persians.

¹ It is to this general and solemn meeting, held at Platæa after the victory, that we might probably refer another vow noticed by the historians and orators of the subsequent century, if that vow were not of suspicious authenticity. The Greeks, while promising faithful attachment, and continued peaceful dealing among themselves, and engaging at the same time to amerce in a tithe of their property all who had *medised*—are said to have vowed that they would not repair or rebuild the temples which the Persian invader had burnt; but would leave them in their half-ruined condition as a monument of his sacrilege. Some of the injured temples near Athens were seen in their half-burnt state even by the traveller Pausanias (x. 35, 2), in his time. Periklēs, forty years after the battle, tried to convoke a Pan-Hellenic assembly at Athens,

for the purpose of deliberating what should be done with these temples (Plutarch, Periklēs, c. 17). Yet Theopompus pronounced this alleged oath to be a fabrication, though both the orator Lykurgus and Diodorus profess to report it verbatim. We may safely assert that the oath, *as they give it*, is not genuine; but perhaps the vow of tithing those who had voluntarily joined Xerxes, which Herodotus refers to an earlier period, when success was doubtful, may not have been renewed in the moment of victory: see Diodor. ix. 29; Lykurgus cont. Leokrat. c. 19, p. 193; Polybius, ix. 33; Isokratēs, Or. iv.; Panegy. c. 41, p. 74; Theopompus, Fragm. 167, ed. Didot; Suidas, v. *Δεκατέμειον*, Cicero de Republicā, iii. 9, and the beginning of the chapter last but one preceding, of this History.

whom the Persians had installed there, so soon as the Greek fleet should appear off the island. In spite of emphatic appeals to the community of religion and race, Leotychidēs was long deaf to the entreaty; but his reluctance gradually gave way before the persevering earnestness of the orator. While yet not thoroughly determined, he happened to ask the Samian speaker what was his name. To which the latter replied, "Hegesistratus, *i. e.* army-leader." "I accept Hegesistratus as an omen (replied Leotychidēs, struck with the significance of this name), pledge thou thy faith to accompany us—let thy companions prepare the Samians to receive us, and we will go forthwith." Engagements were at once exchanged, and while the other two envoys were sent forward to prepare matters in the island, Hegesistratus remained to conduct the fleet, which was farther encouraged by favourable sacrifices, and by the assurances of the prophet Delphonus, hired from the Corinthian colony of Apollonia.¹

When they reached the Heræum near Kalami in Samos,² and had prepared themselves for a naval engagement, they discovered that the enemy's fleet had already been withdrawn from the island to the neighbouring continent. For the Persian commanders had been so disheartened with the defeat of Salamis that they were not disposed to fight again at sea: we do not know the numbers of their fleet, but perhaps a considerable proportion of it may have consisted of Ionic Greeks, whose fidelity was now very doubtful. Having abandoned the idea of a sea-fight, they permitted their Phœnician squadron to depart, and sailed with their remaining fleet to the promon-

The Persian fleet abandons Samos and retires to Mykalē in Ionia.

¹ Herodot. ix. 91, 92, 95; viii. 132, 133. The prophet of Mardonius at Plataea bore the name—Hegesistratus: and was probably the more highly esteemed for it (Herodot. ix. 37).

Diodorus states the fleet as comprising 250 triremes (xl. 34).

The anecdotes respecting the Apolloniate Euenius, the father of Delphonus, will be found curious and interesting (Herodot. ix. 93, 94). Euenius, as a recompense for having been unjustly blinded by his countrymen, had received from the gods the grant of prophecy transmissible to his descendants: a new

prophetic family was thus created, alongside of the Iamids, Telliads, Klytiads, &c.

² Herodot. ix. 96. *ἐπεὶ δὲ ἐγένοντο τῆς Σαμῆς πρὸς Καλάμοισι, οἱ μὲν αὐτοῦ ὁρμισμένοι κατὰ τὸ Ἑραῖον τὸ ταῦτα, παρεσκευάζοντο ἐς ναυμαχίην.*

It is by no means certain that the Heræum here indicated is the celebrated temple which stood near the city of Samos (iii. 80): the words of Herodotus rather seem to indicate that another temple of Hêrê, in some other part of the island, is intended.

tory of Mykalê near Miletus.¹ Here they were under the protection of a land-force of 60,000 men, under the command of Tigranês—the main reliance of Xerxes for the defence of Ionia. The ships were dragged ashore, and a rampart of stones and stakes was erected to protect them, while the defending army lined the shore, and seemed amply sufficient to repel attack from seaward.²

It was not long before the Greek fleet arrived. Disappointed of their intention of fighting, by the flight of the enemy from Samos, they had at first proposed either to return home, or to turn aside to the Hellespont: but they were at last persuaded by the Ionian envoys to pursue the enemy's fleet and again offer battle at Mykalê. On reaching that point, they discovered that the Persians had abandoned the sea, intending to fight only on land. So much had the Greeks now become emboldened, that they ventured to disembark and attack the united land-force and sea-force before them. But since much of their chance of success depended on the desertion of the Ionians, the first proceeding of Leotychidês was, to copy the previous manœuvre of Themistoklês, when retreating from Artemisium, at the watering-places of Eubœa. Sailing along close to the coast, he addressed, through a herald of loud voice, earnest appeals to the Ionians among the enemy to revolt; calculating, even if they did not listen to him, that he should at least render them mistrusted by the Persians. He then disembarked his troops, and marshalled them for the purpose of attacking the Persian camp on land: while the Persian generals, surprised by this daring manifestation and suspecting, either from his manœuvre, or from previous evidences, that the Ionians were in secret collusion with him, ordered the Samian contingent to be disarmed, and the Milesians to retire to the rear of the army, for the purpose of occupying the

¹ Herodotus describes the Persian position by topographical indications known to his readers, but not open to be determined by us—Gæson, Skolopœis, the chapel of Dêmêtêr, built by Philistus one of the primitive colonists of Miletus, &c. (ix. 96): from the language of Herodotus, we may suppose that Gæson was the name of a town as well as of a river (Euphorus ap. Athenæ.

vi. p. 311).

The eastern promontory (Cape Poseidion) of Samos was separated only by seven stadia from Mykalê (Strabo, xiv. p. 637), near to the place where Glankê was situated (Thucyd. viii. 79)—modern observers make the distance rather more than a mile (Poppo, Prolegg. ap. Thucyd. vol. ii. p. 465).

² Herodot. ix. 96, 97.

various mountain roads up to the summit of Mykalé—with which the latter were familiar as a part of their own territory.¹

Serving as these Greeks in the fleet were, at a distance from their own homes, and having left a powerful army of Persians and Greeks under Mardonius in Bœotia, they were of course full of anxiety lest his arms might prove victorious and extinguish the freedom of their country. It was under these feelings of solicitude for their absent brethren that they disembarked, and were made ready for attack by the afternoon. But it was the afternoon of an ever-memorable day—the 4th of the month Boëdromion (about September), 479 B.C. By a remarkable coincidence, the victory of Plataea in Bœotia had been gained by Pausanias that very morning. At the moment when the Greeks were advancing to the charge, a divine Phê mê or message flew into the camp. Whilst a herald's staff was seen floated to the shore by the western wave, the symbol of electric transmission across the Ægean—the revelation, sudden, simultaneous, irresistible, struck at once upon the minds of all, as if the multitude had one common soul and sense, acquainting them that on that very morning their countrymen in Bœotia had gained a complete victory over Mardonius. At once the previous anxiety was dissipated, and the whole army, full of joy and confidence, charged with redoubled energy. Such is the account given by Herodotus,² and

The Greeks land to attack the Persians ashore—revelation of the victory of Plataea, gained by their countrymen on the same morning, is communicated to them before the battle.

¹ Herodot. ix. 98, 99, 104.

² Herodot. ix. 100, 101. *ἰούσι δὲ σφί (Ἑλλήσι) φήμη τε ἐσέπτατο ἐς τὸ στρατόπεδον πᾶν, καὶ κηρυκῶν ἐφάνη ἐπὶ τῆς κυματώγῃς κείμενον. ἡ δὲ φήμη διήλθ' ἐς σφί ὧδε, ὡς οἱ Ἕλληνες τὴν Μαρδονίου στρατὸν νικῶν ἐν Βοιωτίῃ μαχόμενοι. Δῆλα δὲ πολλοῖσι τεκμηρίοις ἐστὶ τὰ θεῖα τῶν πρηγμάτων εἰ καὶ τότε τῆς αὐτῆς ἡμέρης συμπτουμένης τοῦ τε ἐν Πλαταιῇσι καὶ τοῦ ἐν Μυκᾷ μύλλοντος ἵστασθαι τράματος, φήμη τοῖσι Ἕλλησι τοῖσι ταύτῃ ἰσαπέκετο, ὥστε θαρσύναι τε τὴν στρατὸν πολλῶ μᾶλλον, καὶ δόξειεν προθυμότερον κινδυνεύειν. . . γιγνέσθαι δὲ νίκην τῶν μετὰ Πανσάνειον Ἑλλήνων ὁρθῶς σφί ἡ φήμη συνέβαινε ἐλθούσῃ· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐν Πλαταιῇσι πρῶτ' ἐπὶ τῆς ἡμέρης ἐγένετο· τὸ δὲ ἐν Μυκᾷ, περὶ δελφῶν. . . ἣν δὲ ἀρβύδι*

σφί πρὶν τὴν φήμην ἰσαπείσθαι, οὐκ ἐπὶ σφίον αὐτῶν οὕτω, ὡς τῶν Ἑλλήνων, μὴ περὶ Μαρδονίου πάλῃ ἡ Ἑλλάς. ὡς μύθοι ἡ κληθὼν αὕτη σφί ἐσέπτατο, μᾶλλον τι καὶ ταχύτερον τὴν πρόσθεν ἰποικύοντο: compare Plutarch, Paul. Emilius, c. 24, 25, about the battle of Pydna.—The φήμη which circulated through the assembled army of Mardonius in Bœotia, respecting his intention to kill the Phokians, turned out incorrect (Herodot. ix. 17).

Two passages in Æschines (cont. Timarchum, c. 27, p. 57, and De Fals. Legat. c. 45, p. 290) are peculiarly valuable as illustrating the ancient idea of *Φήμη*—a divine voice or vocal goddess, generally considered as informing a crowd of persons at once, or moving them all by one and the same unanimous feeling—the *Vox Dei* passing into the

doubtless universally accepted in his time, when the combatants of Mykalé were alive to tell their own story. He

Vox Populi. There was an altar to $\Phi\eta\mu\eta$ at Athens (Pausan. i. 17, 1); compare Hesiod. Opp. Di. 761, and the "Ossa of Homer, which is essentially the same idea as $\Phi\eta\mu\eta$: Iliad, ii. 93. $\mu\epsilon\tau\acute{\alpha}\ \delta\epsilon\ \sigma\phi\iota\sigma\iota\upsilon\ \text{"O}\sigma\sigma\alpha\ \delta\epsilon\delta\eta\epsilon\iota\ \text{"O}\sigma\tau\acute{\rho}\nu\omicron\upsilon\sigma\alpha\ \acute{\iota}\nu\alpha\iota,\ \Delta\iota\omicron\varsigma\ \delta\gamma\gamma\epsilon\lambda\omicron\varsigma$; also Odyssey, i. 282—opposed to the idea of a distinct human speaker or informant— $\eta\gamma\ \tau\iota\varsigma\ \tau\omicron\iota\ \epsilon\lambda\epsilon\gamma\sigma\iota\ \beta\tau\omicron\tau\omega\acute{\nu},\ \eta\ \text{"O}\sigma\sigma\alpha\ \acute{\alpha}\kappa\omicron\upsilon\sigma\eta\ \text{"E}\kappa\ \Delta\iota\omicron\delta\iota,\ \eta\tau\epsilon\ \mu\acute{\alpha}\lambda\iota\sigma\tau\alpha\ \phi\acute{\epsilon}\rho\epsilon\iota\ \kappa\lambda\acute{\iota}\omicron\varsigma\ \acute{\alpha}\nu\theta\rho\acute{\omega}\pi\omicron\iota\varsigma$; and Odyssey. xxiv. 412. $\text{"O}\sigma\sigma\alpha\ \delta'\ \acute{\alpha}\rho'\ \delta\gamma\gamma\epsilon\lambda\omicron\varsigma\ \acute{\alpha}\kappa\alpha\ \kappa\alpha\tau\acute{\alpha}\ \pi\acute{\omicron}\lambda\iota\upsilon\ \phi\chi\epsilon\tau\omicron\ \pi\acute{\alpha}\nu\tau\eta,\ \mu\eta\chi\sigma\tau\acute{\eta}\rho\alpha\iota\ \sigma\tau\upsilon\gamma\epsilon\rho\acute{\omicron}\nu\ \theta\acute{\alpha}\nu\alpha\tau\omicron\iota\ \kappa\alpha\iota\ \kappa\acute{\eta}\rho'\ \acute{\iota}\nu\acute{\epsilon}\kappa\omicron\upsilon\sigma\alpha$. The word $\kappa\lambda\eta\delta\acute{\omega}\nu$ is used in the same meaning by Sophoklēs, Philoktet. 255: $\kappa\lambda\eta\delta\acute{\omega}\nu$ at Smyrna had altars as a goddess, Aristeidēs, Orat. xl. p. 507, ed. Dindorf, p. 754 (see Andokidēs de Mysteriis, c. 22, p. 64): Herodotus in the passage now before us considers the two as identical—compare also Herodot. v. 72. Both words are used also to signify an omen conveyed by some undesigned human word or speech, which in that particular case is considered as determined by the special intervention of the gods, for the information of some person who hears it: see Homer, Odyssey. xx. 100: compare also Aristophan. Aves, 719: Sophoklēs, *Œdip. Tyr.* 43-472; Xenophon, *Symposion*, c. 14, s. 48.

The descriptions of *Fama* by Virgil, *Æneid*, iv. 176 *seq.*, and Ovid, *Metamorph.* xii. 40 *seq.*, are more diffuse and overcharged, departing from the simplicity of the Greek conception.

We may notice, as partial illustrations of what is here intended, those sudden, unaccountable impressions of panic terror which occasionally ran through the ancient armies or assembled multitudes, and which were supposed to be produced by Pan or by Nymphs—indeed sudden, violent and contagious impressions of every kind, not merely of fear. Livy, x. 28. "Victorem equitatum velut *lymphaticus* pavor dissipat," ix. 27. "Milites, incertum ob quam causam, *lymphatis* similes ad arma discurrunt"—in Greek $\nu\mu\phi\acute{\omicron}\lambda\eta\pi\tau\omicron\iota$: compare Polyæn. iv. 3, 26, and an instructive note of Mültel, ad Quint. Curt. iv. 46, 1 (iv. 12, 14).

But I cannot better illustrate that idea which the Greeks invested with

divinity under the name of $\Phi\eta\mu\eta$ than by transcribing a striking passage from M. Michelet's *Histoire de la Révolution Française*. The illustration is the more instructive, because the religious point of view, which in Herodotus is predominant,—and which, to the believing mind, furnishes an explanation pre-eminently satisfactory—has passed away in the historian of the nineteenth century, and gives place to a graphic description of the real phenomenon, of high importance in human affairs; the common susceptibilities, common inspiration, and common spontaneous impulse, of a multitude, effacing for the time each man's separate individuality.

M. Michelet is about to describe that ever-memorable event—the capture of the Bastille, on the 14th of July, 1789 (ch. vii. vol. i. p. 105).

"Versailles, avec un gouvernement organisé, un roi, des ministres, un général, une armée, n'étoit qu'une bésitation, doute, incertitude, dans la plus complète anarchie morale.

"Paris, bouleversé, délaissé de toute autorité légale, dans un désordre apparent, atteignit, le 14 Juillet, ce qui moralement est l'ordre le plus profond, l'unanimité des esprits.

"Le 13 Juillet, Paris ne songeait qu'à se défendre. Le 14, il attaqua.

"Le 13, au soir, il y avoit encore des doutes, il n'y en eut plus le matin. Le soir étoit plein de troubles, de fureur désordonnée. Le matin fut lumineux et d'une sérénité terrible.

"Une idole se leva sur Paris avec le jour, et tous virent la même lumière. Une lumière dans les esprits, et dans chaque cœur une voix: Va, et tu prendras la Bastille!

"Cela étoit impossible, insensé, étrange à dire; . . . Et tous le crurent néanmoins. Et cela se fit.

"La Bastille, pour être une vieille forteresse, n'en étoit pas moins impenetrable, à moins d'y mettre plusieurs jours, et beaucoup d'artillerie. Le peuple n'avoit en cette crise ni le temps ni les moyens de faire un siège régulier. L'eût-il fait, la Bastille n'avoit pas à craindre, ayant assez de vivres pour attendre un secours si proche, et d'immenses munitions de guerre. Ses murs

moreover mentions another of those coincidences which the Greek mind always seized upon with so much avidity: there was a chapel of the Eleusinian Dêmêtêr close to the field of battle at Mykalé, as well as at Plataæ. Diodorus and other later writers,¹ who wrote when the impressions of the time had vanished, and when divine interventions were less easily and literally admitted, treat the whole proceeding as if it were a report designedly circulated by the generals, for the purpose of encouraging their army.

The Lacedæmonians on the right wing, and the portion of the army near them, had a difficult path before them, over hilly ground and ravine; while the Athenians, Corinthians, Sikyonians and Trœzenians, and the left half of the army, marching only along the beach, came much sooner into conflict with the enemy. The Persians, as at Plataæ, employed their *gerrha*, or wicker bucklers planted by spikes in the ground, as a breastwork, from behind which they discharged their arrows; and they made a strenuous resistance to prevent this defence from being overthrown. Ultimately, the Greeks succeeded in demolishing it; driving the enemy into the interior of the fortification, where they in vain tried to maintain themselves against the ardour of their pursuers, who forced their way into it almost along with the defenders. Even when this last

Battle of Mykalé—revolt of the Ionians in the Persian camp—complete defeat of the Persians.

de dix pieds d'épaisseur au sommet des tours, de trente et quarante à la base, pouvaient rire longtemps des boulets: et ses batteries, à elle, dont le feu plongeait sur Paris, auroient pu en attendant démolir tout le Marais, tout le Faubourg St. Antoine.

"L'attaque de la Bastille ne fut un acte nullement raisonnable. Ce fut un acte de foi.

"*Personne ne proposa. Mais tous crurent et tous agirent.* Le long des rues, des quais, des ponts, des boulevards, la foule criait à la foule—À la Bastille—à la Bastille. Et dans le tocsin qui sonnoit, tous entendoient: A la Bastille.

"*Personne, je le répète, ne donna l'impulsion.* Les parleurs du Palais Royal passèrent le temps à dresser une liste de proscription, à juger à mort la Reine, le Polignac, Artois, le prévôt Flesselles, d'autres encore. Les noms

des vainqueurs de la Bastille n'offrent pas un seul des faiseurs de motions. Le Palais Royal ne fut pas le point de départ, et ce n'est pas non plus au Palais Royal que les vainqueurs ramenèrent les dépouilles et les prisonniers.

"Encore moins les électeurs qui siégeaient à l'Hôtel de ville eurent-ils l'idée de l'attaque. Loin de là, pour l'empêcher, pour prévenir le carnage que la Bastille pouvoit faire si aisément, ils allèrent jusqu'à promettre au gouverneur, que s'il retirait ses canons, on ne l'attaquerait pas. Les électeurs ne trahissoient pas comme ils en furent accusés: mais ils n'avoient pas la foi.

"Qui l'eut? Celui qui eut aussi le dévouement, la force, pour accomplir sa foi. Qui? Le peuple, tout le monde."

¹ Diodor. xi. 35; Polyæn. i. 33. Justin (ii. 14) is astonished in relating "tantam famæ velocitatem."

rampart was carried, and when the Persian allies had fled, the native Persians still continued to prolong the struggle with undiminished bravery. Unpractised in line and drill, and acting only in small knots,¹ with disadvantages of armour such as had been felt severely at Plataea, they still maintained an unequal conflict with the Greek hoplites; nor was it until the Lacedæmonians with their half of the army arrived to join in the attack that the defence was abandoned as hopeless. The revolt of the Ionians in the camp put the finishing stroke to this ruinous defeat. First, the disarmed Samians—next, other Ionians and Æolians—lastly, the Milesians, who had been posted to guard the passes in the rear—not only deserted, but took an active part in the attack. The Milesians especially, to whom the Persians had trusted for guidance up to the summits of Mykalê, led them by wrong roads, threw them into the hands of their pursuers, and at last set upon them with their own hands. A large number of the native Persians, together with both the generals of the land-force, Tigranês and Mardontês, perished in this disastrous battle: the two Persian admirals, Artayntês and Ithamithrês, escaped, but the army was irretrievably dispersed, while all the ships which had been dragged up on the shore fell into the hands of the assailants, and were burnt. But the victory of the Greeks was by no means bloodless. Among the left wing, upon which the brunt of the action had fallen, a considerable number of men were slain, especially Sikyonians, with their commander Perilaus.² The honours of the battle were awarded, first to the Athenians, next to the Corinthians, Sikyonians, and Træzenians; the Lacedæmonians having done comparatively little. Hermolykus the Athenian, a celebrated pankratiast, was the warrior most distinguished for individual feats of arms.³

The dispersed Persian army, so much of it at least as had at first found protection on the heights of Mykalê, was withdrawn from the coast forthwith to Sardis under the com-

¹ Herodot. ix. 102, 103. Οἷνοι δὲ (Πέρσαι), κατ' ὀλίγους γινόμενοι, ἐμάχοντο τοῖσι αἰεὶ ἐς τὸ τεῖχος ἐσπίπτονται Ἕλλησιν.

² Herodot. ix. 104, 105. Diodorus (xi. 36) seems to follow different authorities from Herodotus: his statement

varies in many particulars, but is less probable.

Herodotus does not specify the loss on either side, nor Diodorus that of the Greeks; but the latter says that 40,000 Persians and allies were slain.

³ Herodot. ix. 105.

mand of Artayntês, whom Masistês, the brother of Xerxes, bitterly reproached on the score of cowardice in the recent defeat. The general was at length so mad-
 dened by a repetition of these insults, that he drew his scimitar and would have slain Masistês, had he not been prevented by a Greek of Halikarnassus named Xenagoras,¹ who was rewarded by Xerxes with the government of Kilikia. Xerxes was still at Sardis, where he had remained ever since his return, and where he conceived a passion for the wife of his brother Masistês. The consequences of his passion entailed upon that unfortunate woman sufferings too tragical to be described, by the orders of his own queen, the jealous and savage Amêstris.² But he had no fresh army ready to send down to the coast ; so that the Greek cities, even on the continent, were for the time practically liberated from Persian supremacy, while the insular Greeks were in a position of still greater safety.

Retirement of the defeated Persian army to Sardis.

The commanders of the victorious Grecian fleet, having full confidence in their power of defending the islands, willingly admitted the Chians, Samians, Lesbians, and the other islanders hitherto subjects of Persia, to the protection and reciprocal engagements of their alliance. We may presume that the despots Strattis and Theomêstor were expelled from Chios and Samos.³ But the Peloponnesian commanders hesitated in guaranteeing the same secure autonomy to the continental cities, which could not be upheld against the great inland power without efforts incessant as well as exhausting. Nevertheless not enduring to abandon these continental Ionians to the mercy of Xerxes, they made the offer to transplant them into European Greece, and to make room for them by expelling the *medising* Greeks from their seaport towns. But this proposition was at once repudiated by the Athenians, who would not permit that colonies originally planted by themselves should be abandoned, thus impairing the metropolitan dignity of Athens.⁴ The Lace-

Reluctance of the Spartans to adopt the continental Ionians into their alliance—proposition to transport them across the Ægean into Western Greece—rejected by the Athenians.

¹ Herodot. ix. 107. I do not know whether we may suppose Herodotus to have heard this from his fellow-citizen Xenagoras.

² Herodot. ix. 108-113. He gives

the story at considerable length: it illustrates forcibly and painfully the interior of the Persian regal palace.

³ Herodot. viii. 132.

⁴ Herodot. ix. 106; Diodor. xi. 37.

dæmonians readily acquiesced in this objection, and were glad, in all probability, to find honourable grounds for renouncing a scheme of wholesale dispossession eminently difficult to execute¹—yet at the same time to be absolved from onerous obligations towards the Ionians, and to throw upon Athens either the burden of defending or the shame of abandoning them. The first step was thus taken, which we shall quickly see followed by others, for giving to Athens a separate ascendancy and separate duties in regard to the Asiatic Greeks, and for introducing first, the confederacy of Delos—next, Athenian maritime empire.

From the coast of Ionia the Greek fleet sailed northward to the Hellespont, chiefly at the instance of the Athenians, and for the purpose of breaking down the Xerxeian bridge. For so imperfect was their information, that they believed this bridge to be still firm and in passable condition in September 479 B.C., though it had been broken and useless at the time when Xerxes crossed the strait in his retreat, ten months before (about November 480 B.C.).² Having ascertained on their arrival at Abydos the destruction of the bridge, Leotychidēs and the Peloponnesians returned home forthwith; but Xanthippus with the Athenian squadron resolved to remain and expel the Persians from the Thracian Chersonese. This peninsula had been in great part an Athenian possession, for the space of more than forty years, from the first settlement of the elder Miltiadēs³ down to the suppression of the Ionic revolt, although during part of that time tributary to Persia. From the flight of the second Miltiadēs to the expulsion of Xerxes from Greece (493-480 B.C.), a period during which the Persian monarch was irre-

The Grecian fleet sails to the Hellespont: the Spartans return home, but the Athenians remain to attack the Chersonese.

The latter represents the Ionians and Æolians as having actually consented to remove into European Greece, and indeed the Athenians themselves as having at first consented to it, though the latter afterwards repented and opposed the scheme.

¹ Such wholesale transportations of population from one continent to another have always been more or less in the habits of Oriental despots, the Persians in ancient times and the Turks in more modern times: to a conjunction

of free states like the Greeks they must have been impracticable.

See Von Hammer, *Geschichte des Osmanischen Reichs*, vol. i. book vi. p. 251, for the forced migrations of people from Asia into Europe directed by the Turkish Sultan Bajazet (A.D. 1390-1400).

² Herodot. viii. 115, 117; ix. 106, 114.

³ See the preceding volume of this History, ch. xxx., ch. xxxiv., ch. xxxv.

sistible and full of hatred to Athens, no Athenian citizen would find it safe to live there. But the Athenian squadron from Mykalê were now naturally eager both to re-establish the ascendancy of Athens, and to regain the properties of Athenian citizens in the Chersonese. Probably many of the leading men, especially Kimon son of Miltiadês, had extensive possessions there to recover, as Alkibiadês had in after days, with private forts of his own.¹ To this motive for attacking the Chersonese may be added another—the importance of its corn-produce, as well as of a clear passage through the Hellespont for the corn ships out of the Propontis to Athens and Ægina.² Such were the reasons which induced Xanthippus and the leading Athenians, even without the co-operation of the Peloponnesians, to undertake the siege of Sestus—the strongest place in the peninsula, the key of the strait, and the centre in which all the neighbouring Persian garrisons, from Kardia and elsewhere, had got together under Œobazus and Artayktês.³

The Grecian inhabitants of the Chersonese readily joined the Athenians in expelling the Persians, who, taken altogether by surprise, had been constrained to throw themselves into Sestus, without stores of provisions or means of making a long defence. But of all the Chersonesites the most forward and exasperated were the inhabitants of Elæus—the southernmost town of the peninsula, celebrated for its tomb, temple, and sacred grove of the hero Protesilaus, who figured in the Trojan legend as the foremost warrior in the host of Agamemnon to leap ashore, and as the first victim to the spear of Hektor. The temple of Protesilaus, conspicuously placed on the sea-shore,⁴ was a scene of worship and pilgrimage not merely for the inhabitants of Elæus, but also for the neighbouring Greeks generally, insomuch that it had been enriched with ample votive offerings and probably deposits for security—money, gold and silver saucers, brazen implements, robes,

Siege of Sestus—antipathy of the Chersonesites against Artayktês.

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. i. 5, 17. τὰ αὐτοῦ τείχη.

² Herodot. vii. 147. Schol. ad Aristophan. Equites, 262.

In illustration of the value set by Athens upon the command of the Hellespont, see Demosthenês, De Fals.

Legat. c. 59.

³ Herodot. ix. 114, 115. Πηστὸν—φρούριον καὶ φυλακὴν τοῦ παντὸς Ἑλληνιστοῦ—Thucyd. viii. 62: compare Xenophon, Hellenic. ii. 1, 25.

⁴ Thucyd. viii. 102.

and various other presents. The story ran that when Xerxes was on his march across the Hellespont into Greece, Artayktēs, greedy of all this wealth, and aware that the monarch would not knowingly permit the sanctuary to be despoiled, preferred a wily request to him—"Master, here is the house of a Greek, who in invading thy territory met his just reward and perished: I pray thee give his house to me, in order that people may learn for the future not to invade *thy* land"—the whole soil of Asia being regarded by the Persian monarchs as their rightful possession, and Protesilaus having been in this sense an aggressor against them. Xerxes, interpreting the request literally, and not troubling himself to ask who the invader was, consented: upon which, Artayktēs, while the army were engaged in their forward march into Greece, stripped the sacred grove of Protesilaus, carrying all the treasures to Sestus. He was not content without still farther outraging Grecian sentiment: he turned cattle into the grove, ploughed and sowed it, and was even said to have profaned the sanctuary by visiting it with his concubines.¹ Such proceedings were more than enough to raise the strongest antipathy against him among the Chersonesite Greeks, who now crowded to reinforce the Athenians and blocked him up in Sestus. After a certain length of siege, the stock of provisions in the town failed, and famine began to make itself felt among the garrison; which nevertheless still held out, by painful shifts and endurance, until a late period in the autumn, when the patience even of the Athenian besiegers was well nigh exhausted. It was with difficulty that the leaders repressed the clamorous desire manifested in their own camp to return to Athens.

Impatience having been appeased, and the seamen kept together, the siege was pressed without relaxation, and presently the privations of the garrison became intolerable; so that Artayktēs and Œobazus were at last reduced to the necessity of escaping by stealth, letting themselves down with a few followers from the wall at a point where it was imperfectly blockaded. Œobazus found

Capture of
Sestus—crucifixion of
Artayktēs.

¹ Herodot. ix. 116: compare i. 4. 'Ἀρτακτῆς, ἄνθρωπος Πέρσης, δευρὸς δὲ καὶ Ἀθηναίων χρημάτων ἐξ Ἑλαιοῦντος ὑπελό-
μηνος. Compare Herodot. ii. 64.

his way into Thrace, where however he was taken captive by the Abysinthian natives and offered up as a sacrifice to their god Pleistôrus : Artayktês fled northward along the shores of the Hellespont, but was pursued by the Greeks, and made prisoner near Ægospotami, after a strenuous resistance. He was brought with his son in chains to Sestus, which immediately after his departure had been cheerfully surrendered by its inhabitants to the Athenians. It was in vain that he offered a sum of 100 talents as compensation to the treasury of Protesilaus, and a farther sum of 200 talents to the Athenians as personal ransom for himself and his son. So deep was the wrath inspired by his insults to the sacred ground, that both the Athenian commander Xanthippus, and the citizens of Elæus, disdained everything less than a severe and even cruel personal atonement for the outraged Protesilaus. Artayktês, after having first seen his son stoned to death before his eyes, was hung up to a lofty board fixed for the purpose, and left to perish, on the spot where the Xerxian bridge had been fixed.¹ There is something in this proceeding more Oriental than Grecian : it is not in the Grecian character to aggravate death by artificial and lingering preliminaries.

After the capture of Sestus the Athenian fleets returned home with their plunder, towards the commencement of winter, not omitting to carry with them the vast cables of the Xerxian bridge, which had been taken in the town, as a trophy to adorn the acropolis of Athens.²

Return of
the fleet to
Athens.

¹ Herodot. ix. 118, 119, 120. Οἱ γὰρ Ἑλαιοῦσιαι τιμωρόντες τῷ Πρωτεσίλῳ ἐβίοντό μιν καταχρησθῆναι καὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ στρατηγοῦ ταῦτ' ὁ νόος ἔφερε.

² Herodot. ix. 121. It must be either to the joint Grecian armament of this year, or to that of the former year, that Plutarch must intend his celebrated story respecting the proposition advanced by Themistoklês and condemned by Aristeidês, to apply (Plutarch, Themistoklês, c. 20 ; Aristeidês, c. 22). He tells us that the Greek fleet was all assembled to pass the winter in the Thessalian harbour of Pagasæ, when Themistoklês formed the project of burning all the other Grecian ships except the Athenian, in order that no

city except Athens might have a naval force. Themistoklês (he tells us) intimated to the people, that he had a proposition, very advantageous to the state, to communicate ; but that it could not be publicly proclaimed and discussed : upon which they desired him to mention it privately to Aristeidês. Themistoklês did so ; and Aristeidês told the people, that the project was at once eminently advantageous and not less eminently unjust. Upon which the people renounced it forthwith, without asking what it was.

Considering the great celebrity which this story has obtained, some allusion to it was necessary, though it has long ceased to be received as matter of his-

tory. It is quite inconsistent with the narrative of Herodotus, as well as with all the conditions of the time: Pagasæ was *Thessalian*, and as such, hostile to the Greek fleet rather than otherwise: the fleet seems to have never been there: moreover we may add, that taking matters as they then stood, when the fear from Persia was not at all terminated, the Athenians would have lost more than they gained by burning the ships of the other Greeks, so that

Themistoklēs was not very likely to conceive the scheme, nor Aristeidēs to describe it in the language put into his mouth.

The story is probably the invention of some Greek of the Platonic age, who wished to contrast justice with expediency and Aristeidēs with Themistoklēs—as well as to bestow at the same time panegyric upon Athens in the days of her glory.

CHAPTER XLIII.

EVENTS IN SICILY DOWN TO THE EXPULSION OF THE
GELONIAN DYNASTY AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF
POPULAR GOVERNMENTS THROUGHOUT THE ISLAND.

I HAVE already mentioned, in the preceding volume of this History, the foundation of the Greek colonies in Italy and Sicily, together with the general fact, that in the sixth century before the Christian æra, they were among the most powerful and flourishing cities that bore the Hellenic name. Beyond this general fact, we obtain little insight into their history.

Though Syracuse, after it fell into the hands of Gelo, about 485 B.C., became the most powerful city in Sicily, yet in the preceding century Gela and Agrigentum, on the south side of the island, had been its superiors. The latter, within a few years of its foundation, fell under the dominion of one of its own citizens named Phalaris; a despot energetic, warlike, and cruel. An exile from Astypalæa near Rhodes, but a rich man, and an early settler at Agrigentum, he contrived to make himself despot seemingly about the year 570 B.C. He had been named to one of the chief posts in the city, and having undertaken at his own cost the erection of a temple to Zeus Policus in the acropolis (as the Athenian Alkmæônids rebuilt the burnt temple of Delphi), he was allowed on this pretence to assemble therein a considerable number of men; whom he armed, and availed himself of the opportunity of a festival of Dêmêtêr to turn them against the people. He is said to have made many conquests over the petty Sikan communities in the neighbourhood: but exaction and cruelties towards his own subjects are noticed as his most prominent characteristic, and his brazen bull passed into imperishable memory. This piece of mechanism was hollow, and sufficiently capacious to contain one or more victims enclosed within it, to perish in tortures when the metal was heated: the cries of these suffering prisoners passed for

Agrigentum
and Gela
superior to
Syracuse be-
fore 500 B.C.
—Phalaris
despot of
Agrigentum.

the roarings of the animal. The artist was named Perillus, and is said to have been himself the first person burnt in it by order of the despot. In spite of the odium thus incurred, Phalaris maintained himself as despot for sixteen years; at the end of which period, a general rising of the people, headed by a leading man named Telemachus, terminated both his reign and his life.¹ Whether Telemachus became despot or not, we have no information: sixty years afterwards, we shall find his descendant Théro established in that position.

It was about the period of the death of Phalaris that the Syracusans reconquered their revolted colony of Kamarina (in the south-east of the island between Syracuse and Gela), expelled or dispossessed the inhabitants, and resumed the territory.² With the exception of this accidental circumstance, we are without information about the Sicilian cities until a time rather before 500 B.C., just when the war between Kroton and Sybaris had extinguished the power of the latter, and when the despotism of the Peisistratids at Athens had been exchanged for the democratical constitution of Kleisthenēs.

The first forms of government among the Sicilian Greeks, as among the cities of Greece Proper in the early historical age, appear to have been all oligarchical. We do not know under what particular modifications they were kept up, but probably all more or less resembled that of Syracuse, where the Gamori (or wealthy proprietors descended from the original colonising chiefs), possessing large landed properties

¹ Everything which has ever been said about Phalaris, is noticed and discussed in the learned and acute Dissertation of Bentley on the Letters of Phalaris: compare also Seyffert, *Akragas und sein Gebiet*, p. 57-61, who however treats the pretended letters of Phalaris with more consideration than the readers of Dr. Bentley will generally be disposed to sanction.

The story of the brazen bull of Phalaris seems to rest on sufficient evidence: it is expressly mentioned by Pindar, and the bull itself, after having been carried away to Carthage when the Carthaginians took Agrigentum, was restored to the Agrigentines by Scipio when he took Carthage. See *Aristol. Polit.* v. 8, 4;

Pindar, *Pyth.* i. 185; Polyb. xii. 25; Diodor. xiii. 90; Cicero in *Verr.* iv. 33.

It does not appear that Timæus really called in question the historical reality of the bull of Phalaris, though he has been erroneously supposed to have done so. Timæus affirmed that the bull which was shown in his own time at Agrigentum was not the identical machine: which was correct, for it must have been *then* at Carthage, from whence it was not restored to Agrigentum until after 146 B.C. See a note of Boeckh on the Scholia ad Pindar. *Pyth.* i. 185.

² Thucyd. vi. 5; Schol. ad Pindar. *Olymp.* v. 19; compare Wesseling ad Diodor. xi. 76.

Syracuse in 500 B.C.—oligarchical government under the Gamori or privileged descendants of the original proprietary colonists—the Demos—the Kyllyni or Serfs.

tilled by a numerous Sikel serf population called Kyllyrîi, formed the qualified citizens—out of whom, as well as by whom, magistrates and generals were chosen: while the Demos, or non-privileged freemen, comprised, first, the small proprietary cultivators who maintained themselves, by manual labour and without slaves, from their own lands or gardens—next, the artisans and tradesmen. In the course of two or three generations, many individuals of the privileged class would have fallen into poverty, and would find themselves more nearly on a par with the non-privileged; while such members of the latter as might rise to opulence were not for that reason admitted into the privileged body. Here were ample materials for discontent. Ambitious leaders, often themselves members of the privileged body, put themselves at the head of the popular opposition, overthrew the oligarchy, and made themselves despots; democracy being at that time hardly known anywhere in Greece. The general fact of this change, preceded by occasional violent dissensions among the privileged class themselves,¹ is all that we are permitted to know, without those modifying circumstances by which it must have been accompanied in every separate city. Towards or near the year 500 B.C., we find Anaxilaus despot at Rhegium, Skythês at Zanklê, Têrillus at Himera, Peithagoras at Selinus, Kleander at Gela, and Panætius at Leontini.² It was about the year 509 B.C. that the Spartan prince Dorieus conducted a body of emigrants to the territories of Eryx and Egesta, near the north-western corner of the island, in hopes of expelling the non-Hellenic inhabitants and founding a new Grecian colony. But the Carthaginians, whose Sicilian possessions were close adjoining and who had already aided in driving Dorieus from a previous establishment at Kinyps in Libya,—now lent such vigorous assistance to the Egestæan inhabitants, that the Spartan prince, after a short period of prosperity, was defeated and slain with most of his companions. Such of them as escaped, under the orders of Euryleon, took

Early governments of the Greek cities in Sicily—original oligarchies subverted in many places by despots—attempted colony of the Spartan prince Dorieus.

¹ At Gela, Herodot. vii. 153; at Syracuse, Aristot. Politic. v. 3, 1.

² Aristot. Politic. v. 8, 4; v. 10, 4. Καὶ εἰς τυραννίδα μεταβάλλει ἐξ ὀλιγαρχίας, ὥσπερ ἐν Σικελίᾳ σχεδὸν αἱ πλεῖσται

τῶν ἀρχαίων ἐν Λεοντίνοις εἰς τὴν Παναίτιου τυραννίδα, καὶ ἐν Γέλᾳ, εἰς τὴν Κλεάνδρου, καὶ ἐν ἄλλαις πολλαῖς πόλεσιν ὡσαύτως..

possession of Minoa, which bore from henceforward the name of Herakleia¹—a colony and dependency of the neighbouring town of Selinus, of which Peithagoras was then despot. Euryleon joined the malcontents at Selinus, overthrew Peithagoras, and established himself as despot, until, after a short possession of power, he was slain in a popular mutiny.²

We are here introduced to the first known instance of that series of contests between the Phœnicians and Greeks in Sicily, which, like the struggles between the Saracens and the Normans in the eleventh and twelfth centuries after the Christian æra, were destined to determine whether the island should be a part of Africa or a part of Europe—and which were only terminated, after the lapse of three centuries, by the absorption of both into the vast bosom of Rome. It seems that the Carthaginians and Egestæans not only overwhelmed Dorieus, but also made some conquests of the neighbouring Grecian possessions, which were subsequently recovered by Gelo of Syracuse.³

Not long after the death of Dorieus, Kleander despot of Gela began to raise his city to ascendancy over the other Sicilian Greeks, who had hitherto been, if not all equal, at least all independent. His powerful mercenary force, levied in part among the Sikel tribes,⁴ did not preserve him from the sword of a Geloan citizen named Sabyllus, who slew him after a reign of seven years: but it enabled his brother and successor Hippokratês to extend his dominion over nearly half of the island. In that mercenary force two officers, Gelo and Ænesidêmus (the latter a citizen of Agrigentum, of the conspicuous family of the Emmenidæ, and descended from Telemachus the deposer of Phalaris), particularly distinguished themselves. Gelo was descended from a native of Têlos near the Triopian Cape, one of the original

About B.C.
505.
Kleander
despot of
Gela.—B.C.
about 500.—
First rise of
Gelo and
Ænesidêmus
in his ser-
vice. Tê-
linês, the
first marked
ancestor of
Gelo.

¹ Diodorus ascribes the foundation of Herakleia to Dorieus: this seems not consistent with the account of Herodotus, unless we are to assume that the town of Herakleia which Dorieus founded was destroyed by the Carthaginians, and that the name Herakleia was afterwards given by Eurylêon or his successors to that which had before been called Minoa (Diodor. iv. 23).

A funereal monument in honour of Athenæus, one of the settlers who perished with Dorieus, was seen by Pausanias at Sparta (Pausanias, iii. 16, 4).

² Herodot. v. 43, 46.

³ Herodot. vii. 158. The extreme brevity of his allusion is perplexing, as we have no collateral knowledge to illustrate it. ⁴ Polyænus, v. 6.

settlers who accompanied the Rhodian Antiphémus to Sicily. His immediate ancestor, named Têlinês, had first raised the family to distinction by valuable aid to a defeated political party, who had been worsted in a struggle and forced to seek shelter in the neighbouring town of Maktorium. Têlinês was possessed of certain peculiar sacred rites (or visible and portable holy symbols, with a privileged knowledge of the ceremonial acts and formalities of divine service under which they were to be shown) for propitiating the Subterranean Goddesses, Dêmêtêr and Persephonê: "from whom he obtained them, or how he got at them himself (says Herodotus), I cannot say;" but such was the imposing effect of his presence and manner of exhibiting them, that he ventured to march into Gela at the head of the exiles from Maktorium, and was enabled to reinstate them in power—detering the people from resistance in the same manner as the Athenians had been overawed by the spectacle of Phylê-Athênê in the chariot along with Peisistratus. The extraordinary boldness of this proceeding excites the admiration of Herodotus, especially as he had been informed that Têlinês was of an unwarlike temperament. The restored exiles rewarded it by granting to him, and to his descendants after him, the hereditary dignity of hierophants of the two goddesses¹—a function

¹ See about Têlinês and this hereditary priesthood, Herodot. vii. 153. *τούτους ἄν ὁ Τηλίνης καθήγαγε ἐς Γέλην, ἔχων οὐδεμίαν ἀνδρῶν δύναμιν, ἀλλ' ἱρὰ τούτων τῶν θεῶν. θέν δι' αὐτὰ ἔλαβε, ἢ αὐτὸς ἐκτέλεστο, τοῦτο οὐκ ἔχω εἶπαι. τούτοις δὲ ἄν πῶστος εἶν, καθήγαγε, ἐπ' ᾧ τε οἱ ἀπόγονοι αὐτοῦ ἱεροφάνται τῶν θεῶν ἴσονται*: compare a previous passage of this History, vol. i. chap. i.

It appears from Pindar that Hiero exercised this hereditary priesthood (Olymp. v. 160 (95), with the Scholia ad loc. and Scholia ad Pindar. Pyth. ii. 27).

About the story of Phylê personifying Athênê at Athens, see above, ch. xxx. of this History.

The ancient religious worship addressed itself more to the eye than to the ear; the words spoken were of less importance than the things exhibited, the persons performing, and the actions done. The vague sense of the Greek

and Latin neuter, *ιερά* or *sacra*, includes the entire ceremony, and is difficult to translate into a modern language: but the verbs connected with it, *ἔχειν*, *κεκτῆσθαι*, *κομίζειν*, *φαίνειν*, *ιερά*—*ιεροφάντης*, &c., relate to exhibition and action. This was particularly the case with the mysteries (or solemnities not thrown open to the general public, but accessible only to those who went through certain preliminary forms, and under certain restrictions) in honour of Dêmêtêr and Persephonê, as well as of other deities in different parts of Greece. The *λεγόμενα*, or things *said* on these occasions, were of less importance than the *δεικνόμενα* and *δρώμενα*, or *matters shown* and *things done* (see Pausanias, ii. 37, 3). Herodotus says about the lake of Saïs in Egypt, *Ἐν δὲ τῇ λίμνῃ ταύτῃ τὰ δεικνύμενα τῶν παθῶν αὐτοῦ* (of Osiris) *νοκτὸς ποιῶσι, τὰ καλῶσι μυστήρια Αἰγύπτιοι*: he proceeds to state that the Thesmophoria celebrated in honour of

certainly honourable, and probably lucrative, connected with the administration of consecrated property and with the enjoyment of a large portion of its fruits.

Dēmêtér in Greece were of the same nature, and gives his opinion that they were imported into Greece from Egypt. Homer (*Hymn. Cerer.* 476); compare Pausan. ii. 14, 2.

Δείξεν Τριπολίμν τε, Διόλεϊ τε πληθύνει
Δρησσοσύνην ἱερῶν· καὶ ἐπὶ ῥαβδῶν ὄργια
παῖσι
Προεβούργης Κελίοιο· . . .
Ὀλβιοι, ὅς τε τὰ δ' ὅσων περ ἐπιχθονίαν ἀνθρώπων, &c.

Compare Eurip. *Hippolyt.* 25; Pindar, *Fragm.* xcvi.; Sophokl. *Frag.* lviii. ed. Brunck; Plutarch, *De Profect. in Virtute*, c. 10, p. 81; De Isid. et Osir. p. 353, c. 3. ὡς γὰρ οἱ τελοῦμενοι κατ' ἀρχὰς ἐν θαρόβῃ καὶ βοῇ πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἀδούμενοι συνίασι, δρωμένων δὲ καὶ δεικνυμένων τῶν ἱερῶν, προσέχουσιν ἥδη μετὰ φόβου καὶ σιωπῆς; and Isokratēs, *Panegyric*, c. 6, about Eleusis, τὰ ἱερὰ καὶ οὖν δεικνυμεν καθ' ἑκάστον ἡμεῶν. These mysteries consisted thus chiefly of exhibition and action addressed to the eyes of the communicants, and Clemens Alexandrinus calls them a mystic drama—*Δηρὸν καὶ Κόρη δρᾶμα ἐγενέσθαι μυστικόν, καὶ τὴν πλάττειν καὶ τὴν ἀρμαγὴν καὶ τὸ πένθος ἢ Ἐλευσίς διδουχέι*. The word *ὄργια* is originally nothing more than a consecrated expression for *ἔργα*—*ἱερὰ ἔργα* (see Pausanias, iv. 1, 4, 5), though it comes afterwards to designate the whole ceremony, matters shown as well as matters done—τὰ ὄργια κομίζων—*ὄργιων παρτοίων συνθέτης*, &c.: compare Plutarch, *Alkibiad.* 22-34.

The sacred objects exhibited formed an essential part of the ceremony, together with the chest in which such of them as were moveable were brought out—*τελετῆς ἐγκύματα μυστιδὰ κίστην* (Nonnus, ix. 127). Æschines, in assisting the religious lustrations performed by his mother, was bearer of the chest—*κιστοφόρος καὶ λικνοφόρος* (Demosthen. *de Coronâ*, c. 79, p. 313). Clemens Alexandrinus (*Cohort. ad Gent.* p. 14) describes the objects which were contained in these mystic chests of the Eleusinian mysteries—cakes of particular shape, pomegranates, salt, fefules, ivy, &c. The communicant was permitted, as a part of the ceremony, to take these out of the chest and put

them into a basket, afterwards putting them back again—"Jejunavi et elibi cyceonem: ex cistâ sumpsi et in calathum misi: accepi rursus, in cistulam transtuli" (Arnobius *ad Gent.* v. p. 175, ed. Elmenhorst), while the uninitiated were excluded from seeing it, and forbidden from looking at it "even from the house-top."

Τὸν κάλαθον κατιόντα χαμαὶ θασίσθε βάβαλον
Μετ' ἀπὸ τοῦ τέγους.

(Kallimachos, *Hymn.* in *Cerere*, 4.)

Lobeck, in his learned and excellent treatise, *Aglaophamus* (i. p. 51), says, "Sacrorum nomine tam Græci, quam Romani, præcipuè signa et imagines Deorum, omnemque sacram supellectilem dignari solent. Quæ res animum illuc potius inclinat, ut pntem Hierophantæ ejusmodi *ἱερὰ* in conspectum hominum protulisse, sive deorum simulacra, sive vasa sacra et instrumenta aliave prisæ religionis monumenta; qualia in sacrario Eleusinio asservata fuisse, etsi nullo testimonio affirmare possumus, tamen probabilitatis speciem habet testimonio similem. Namque non solum in templis ferè omnibus eiemia venerandæ antiquitatis condita erant, sed in mysteriis ipsis talium rerum mentio occurrit, quas initiati summâ cum veneratione aspicerent, non initiatis ne aspicere quidem liceret. . . . Ex his testimoniis efficitur (p. 61) sacra quæ Hierophanta ostendit, illa ipse fuisse *ἔργια φάσματα* sive simulacra Deorum, eorumque aspectum qui præbeant *δείξαι τὰ ἱερὰ* vel *παρίχειν* vel *φαίνειν* dici, et ab hoc quasi primario Hierophantæ actu tum Eleusiniarum sacerdotum principem nomen accepisse, tum totum negotium esse nuncupatum."

Compare also K. F. Hermann, *Gottesdienstliche Alterthümer der Griechen*, part ii. ch. ii. sect. 32.

A passage in Cicero *de Haruspicio Responsis* (c. 11), which is transcribed almost entirely by Arnobius *adv. Gentes*, iv. p. 148, demonstrates the minute precision required at Rome in the performance of the festival of the Megalesia: the smallest omission or alteration was supposed to render the festival unsatisfactory to the gods.

The memorable history of the Holy

Gelo thus belonged to an ancient and distinguished heroic family at Gela, being the eldest of four brothers, sons of Deinomenes—Gelo, Hiero, Polyzelus and Thrasybulus: and he further ennobled himself by such personal exploits, in the army of the despot Hippokratês, as to be promoted to the supreme command of the cavalry. It was greatly to the activity of Gelo that the despot owed a succession of victories and conquests, in which the Ionic or Chalkidic cities of Kallipolis, Naxos, Leontini and Zanklê, were successively reduced to dependence.¹

Gelo—in high command among the mercenaries of Hippokratês despot of Gela.

The fate of Zanklê—seemingly held by its despot Skythês in a state of dependent alliance under Hippokratês, and in standing feud with Anaxilaus of Rhegium on the opposite side of the strait of Messina—was remarkable. At the time when the Ionic revolt in Asia was suppressed, and Milêtus reconquered by the Persians (B.C. 494, 493), a natural sympathy was manifested by the Ionic Greeks in Sicily towards the sufferers of the same race on the east of the Ægean sea. Projects were devised for assisting the Asiatic refugees to a new abode; and the Zanklêans, especially, invited them to form a new Pan-Ionic colony upon the territory of the Sikels, called Kalê Aktê, on the north coast of Sicily; a coast presenting fertile and attractive situations, and along the whole line of which there was only one Grecian colony—Himera. This invitation was accepted by the refugees from Samos and Milêtus, who accordingly put themselves on ship-board for Zanklê; steering, as was usual, along the coast of Akarnania to Korkyra, from thence across to Tarentum, and along the Italian coast to the strait of Messina. It happened that when they reached the town of Epizephyrian Lokri, Skythês, the despot of Zanklê, was absent from his city, together with the larger portion of his military force, on an expedition against the Sikels—perhaps undertaken to facilitate the contemplated colony at Kalê Aktê. His enemy the Rhegian prince Anaxilaus, taking advantage of this accident,

Fate of the Ionic town of Zanklê, afterwards Messina—it is seized by the Samians—conduct of Hippokratês.

Tunic at Treves in 1845, shows what immense and wide-spread effect upon the human mind may be produced, even

in the nineteenth century, by *lepiò ðeiknômenon*.

¹ Herodot. vii. 154.

proposed to the refugees at Lokri that they should seize for themselves, and retain, the unguarded city of Zanklê. They followed his suggestion, and possessed themselves of the city, together with the families and property of the absent Zanklæans; who speedily returned to repair their loss, while their prince Skythês farther invoked the powerful aid of his ally and superior, Hippokratês. The latter, however, provoked at the loss of one of his dependent cities, seized and imprisoned Skythês, whom he considered as the cause of it,¹ at Inykus, in the interior of the island. But he found it at the same time advantageous to accept a proposition made to him by the Samians, captors of the city, and to betray the Zanklæans whom he had come to aid. By a convention ratified with an oath, it was agreed that Hippokratês should receive for himself all the extra-mural, and half the intra-mural, property and slaves belonging to the Zanklæans, leaving the other half to the Samians. Among the property without the walls, not the least valuable part consisted in the persons of those Zanklæans whom Hippokratês had come to assist, but whom he now carried away as slaves: excepting however from this lot, three hundred of the principal citizens, whom he delivered over to the Samians to be slaughtered—probably lest they might find friends to procure their ransom, and afterwards disturb the Samian possession of the town. Their lives were however spared by the Samians, though we are not told what became of them. This transaction, alike perfidious on the part of the Samians and of Hippokratês, secured to the former a flourishing city, and to the latter an abundant booty. We are glad to learn that the imprisoned Skythês found means to escape to Darius, king of Persia, from whom he received a generous shelter: imperfect compensation for the iniquity of his fellow Greeks.² The Samians however did not long retain possession of their

¹ Herodot. vi. 22, 23. Σκύθην μὲν τὸν μόνον τῶν Ζαγκλαίων, ὡς ἀποβαλόντα τὴν πόλιν, ὁ Ἱπποκράτης πεδήσας, καὶ τὸν ἀδελφεὸν αὐτοῦ Πυθογένεα, ἐς Ἰνυκὸν πόλιν ἀπέπεμψε.

The words ὡς ἀποβαλόντα seem to imply the relation pre-existing between Hippokratês and Skythês, as superior and subject; and punishment inflicted

by the former upon the latter for having lost an important post.

² Herodot. vi. 23, 24. Aristotle (Polit. v. 2, 11) represents the Samians as having been first actually received into Zanklê, and afterwards expelling the prior inhabitants: his brief notice is not to be set against the perspicuous narrative of Herodotus.

conquest, but were expelled by the very person who had instigated them to seize it—Anaxilaus of Rhegium. He planted in it new inhabitants, of Dorian and Messenian race, re-colonizing it under the name of Messênê—a name which it ever afterwards bore;¹ and it appears to have been governed either by himself or by his son Kleophrôn, until his death about B.C. 476.

Besides the conquests above-mentioned, Hippokratês of Gela was on the point of making the still more important acquisition of Syracuse, and was only prevented from doing so, after defeating the Syracusans at the river Helôrus, and capturing many prisoners, by the mediation of the Corinthians and Korkyræans, who prevailed on him to be satisfied with the cession of Kamarina and its territory as a ransom. Having repeopled this territory, which became thus annexed to Gela, he was prosecuting his conquests farther among the Sikels, when he died or was killed at Hybla. His death caused a mutiny among the Geloans, who refused to acknowledge his sons, and strove to regain their freedom; but Gelo, the general of horse in the army, espousing the cause of the sons with energy, put down by force the resistance of the people. As soon as this was done, he threw off the mask, deposed the sons of Hippokratês, and seized the sceptre himself.²

Thus master of Gela, and succeeding probably to the ascendancy enjoyed by his predecessor over the Ionic cities, Gelo became the most powerful man in the island; but an incident which occurred a few years afterwards (B.C. 471), while it aggrandised him still farther, transferred the seat of his power from Gela to Syracuse. The Syracusan Gamori, or oligarchical order of proprietary families, probably humbled by their ruinous defeat at the Helôrus, were dispossessed of the government by a combination between their serf-cultivators called the Kyllyrîi, and the smaller freemen called the Demos; they were forced to retire to Kasmenæ, where they invoked the aid of Gelo to restore

Hippokratês is victorious over the Syracusans—takes Kamarina—dies—Gelo becomes in his place despot of Gela.

B.C. 471.

Greatness of Gelo—he gets possession of Syracuse—and transfers the seat of his power from Gela to Syracuse.

¹ Thucyd. vi. 4; Schol. ad Pindar. Pyth. ii. 84; Diodor. xi. 48.

² Herodot. vii. 155; Thucyd. vi. 5. The ninth Nemean Ode of Pindar (v.

40), addressed to Chromius the friend of Hiero of Syracuse, commemorates, among other exploits, his conduct at the battle of the Helôrus.

them. That ambitious prince undertook the task, and accomplished it with facility; for the Syracusan people, probably unable to resist their political opponents when backed by such powerful foreign aid, surrendered to him without striking a blow.¹ But instead of restoring the place to the previous oligarchy, Gelo appropriated it to himself, leaving Gela to be governed by his brother Hiero. He greatly enlarged the city of Syracuse, and strengthened its fortifications: probably it was he who first carried it beyond the islet of Ortygia, so as to include a larger space of the adjacent mainland (or rather island of Sicily) which bore the name of Achradina. To people this enlarged space he brought all the residents in Kamarina, which town he dismantled—and more than half of those in Gela; which was thus reduced in importance, while Syracuse became the first city in Sicily, and even received fresh addition of inhabitants from the neighbouring towns of Megara and Eubœa.

Both these towns, Megara and Eubœa, like Syracuse, were governed by oligarchies, with serf-cultivators dependent upon them, and a Demos or body of smaller freemen excluded from the political franchise: both were involved in war with Gelo,

¹ Herodot. vii. 155. 'Ο γὰρ δῆμος ὁ τῶν Συρακουσίων ἐκόντι Γέλωνι παραδίδοι τὴν πόλιν καὶ ἑαυτὸν.

Aristotle (*Politic.* v. 2, 6) alludes to the Syracusan democracy prior to the despotism of Gelo as a case of democracy ruined by its own lawlessness and disorder. But such can hardly have been the fact, if the narrative of Herodotus is to be trusted. The expulsion of the Gamori was not an act of lawless democracy, but the rising of free subjects and slaves against a governing oligarchy. After the Gamori were expelled, there was no time for the democracy to constitute itself, or to show in what degree it possessed capacity for government, since the narrative of Herodotus indicates that the restoration by Gelo followed closely upon the expulsion. And the superior force which Gelo brought to the aid of the expelled Gamori, is quite sufficient to explain the submission of the Syracusan people, had they been ever so well administered. Perhaps Aristotle may have had before him reports different from those of Herodotus: unless indeed we might ven-

ture to suspect that the name of *Gelo* appears in Aristotle by lapse of memory in place of that of *Dionysius*. It is highly probable that the partial disorder into which the Syracusan democracy had fallen immediately before the despotism of Dionysius, was one of the main circumstances which enabled him to acquire the supreme power; but a similar assertion can hardly be made applicable to the early times preceding Gelo, in which indeed democracy was only just beginning in Greece.

The confusion often made by hasty historians between the names of Gelo and Dionysius, is severely commented on by Dionysius of Halikarnassus (*Antiq. Roman.* vii. 1. p. 1314): the latter however, in his own statement respecting Gelo, is not altogether free from error, since he describes Hippokratēs as brother of Gelo. We must accept the supposition of Larcher, that Pausanias (vi. 9, 2), while professing to give the date of Gelo's occupation of *Syracuse*, has really given the date of Gelo's occupation of *Gela* (see Mr. Fynes Clinton, *Fast. Hellen.* ad ann. 491 B.C.)

probably to resist his encroachments: both were besieged and taken. The oligarchy who ruled these cities, and who were the authors as well as leaders of the war, anticipated nothing but ruin at the hands of the conqueror; while the Demos, who had not been consulted and had taken no part in the war (which we must presume to have been carried on by the oligarchy and their serfs alone), felt assured that no harm would be done to them. His behaviour disappointed the expectations of both. After transporting both of them to Syracuse, he established the oligarchs in that town as citizens, and sold the Demos as slaves under covenant that they should be exported from Sicily. "His conduct (says Herodotus¹) was dictated by the conviction, that a Demos was a most troublesome companion to live with." It appears that the state of society which he wished to establish was that of Patricians and clients, without any Plebs; something like that of Thessaly, where there was a proprietary oligarchy living in the cities, with Penestæ or dependent cultivators occupying and tilling the land on their account—but no small self-working proprietors or tradesmen in sufficient number to form a recognised class. And since Gelo was removing the free population from these conquered towns, leaving in or around the towns no one except the serf-cultivators, we may presume that the oligarchical proprietors when removed might still continue, even as residents at Syracuse, to receive the produce raised for them by others: but the small self-working proprietors, if removed in like manner would be deprived of subsistence, because their land would be too distant for personal tillage, and they had no serfs. While therefore we fully believe, with Herodotus, that Gelo considered the small free proprietors as "troublesome yoke-fellows"—a sentiment perfectly natural to a Grecian despot, unless where he found them useful aids to his own ambition

Conquest of various Sicilian towns by Gelo—he transports the oligarchy to Syracuse, and sells the Demos for slaves.

¹ Herodot. vii. 156. Μεγαρίας τε τοὺς ἐν Σικελίᾳ, ὡς πολιιορκούμενοι ἐς ὁμολογίην προσεχώρησαν, τοὺς μὲν αὐτῶν παχίας, ἀειραμένους τε πόλεμον αὐτῶ καὶ προσδοκίοντας ἀπολείσθαι διὰ τοῦτο, ἔγων ἐς Συρακοῦσας πολίητας ἐποίησε· τὸν δὲ δῆμον τῶν Μεγαρίων, οὐκ ἰδόντα μεταίτιον τοῦ πολέμου τούτου, οὐδὲ προσ-

δεκόμενον κακὸν οὐδὲν πείσασθαι, ἀγαγὼν καὶ τούτους ἐς τὰς Συρακοῦσας, ἀτίδοτο ἐπ' ἐξαγωγῇ ἐκ Σικελίης. Τὰντ' δὲ τοῦτον καὶ Εὐβοίας τοὺς ἐν Σικελίᾳ ἐποίησε διακρίνας. Ἐποίησε δὲ τὰντα τούτους ἀμφοτέρους, νομίσας δῆμον εἶναι συνόλημα ἀχαριτώτατον.

against a hostile oligarchy—we must add that they would become peculiarly troublesome in his scheme of concentrating the free population of Syracuse, seeing that he would have to give them land in the neighbourhood or to provide in some other way for their maintenance.

So large an accession of size, walls, and population, rendered Syracuse the first Greek city in Sicily. And the power of Gelo, embracing as it did not merely Syracuse, but so considerable a portion of the rest of the island, Greek as well as Sikel, was the greatest Hellenic force then existing. It appears to have comprised the Grecian cities on the east and south-east of the island from the borders of Agrigentum to those of Zanklê or Messênê, together with no small proportion of the Sikel tribes. Messênê was under the rule of Anaxilaus of Rhegium, Agrigentum under that of Thêro son of Ænesidêmus, Himera under that of Terillus; while Selinus, close on the borders of Egesta and the Carthaginian possession, had its own government free or despotic, but appears to have been allied with or dependent upon Carthage.¹ A dominion thus extensive doubtless furnished ample tribute, besides which Gelo, having conquered and dispossessed many landed proprietors and having recolonised Syracuse, could easily provide both lands and citizenship to recompense adherents. Hence he was enabled to enlarge materially the military force transmitted to him by Hippokratês, and to form a naval force besides. Phormis² the Mænalian, who took service under him and became citizen of Syracuse, with fortune enough to send donatives to Olympia—and Agêsias the Iamid prophet from Stympphâlus³—are doubtless not the only examples of emigrants joining him from Arcadia. For the Arcadian population were poor,

¹ Diodor. xi. 21.

² Pausan. v. 27, 1, 2. We find the elder Dionysius, about a century afterwards, transferring the entire free population of conquered towns (Kaulonia and Hipponium in Italy, &c.) to Syracuse (Diodor. xiv. 106, 107).

³ See the sixth Olympic Ode of Pindar, addressed to the Syracusan Agêsias. The Scholiast on v. 5 of that ode—who says that not Agêsias himself, but some of his progenitors migrated from Stympphâlus to Syracuse—is con-

tradicted not only by the Scholiast on v. 167, where Agêsias is rightly termed both Ἀρκὰς and Συρακόσιος; but also by the better evidence of Pindar's own expressions—συροικιστὴρ τε τῶν κλειρῶν Συρακοσσῶν—οἰκοθεν οἰκαδε, with reference to Stympphâlus and Syracuse—δὲ Ἀρκίαι (v. 6, 99, 101=166-174).

Ergoteleôs, an exile from Knôssus in Krete, must have migrated somewhere about this time to Himera in Sicily. See the twelfth Olympic Ode of Pindar.

brave, and ready for mercenary soldiery; while the service of a Greek despot in Sicily must have been more attractive to them than that of Xerxes.¹ Moreover during the ten years between the battles of Marathon and Salamis, when not only so large a portion of the Greek cities had become subject to Persia, but the prospect of Persian invasion hung like a cloud over Greece Proper—the increased feeling of insecurity throughout the latter probably rendered emigration to Sicily unusually inviting.

These circumstances in part explain the immense power and position which Herodotus represents Gelo to have enjoyed, towards the autumn of 481 B.C., when the Greeks from the Isthmus of Corinth, confederated to resist Xerxes, sent to solicit his aid. He was then imperial leader of Sicily: he could offer to the Greeks (so the historian tells us) 20,000 hoplites, 200 triremes, 2000 cavalry, 2000 archers, 2000 slingers, 2000 light-armed horse, besides furnishing provisions for the entire Grecian force as long as the war might last.² If this numerical statement could be at all trusted (which I do not believe), Herodotus would be much within the truth in saying, that there was no other Hellenic power which would bear the least comparison with that of Gelo:³ and we may well assume such general superiority to be substantially true, though the numbers above-mentioned may be an empty boast rather than a reality.

Owing to the great power of Gelo, we now for the first time trace an incipient tendency in Sicily to combined and central operations. It appears that Gelo had formed the plan of uniting the Greek forces in Sicily for the purpose of expelling the Carthaginians and Egestæans, either wholly or partially, from their maritime possessions in the western corner of the island, and of avenging the death of the Spartan prince Dorieus—that he even attempted, though in vain, to induce

Power of Gelo when the envoys from Sparta and Athens came to entreat his aid —B.C. 481.

Plans of Gelo for strengthening Sicilian Hellenism against the barbaric interests in the islands.

¹ Herodot. viii. 26.

² Herodot. vii. 157. οὐδὲ δυνάμεις τε ἦκειν μεγάλης, καὶ μοῖρὰ τοι τῆς Ἑλλάδος οὐκ ἐλαχίστη μέγα, ἀρχοντὶ γε Σικελίης: and even still stronger, c. 163. ἰὼν Σικελίης τύραννος.

The word ἀρχων corresponds with ἀρχή, such as that of the Athenians,

and is less strong than τύραννος. The numerical statement is contained in the speech composed by Herodotus for Gelo (vii. 158).

³ Herodot. vii. 145. τὰ δὲ Γέλωνος πρῆγματα μεγάλα ἐλέγετο εἶναι οὐδαμῶν Ἑλληνικῶν τῶν οὐ πολλὰν μέζω.

the Spartans and other central Greeks to cooperate in this plan—and that upon their refusal, he had in part executed it with the Sicilian forces alone.¹ We have nothing but a brief and vague allusion to this exploit, wherein Gelo appears as the chief and champion of Hellenic against barbaric interests in Sicily—the forerunner of Dionysius, Timoleon, and Agathoklēs. But he had already begun to conceive himself, and had already been recognised by others, in this commanding position, when the envoys of Sparta, Athens, Corinth, &c.,

Spartan and Athenian envoys apply to Gelo—his answer.

reached him from the Isthmus of Corinth, in 481 B.C., to entreat his aid for the repulse of the vast host of invaders about to cross the Hellespont. Gelo, after reminding them that they had refused a similar application for aid from him, said that, far from requiting them at the hour of need in the like ungenerous spirit, he would bring to them an overwhelming reinforcement (the numbers as given by Herodotus have been already stated), but upon one condition only—that he should be recognised as generalissimo of the entire Grecian force against the Persians. His offer was repudiated, with indignant scorn, by the Spartan envoy: and Gelo then so far abated in his demand, as to be content with the command either of the land force or the naval force, whichever might be judged preferable. But here the Athenian envoy interposed his protest—"We are sent here (said he) to ask for an army, and not for a general; and thou givest us the army, only in order to make thyself

¹ Herodot. vii. 158. Gelo says to the envoys from Peloponnesus—"Ἄνδρες Ἕλληνες, λόγον ἔχοντες πλεονέκτην, ἰτολήσατε ἐμὲ σύμμαχον ἐπὶ τὸν βάρβαρον παρακαλῶντες ἔλθειν. Αὐτοὶ δὲ, ἐμεῦ πρότερον διηθέντος βαρβαρικοῦ στρατοῦ συνεκάψασθαι, ὅτε μοι πρὸς Καρχηδονίους νίκας συνήπτο, ἐπισκῆτοντός τε τὸν Δωριεὺς τοῦ Ἀναξανδρίδου πρὸς Ἑγσταίους φόνον ἐκπρήξασθαι, ὑποτεινόντός τε τὰ ἐμπόρια συνελευθερίον, ἅπ' ὧν ἡμῖν μεγάλα ὠφελεῖται καὶ παύρεσις γιγνώσκει οὐτε ἐμεῦ εἵνεκα ἤλθετε βοηθήσοντας, οὐτε τὸν Δωριεὺς φόνον ἐκπληροῦμενοι τὸ δὲ κατ' ὑμῶν, τάδε πάντα ὑπὸ βαρβαροῖσι νίμεται. Ἀλλὰ εὖ γὰρ ἡμῖν καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ ἡμεῖνον κατέστη· νῦν δὲ, ἐπειδὴ περιλήλυθε ὁ πόλεμος καὶ ὅπῃται ἐς ὑμῶν, οὕτω δὴ Γέλωνος μνηστὴς γέγονε.

It is much to be regretted that we

have no farther information respecting the events which these words glance at. They seem to indicate that the Carthaginians and Egesteans had made some encroachments and threatened to make more: that Gelo had repelled them by actual and successful war. I think it strange however that he should be made to say—"You (the Peloponnesians) have derived great and signal advantages from these sea-ports"—the profit derived from the latter by the Peloponnesians can never have been so great as to be singled out in this pointed manner. I should rather have expected—ἅπ' ὧν ἡμῖν (and not ἅπ' ὧν ὑμῖν)—which must have been true in point of fact, and will be found to read quite consistently with the general purport of Gelo's speech.

general. Know, that even if the Spartans would allow thee to command at sea, *we* would not. The naval command is ours, if they decline it: we Athenians, the oldest nation in Greece—the only Greeks who have never migrated from home—whose leader before Troy stands proclaimed by Homer as the best of all the Greeks for marshalling and keeping order in an army—we, who moreover furnish the largest naval contingent in the fleet—*we* will never submit to be commanded by a Syracusan."

"Athenian stranger (replied Gelo), ye seem to be provided with commanders, but ye are not likely to have soldiers to be commanded. Ye may return as soon as you please, and tell the Greeks that their year is deprived of its spring."¹

That envoys were sent from Peloponnesus to solicit assistance from Gelo against Xerxes, and that they solicited in vain, is an incident not to be disputed: but the reason assigned for refusal—conflicting pretensions about the supreme command—may be suspected to have arisen less from historical transmission, than from the conceptions of the historian, or of his informants, respecting the relations between the parties. In his time, Sparta, Athens, and Syracuse were the three great imperial cities of Greece; and his Sicilian witnesses, proud of the great past power of Gelo, might well ascribe to him that competition for preeminence and command which Herodotus has dramatised. The immense total of forces which Gelo is made to promise becomes the more incredible, when we reflect that he had another and a better reason for refusing aid altogether. He was attacked at home, and was fully employed in defending himself.

The same spring which brought Xerxes across the Hellespont into Greece, also witnessed a formidable Carthaginian invasion of Sicily. Gelo had already been engaged in war against them (as has been above stated) and had obtained successes, which they would naturally seek the first opportunity of retrieving. The vast Persian invasion of Greece, organised for

¹ Herodot. vii. 161, 162. Polybius (xii. 26) does not seem to have read this embassy as related by Herodotus—or at least he must have preferred some other account of it. He gives a different

account of the answer which they made to Gelo: an answer (not insolent, but) business-like and evasive—πραγματικώτατον ἀπόκριμα, &c. See Timæus, Fragm. 87, ed. Didot.

480 B.C.
Carthaginian invasion of Sicily, simultaneous with the invasion of Greece by Xerxes.

three years before, and drawing contingents not only from the whole eastern world, but especially from their own metropolitan brethren at Tyre and Sidon, was well calculated to encourage them: and there seems good reason for believing that the simultaneous attack on the Greeks both in Peloponnesus and in Sicily, was concerted between the Carthaginians and Xerxes¹—probably by the Phœnicians on behalf of Xerxes. Nevertheless this alliance does not exclude other concurrent circumstances in the interior of the island, which supplied the Carthaginians both with invitation and with help. Agrigentum, though not under the dominion of Gelo, was ruled by his friend and relative Thêro; while Rhegium and Messênê under the government of Anaxilaus,—Himera under that of his father-in-law Terillus—and Selinus,—seem to have formed an imposing minority among the Sicilian Greeks; at variance with Gelo and Thêro, but in amity and correspondence with Carthage.² It was seemingly about the year 481 B.C., that Thêro, perhaps invited by an Himeræan party, expelled from Himera the despot Terillus, and became possessed of the town. Terillus applied for aid to Carthage; backed by his son-in-law Anaxilaus, who espoused the quarrel so warmly, as even to tender his own children as hostages to Hamilkar the Carthaginian Suffet or general, the personal friend or guest of Terillus. The application was favourably entertained, and Hamilkar, arriving at Panormus in the eventful year 480 B.C., with a fleet of 3000 ships of war and a still larger number of store ships, disembarked a land-force of 300,000 men: which would even have been larger, had not the vessels carrying the cavalry and the chariots happened to be dispersed by storms.³ These numbers we can only repeat as we find them, without trusting them any farther than as proof that the armament was on the most extensive scale. But the different nations of whom Herodotus reports the land-force to have consisted are trustworthy and curious:

¹ Ephorus, Fragment 111, ed. Didot; Diodor. xi. 1, 20. Mitford and Dahlmann (*Forschungen, Herodotus, &c.*, sect. 35, p. 186) call in question this alliance or understanding between Xerxes and the Carthaginians: but on no sufficient grounds, in my judgement.

² Herodot. vii. 165; Diodor. xi. 23:

compare also xiii. 55, 59. In like manner Rhegium and Messênê formed the opposing interest to Syracuse, under Dionysius the elder (Diodor. xiv. 44).

³ Herodot. (vii. 165) and Diodor. (xi. 20) both give the number of the land-force: the latter alone gives that of the fleet.

it included Phœnicians, Libyans, Iberians, Ligyes, Helisyki, Sardinians, and Corsicans.¹ This is the first example known to us of those numerous mercenary armies which it was the policy of Carthage to compose of nations different in race and language,² in order to obviate conspiracy or mutiny against the general.

The Carthaginian army under Hamilkar besieged Himera—battle of Himera—complete victory gained over them by Gelo.

Having landed at Panormus, Hamilkar marched to Himera, dragged his vessels on shore under the shelter of a rampart, and then laid siege to the town; while the Himerians, reinforced by Théro and the army of Agrigentum, determined on an obstinate defence, and even bricked up the gates. Pressing messages were despatched to solicit aid from Gelo, who collected his whole force, said to have amounted to 50,000 foot and 5000 horse, and marched to Himera. His arrival restored the courage of the inhabitants, and after some partial fighting, which turned out to the advantage of the Greeks, a general battle ensued. It was obstinate and bloody, lasting from sunrise until late in the afternoon; and its success was mainly determined by an intercepted letter which fell into the hands of Gelo—a communication from the Selinuntines to Hamilkar, promising to send a body of horse to his aid, and intimating the time at which they would arrive. A party of Gelo's horse, instructed to personate this reinforcement from Selinus, were received into the camp of Hamilkar, where they spread consternation and disorder, and are even said to have slain the general and set fire to the ships; while the Greek army, brought to action at this opportune moment, at length succeeded in triumphing over both superior numbers and a determined resistance. If we are to believe Diodorus, 150,000 men were slain on the side of the Carthaginians; the rest fled—partly to the Sikanian mountains where they became prisoners of the Agrigentines—partly to a hilly ground, where, from want of water, they were obliged to surrender at discretion. Twenty ships alone escaped with a few fugitives, and

¹ Herodot. vii. 165. The Ligyes came from the southern junction of Italy and France; the Gulfs of Lyons and Genoa. The Helisyki cannot be satisfactorily verified; Niebuhr considers them to have been the *Volsci*:

an ingenious conjecture.

² Polyb. i. 67. His description of the mutiny of the Carthaginian mercenaries, after the conclusion of the first Punic war, is highly instructive.

these twenty were destroyed by a storm on the passage, so that only one small boat arrived at Carthage with the disastrous tidings.¹ Dismissing such unreasonable exaggerations, we can only venture to assert that the battle was strenuously disputed, the victory complete, and the slain as well as the prisoners numerous. The body of Hamilkar was never discovered, in spite of careful search ordered by Gelo: the Carthaginians affirmed, that as soon as the defeat of his army became irreparable, he had cast himself into the great sacrificial fire wherein he had been offering entire victims (the usual sacrifice consisting only of a small part of the beast²) to propitiate the gods, and had there been consumed. The Carthaginians erected funereal monuments to him, graced with periodical sacrifices, both in Carthage and in their principal colonies:³ on the field of battle itself also, a monument was raised to him by the Greeks. On that monument, seventy years afterwards, his victorious grandson, fresh from the plunder of this same city of Himera, offered the bloody sacrifice of 3000 Grecian prisoners.⁴

We may presume that Anaxilaus with the forces of Rhegium shared in the defeat of the foreign invader whom he had called in, and probably other Greeks besides. All of them were now

¹ Diodor. xi. 21-24.

² Herodotus, vii. 167. σώματα δλα καταΐζον. This passage of Herodotus receives illustration from the learned comment of Movers on the Phœnician inscription recently discovered at Marseilles. It was the usual custom of the Jews, and it had been in old times the custom with the Phœnicians (Porphy. de Abst. iv. 15), to burn the victim entire: the Phœnicians departed from this practice, but the departure seems to have been considered as not strictly correct, and in times of great misfortune or anxiety the old habit was resumed (Movers, Das Opferwesen der Karthager. Breslau, 1847, p. 71-118).

³ Herodot. vii. 166, 167. Hamilkar was son of a Syracusan mother: a curious proof of *connubium* between Carthage and Syracuse. At the moment when the elder Dionysius declared war against Carthage, in 398 B.C., there were many Carthaginian merchants dwelling both in Syracuse and in other Greco-Sicilian cities, together with ships and other

property. Dionysius gave licence to the Syracusans, at the first instant when he had determined on declaring war, to plunder all this property (Diodor. xiv. 46). This speedy multiplication of Carthaginians with merchandise in the Grecian cities so soon after a bloody war had been concluded, is a strong proof of the spontaneous tendencies of trade.

⁴ Diodor. xiii. 62. According to Herodotus, the battle of Himera took place on the same day as that of Salamis; according to Diodorus, on the same day as that of Thermopylæ. If we are forced to choose between the two witnesses, there can be no hesitation in preferring the former: but it seems more probable that neither is correct.

As far as we can judge from the brief allusions of Herodotus, he must have conceived the battle of Himera in a manner totally different from Diodorus. Under such circumstances, I cannot venture to trust the details given by the latter.

compelled to sue for peace from Gelo, and to solicit the privilege of being enrolled as his dependent allies, which was granted to them without any harder imposition than the tribute probably involved in that relation.¹ Even the Carthaginians themselves were so intimidated by the defeat, that they sent envoys to ask for peace at Syracuse, which they are said to have obtained mainly by the solicitation of Damaretê wife of Gelo, on condition of paying 2000 talents to defray the costs of the war, and of erecting two temples in which the terms of the treaty were to be permanently recorded.² If we could believe the assertion of Theophrastus, Gelo exacted from the Carthaginians a stipulation that they would for the future abstain from human sacrifices in their religious worship.³ But such an interference with foreign religious rites would be unexampled in that age, and we know moreover that the practice was not permanently discontinued at Carthage.⁴ Indeed we may considerably suspect that Diodorus, copying from writers like Ephorus and Timæus, long after the events, has exaggerated considerably the defeat, the humiliation, and the amercement of the Carthaginians. For the words of the poet Pindar, a very few years after the battle of Himera, represent a fresh Carthaginian invasion as matter of present uneasiness and alarm:⁵ and the Carthaginian fleet is found engaged in aggressive warfare on the coast of Italy, requiring to be coerced by the brother and successor of Gelo.

Supremacy of Gelo in Sicily—he grants peace to the Carthaginians.

The victory of Himera procured for the Sicilian cities immunity from foreign war, together with a large plunder. Splendid offerings of thanksgiving to the gods were dedicated in the temples of Himera, Syracuse, and Delphi; while the epigram of Simonidês,⁶ composed for the tripod offered in the latter temple, described Gelo with his three brothers Hiero, Polyzêlus, and Thrasybulus, as the joint liberators of Greece from the Barbarian, along with the victors of Salamis and

Conduct of Gelo towards the confederate Greeks who were contending against Xerxes.

¹ I presume this treatment of Anaxilaus by Gelo must be alluded to in Diodorus, xi. 66: at least it is difficult to understand what other "great benefit" Gelo had conferred on Anaxilaus.

² Diodor. xi. 26.

³ Schol. ad Pindar. Pyth. ii. 3; Plu-

tarch, De Serâ Numinis Vindictâ, p. 552, c. 6.

⁴ Diodor. xx. 14.

⁵ Pindar, Nem. ix. 67 (= 28a.) with the Scholia.

⁶ Simonidês, Epigr. 141, ed. Bergk.

Plataea. And the Sicilians alleged that he was on the point of actually sending reinforcements to the Greeks against Xerxes, in spite of the necessity of submitting to Spartan command, when the intelligence of the defeat and retreat of that prince reached him. But we find another statement decidedly more probable—that he sent a confidential envoy named Kadmus to Delphi with orders to watch the turn of the Xerxeian invasion, and in case it should prove successful (as he thought that it probably would be) to tender presents and submission to the victorious invader on behalf of Syracuse.¹ When we consider that until the very morning of the battle of Salamis, the cause of Grecian independence must have appeared to an impartial spectator almost desperate, we cannot wonder that Gelo should take precautions for preventing the onward progress of the Persians towards Sicily, which was already sufficiently imperilled by its formidable enemies in Africa. The defeat of the Persians at Salamis and of the Carthaginians at Himera cleared away suddenly and unexpectedly the terrific cloud from Greece as well as from Sicily, and left a sky comparatively brilliant with prosperous hopes.

To the victorious army of Gelo, there was abundant plunder for recompense as well as distribution. Among the most valuable part of the plunder were the numerous prisoners taken, who were divided among the cities in proportion to the number of troops furnished by each. Of course the largest shares must have fallen to Syracuse and Agrigentum; while the number acquired by the latter was still farther increased by the separate capture of those prisoners who had dispersed throughout the mountains in and near the Agrigentine territory. All the Sicilian cities allied with or dependent on Gelo, but especially the two last-mentioned, were thus put in possession of a number of slaves as public property, who were kept in chains to work,² and were either employed on public undertakings for defence, ornament, and religious solemn-

¹ Herodot. vii. 163-165: compare Diodor. xi. 26; Ephorus, Fragm. 111, ed. Didot.

² Diodor. xi. 25. αἱ δὲ πόλεις εἰς πύδας κατέστησαν τοὺς διαρθεύοντας αἰχμαλώτους, καὶ τὰ δημόσια τῶν ἔργων διὰ τοῦ.

των ἐπισκεύαζον.

For analogous instances of captives taken in war being employed in public works by the captors, and labouring in chains, see the cases of Tegea and Samos in Herodot. i. 66; iii. 39.

nity—or let out to private masters so as to afford a revenue to the state. So great was the total of these public slaves at Agrigentum, that though many were employed on state-works, which elevated the city to signal grandeur during the flourishing period of seventy years which intervened between the recent battle and its subsequent capture by the Carthaginians—there nevertheless remained great numbers to be let out to private individuals, some of whom had no less than five hundred slaves respectively in their employment.¹

The peace which now ensued left Gelo master of Syracuse and Gela, with the Chalkidic Greek towns on the east of the island; while Théro governed in Agrigentum, and his son Thrasydæus in Himera. In power as well as in reputation, Gelo was unquestionably the chief person in the island; moreover he was connected by marriage, and lived on terms of uninterrupted friendship, with Théro. His conduct, both at Syracuse and towards the cities dependent upon him, was mild and conciliating. But his subsequent career was very short: he died of a dropsical complaint not much more than a year after the battle of Himera, while the glories of that day were fresh in every one's recollection. As the Syracusan law rigorously interdicted expensive funerals, Gelo had commanded that his own obsequies should be conducted in strict conformity to the law: nevertheless the zeal of his successor as well as the attachment of the people disobeyed these commands. The great mass of citizens followed his funeral procession from the city to the estate of his wife, fifteen miles distant: nine massive towers were erected to distinguish the spot; and the solemnities of heroic worship were rendered to him. The respectful recollections of the conqueror of Himera never afterwards died out among the Syracusan people, though his tomb was defaced first by the Carthaginians, and afterwards by the despot Agathoklês.² And when we recollect the destructive effects caused by the subsequent Carthaginian invasions, we shall be sensible how great was the debt of gratitude owing to Gelo by his contemporaries.

Death and
obsequies of
Gelo.

¹ Diodor. xi. 25. Respecting slaves belonging to the public, and let out for hire to individual employers, compare the large financial project conceived by Xenophon, *De Vectigalibus*, capp. 3

and 4.

² Diodor. xi. 38, 67; Plutarch, *Timoleon*, c. 29; Aristotle *Γελάων Πολιτεία*; *Fragm.* p. 106, ed. Neumann.

It was not merely as conqueror of Himera, but as a sort of second founder of Syracuse,¹ that Gelo was thus solemnly worshipped. The size, the strength, and the population, of the town were all greatly increased under him. Besides the number of the new inhabitants which he brought from Gela, the Hyblæan Megara, and the Sicilian Eubœa, we are informed that he also inscribed on the roll of citizens no less than 10,000 mercenary soldiers. It will moreover appear that these new-made citizens were in possession of the islet of Ortygia²—the interior stronghold of Syracuse. It has already been stated that Ortygia was the original settlement, and that the city did not overstep the boundaries of the islet before the enlargements of Gelo. We do not know by what arrangements Gelo provided new lands for so large a number of new-comers: but when we come to notice the antipathy with which these latter were regarded by the remaining citizens, we shall be inclined to believe that the old citizens had been dispossessed and degraded.

Gelo left a son in tender years, but his power passed, by his own direction, to two of his brothers, Polyzélus and Hiero; the former of whom married the widow of the deceased prince, and was named, according to his testamentary directions, commander of the military force—while Hiero was intended to enjoy the government of the city. Whatever may have been the wishes of Gelo, however, the real power fell to Hiero; a man of energy and determination, and munificent as a patron of contemporary poets, Pindar, Simonidès, Bacchylidès, Epicharmus, Æschylus, and others; but the victim of a painful internal complaint—jealous in his temper—cruel, and rapacious in his government³—and noted as an organizer of that systematic espionage which broke up all freedom of speech among his subjects. Especially jealous of his brother Polyzélus, who was very popular in the city, he despatched him on a military expedi-

Hiero, brother and successor of Gelo at Syracuse—jealous of his brother Polyzélus—harsh as a ruler—quarrel between Hiero of Syracuse and Thêro of Agrigentum—appealed by the poet Simonidès.

¹ Diodor. xi. 49.

² Diodor. xi. 72, 73.

³ Diodor. xi. 67; Aristotel. Politic. v. 9, 3. In spite of the compliments directly paid by Pindar to Hiero (πρᾶτος ἀστροῖς, οὐ φθονίων ἀγαθοῖς, ξείνοισι δὲ

θευμαστὸς πατήρ, Pyth. iii. 71=125), his indirect admonitions and hints sufficiently attest the real character (see Dissen ad Pindar. Pyth. i. and ii. p. 161-182).

tion against the Krotoniates, with a view of indirectly accomplishing his destruction. But Polyzélus, aware of the snare, fled to Agrigentum, and sought protection from his brother-in-law the despot Thêro : from whom Hiero re-demanded him, and on receiving a refusal, prepared to enforce the demand by arms. He had already advanced on his march as far as the river Gela, but no actual battle appears to have taken place. It is interesting to hear that Simonidês the poet, esteemed and rewarded by both these princes, was the mediator of peace between them.¹

The temporary breach, and sudden reconciliation, between these two powerful despots, proved the cause of sorrow and ruin at Himera. That city, under the dominion of the Agrigentine Thêro, was administered by his son Thrasydæus—a youth whose oppressive conduct speedily excited the strongest antipathy. The Himeraëans, knowing that they had little chance of redress from Thêro against his son, took advantage of the quarrel between him and Hiero to make propositions to the latter, and to entreat his aid for the expulsion of Thrasydæus, tendering themselves as subjects of Syracuse. It appears that Kapys and Hippokratês, cousins of Thêro, but at variance with him, and also candidates for the protection of Hiero, were concerned in this scheme for detaching Himera from the dominion of Thêro. But so soon as peace had been concluded, Hiero betrayed to Thêro both the schemes and the malcontents at Himera. We seem to make out that Kapys and Hippokratês collected some forces to resist Thêro, but were defeated by him at the river Himera :² his victory was followed up by seizing and putting to death a large number of Himeraëan citizens. So great was the number slain, coupled with the loss of others who fled for fear of being slain, that the population of the city was sensibly and inconveniently diminished. Thêro invited and enrolled a large addition of new citizens, chiefly of Dorian blood.³

Severe treatment of the inhabitants of Himera by Thêro.

¹ Diodor. xi. 48; Schol. Pindar, Olymp. ii. 29.

² Schol. ad Pindar. Olymp. ii. 173. For the few facts which can be made out respecting the family and genealogy of Thêro, see Gôller, *De Situ et Origine Syracusarum*, ch. vii. p. 19-22. The

Scholiasts of Pindar are occasionally useful in explaining the brief historical allusions of the poet; but they seem to have had very few trustworthy materials before them for so doing.

³ Diodor. xi. 48, 49.

Power and exploits of Hiero—against the Carthaginians and Tyrrhenians—against Anaxilaus—he founds the city of Ætna—new wholesale transplantation of inhabitants—compliments of Pindar.

The power of Hiero, now reconciled both with Thêro and with his brother Polyzêlus, is marked by several circumstances as noway inferior to that of Gelo, and probably the greatest, not merely in Sicily, but throughout the Grecian world. The citizens of the distant city of Cumæ, on the coast of Italy, harassed by Carthaginian and Tyrrhenian fleets, entreated his aid, and received from him a squadron which defeated and drove off their enemies:¹ he even settled a Syracusan colony in the neighbouring island of Pithekusa. Anaxilaus, despot of Rhegium and Messênê, had attacked, and might probably have overpowered, his neighbours the Epizephyrian Lokrians; but the menaces of Hiero, invoked by the Lokrians, and conveyed by the envoy Chromius, compelled him to desist.² Those heroic honours, which in Greece belonged to the Ækist of a new city, were yet wanting to him. He procured them by the foundation of the new city of Ætna,³ on the site and in the place of Katana, the inhabitants of which he expelled, as well as those of Naxos. While these Naxians and Katanæans were directed to take up their abode at Leontini along with the existing inhabitants, Hiero planted 10,000 new inhabitants in his adopted city of Ætna; 5000 of them from Syracuse and Gela—with an equal number from Peloponnesus. They served as an auxiliary force, ready to be called forth in the event of discontents at Syracuse, as we shall see by the history of his successor: he gave them not only the territory which had before belonged to Katana, but also a large addition besides, chiefly at the expense of the neighbouring Sikel tribes. His son Deinomenês, and his friend and confidant Chromius,

¹ The brazen helmet, discovered near the site of Olympia with the name of Hiero and the victory at Cumæ inscribed on it, yet remains as an interesting relie to commemorate this event: it was among the offerings presented by Hiero to the Olympic Zeus: see Boeckh, Corp. Inscript. Græc. No. 16, part i. p. 34.

² Diodor. xi. 51; Pindar, i. 74 (= 140); ii. 17 (= 35) with the Scholia; Epicharmus, Fragment, p. 19, ed. Krusemann; Schol. Pindar. Pyth. i. 98; Strabo, v. p. 247.

³ Ἰέρων οἰκιστὴς ἀντὶ τυράννου βουλόμενος εἶναι, Κατάνην ἐξελὼν Ἀττίνην μετωνόμασε τὴν πόλιν, αὐτὸν οἰκιστὴν προσαγορεύσας (Schol. ad Pindar. Nem. i. 1).

Compare the subsequent case of the foundation of Thurii, among the citizens of which violent disputes arose, in determining who should be recognised as Ækist of the place. On referring to the oracle, Apollo directed them to commemorate *himself* as Ækist (Diodor. xii. 35).

enrolled as an Ætnæan, became joint administrators of the city, whose religious and social customs were assimilated to the Dorian model.¹ Pindar dreams of future relations between the despot and citizens of Ætna, analogous to those between king and citizens at Sparta. Both Hiero and Chromius were proclaimed as Ætnæans at the Pythian and Nemean games, when their chariots gained victories; on which occasion the assembled crowd heard for the first time of the new Hellenic city of Ætna. We see, by the compliments of Pindar,² that Hiero was vain of his new title of founder. But we must remark that it was procured, not, as in most cases, by planting Greeks on a spot previously barbarous, but by the dispossession and impoverishment of other Grecian citizens, who seem to have given no ground of offence. Both in Gelo and Hiero we see the first exhibition of that propensity to violent and wholesale transplantation of inhabitants from one seat to another, which was not uncommon among Assyrian and Persian despots, and which was exhibited on a still larger scale by the successors of Alexander the Great in their numerous new-built cities.

Anaxilaus of Rhegium died shortly after that message of Hiero which had compelled him to spare the Lokrians. Such was the esteem entertained for his memory, and so efficient the government of Mikythus, a manumitted slave whom he constituted regent, that Rhegium and Messênê were preserved for his children, yet minors.³ But a still more important change in Sicily was caused by the death of the Agrigentine Thêro, which took place seemingly about 472 B.C. This prince, a partner with Gelo in the great victory over the Carthaginians, left a reputation of good government as well as ability among the Agrigentines, which we find perpetuated in the laureat strains of Pindar: and his memory doubtless became still farther

Death of Anaxilaus of Rhegium, and of Thêro of Agrigentum. Thrasydæus, son of Thêro, rules Agrigentum and Himera. His cruel government—he is deposed by Hiero and expelled.

¹ Chromius *ἐλευθερώσας τῆς Αἰτνῆς* (Schol. Pind. Nem. ix. 1). About the Dorian institutions of Ætna, &c., Pindar, Pyth. i. 60-71.

Deinomenês survived his father, and commemorated the Olympic victories of the latter by costly offerings at Olympia (Pausan. vi. 12, 1).

² Pindar. Pyth. i. 60 (= 117); iii. 69 (= 121). Pindar. ap. Strabo, vi. p. 269. Compare Nemea, ix. 1-30, addressed to Chromius. Hiero is proclaimed in some odes as a Syracusan; but Syracuse and the newly-founded Ætna are intimately joined together: see Nemea, i. *init.*

³ Justin. iv. 2.

endeared from comparison with his son and successor. Thrasydæus, now master both of Himera and Agrigentum, displayed on a larger scale the same oppressive and sanguinary dispositions which had before provoked rebellion at the former city. Feeling himself detested by his subjects, he enlarged the military force which had been left by his father, and engaged so many new mercenaries, that he became master of a force of 20,000 men, horse and foot. And in his own territory, perhaps he might long have trodden with impunity in the footsteps of Phalaris, had he not imprudently provoked his more powerful neighbour Hiero. In an obstinate and murderous battle between these two princes, 2000 men were slain on the side of the Syracusans, and 4000 on that of the Agrigentines: an immense slaughter, considering that it mostly fell upon the Greeks in the two armies, and not upon the non-Hellenic mercenaries.¹ But the defeat of Thrasydæus was so complete, that he was compelled to flee not only from Agrigentum, but from Sicily: he retired to Megara in Greece Proper, where he was condemned to death and perished.² The Agrigentines, thus happily released from their oppressor, sued for and obtained peace from Hiero. They are said to have established a democratical government, but we learn that Hiero sent many citizens into banishment from Agrigentum and Himera, as well as from Gela,³ nor can we doubt that all the three were numbered among his subject cities. The moment of freedom only commenced for them when the Gelonian dynasty shared the fate of the Theronian.

The victory over Thrasydæus rendered Hiero more completely master of Sicily than his brother Gelo had been before him. The last act which we hear of him is, his interference on behalf of his brothers-in-law,⁴ the sons of Anaxilaus of Rhegium who were

Great power of Hiero, after the defeat of Thrasydæus—his death.

¹ So I conceive the words of Diodorus are to be understood—*κλείστοι τῶν παραταξαμένων Ἑλλήνων πρὸς Ἑλληνας ἔπεσον* (Diodor. xi. 53).

² Diodor. xi. 53. *ἐκεῖ θανάτου καταγνωσθεὶς ἐτελεύτησεν*. This is a remarkable specimen of the feeling in a foreign city towards an oppressive tyrant. The Megarians of Greece Proper were much connected with Sicily, through the Hyblean Megara, as well as Selinus.

³ Diodor. xi. 76. *Οἱ κατὰ τὴν Ἱέρανος δυναστείαν ἐκπεπρωκότες ἐκ τῶν ἰδίων πόλεων—τούτων δ' ἦσαν Γελῶσι καὶ Ἀκραγαντίνοι καὶ Ἱμεραῖοι*.

⁴ Hiero had married the daughter of Anaxilaus, but he seems also to have had two other wives—the sister or cousin of Thêro, and the daughter of a Syracusan named Nikoklēs: this last was the mother of his son Deinomenēs (Schol. Pindar. Pyth. i. 112).

We read of Kleophron son of Anaxi-

now of age to govern. He encouraged them to prefer, and probably showed himself ready to enforce, their claim against Mikythus, who had administered Rhegium since the death of Anaxilaus, for the property as well as the sceptre. Mikythus complied readily with the demand, rendering an account so exact and faithful, that the sons of Anaxilaus themselves entreated him to remain and govern—or more probably to lend his aid to their government. This request he was wise enough to refuse: he removed his own property and retired to Tegea in Arcadia. Hiero died shortly afterwards, of the complaint under which he had so long suffered, after a reign of ten years.¹

On the death of Hiero, the succession was disputed between his brother Thrasybulus, and his nephew the youthful son of Gelo, so that the partisans of the family became thus divided. Thrasybulus, surrounding his nephew with temptations to luxurious pleasure, contrived to put him indirectly aside, and thus to seize the government for himself.² This family division—a curse often resting upon the blood-relations of Grecian despots, and leading to the greatest atrocities³—coupled with the conduct of Thrasybulus himself, caused the downfall of the mighty Gelonian dynasty. The bad qualities of Hiero were now seen greatly exaggerated, but without his accompanying energy, in Thrasybulus; who put to death many citizens, and banished still more, for the purpose of seizing their property, until at length he provoked among the Syracusans intense and universal hatred, shared even by many of the old Gelonian partisans.

B.C. 467.
Thrasybulus, brother and successor of Hiero—disputes among the members of the Gelonian family.
—Cruelties and unpopularity of Thrasybulus—mutiny against him at Syracuse.

laus, governing Messênê during his father's lifetime: probably this young man must have died, otherwise Mikythus would not have succeeded (Schol. Pindar. Pyth. ii. 34).

¹ Diodor. xi. 66.

² Aristotel. Politic. v. 8, 19. Diodorus does not mention the son of Gelo.

Mr. Fynes Clinton (Fasti Hellenici, App. chap. 10, p. 264 seq.) has discussed all the main points connected with Syracusan and Sicilian chronology.

³ Xenophon. Hiero, iii. 8. Εἰ τοίνυν ἐθέλεις κατανοεῖν, εὐρήσεις μὲν τοὺς ἰδιώτας ἐπὶ τούτων μάλιστα φιλομένους, τοὺς δὲ τυράννους πολλοὺς μὲν παῖδας

ἐκ τῶν ἀπεκτονηκότας, πολλοὺς δ' ἐπὶ παῖδων αὐτοὺς ἀπολωλότας, πολλοὺς δὲ ἀδελφοὺς ἐν τυραννίσιν ἀλληλοφόνους γεγεννημένους, πολλοὺς δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ γυναικῶν τῶν αὐτῶν τυράννους διεφθαρμένους, καὶ ἐπὶ ἑταίρων γε τῶν μάλιστα δοκούντων φίλων εἶναι: compare Isokratēs, De Pace, Orat. viii. p. 182, § 138.

So also Tacitus (Hist. v. 9) respecting the native kings of Judæa, after the expulsion of the Syrian dynasty—"Sibi ipsi reges imposuere: qui, mobilitate vulgi expulsi, resumptâ per arma dominatione, fugas civium, urbium everSIONES,—fratrum, conjugum, parentum, neces—aliæque solita regibus ausi," &c.

Though he tried to strengthen himself by increasing his mercenary force, he could not prevent a general revolt from breaking out among the Syracusan population. By summoning those cities which Hiero had planted in his new city of Ætna, as well as various troops from his dependent allies, he found himself at the head of 15,000 men, and master of the inner city; that is, the islet of Ortygia, which was the primitive settlement of Syracuse, and was not only distinct and defensible in itself, but also contained the docks, the shipping, and command of the harbour. The revolted people on their side were masters of the outer city, better known under its latter name of Achradina, which lay on the adjacent mainland of Sicily, was surrounded by a separate wall of its own, and was divided from Ortygia by an intervening space of low ground used for burials.¹ Though superior in number, yet being no match in military efficiency for the forces of Thrasybulus,

¹ Respecting the topography of Syracuse at the time of these disturbances, immediately preceding and following the fall of the Gelonian dynasty—my statements in the present edition will be found somewhat modified as compared with the first. In describing the siege of the city by the Athenian army under Nikias, I found it necessary to study the local details of Thucydides with great minuteness, besides consulting fuller modern authorities. The conclusion which I have formed will be found stated,—partly in the early part of chapter lix.—but chiefly in a separate dissertation annexed as an Appendix to vol. vi., and illustrated by two plans. To the latter Dissertation with its Plans, I request the reader to refer.

Diodorus here states (xi. 67, 68) that Thrasybulus was master both of the Island (Ortygia) and Achradina, while the revolted Syracusans held the rest of the city, of which Itykê or Tychê was a part. He evidently conceives Syracuse as having comprised, in 463 B.C., substantially the same great space and the same number of four quarters or portions, as it afterwards came to contain from the time of the despot Dionysius down to the Roman empire, and as it is set forth in the description of Cicero (*Orat. in Verr.* iv. 53, 118-120) enumerating the four quarters Ortygia, Achradina, Tychê, and Neapolis. I believe this to be a mistake. I take the general

conception of the topography of Syracuse given by Thucydides in 415 B.C., as representing in the main what it had been fifty years before. Thucydides (vi. 3) mentions only the Inner City, which was in the Islet of Ortygia (ἡ πόλις ἡ ἐνὶ ὄρεϊ)—and the Outer City (ἡ πόλις ἡ ἐξω). This latter was afterwards known by the name of Achradina, though that name does not occur in Thucydides. Diodorus expressly mentions that both Ortygia and Achradina had each separate fortifications (xi. 73).

In these disputes connected with the fall of the Gelonian dynasty, I conceive Thrasybulus to have held possession of Ortygia, which was at all times the inner stronghold and the most valuable portion of Syracuse; inasmuch that under the Roman dominion, Marcellus prohibited any native Syracusan from dwelling in it. (*Cicero cont. Verr.* v. 32-84, 38, 98.) The enemies of Thrasybulus, on the contrary, I conceive to have occupied Achradina.

There is no doubt that this bisection of Syracuse into two separate fortifications must have afforded great additional facility for civil dispute, if there were any causes abroad tending to foment it; conformably to a remark of Aristotle (*Polit.* v. 2, 12), which the philosopher illustrates by reference to Kolophon and Notium, as well as to the insular and continental portions of Klazomenæ.

they were obliged to invoke aid from the other cities in Sicily, as well as from the Sikel tribes—proclaiming the Gelonian dynasty as the common enemy of freedom in the island, and holding out universal independence as the reward of victory. It was fortunate for them that there was no brother-despot like the powerful Thêro to espouse the cause of Thrasybulus. Gela, Agrigentum, Selinus, Himera, and even the Sikel tribes, all responded to the call with alacrity, so that a large force, both military and naval, came to reinforce the Syracusans; and Thrasybulus, being totally defeated, first in naval action, next on land, was obliged to shut himself up in Ortygia, where he soon found his situation hopeless. He accordingly opened a negotiation with his opponents, which ended in his abdication and retirement to Lokri, while the mercenary troops whom he had brought together were also permitted to depart unmolested.¹ The expelled Thrasybulus afterwards lived and died as a private citizen at Lokri—a very different fate from that which had befallen Thrasidæus (son of Thêro) at Megara, though both seem to have given the same provocation.

Thus fell the powerful Gelonian dynasty at Syracuse, after a continuance of eighteen years.² Its fall was nothing less than an extensive revolution throughout Sicily. Among the various cities of the island there had grown up many petty despots, each with his separate mercenary force; acting as the instruments, and relying on the protection, of the great despot at Syracuse. All these were now expelled, and governments more or less democratical were established everywhere.³ The sons of Anaxilaus maintained themselves a little longer at Rhegium and Messênê, but the citizens of these two towns at length followed the general example, compelled them to retire,⁴ and began their æra of freedom.

But though the Sicilian despots had thus been expelled, the free governments established in their place were exposed at first to much difficulty and collision. It has been already mentioned that Gelo, Hiero, Thêro, Thrasidæus, Thrasybulus, &c., had all condemned many citizens to exile with confiscation of property; and had planted on the soil new citizens

B.C. 465.
Expulsion
of Thrasybu-
lus, and ex-
tinction of
the Gelonian
dynasty.

¹ Diodor. ix. 67, 68.

² Aristotel. Politic. v. 8, 23.

³ Diodor. xi. 68.

⁴ Diodor. xi. 76.

and mercenaries, in numbers no less considerable. To what race these mercenaries belonged, we are not told: it is probable that they were only in part Greeks. Such violent mutations, both of persons and property, could not occur without raising bitter conflicts, of interest as well as of feeling, between the old, the new, and the dispossessed proprietors, as soon as the iron hand of compression was removed. This source of angry dissension was common to all the Sicilian cities, but in none did it flow more profusely than in Syracuse. In that city, the new mercenaries last introduced by Thrasybulus, had retired at the same time with him, many of them to the Hieronian city of *Ætna*, from whence they had been brought. But there yet remained the more numerous body introduced principally by Gelo, partly also by Hiero; the former alone having enrolled 10,000, of whom more than 7000 yet remained. What part these Gelonian citizens had taken in the late revolution, we do not find distinctly stated: they seem not to have supported Thrasybulus as a body, and probably many of them took part against him.

After the revolution had been accomplished, a public assembly of the Syracusans was convened, in which the first resolution was, to provide for the religious commemoration of the event, by erecting a colossal statue of Zeus Eleutherius, and by celebrating an annual festival to be called the Eleutheria, with solemn matches and sacrifices. They next proceeded to determine the political constitution, and such was the predominant reaction, doubtless aggravated by the returned exiles, of hatred and fear against the expelled dynasty—that the whole body of new citizens, who had been domiciliated under Gelo and Hiero, were declared ineligible to magistracy or honour. This harsh and sweeping disqualification, falling at once upon a numerous minority, naturally provoked renewed irritation and civil war. The Gelonian citizens, the most warlike individuals in the state, and occupying, as favoured partisans of the previous dynasty, the inner section of Syracuse¹—Ortygia—placed themselves in

¹ Aristotle (*Polit.* v. 2, 11) mentions, as one of his illustrations of the mischief of receiving new citizens, that the Syracusans, after the Gelonian

Popular governments established in all the Sicilian cities—confusion and disputes arising out of the number of new citizens and mercenaries domiciliated by the Gelonian princes.

open revolt; while the general mass of citizens, masters of the outer city, were not strong enough to assail with success this defensible position.¹ But they contrived to block it up nearly altogether, and to intercept both its supplies and its communication with the country, by means of a new fortification carried out from the outer city towards the Great Harbour, and stretching between Ortygia and Epipolæ. The garrison within could thus only obtain supplies at the cost of perpetual conflicts. This disastrous internal war continued for some months, with many partial engagements both by land and sea: whereby the general body of citizens became accustomed to arms, while a chosen regiment of 600 trained volunteers acquired especial efficiency. Unable to maintain themselves longer, the Gelonians were forced to hazard a general battle, which, after an obstinate struggle, terminated in their complete defeat. The chosen band of 600, who had eminently contributed to this victory, received from their fellow-citizens a crown of honour, and a reward of one mina per head.²

The meagre annals, wherein these interesting events are indicated rather than described, tell us scarcely anything of the political arrangements which resulted from so important

Internal dissensions and combats in Syracuse.

dynasty, admitted the foreign mercenaries to citizenship, and from hence came to sedition and armed conflict. But the incident cannot fairly be quoted in illustration of that principle which he brings it to support. The mercenaries, so long as the dynasty lasted, had been the first citizens in the community: after its overthrow, they became the inferior, and were rendered inadmissible to honours. It is hardly matter of surprise that so great a change of position excited them to rebel: but this is not a case properly adducible to prove the difficulty of adjusting matters with new-coming citizens.

After the expulsion of Agathoklès from Syracuse, nearly two centuries after these events, the same quarrel and sedition was renewed, by the exclusion of his mercenaries from magistracy and posts of honour (Diodor. xxi. Fragm. p. 282).

¹ Diodor. xi. 73. Οἱ δὲ Συρακοῦσιοι πάλιν ἐμπεσόντες εἰς ταραχὴν, τὸ λοιπὸν τῆς πόλεως κάτεσχον, καὶ τὸ πρὸς τὰς

Ἐπιπολάς τετραμμένον αὐτῆς ἐπετείχισαν, καὶ πολλὰν ἀσφάλειαν αὐτοῖς κατέσκεινσαν· εὐθὺς γὰρ τῆς ἐπὶ τὴν χώραν ἐξόδου τοῦς ἀφιστηκότας εὐχερῶς εἴργον καὶ ταχὺ τῶν ἐπιτηδείων ὑποίησαν ἀπορεῖν.

Diodorus here repeats the same misconception as I have noticed in a previous note. He supposes that the Gelonians were in possession both of Ortygia and of Achradina, whereas they were only in possession of the former, as Thrasybulus had been in the former contest.

The opposing party were in possession of the outer city or Achradina; and it would be easy for them, by throwing out a fortification between Epipolæ and the Great Harbour, to straiten the communication of Ortygia with the country around; as may be seen by referring to the Plans of Syracuse annexed to vol. vi. of this History.

² Diodor. xi. 72, 73, 76.

a victory. Probably many of the Gelonians were expelled: but we may assume as certain, that they were deprived of the dangerous privilege of a separate residence in the inner stronghold or islet Ortygia.¹

Defeat of the
Gelonians—
Syracuse
made into
one popular
government.

Meanwhile the rest of Sicily had experienced disorders analogous in character to those of Syracuse. At Gela, at Agrigentum, at Himera, the reaction against the Gelonian dynasty had brought back in crowds the dispossessed exiles; who, claiming restitution of their properties and influence, found their demands sustained by the population generally. The Katanaeans, whom Hiero had driven from their own city to Leontini, in order that he might convert Katana into his own settlement Ætna, assembled in arms and allied themselves with the Sikel prince Duketius, to reconquer their former home and to restore to the Sikels that which Hiero had taken from them for enlargement of the Ætnæan territory. They were aided by the Syracusans, to whom the neighbourhood of these Hieronian partisans was dangerous: but they did not accomplish their object until after a long contest and several battles with the Ætnæans. A convention was at length concluded, by which the latter evacuated Katana and were allowed to occupy the town and territory (seemingly Sikel) of Ennesia or Inessa, upon which they bestowed the name of Ætna,² with monuments commemorating Hiero as the founder—while the tomb of the latter at Katana was demolished by the restored inhabitants.

Disorders
in other
Sicilian
cities, arising
from the
return of
exiles who
had been dis-
possessed
under the
Gelonian
dynasty.
Katana and
Ætna.

These conflicts, disturbing the peace of all Sicily, came to be so intolerable, that a general congress was held between the various cities to adjust them. It was determined by joint resolution to re-admit the exiles and to extrude the Gelonian settlers everywhere: but an establishment was provided for these latter in the territory of Messênê. It appears that the exiles received back their property, or at least an assignment of other lands in compensation for it. The inhabitants of Gela were enabled to provide for their own exiles by

General con-
gress and
compromise
—the exiles
are provided
for—Kama-
rina again
restored as a
separate au-
tonomous
city.

¹ Diodorus, xiv. 7.

² Diodorus, xi. 76; Strabo, vi. 268. Compare, as an analogous event, the destruction of the edifices erected in the

market-place of Amphipolis, in honour of the Athenian Agnon the Ekist, after the revolt of that city from Athens (Thucyd. v. 11).

re-establishing the city of Kamarina,¹ which had been conquered from Syracuse by Hippokratēs despot of Gela, but which Gelo, on transferring his abode to Syracuse, had made a portion of the Syracusan territory, conveying its inhabitants to the city of Syracuse. The Syracusans now renounced the possession of it—a cession to be explained probably by the fact, that among the new-comers transferred by Gelo to Syracuse, there were included not only the previous Kamarinæans, but also many who had before been citizens of Gela.² For these men, now obliged to quit Syracuse, it would be convenient to provide an abode at Kamarina, as well as for the other restored Geloan exiles; and we may farther presume that this new city served as a receptacle for other homeless citizens from all parts of the island. It was consecrated by the Geloans as an independent city, with Dorian rites and customs: its lands were distributed anew, and among its settlers were men rich enough to send prize chariots to Peloponnesus, as well as to pay for odes of Pindar. The Olympic victories of the Kamarinæan Psaumis secured for his new city an Hellenic celebrity, at a moment when it had hardly yet emerged from the hardships of an initiatory settlement.³

Such was the great reactionary movement in Sicily against the high-handed violences of the previous despots. We are only enabled to follow it generally, but we see that all their transplantations and expulsions of inhabitants were reversed, and all their arrangements overthrown. In the correction of the past injustice, we cannot doubt that new injustice was in many cases committed, nor are we surprised to hear that at Syracuse many new enrolments of citizens took place without any rightful claim,⁴ probably accompanied by grants of land. The reigning feeling at Syracuse would now be quite opposite to that of the days of Gelo, when the Demos

Reactionary feelings against the previous despotism, and in favour of popular government, at Syracuse and in the other cities.

¹ Diodor. xi. 76. *μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα Καμάριναν μὲν Γελῶνι κατοικίσαντες ἐξ ἀρχῆς κατεκληρούησαν.*

See the note of Wesseling upon this passage. There can be little doubt that in Thucydides (vi. 5) the correction of *κατεκλήσθη* ὑπὸ Γελῶν (in place of ὑπὸ Γελωνος) is correct.

² Herodot. vii. 155.

³ See the fourth and fifth Olympic odes of Pindar, referred to Olympiad 82, or 452 B.C., about nine years after the Geloans had re-established Kamarina. *Τὰν νόονον ἔδραν* (Olymp. v. 9); *ἀπ' ἀμαχανίας ἔγων ἐς φῶς τότε δῆμον ἄστων* (Olymp. v. 14).

⁴ Diodor. xi. 86. *πολλῶν εἰσι καὶ ὡς ἔτυχε πεπολιτογραφημένων.*

or aggregate of small self-working proprietors was considered as "a troublesome yoke-fellow," fit only to be sold into slavery for exportation. It is highly probable that the new table of citizens now prepared included that class of men in larger number than ever, on principles analogous to the liberal enrolments of Kleisthenês at Athens. In spite of all the confusion however with which this period of popular government opens, lasting for more than fifty years until the despotism of the elder Dionysius, we shall find it far the best and most prosperous portion of Sicilian history. We shall arrive at it in a subsequent chapter.

Respecting the Grecian cities along the coast of Italy, during the period of the Gelonian dynasty, a few words will exhaust the whole of our knowledge. Rhegium, with its despots Anaxilaus and Mikythus, figures chiefly as a Sicilian city, and has been noticed as such in the stream of Sicilian politics. But it is also involved in the only event which has been preserved to us respecting this portion of the history of the Italian Greeks. It was about the year B.C. 473, that the Tarentines undertook an expedition against their non-Hellenic neighbours the Iapygians, in hopes of conquering Hyria and the other towns belonging to them. Mikythus, despot of Rhegium, against the will of his citizens, despatched 3000 of them by constraint as auxiliaries to the Tarentines. But the expedition proved signally disastrous to both. The Iapygians, to the number of 20,000 men, encountered the united Grecian forces in the field, and completely defeated them. The battle having taken place in a hostile country, it seems that the larger portion both of Rhegians and Tarentines perished, insomuch that Herodotus pronounces it to have been the greatest Hellenic slaughter within his knowledge.¹ Of the Tarentines slain a great proportion were opulent and substantial citizens, the

Italian
Greeks—
destructive
defeat of the
inhabitants
of Tarentum
and of Rhe-
gium.

¹ Herodot. vii. 170; Diodor. xi. 52. The latter asserts that the Iapygian victors divided their forces, part of them pursuing the Rhegian fugitives, the rest pursuing the Tarentines. Those who followed the former were so rapid in their movements, that they entered (he says) along with the fugitives into the town of Rhegium, and even became masters

of it.

To say nothing of the fact, that Rhegium continues afterwards, as before, under the rule of Mikythus—we may remark that Diodorus must have formed to himself a strange idea of the geography of southern Italy, to talk of pursuit and flight from Iapygia to Rhegium.

loss of whom sensibly affected the government of the city; strengthening the Demos, and rendering the constitution more democratical. In what particulars the change consisted we do not know: the expression of Aristotle gives reason to suppose that even before this event the constitution had been popular.¹

¹ Aristotel. Polit. v. 2, 8. Aristotle has another passage (vi. 3, 5) in which he comments on the government of Tarentum: and O. Müller applies this second passage to illustrate the particular constitutional changes which were made after the Iapygian disaster. I think this juxtaposition of the two passages unauthorized: there is nothing at all to connect them together. See History of the Dorians, iii. 9, 14.

CHAPTER XLIV.

FROM THE BATTLES OF PLATÆA AND MYKALĒ DOWN TO
THE DEATHS OF THEMISTOKLĒS AND ARISTEIDĒS.

AFTER having in the last chapter followed the repulse of the Carthaginians by the Sicilian Greeks, we now return to the central Greeks and the Persians—a case in which the triumph was yet more interesting to the cause of human improvement generally.

The disproportion between the immense host assembled by Xerxes, and the little which he accomplished, naturally provokes both a contempt for Persian force and an admiration for the comparative handful of men by whom they were so ignominiously beaten. Both these sentiments are just, but both are often exaggerated beyond the point which attentive contemplation of the facts will justify. The Persian mode of making war (which we may liken to that of the modern Turks,¹ now that the period of their energetic fanaticism has passed away) was in a high degree disorderly and inefficient. The men indeed, individually taken, especially the native Persians, were not deficient in the qualities of soldiers, but their arms and their organisation were wretched—and their leaders yet worse. On the other hand, the Greeks, equal, if not superior, in individual bravery, were incomparably superior in soldierlike order as well as in arms; but here too the leadership was defective, and the disunion a constant source of peril. Those who, like Plutarch (or rather the Pseudo-Plutarch) in his treatise on the Malignity of Herodotus, insist on acknowledging nothing but magnanimity and heroism in the proceedings of the Greeks throughout these critical years, are forced to deal harshly with the

Causes of the disgraceful repulse of Xerxes from Greece—his own defects—inferior quality and slackness of most of his army.—Tendency to exaggerate the heroism of the Greeks.

¹ Mr. Waddington's Letters from Greece, describing the Greek revolution of 1821, will convey a good idea of the stupidity of Turkish warfare: compare also the second volume of the Memoirs of Baron de Tott, part. iii.

inestimable witness on whom our knowledge of the facts depends. That witness intimates plainly that, in spite of the devoted courage displayed not less by the vanquished at Thermopylæ, than by the victors at Salamis, Greece owed her salvation chiefly to the imbecility, cowardice, and credulous rashness, of Xerxes.¹ Had he indeed possessed either the personal energy of Cyrus, or the judgement of Artemisia, it may be doubted whether any excellence of management, or any intimacy of union, could have preserved the Greeks against so great a superiority of force. But it is certain that all their courage as soldiers in line would have been unavailing for that purpose, without a higher degree of generalship, and a more hearty spirit of co-operation, than that which they actually manifested.

Comparison of the invasion of Greece by Xerxes with the invasion of Persia afterwards by Alexander the Great.—No improvement in warfare among the Persians during that interval of 150 years—great improvement among the Greeks.

One hundred and fifty years after this eventful period, we shall see the tables turned, and the united forces of Greece under Alexander of Macedon becoming invaders of Persia. We shall find that in Persia no improvement has taken place during this long interval—that the scheme of defence under Darius Codomannus labours under the same defects as that of attack under Xerxes—that there is the same blind and exclusive confidence in pitched battles with superior numbers²—that the advice of Mentor the Rhodian, and of Charidemus, is despised like that of Demaratus and Artemisia—that Darius Codomannus, essentially of the same stamp as Xerxes, is hurried into the battle of Issus by the same ruinous temerity as that which threw away the Persian fleet at Salamis—and that the Persian native infantry (not the cavalry) even appear to have lost that individual gallantry which they displayed so conspicuously at Plataea. But on the Grecian side, the improvement in every way is very great: the orderly courage of the soldier has been sustained and even augmented, while the generalship and power of military combination has reached a point unexampled in the previous history of mankind. Military science may be esteemed a sort of creation during

¹ Thucyd. i. 69. ἐπιστάμενοι καὶ τὸν βάρβαρον αὐτὸν περὶ αὐτῷ τὰ πλεῖστα σφαλέστα, &c. : compare Thucyd. vi. 33.

² Thucyd. i. 142. πλῆθει τὴν ἀμαθίαν θρασύνοντες, &c.

this interval, and will be found to go through various stages—Demosthenês and Brasidas—the Cyreian army and Xenophon—Agésilas—Iphikratês—Epaminondas—Philip of Macedon—Alexander:¹ for the Macedonian princes are borrowers of Greek tactics, though extending and applying them with a personal energy peculiar to themselves, and with advantages of position such as no Athenian or Spartan ever enjoyed. In this comparison between the invasion of Xerxes and that of Alexander, we contrast the progressive spirit of Greece, serving as herald and stimulus to the like spirit in Europe—with the stationary mind of Asia, occasionally roused by some splendid individual, but never appropriating to itself new social ideas or powers, either for a war or for peace.

It is out of the invasion of Xerxes that those new powers of combination, political as well as military, which lighten up Grecian history during the next century and more, take their rise. They are brought into agency through the altered position and character of the Athenians—improvers, to a certain extent, of military operations on land, but the great creators of marine tactics and manœuvring in Greece—and the earliest of all Greeks who showed themselves capable of organising and directing the joint action of numerous allies and dependents: thus uniting the two distinctive qualities of the Homeric Agamemnon²—ability in command, with vigour in execution.

In the general Hellenic confederacy, which had acted against Persia under the presidency of Sparta, Athens could hardly be said to occupy any ostensible rank above that of an ordinary member. The post of second dignity in the line at Plataea had indeed been adjudged to her, yet only after a contending claim from Tegea. But without any difference in ostensible rank, she was in the eye and feeling of Greece no longer the same power as before. She had suffered more, and at sea had certainly done more, than all the other allies put together. Even on land at Plataea, her hoplites

¹ See a remarkable passage in the third Philippic of Demosthenês, c. 10, p. 123.

² Ἀμφότερον, βασιλεὺς τ' ἀγαθός, κρατερὸς τ' ἐκχηρήτης.

Homer, *Iliad*, iii. 179.

had manifested a combination of bravery, discipline, and efficiency against the formidable Persian cavalry, superior even to the Spartans. No Athenian officer had committed so perilous an act of disobedience as the Spartan Amompharetus. After the victory of Mykalê, when the Peloponnesians all hastened home to enjoy their triumph, the Athenian forces did not shrink from prolonged service for the important object of clearing the Hellespont, thus standing forth as the willing and forward champions of the Asiatic Greeks against Persia. Besides these exploits of Athens collectively, the only two individuals, gifted with any talents for command, whom this momentous contest had thrown up, were both of them Athenians: first, Themistoklês; next Aristeidês. From the beginning to the end of the struggle, Athens had displayed an unreserved Pan-hellenic patriotism which had been most ungenerously requited by the Peloponnesians; who had kept within their Isthmian walls, and betrayed Attica twice to hostile ravage; the first time, perhaps, unavoidably—but the second time by a culpable neglect in postponing their outward march against Mardonius. And the Peloponnesians could not but feel, that while they had left Attica unprotected, they owed their own salvation at Salamis altogether to the dexterity of Themistoklês and to the imposing Athenian naval force.

Considering that the Peloponnesians had sustained little or no mischief by the invasion, while the Athenians had lost for the time even their city and country, with a large proportion of their moveable property irrecoverably destroyed—we might naturally expect to find the former, if not lending their grateful and active aid to repair the damage in Attica, at least cordially welcoming the restoration of the ruined city by its former inhabitants. Instead of this we find the selfishness again prevalent among them. Ill-will and mistrust for the future, aggravated by an admiration which they could not help feeling, overlays all their gratitude and sympathy.

The Athenians, on returning from Salamis after the battle of Plataea, found a desolate home to harbour them. Their country was laid waste,—their city burnt or destroyed, so that there remained but a few houses standing, wherein the Persian officers had taken up their quarters—and their fortifi-

Proceedings of the Athenians to restore their city—jealous obstructions caused by the Peloponnesians.

cations for the most part razed or overthrown. It was their first task to bring home their families and effects from the temporary places of shelter at Trœzen, Ægina, and Salamis. After providing what was indispensably necessary for immediate wants, they began to rebuild their city and its fortifications on a scale of enlarged size in every direction.¹ But as soon as they were seen to be employed on this indispensable work, without which neither political existence nor personal safety was practicable, the allies took the alarm, preferred complaints to Sparta, and urged her to arrest the work. In the front of these complainants probably stood the Æginetans, as the old enemies of Athens, and as having most to apprehend from her might at sea. The Spartans, perfectly sympathising with the jealousy and uneasiness of their allies, were even disposed, from old association, to carry their dislike of fortifications still farther, so that they would have been pleased to see all the other Grecian cities systematically defenceless like Sparta itself.² But while sending an embassy to Athens, to offer a friendly remonstrance against the project of re-fortifying the city, they could not openly and peremptorily forbid the exercise of a right common to every autonomous community. Nor did they even venture, at a moment when the events of the past months were fresh in every one's remembrance, to divulge their real jealousies as to the future. They affected to offer prudential reasons against the scheme, founded on the chance of a future Persian invasion; in which case it would be a dangerous advantage for the invader to find any fortified city outside of Peloponnesus to further his operations, as Thebes had recently seconded Mardonius. They proposed to the Athenians therefore, not merely to desist from their own fortifications, but also to assist them in demolishing all fortifications of other cities beyond the limits of Peloponnesus—promising shelter within the Isthmus, in case of need to all exposed parties.

A statesman like Themistoklēs was not likely to be imposed upon by this diplomacy: but he saw that the Spartans had the power of preventing the work if they chose, and

¹ Thucyd. i. 89.

² Thucyd. i. 90. τὰ μὲν καὶ αὐτοὶ ἥδιον ἂν ὀρώμεντες μῆτε δακρύουσι μὴτ' ἄλλον μηδὲνα τείχος ἔχοντα, τὸ δὲ πλέον,

τῶν συμμάχων ἐξοτρυνόντων καὶ φοβουμένων τοῦ τε ναυτικοῦ αὐτῶν τὸ πλεῖστον, ὃ πρὶν οὐκ ἐπῆρχε, καὶ τὴν ἐς τὸν Μηδικὸν πόλεμον τόλμαν γενομένην.

that it could only be executed by the help of successful deceit. By his advice the Athenians dismissed the Spartan envoys, saying that they would themselves send to Sparta and explain their views. Accordingly Themistoklēs himself was presently despatched thither, as one among three envoys instructed to enter into explanations with the Spartan authorities.

Stratagem of Themistoklēs to procure for the Athenians the opportunity of fortifying their city.

But his two colleagues, Aristeidēs and Abironichus, by previous concert, were tardy in arriving—and he remained inactive at Sparta, making use of their absence as an excuse for not even demanding an audience, yet affecting surprise that their coming was so long delayed. But while Aristeidēs and Abironichus, the other two envoys, were thus studiously kept back, the whole population of Athens laboured unremittingly at the walls. Men, women, and children, all tasked their strength to the utmost during this precious interval. Neither private houses, nor sacred edifices, were spared to furnish materials; and such was their ardour in the enterprise, that before the three envoys were united at Sparta, the wall had already attained a height sufficient at least to attempt defence. Yet the interval had been long enough to provoke suspicion, even in the slow mind of the Spartans; while the more watchful Æginetans sent them positive intelligence that the wall was rapidly advancing.

Themistoklēs, on hearing this allegation, peremptorily denied the truth of it; and the personal esteem entertained towards him was at that time so great, that his assurance¹ obtained for some time unqualified credit, until fresh messengers again raised suspicions in the minds of the Spartans. In reply to these, Themistoklēs urged the Ephors to send envoys of their own to Athens, and thus convince themselves of the state of the facts. They unsuspectingly acted upon his recommendation, while he at the same time transmitted a private communication to Athens, desiring that the envoys might not be suffered to depart until the safe return of himself and his colleagues, which he feared might be denied them when his trick came to be divulged. Aristeidēs and Abironichus had now arrived—the wall was announced to be of a height at least above contempt—and Themistoklēs at once threw off

¹ Thucyd. i. 91. τῇ μὲν Θερμιστοκλέϊ ἐπεΐθοντο διὰ φίλιαν αὐτοῦ.

the mask. He avowed the stratagem practised—told the Spartans that Athens was already fortified sufficiently to ensure the safety and free will of its inhabitants—and warned them that the hour of constraint was now past, the Athenians being in a condition to define and vindicate for themselves their own rights and duties in reference to Sparta and the allies. He reminded them that the Athenians had always been found competent to judge for themselves, whether in joint consultation, or in any separate affair such as the momentous crisis of abandoning their city and taking to their ships. They had now, in the exercise of this self-judgement, resolved on fortifying their city, as a step indispensable to themselves and advantageous even to the allies generally. No equal or fair interchange of opinion could subsist, unless all the allies had equal means of defence: either all must be unfortified, or Athens must be fortified as well as the rest.¹

Mortified as the Spartans were by a revelation which showed that they had not only been detected in a dishonest purpose, but completely outwitted—they were at the same time overawed by the decisive tone of Themistoklēs, whom they never afterwards forgave. To arrest beforehand erection of the walls, would have been practicable, though not perhaps without difficulty; to deal by force with the fact accomplished, was perilous in a high degree. Moreover the inestimable services just rendered by Athens became again predominant in their minds, so that sentiment and prudence for the time coincided. They affected therefore to accept the communication without manifesting any offence, nor had they indeed put forward any pretence which required to be formally retracted. The envoys on both sides returned home, and the Athenians completed their fortifications, without obstruction²—yet not

Athens
fortified—
confusion
of the
Spartans—
disappoint-
ment of the
allies.

¹ Thucyd. i. 91. Οὐ γὰρ οὐδὲν τι εἶναι μὴ ἀπὸ ἀντιπάλου παρασκευῆς ὁμοῖον τι ἢ ἴσον εἰς τὸ κοινὸν βουλευέσθαι. Ἡ πάντας οὖν ἀτειχίστους ἔφη χρῆναι ξυμμαχεῖν, ἢ καὶ τὰδε νομίσαι ὁρθῶς ἔχειν.

² We are fortunate enough to possess this narrative, respecting the rebuilding of the walls of Athens, as recounted by Thucydides. It is the first incident which he relates, in that general sketch of events between the Persian and Peloponnesian war, which precedes his pro-

fessed history (i. 89-92). Diodorus (xi. 39, 40), Plutarch (Themistoklēs, c. 19), and Cornelius Nepos (Themist. c. 6, 7) seem all to have followed Thucydides, though Plutarch also notices a statement of Theopompus, to the effect that Themistoklēs accomplished his object by bribing the Ephors. This would not be improbable in itself—nor is it inconsistent with the narrative of Thucydides; but the latter either had not heard or did not believe it.

without murmurs on the part of the allies, who bitterly reproached Sparta afterwards for having let slip this golden opportunity of arresting the growth of the giant.¹

If the allies were apprehensive of Athens before, the mixture of audacity, invention, and deceit, whereby she had just eluded the hindrance opposed to her fortifications, was well calculated to aggravate their uneasiness. On the other hand, to the Athenians, the mere hint of intervention to debar them from that

Effect of this intended, but baffled intervention upon Athenian feelings.

common right of self-defence which was exercised by every autonomous city except Sparta, must have appeared outrageous injustice—aggravated by the fact that it was brought upon them by their peculiar sufferings in the common cause, and by the very allies who without their devoted forwardness would now have been slaves of the Great King. And the intention of the allies to obstruct the fortifications must have been known to every soul in Athens, from the universal press of hands required to hurry the work and escape interference; just as it was proclaimed to after-generations by the shapeless fragments and irregular structure of the wall, in which even sepulchral stones and inscribed columns were seen imbedded.² Assuredly the sentiment connected with this work—performed as it was alike by rich and poor, strong and weak—men, women, and children—must have been intense as well as equalising. All had endured the common miseries of exile, all had contributed to the victory, all were now sharing the same fatigue for the defence of their recovered city, in order to counterwork the ungenerous hindrance of their Peloponnesian allies. We must take notice of these stirring circumstances, peculiar to the Athenians and acting upon a generation which had now been nursed in democracy for a quarter of a century and had achieved unaided the victory of Marathon—if we would understand that still stronger burst of aggressive activity, persevering self-confidence, and aptitude as well as thirst for command—together with that still wider spread of democratical organisation—which marks their character during the age immediately following.

¹ Thucyd. i. 69. Καὶ τῶνδε ὑμεῖς αἰτίαι (says the Corinthian envoy addressing the Lacedæmonians), τό τε πρῶτον ἰδούσας αὐτοὺς (the Athenians) τὴν πόλιν μετὰ τὰ Μηδικὰ κρατύναι, καὶ

ὕστερον τὰ μακρὰ στήσαι τείχῃ, &c.

² Thucyd. i. 93. Cornelius Nepos (Themist. c. 7) exaggerates this into a foolish conceit.

The plan of the new fortification was projected on a scale not unworthy of the future grandeur of the city. Its circuit was sixty stadia or about seven miles, with the acropolis nearly in the centre : but the circuit of the previous walls is unknown, so that we are unable to measure the extent of that enlargement which Thucydides testifies to have been carried out on every side. It included within the town the three hills of the Areopagus, Pnyx, and the Museum ; while on the south of the town it was carried for a space even on the southern bank of the Ilissus, thus also comprising the fountain Kallirhoë.¹ In spite of the excessive hurry in which it was raised, the structure was thoroughly solid and sufficient against every external enemy : but there is reason to believe that its very large inner area was never filled with buildings. Empty spaces, for the temporary shelter of inhabitants driven in from the country with their property, were eminently useful to a Grecian city-community, to none more useful than to the Athenians, whose principal strength lay in their fleet, and whose citizens habitually resided in large proportion in their separate demes throughout Attica.

The first indispensable step in the renovation of Athens after her temporary extinction, was now happily accomplished : the city was made secure against external enemies. But Themistoklēs, to whom the Athenians owed the late successful stratagem, and whose influence must have been much strengthened by its success, had conceived plans of a wider and more ambitious range. He had been the original adviser of the great maritime start taken by his countrymen, as well as of the powerful naval force which they had created during the last few years, and which had so recently proved their salvation. He saw in that force both the only chance of salvation for the future, in case the Persians should renew their attack by sea—a contingency at that time seemingly probable—and boundless prospects of future ascendancy over the Grecian coasts and islands. It was the

Enlargement
of the walls
of Athens.

Large plans
of Themistoklēs
for the naval
aggrandisement
of the city—fortified
town and harbour
provided at
Peiræus—vast height
and thickness
projected for
the walls.

¹ For the dimensions and direction of the Themistoklean walls of Athens, see especially the excellent Treatise of Forchhammer—*Topographie von Athen*—published in the *Kieler Philologische Studien*, Kiel, 1841.

The plan of Athens, prepared by Kiepert after his own researches and published among his recent maps, adopts for the most part the ideas of Forchhammer as to the course of the walls.

great engine of defence, of offence, and of ambition. To continue this movement required much less foresight and genius than to begin it. Themistoklēs, the moment that the walls of the city had been finished, brought back the attention of his countrymen to those wooden walls which had served them as a refuge against the Persian monarch. He prevailed upon them to provide harbour-room at once safe and adequate, by the enlargement and fortification of the Peiræus. This again was only the prosecution of an enterprise previously begun; for he had already, while in office two or three years before,¹ made his countrymen sensible that the open roadstead of Phalærum was thoroughly insecure, and had prevailed upon them to improve and employ in part the more spacious harbours of Peiræus and Munychia—three natural basins, all capable of being closed and defended. Something had then been done towards the enlargement of this port, though it had probably been subsequently ruined by the Persian invaders. But Themistoklēs now resumed the scheme on a scale far grander than he could have ventured to propose—a scale which demonstrates the vast auguries present to his mind respecting the destinies of Athens.

Peiræus and Munychia, in his new plan, constituted a fortified space as large as the enlarged Athens, and with a wall far

¹ Thucyd. i. 93. *ἔπεισε δὲ καὶ τοῦ Πειραιῶτος τὰ λοιπὰ ὁ Θεμιστοκλῆς οἰκοδομεῖν (ἐπῆρκετο δ' αὐτοῦ πρότερον ἐπὶ τῆς ἐκείνου ἀρχῆς, ἥτις κατ' ἐνιαυτὸν Ἀθηναίοις ἤρξε.)*

Upon which words the Scholiast observes (*κατ' ἐνιαυτὸν*)—*κατὰ τινα ἐνιαυτὸν ἢ γεμῶν ἐγένετο· πρὸ δὲ τῶν Μηδικῶν ἤρξε Θεμιστοκλῆς ἐνιαυτὸν ἕνα.*

It seems hardly possible, having no fuller evidence to proceed upon, to determine to which of the preceding years Thucydides means to refer this ἀρχὴ of Themistoklēs. Mr. Fynes Clinton, after discussing the opinions of Dodwell and Corsini (see *Fasti Hellenici*, ad ann. 481 B.C. and Preface, p. xv.), inserts Themistoklēs as Archon Eponymus in 481 B.C., the year before the invasion of Xerxes, and supposes the Peiræus to have been commenced in that year. This is not in itself improbable; but he cites the Scholiast as having asserted the same thing before him (*πρὸ τῶν Μηδικῶν ἤρξε Θεμιστοκλῆς*

ἐνιαυτὸν ἕνα), in which I apprehend that he is not borne out by the analogy of the language: *ἐνιαυτὸν ἕνα* in the accusative case denotes only the duration of ἀρχή, not the position of the year (compare Thucyd. iii. 68).

I do not feel certain that Thucydides meant to designate Themistoklēs as having been Archon Eponymus, or even as having been one of the nine Archons. He may have meant "during the year when Themistoklēs was Strategus (or general)," and the explanation of the Scholiast, who employs the word *ἡγεμῶν*, rather implies that he so understood it. The Strategē were annual as well as the Archons. Now we know that Themistoklēs was one of the generals in 480 B.C., and that he commanded in Thessaly, at Artemisium, and at Salamis. The Peiræus may have been begun in the early part of 480 B.C., when Xerxes was already on his march, or at least at Sardis.

more elaborate and unassailable. The wall which surrounded them, sixty stadia in circuit,¹ was intended by him to be so stupendous, both in height and thickness, as to render assault hopeless, and to enable the whole military population to act on shipboard, leaving only old men and boys as a garrison.² We may judge how vast his project was, when we learn that the wall, though in practice always found sufficient, was only carried up to half the height which he had contemplated.³ In respect to thickness however his ideas were exactly followed: two carts meeting one another brought stones which were laid together right and left on the outer side of each, and thus formed two primary parallel walls, between which the interior space (of course at least as broad as the joint breadth of the two carts) was filled up "not with rubble, in the usual manner of the Greeks, but constructed, throughout the whole thickness, of squared stones, cramped together with metal."⁴ The result was a solid wall, probably not less than fourteen or fifteen feet thick, since it was intended to carry so very unusual a height. In the exhortations whereby he animated the people to this fatiguing and costly work, he laboured to impress upon them that Peiræus was of more value to them than Athens itself, and that it afforded a shelter into which, if their territory should be again overwhelmed by a superior land-force, they might securely retire, with full liberty of that maritime action in which they were a match for all the world.⁵ We may even suspect that if Themistoklēs could have followed his own feelings, he would have altered the site of the city from Athens to Peiræus: the attachment of the people to their ancient and holy rock doubtless prevented any such proposition. Nor did he at that time, probably, contemplate the possibility of those long walls which in a few years afterwards consolidated the two cities into one.

¹ Thucyd. ii. 13.

² Thucyd. i. 93.

³ Thucyd. i. 93. τὸ δὲ ὕψος ἡμῶν μάλιστα ἐτελέσθη οὐ διενοεῖτο· ἐβούλετο γὰρ τῇ μεγέθει καὶ τῇ πάχει ἀφιστάναι τὰς τῶν πολεμίων ἐπιβουλὰς, ἀνθρώπων δὲ ἐνόμιζεν ὀλίγων καὶ τῶν ἀχρειοτάτων ἀρκέσειν τὴν φυλακὴν, τοὺς δ' ἄλλους ἐς τὰς ναῦς ἐσθῆσεσθαι.

⁴ Thucyd. i. 93. The expressions are those of Colonel Leake, derived from

inspection of the scanty remnant of these famous walls still to be seen—Topography of Athens, ch. ix. p. 411: see edit. p. 293, Germ. transl. Compare Aristophan. Aves, 1127, about the breadth of the wall of Nephelokokygia.

⁵ Thucyd. i. 93 (compare Cornel. Nepos, Themistok. c. 6). ταῖς ναυσὶ πρὸς ἅπαντας ἀνίστασθαι.

Forty-five years afterwards, at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, we shall hear from Periklês, who espoused and carried out the large ideas of Themistoklês, this same language about the capacity of Athens to sustain a great power exclusively or chiefly upon maritime action. But the Athenian empire was then an established reality, whereas in the time of Themistoklês it was yet a dream, and his bold predictions, surpassed as they were by the future reality, mark that extraordinary power of practical divination which Thucydides so emphatically extols in him. And it proves the exuberant hope which had now passed into the temper of the Athenian people, when we find them, on the faith of these predictions, undertaking a new enterprise of so much toil and expense; and that too when just returned from exile into a desolated country, at a moment of private distress and public impoverishment.

Advantages of the enlarged and fortified harbour—increase of metics and of commerce at Athens.

However, Peiræus served other purposes besides its direct use as a dockyard for military marine. Its secure fortifications and the protection of the Athenian navy were well-calculated to call back those metics or resident foreigners, who had been driven away by the invasion of Xerxes, and who might feel themselves insecure in returning unless some new and conspicuous means of protection were exhibited. To invite them back, and to attract new residents of a similar description, Themistoklês proposed to exempt them from the *Metoikion* or non-freeman's annual tax:¹ but this exemption can only have lasted for a time, and the great temptation for them to return must have consisted in the new securities and facilities for trade, which Athens, with her fortified ports and navy, now afforded. The presence of numerous metics was profitable to the Athenians, both privately and publicly. Much of the trading, professional and handicraft business, was in their hands: and the Athenian legislation, while it excluded them from the political franchise, was in other respects equitable and protective to them. In regard to trading pursuits, the metics had this advantage over the citizens—that they were less frequently carried away for foreign military service. The great increase of their numbers, from this period forward,

¹ Diodor. xi. 43.

while it tended materially to increase the value of property all throughout Attica, but especially in Peiræus and Athens, where they mostly resided, helps us to explain the extraordinary prosperity, together with the excellent cultivation, prevalent throughout the country before the Peloponnesian war. The barley, vegetables, figs, and oil, produced in most parts of the territory—the charcoal prepared in the flourishing deme of Acharnæ¹—and the fish obtained in abundance near the coast—all found opulent buyers and a constant demand from the augmenting town population.

We are farther told that Themistoklēs² prevailed on the Athenians to build every year twenty new ships of the line—so we may designate the trireme. Whether this number was always strictly adhered to, it is impossible to say: but to repair the ships, as well as to keep up their numbers, was always regarded among the most indispensable obligations of the executive government.

It does not appear that the Spartans offered any opposition to the fortification of the Peiræus, though it was an enterprise greater, more novel, and more menacing, than that of Athens. But Diodorus tells us, probably enough, that Themistoklēs thought it necessary to send an embassy to Sparta,³ intimating that his scheme was to provide a safe harbour for the collective navy of Greece, in the event of future Persian attack.

Works on so vast a scale must have taken a considerable time and absorbed much of the Athenian force: yet they did not prevent Athens from lending active aid towards the expedition which, in the year after the battle of Plataea (B.C. 478), set sail for Asia under the Spartan Pausanias. Twenty

¹ See the lively picture of the Acharnian demots in the comedy of Aristophanes so entitled.

Respecting the advantages derived from the residence of metics and from foreign visitors, compare the observations of Isokratēs, more than a century after this period, *Orat. iv. De Pace*, p. 163, and Xenophon, *De Vectigalibus*, c. iv.

² Diodor. xi. 43.

³ Diodor. xi. 41, 42, 43. I mean, that the fact of such an embassy being sent to Sparta is probable enough—separating that fact from the preliminary discussions which Diodorus describes

as having preceded it in the assembly of Athens, and which seem unmeaning as well as incredible. His story—that Themistoklēs told the assembly that he had conceived a scheme of great moment to the state, but that it did not admit of being made public beforehand, upon which the assembly named Aristeidēs and Xanthippos to hear it confidentially and judge of it—seems to indicate that Diodorus had read the well-known tale of the project of Themistoklēs to burn the Grecian fleet in the harbour of Pagasæ, and that he jumbled it in his memory with this other project for enlarging and fortifying the Peiræus.

ships from the various cities of Peloponnesus¹ were under his command: the Athenians alone furnished thirty, under the orders of Aristeidēs and Kimon: other triremes also came from the Ionian and insular allies. They first sailed to Cyprus, in which island they liberated most of the Grecian cities from the Persian government. Next they turned to the Bosphorus of Thrace, and undertook the siege of Byzantium, which, like Sestus in the Chersonese, was a post of great moment as well as of great strength—occupied by a considerable Persian force, with several leading Persians, and even kinsmen of the monarch. The place was captured,² seemingly after a prolonged siege: it might probably hold out even longer than Sestus, as being taken less unprepared. The line of communication between the Euxine sea and Greece was thus cleared of obstruction.

Expedition of the united Greek fleet against Asia, under the Spartan Pausanias—capture of Byzantium.

The capture of Byzantium proved the signal for a capital and unexpected change in the relations of the various Grecian cities; a change, of which the proximate cause lay in the misconduct of Pausanias, but towards which other causes, deep-seated as well as various, also tended. In recounting the history of Miltiadēs,³ I noticed the deplorable liability of the Grecian leading men to be spoiled by success. This distemper worked with singular rapidity on Pausanias. As conqueror of Plataea, he had acquired a renown unparalleled in Grecian experience, together with a prodigious share of the plunder. The concubines, horses,⁴ camels, and gold plate, which had thus passed into his possession, were well calculated to make the sobriety and discipline of Spartan life irksome, while his power also, though great on foreign command, became subordinate to that of the Ephors when he returned home. His newly-acquired insolence was manifested immediately after the battle, in the commemorative tripod dedicated by his order at Delphi, which proclaimed himself by name and singly, as commander of the Greeks and destroyer of the Persians: an unseemly

Misconduct of Pausanias—refusal of the allies to obey him—his treasonable correspondence with Xerxes.

¹ Thucyd. i. 94; Plutarch, Aristeidēs, c. 23. Diodorus (xi. 44) says that the Peloponnesian ships were fifty in number: his statement is not to be accepted, in opposition to Thucydides.

² Thucyd. i. 94.

³ See above, ch. xxxvi.

⁴ Herodot. ix. 81.

boast, of which the Lacedæmonians themselves were the first to mark their disapprobation by causing the inscription to be erased, and the names of the cities who had taken part in the combat to be all enumerated on the tripod.¹ Nevertheless he was still sent on the command against Cyprus and Byzantium, and it was on the capture of this latter place that his ambition and discontent first ripened into distinct treason. He entered into correspondence with Gongylus the Eretrian exile (now a subject of Persia, and invested with the property and government of a district in Mysia), to whom he entrusted his new acquisition of Byzantium, and the care of the valuable prisoners taken in it.

These prisoners were presently suffered to escape, or rather sent away underhand to Xerxes; together with a letter from the hand of Pausanias himself, to the following effect:—"Pausanias the Spartan commander having taken these captives, sends them back in his anxiety to oblige thee. I am minded, if it so please thee, to marry thy daughter, and to bring under thy dominion both Sparta and the rest of Greece: with thy aid I think myself competent to achieve this. If my proposition be acceptable, send some confidential person down to the seaboard, through whom we may hereafter correspond." Xerxes, highly pleased with the opening thus held out, immediately sent down Artabazus (the same who had been second in command in Bœotia), to supersede Megabates in the satrapy of Daskylium. The new satrap, furnished with a letter of reply bearing the regal seal, was instructed to promote actively the projects of Pausanias. The letter was to this purport:—"Thus saith King Xerxes to Pausanias. Thy name stands for ever recorded in my house as a well-doer, on account of the men whom thou hast saved for me beyond sea at Byzantium; and thy propositions now received are acceptable to me. Relax not either night or day in accomplishing that

¹ In the Athenian inscriptions on the votive offerings dedicated after the capture of Eion, as well as after the great victories near the river Eurymedon, the name of Kimon the commander is not even mentioned (Plutarch, Kimon, c. 7; Diodor. xi. 62).

A strong protest, apparently familiar to Grecian feeling, against singling out

the general particularly, to receive the honours of victory, appears in Euripid. *Andromach.* 694:—striking verses, which are said (truly or falsely) to have been indignantly repeated by Kleitus, during the intoxication of the banquet wherein he was slain by Alexander (Quint. Curtius, viii. 4, 29 (viii. 4); Plutarch, *Alexand.* c. 51).

which thou promisest, nor let thyself be held back by cost, either gold or silver, or numbers of men, if thou standest in need of them; but transact in confidence thy business and mine jointly with Artabazus, the good man whom I have now sent, in such manner as may be best for both of us."¹

Throughout the whole of this expedition, Pausanias had been insolent and domineering; degrading the allies at quarters and watering-places in the most offensive manner as compared with the Spartans, and treating the whole armament in a manner which Greek warriors could not tolerate, even in a Spartan Herakleid and a victorious general. But when he received the letter from Xerxes, and found himself in immediate communication with Artabazus, as well as supplied with funds for corruption,² his insane hopes knew no bounds, and he already fancied himself son-in-law of the Great King as well as despot of Hellas. Fortunately for Greece, his treasonable plans were neither deliberately laid, nor veiled until ripe for execution, but manifested with childish impatience. He clothed himself in Persian attire (a proceeding which the Macedonian army, a century and a half afterwards, could not tolerate³ even in Alexander the Great)—he traversed Thrace with a body of Median and Egyptian guards—he copied the Persian chiefs both in the luxury of his table and in his conduct towards the free women of Byzantium. Kleonikê, a Byzantine maiden of conspicuous family, having been ravished from her parents by his order, was brought to his chamber at night: he happened to be asleep, and being suddenly awakened, knew not at first who was the person approaching his bed, but seized his sword and slew her.⁴ Moreover his haughty reserve, with uncontrolled bursts of wrath, rendered

Pausanias, having assurances of aid from Xerxes, becomes more intolerable in his behaviour. He is recalled to Sparta.

¹ These letters are given by Thucydides verbatim (i. 128, 129): he had seen them or obtained copies (*ὡς ἔρεπον ἀ-επιθήν*)—they were doubtless communicated along with the final revelations of the confidential Argilian slave. As they are autographs, I have translated them literally, retaining that abrupt transition from the third person to the first, which is one of their peculiarities. Cornelius Nepos, who translates the letter of Pausanias, has effaced this peculiarity. He carries the third person

from the beginning to the end (Cornel. Nep. Pausan. c. 2).

² Diodor. xi. 44.

³ Arrian. Exp. Alex. iv. 7, 7; vii. 8, 4; Quint. Curt. vi. 6, 10 (vi. 21, 11).

⁴ Plutarch, Kimon, c. 6; also Plutarch, De Ser. Numin. Vind. c. 10, p. 555. Pausanias, iii. 17, 8. It is remarkable that the latter heard the story of the death of Kleonikê from the lips of a Byzantine citizen of his own day, and seems to think that it had never found place in any written work.

him unapproachable; and the allies at length came to regard him as a despot rather than a general. The news of such outrageous behaviour, and the manifest evidences of his alliance with the Persians, were soon transmitted to the Spartans, who recalled him to answer for his conduct, and seemingly the Spartan vessels along with him.¹

In spite of the flagrant conduct of Pausanias, the Lacedæmonians acquitted him on the allegations of positive and individual wrong; yet mistrusting his conduct in reference to collusion with the enemy, they sent out Dorkis to supersede him as commander. But a revolution, of immense importance for Greece, had taken place in the minds of the allies. The headship, or hegemony, was in the hands of Athens, and Dorkis the Spartan found the allies not disposed to recognize his authority.

Even before the battle of Salamis, the question had been raised,² whether Athens was not entitled to the command at sea, in consequence of the preponderance of her naval contingent. The repugnance of the allies to any command except that of Sparta, either on land or water, had induced the Athenians to waive their pretensions at that critical moment. But the subsequent victories had materially exalted the latter in the eyes of Greece; while the armament now serving, differently composed from that which had fought at Salamis, contained a large proportion of the newly-enfranchised Ionic Greeks, who not only had no preference for Spartan command, but were attached to the Athenians on every ground—as well from kindred race, as from the certainty that Athens with her superior fleet was the only protector upon whom they could rely against the Persians. Moreover, it happened that the Athenian generals on this expedition, Aristeidēs and Kimon, were personally just and conciliating, forming a striking contrast with Pausanias. Hence the Ionic Greeks in the fleet, when they found that the behaviour of the latter was not only oppressive towards themselves but also revolting to Grecian sentiment generally—addressed themselves to the Athenian commanders for pro-

¹ Thucyd. i. 95-131: compare Duris and Nymphis apud Athenæum, xii. p. 535.
² Herodot. viii. 2, 3. Compare the

language of the Athenian envoy, as it stands in Herodotus (vii. 155), addressed to Gelo.

tection and redress, on the plausible ground of kindred race ;¹ entreating to be allowed to serve under Athens, as leader instead of Sparta.

Plutarch tells us that Aristeidēs not only tried to remonstrate with Pausanias, who repelled him with arrogance—which is exceedingly probable—but that he also required, as a condition of his compliance with the request of the Ionic allies, that they should personally insult Pausanias, so as to make reconciliation impracticable : upon which a Samian and a Chian captain deliberately attacked and damaged the Spartan admiral-ship in the harbour of Byzantium.² The historians from whom Plutarch copied this latter statement must have presumed in the Athenians a disposition to provoke that quarrel with Sparta which afterwards sprung up as it were spontaneously : but the Athenians had no interest in doing so, nor can we credit the story—which is moreover unnoticed by Thucydidēs. To give the Spartans a just ground of indignation, would have been glaring imprudence on the part of Aristeidēs. Yet having every motive to entertain the request of the allies, he began to take his measures for acting as their protector and chief. And his proceedings were much facilitated by the circumstance that the Spartan government about this time recalled Pausanias to undergo an examination, in consequence of the universal complaints against him which had reached them. He seems to have left no Spartan authority behind him—even the small Spartan squadron accompanied him home : so that the Athenian generals had the best opportunity for ensuring to themselves and exercising that command which the allies besought them to undertake. So effectually did they improve the moment, that when Dorkis arrived to replace Pausanias, they were already in full supremacy ; while Dorkis, having only a small force and being in no condition to employ constraint, found himself obliged to return home.³

This incident, though not a declaration of war against Sparta, was the first open renunciation of her authority as presiding state among the Greeks ; the first avowed manifestation of a

¹ Thucyd. i. 95. ἤξιον αὐτοὺς ἡγεμόνας σφιν γενέσθαι κατὰ τὸ ξυγγενὲς καὶ Πausanias μὴ ἐπιτρέπειν ἢν πρὸς Βιδ-
| ζῆται.

² Plutarch, Aristeidēs, c. 23.

³ Thucyd. i. 95 ; Diodorus, xi. 44-47.

Importance
of this
change in
the relations
of the
Grecian
states.

competitor for that dignity, with numerous and willing followers; the first separation of Greece (considered in herself alone and apart from foreign solicitations such as the Persian invasion) into two distinct organized camps, each with collective interests and projects of its own. In spite of mortified pride, Sparta was constrained, and even in some points of view not indisposed, to patient acquiescence. She had no means of forcing the dispositions of the Ionic allies, while the war with Persia altogether—having now become no longer strictly defensive, and being withal maritime as well as distant from her own territory—had ceased to be in harmony with her home-routine and strict discipline. Her grave senators, especially an ancient Herakleid named Hetæmaridas, reproved the impatience of the younger citizens, and discountenanced the idea of permanent maritime command as a dangerous innovation. They even treated it as an advantage, that Athens should take the lead in carrying on the Persian war, since it could not be altogether dropped: nor had the Athenians as yet manifested any sentiments positively hostile to excite their alarm.¹ Nay, the Spartans actually took credit in the eyes of Athens, about a century afterwards, for having themselves advised this separation of command at sea from command on land.² Moreover, if the war continued under Spartan guidance, there would be a continued necessity for sending out their kings or chief men to command: and the example of Pausanias showed them the depraving effect of such military power, remote as well as unchecked.

¹ Thucyd. i. 95. Following Thucydides in his conception of these events, I have embodied in the narrative as much as seems consistent with it in Diodorus (xi. 50), who evidently did not here copy Thucydides, but probably had Ephorus for his guide. The name of Hetæmaridas, as an influential Spartan statesman on this occasion, is probable enough; but his alleged speech on the mischiefs of maritime empire, which Diodorus seems to have had before him composed by Ephorus, would probably have represented the views and feelings of the year 350 B.C., and not those of 476 B.C. The subject would have been treated in the same

manner as Isokratês, the master of Ephorus, treats it in his Orat. viii. De Pace, p. 179, 180.

² Xenophon. Hellen. vi. 5. 34. It was at the moment when the Spartans were soliciting Athenian aid, after their defeat at Leuktra. ὑπομνησκοντες μὲν, ὡς τὸν βάρβαρον κοῦρῃ ἀπεμαχίσαντο—ἀναμνησκοντες δὲ, ὡς Ἀθηναῖοι! τε ἐπὶ τῶν Ἑλλήνων βρήθησαν ἡγεμόνες τοῦ ναυτικοῦ, καὶ τῶν κοινῶν χρημάτων φύλακες, τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων ταῦτα συμβουλευομένων· αὐτοὶ τε κατὰ γῆν διαλογουμένως ὑφ' ἀπάντων τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἡγεμόνες προκρίθεισαν, συμβουλευομένων αὐτὰ τῶν Ἀθηναίων.

The example of their king Leotychidēs, too, near about this time, was a second illustration of the same tendency. At the same time, apparently, that Pausanias embarked for Asia to carry on the war against the Persians, Leotychidēs was sent with an army into Thessaly to put down the Aleuadæ and those Thessalian parties who had sided with Xerxes and Mardonius. Successful in this expedition, he suffered himself to be bribed, and was even detected with a large sum of money actually on his person: in consequence of which the Lacedæmonians condemned him to banishment and razed his house to the ground. He died afterwards in exile at Tegea.¹ Two such instances were well calculated to make the Lacedæmonians distrust the conduct of their Herakleid leaders when on foreign service, and this feeling weighed much in inducing them to abandon the Asiatic headship in favour of Athens. It appears that their Peloponnesian allies retired from this contest at the same time as they did, so that the prosecution of the war was thus left to Athens as chief of the newly-emancipated Greeks.²

It was from these considerations that the Spartans were

Tendency of the Spartan kings to become corrupted on foreign service—Leotychidēs.

¹ Herodot. vi. 72; Diodor. xi. 48; Pausanias, iii. 7, 8: compare Plutarch, De Herodoti Malign. c. 21, p. 859.

Leotychidēs died, according to Diodorus, in 476 B.C.: he had commanded at Mykalē in 479 B.C. The expedition into Thessaly must therefore have been in one of the two intermediate years, if the chronology of Diodorus were in this case thoroughly trustworthy. But Mr. Clinton (Fasti Hellenici, Appendix, ch. iii. p. 210) has shown that Diodorus is contradicted by Plutarch, about the date of the accession of Archidamus—and by others, about the date of the revolt at Sparta. Mr. Clinton places the accession of Archidamus and the banishment of Leotychidēs (of course therefore the expedition into Thessaly) in 469 B.C. I incline rather to believe that the expedition of Leotychidēs against the Thessalian Aleuadæ took place in the year or in the second year following the battle of Platæa, because they had been the ardent and hearty allies of Mardonius in Bœotia, and because the war would seem not to have been completed without putting

them down and making the opposite party in Thessaly predominant.

Considering how imperfectly we know the Lacedæmonian chronology of this date, it is very possible that some confusion may have arisen in the case of Leotychidēs from the difference between the date of his *banishment* and that of his *death*. King Pleistoanax afterwards, having been banished for the same offence as that committed by Leotychidēs, and having lived many years in banishment, was afterwards restored: and the years which he had passed in banishment were counted as a part of his reign (Fast. Hellen. l. c. p. 211). The date of Archidamus may perhaps have been reckoned in one account from the *banishment* of Leotychidēs—in another from his *death*, the rather, as Archidamus must have been very young, since he reigned forty-two years even after 469 B.C. And the date which Diodorus has given as that of the death of Leotychidēs, may really be only the date of his banishment, in which he lived until 469 B.C.

² Thucyd. i. 18.

induced to submit to that loss of command which the misconduct of Pausanias had brought upon them. Their acquiescence facilitated the immense change about to take place in Grecian politics.

According to the tendencies in progress prior to the Persian invasion, Sparta had become gradually more and more the president of something like a Pan-hellenic union, comprising the greater part of the Grecian states. Such at least was the point towards which things seemed to be tending; and if many separate states stood aloof from this union, none of them at least sought to form any counter-union, if we except the obsolete and important pretensions of Argos.

The preceding volumes of this history have shown that Sparta had risen to such ascendancy, not from her superior competence on the management of collective interests, nor even, in the main, from ambitious efforts on her own part to acquire it—but from the converging tendencies of Grecian feeling which required some such presiding state—and from the commanding military power, rigid discipline, and ancient undisturbed constitution, which attracted that feeling towards Sparta. The necessities of common defence against Persia greatly strengthened these tendencies; and the success of the defence, whereby so many Greeks were emancipated who required protection against their former master, seemed destined to have the like effect still more. For an instant, after the battles of Plataea and Mykalé—when the town of Plataea was set apart as a consecrated neutral spot for an armed confederacy against the Persian, with periodical solemnities and meetings of deputies—Sparta was exalted to be the chief of a full Pan-hellenic union, Athens being only one of the principal members. And had Sparta been capable either of comprehensive policy, of self-directed and persevering efforts, or of the requisite flexibility of dealing, embracing distant Greeks as well as near,—her position was now such, that her own ascendancy, together with undivided Pan-hellenic union, might long have been maintained. But she was lamentably deficient in all the requisite qualities, and the larger the union became, the more her deficiency stood manifest. On the other hand, Athens, now entering into rivalry as a sort of leader of

Momentary Pan-hellenic union under Sparta, immediately after the repulse of Xerxes—now broken up and passing into a schism with two distinct parties and chiefs, Sparta and Athens.

opposition, possessed all those qualities in a remarkable degree, over and above that actual maritime force which was the want of the day; so that the opening made by Spartan incompetence and crime (so far as Pausanias was concerned) found her in every respect prepared.

But the sympathies of the Peloponnesians still clung to Sparta, while those of the Ionian Greeks had turned to Athens: and thus not only the short-lived symptoms of an established Pan-hellenic union, but even all tendencies towards it, from this time disappear. There now stands out a manifest schism, with two pronounced parties, towards one of which nearly all the constituent atoms of the Grecian world gravitate: the maritime states, newly enfranchised from Persia, towards Athens—the land-states, which had formed most part of the confederate army at Plataea, towards Sparta.¹ Along with

¹ Thucyd. i. 18. Καὶ μεγάλου κινδύνου ἐπεκρεμασθέντος οἱ τε Λακεδαιμόνιοι τῶν συμπολεμησάντων Ἑλλήνων ἡγήσαντο δυνάμει προχόντες, καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, διανοηθέντες ἐκλιπεῖν τὴν πόλιν καὶ ἀνασκευάζεσθαι, ἐς τὰς ναῦς μὲν πάντες ναυτικοὶ ἐγένοντο. Κοινῇ δὲ ἀπασάμενοι τὸν βάρβαρον, ὕστερον οὐ πολλῷ διεκρίθησαν πρὸς τε Ἀθηναίους καὶ Λακεδαιμονίους, οἱ τε ἀποστάντες βασιλείας Ἑλλήνες καὶ οἱ συμπολεμήσαντες. Δυνάμει γὰρ ταῦτα μέγιστα διεφάνη· ἴσχυον γὰρ οἱ μὲν κατὰ γῆν, οἱ δὲ ναυσί. Καὶ ὄλγον μὲν χρόνον συνέμεινεν ἡ ὁμαχμία, ἔπειτα δὲ διενεχθέντες οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐπολέμησαν μετὰ τῶν ξυμμάχων πρὸς ἀλλήλους· καὶ τῶν ἑλλων Ἑλλήνων εἰτινές που διασταίεν, πρὸς τούτους ἤδη ἐχώρουν. "Ποτε ἀπὸ τῶν Μηδικῶν ἐς τὸνδε αἰ τὸν πόλεμον, &c.

This is a clear and concise statement of the great revolution in Grecian affairs, comparing the period before and after the Persian war. Thucydides goes on to trace briefly the consequences of this bisection of the Grecian world into two great leagues—the growing improvement in military skill, and the increasing stretch of military effort on both sides from the Persian invasion down to the Peloponnesian war. He remarks also upon the difference between Sparta and Athens in their way of dealing with their allies respectively. He then states the striking fact, that the military force put forth separately by Athens and her allies on the one side, and by Sparta

and her allies on the other, during the Peloponnesian war, were each of them greater than the entire force which had been employed by both together in the most powerful juncture of their confederacy against the Persian invaders—Καὶ ἐγένετο αὐτοῖς ἐς τὸνδε τὸν πόλεμον ἡ ἰδία παρασκευὴ μείζων ἢ ὡς τὰ κράτιστά ποτε μετὰ ἀκραίφροῦς τῆς ξυμμαχίας ἦνθησαν (i. 19).

I notice this last passage especially (construing it as the Scholiast seems to do), not less because it conveys an interesting comparison, than because it has been understood by Dr. Arnold, Gölter, and other commentators in a sense which seems to me erroneous. They interpret thus—αὐτοῖς to mean the Athenians only, and not the Lacedaemonians—ἡ ἰδία παρασκευὴ to denote the forces equipped by Athens herself, apart from her allies—and ἀκραίφρους ξυμμαχίας to refer "to the Athenian alliance only, at a period a little before the conclusion of the thirty years' treaty, when the Athenians were masters not only of the islands, and the Asiatic Greek colonies, but had also united to their confederacy Boeotia and Achaia on the continent of Greece itself" (Dr. Arnold's note). Now so far as the words go, the meaning assigned by Dr. Arnold might be admissible; but if we trace the thread of ideas in Thucydides, we shall see that the comparison, as these commentators conceive it, between Athens alone and Athens aided by her

this national schism, and called into action by it, appears the internal political schism in each separate city between oligarchy and democracy. Of course the germ of these parties had already previously existed in the separate states. But the energetic democracy of Athens, and the pronounced tendency of Sparta to rest upon the native oligarchies in each separate city as her chief support, now began to bestow, on the conflict of internal political parties, an Hellenic importance, and an aggravated bitterness, which had never before belonged to it.

The departure of the Spartan Dorkis left the Athenian generals at liberty; and their situation imposed upon them the duty of organising the new confederacy which they had been chosen to conduct. The Ionic allies were at this time not merely willing and unanimous, but acted as the forward movers in the enterprise; for they stood in obvious need of protection against the attacks of Persia, and had no farther kindness to expect from Sparta or the Peloponnesians. But even had they been less under the pressure of necessity, the conduct of Athens, and of Aristeidēs as the representative of Athens, might have sufficed to bring them into harmonious cooperation. The new leader was no less equitable towards the confederates than energetic against the common enemy. The general conditions of the confederacy were regulated in a common synod of the members, appointed to meet periodically for deliberative purposes, in the temple of Apollo and Artemis at Delos—of old the venerated spot for the religious festivals of the Ionic cities, and at the same time a convenient centre

Proceedings of Athens in her capacity of leader—good conduct of Aristeidēs.

Formation of the confederacy of Delos, under Athens as president—general meetings of allies held in that island.

allies—between the Athenian empire as it stood during the Peloponnesian war, and the same empire as it *had* stood before the thirty years' truce—is quite foreign to his thoughts. Nor had Thucydides said one word to inform the reader, that the Athenian empire at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war had diminished in magnitude, and thus was no longer ἀκραφής: without which previous notification, the comparison supposed by Dr. Arnold could not be clearly understood. I conceive that there are two periods, and two sets of

circumstances, which throughout all this passage Thucydides means to contrast: first, confederate Greece at the time of the Persian war; next, bisected Greece in a state of war, under the double headship of Sparta and Athens.—Αὐτοῖς refers as much to Sparta as to Athens—ἀκραφροῦς τῆς συμμαχίας means what had been before expressed by δμαίχματα—and πότε set against τότε τὸν πόλεμον, is equivalent to the expression which had before been used—ἀπὸ τῶν Μηδικῶν ἐς τότε δεῖ τὸν πόλεμον.

for the members. A definite obligation, either in equipped ships of war or in money, was imposed upon every separate city, and the Athenians, as leaders, determined in which form contributions should be made by each. Their assessment must of course have been reviewed by the synod. They had no power at this time to enforce any regulation not approved by that body.

It had been the good fortune of Athens to profit by the genius of Themistoklēs on two recent critical occasions (the battle of Salamis and the rebuilding of her walls), where sagacity, craft, and decision were required in extraordinary measure, and where pecuniary probity was of less necessity. It was no less her good fortune now,—in the delicate business of assessing a new tax and determining how much each state should bear, when unimpeachable honesty in the assessor was the first of all qualities—not to have Themistoklēs: but to employ in his stead the well-known, we might almost say the ostentatious, probity of Aristeidēs. This must be accounted good fortune, since at the moment when Aristeidēs was sent out, the Athenians could not have anticipated that any such duty would devolve upon him. His assessment not only found favour at the time of its original proposition, when it must have been freely canvassed by the assembled allies—but also maintained its place in general esteem, as equitable and moderate, after the once responsible headship of Athens had degenerated into an unpopular empire.¹

Respecting this first assessment we scarcely know more

¹ Thucyd. v. 18; Plutarch, Aristeidēs, c. 24. Plutarch states that the allies expressly asked the Athenians to send Aristeidēs for the purpose of assessing the tribute. This is not at all probable: Aristeidēs, as commander of the Athenian contingent under Pausanias, was at Byzantium when the mutiny of the Ionians against Pausanias occurred, and was the person to whom they applied for protection. As such, he was the natural person to undertake such duties as devolved upon Athens, without any necessity of supposing that he was specially asked for to perform it.

Plutarch farther states that a certain contribution had been levied from the Greeks towards the war, even during

the headship of Sparta. This statement also is highly improbable. The headship of Sparta covers only one single campaign, in which Pausanias had the command: the Ionic Greeks sent their ships to the fleet, which would be held sufficient, and there was no time for measuring commutations into money.

Pausanias states, but I think quite erroneously, that the name of Aristeidēs was robbed of its due honour because he was the first person who *ἔταξε φόρους τοῖς Ἕλλησι* (Pausan. viii. 52, 2). Neither the assessment nor the name of Aristeidēs was otherwise than popular.

Aristotle employs the name of Aristeidēs as a symbol of unrivalled probity (Rhetoric, ii. 24, 2).

than one single fact—the aggregate in money was 460 talents (= about 106,000*l.* sterling). Of the items composing such aggregate—of the individual cities which paid it—of the distribution of obligations to furnish ships and to furnish money—we are entirely ignorant. The little information which we possess on these points relates to a period considerably later, shortly before the Peloponnesian war, under the uncontrolled empire then exercised by Athens. Thucydides in his brief sketch makes us clearly understand the difference between *presiding* Athens with her autonomous and regularly assembled allies in 476 B.C., and *imperial* Athens with her subject allies in 432 B.C. The Greek word equivalent to *ally* left either of these epithets to be understood, by an ambiguity exceedingly convenient to the powerful states. From the same author, too, we learn the general causes of the change: but he gives us few particulars as to the modifying circumstances, and none at all as to the first start. He tells us only that the Athenians appointed a peculiar board of officers called the *Hellénotamiæ*, to receive and administer the common fund—that Delos was constituted the general treasury, where the money was to be kept—and that the payment thus levied was called the *phoros*,¹ a name which appears then to have been first put into circulation, though afterwards usual—and to have conveyed at first no degrading import, though it afterwards became so odious as to be exchanged for a more innocent synonym.

Endeavouring as well as we can to conceive the Athenian alliance in its infancy, we are first struck with the magnitude of the total sum contributed; which will appear the more remarkable when we reflect that many of the contributing cities furnished ships besides. We may be certain that all which was done at first was done by general consent, and by a freely determining majority. For Athens, at the time when the Ionic allies besought her protection against arrogance, could have had no power of constraining parties, especially when the loss of supremacy, though quietly borne, was yet fresh and rankling among the countrymen of Pausanias. So large a total implies,

Assessment of the confederacy and all its members, made by Aristides—definite obligation in ships and money—money-total—*Hellénotamiæ*.

Rapid growth, early magnitude, of the confederacy of Delos: willing adhesion of the members.

¹ Thucyd. i. 95, 96.

from the very first, a great number of contributing states, and we learn from hence to appreciate the powerful, wide-spread, and voluntary movement which then brought together the maritime and insular Greeks distributed throughout the *Ægean* sea and the Hellespont.

The Phœnician fleet, and the Persian land-force, might at any moment re-appear, and there was no hope of resisting either except by confederacy: so that confederacy under such circumstances became with these exposed Greeks not merely a genuine feeling, but at that time the first of all their feelings. It was their common fear, rather than Athenian ambition, which gave birth to the alliance: and they were grateful to Athens for organising it. The public import of the name *Hellênotamiæ*, coined for the occasion—the selection of Delos as a centre—and the provision for regular meetings of the members—demonstrate the patriotic and fraternal purpose which the league was destined to serve. In truth the protection of the *Ægean* sea against foreign maritime force and lawless piracy, as well as that of the Hellespont and Bosphorus against the transit of a Persian force, was a purpose essentially public, for which all the parties interested were bound in equity to provide by way of common contribution. Any island, or seaport which might refrain from contributing, was a gainer at the cost of others. The general feeling of this common danger, as well as equitable obligation, at a moment when the fear of Persia was yet serious, was the real cause which brought together so many contributing members, and enabled the forward parties to shame into concurrence such as were more backward. How the confederacy came to be turned afterwards to the purposes of Athenian ambition, we shall see at the proper time: but in its origin it was an equal alliance, in so far as alliance between the strong and the weak can ever be equal—not an Athenian empire. Nay, it was an alliance in which every individual member was more exposed, more defenceless, and more essentially benefited in the way of protection than Athens. We have here in truth one of the few moments in Grecian history wherein a purpose at once common, equal, useful and innocent, brought together spontaneously many fragments of this disunited race, and overlaid for a time that exclusive bent towards petty and isolated

autonomy which ultimately made slaves of them all. It was a proceeding equitable and prudent, in principle as well as in detail; promising at the time the most beneficent consequences—not merely protection against the Persians, but a standing police of the Ægean sea, regulated by a common superintending authority. And if such promise was not realised, we shall find that the inherent defects of the allies, indisposing them to the hearty appreciation and steady performance of their duties as equal confederates, are at least as much chargeable with the failure as the ambition of Athens. We may add, that in selecting Delos as a centre, the Ionic allies were conciliated by a renovation of the solemnities which their fathers, in the days of former freedom, had crowded to witness in that sacred island.

At the time when this alliance was formed, the Persians still held not only the important posts of Eion on the Strymon and Doriskus in Thrace, but also several other posts in that country¹ which are not specified to us. We may thus understand why the Greek cities on and near the Chalkidic peninsula—Argilus, Stageirus, Akanthus, Skólus, Olynthus, &c.—which we know to have joined under the first assessment of Aristeidês, were not less anxious² to seek protection in the bosom of the new confederacy, than the Dorian islands of Rhodes and Kos, the Ionic islands of Samos and Chios, the Æolic Lesbos and Tenedos, or continental towns such as Milêtus and Byzantium: by all of whom adhesion to this alliance must have been contemplated, in 477 or 476 B.C., as the sole condition of emancipation from Persia. Nothing more was required, for the success of a foreign enemy against Greece generally, than complete autonomy of every Grecian city, small as well as great—such as the Persian monarch prescribed and tried to enforce ninety years afterwards, through the Lacedæmonian Antalkidas, in the pacification which bears the name of the latter. Some sort of union, organised

¹ Herodot. vii. 106. *ὑπαρχοὶ ἐν τῇ Θρηίκῃ καὶ τοῦ Ἑλλησπόντου πανταχῇ. Οὗτοι ὦν πάντες, οἳ τε ἐκ Θρηίκης καὶ τοῦ Ἑλλησπόντου, πλὴν τοῦ ἐν Δορίσκῃ, ὑπὸ Ἑλλήνων ὕστερον ταύτης τῆς στρατηλασίης ἐξηρίθησαν, &c.*

² Thucyd. v. 18. *τὰς δὲ πόλεις, φερούσας τὸν φόρον τὸν ἐπ' Ἀριστείδου, αὐτοτόμοις εἶναι . . . εἰσι δὲ, Ἄργιλος, Στάγειρος, Ἀκανθος, Σκῶλος, Ὀλυνθός, Σπάρταλος.*

and obligatory upon each city, was indispensable to the safety of all. Indeed even with that aid, at the time when the confederacy of Delos was first formed, it was by no means certain the Asiatic enemy would be effectually kept out; especially as the Persians were strong not merely from their own force, but also from the aid of internal parties in many of the Grecian states—traitors within, as well as exiles without.

Among these traitors, the first in rank as well as the most formidable, was the Spartan Pausanias. Summoned home from Byzantium to Sparta, in order that the loud complaints against him might be examined, he had been acquitted¹ of the charges of wrong and oppression against individuals. Yet the presumptions of *medism* (or treacherous correspondence with the Persians) appeared so strong, that, though not found guilty, he was still not reappointed to the command. Such treatment seems to have only emboldened him in the prosecution of his designs against Greece; for which purpose he came out to Byzantium in a trireme belonging to Hermionê, under pretence of aiding as a volunteer without any formal authority in the war. He there resumed his negotiations with Artabazus. His great station and celebrity still gave him so strong a hold on men's opinions, that he appears to have established a sort of mastery in Byzantium, from whence the Athenians, already recognised heads of the confederacy, were constrained to expel him by force.² And we may be sure that the terror excited by his presence, as well as by his known designs, tended materially to accelerate the organisation of the confederacy under Athens. He then retired to Kolônæ in the Troad, where he continued for some time in the farther prosecution of his schemes, trying to form a Persian party, despatching emissaries to distribute Persian gold among various cities of Greece, and probably employing the name of Sparta to impede the formation of the new confederacy:³ until at length the Spartan authorities, apprised

Conduct of Pausanias after being removed from the command—he prosecutes his treasonable designs in conjunction with Persia.

¹ Cornelius Nepos states that he was fined (Pausanias, c. 2), which is neither noticed by Thucydides, nor at all probable, looking at the subsequent circumstances connected with him.

² Thucyd. i. 130, 131. Καὶ ἐκ τοῦ

Βυζαντίου βίη ὑπὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐκπολιτευθείς, &c.: these words seem to imply that he had acquired a strong position in the town.

³ It is to this time that I refer the mission of Arthmius of Zeleia (an

of his proceedings, sent a herald out to him with peremptory orders that he should come home immediately along with the herald: if he disobeyed, "the Spartans would declare war against him," or constitute him a public enemy.

As the execution of this threat would have frustrated all the ulterior schemes of Pausanias, he thought it prudent to obey; the rather, as he felt entire confidence of escaping all the charges against him at Sparta by the employment of bribes,¹ the means for which were doubtless abundantly furnished to him through Artabazus. He accordingly returned along with the herald, and was, in the first moments of indignation, imprisoned by order of the Ephors, who, it seems, were legally competent to imprison him, even had he been king instead of regent. But he was soon let out, on his own requisition and under a private arrangement with friends and partisans, to take his trial against all accusers.² Even to stand forth as

He is recalled to Sparta—imprisoned—put on his trial—tries to provoke the Helots to revolt.

Asiatic town, between Mount Ida and the southern coast of the Propontis) to gain over such Greeks as he could by means of Persian gold. In the course of his visit to Greece, Arthmius went to Athens: his purpose was discovered, and he was compelled to flee: while the Athenians, at the instance of Themistoklēs, passed an indignant decree, declaring him and his race enemies of Athens, and of all the allies of Athens—and proclaiming that whoever should slay him would be guiltless; because he had brought in Persian gold to bribe the Greeks. This decree was engraven on a brazen column, and placed on record in the acropolis, where it stood near the great statue of Athēnē Promachos, even in the time of Demosthenēs and his contemporary orators. See Demosthen. Philippic. iii. c. 9, p. 122, and De Fals. Legat. c. 76, p. 428; Æschin. cont. Ktesiphont. ad fin. Harpokrat. v. "Ατιμος—Deinarchus cont. Aristogeiton. sect. 25, 26.

Plutarch (Themistoklēs, c. 6, and Aristeidēs, tom. ii. p. 218) tells us that Themistoklēs proposed this decree against Arthmius and caused it to be passed. But Plutarch refers it to the time when Xerxes was on the point of invading Greece. Now it appears to me that the incident cannot well belong to that point of time. Xerxes did not

rely upon bribes, but upon other and different means, for conquering Greece: besides, the very tenor of the decree shows that it must have been passed after the formation of the confederacy of Delos—for it pronounces Arthmius to be an enemy of Athens and of all the allies of Athens. To a native of Zeleia it might be a serious penalty to be excluded and proscribed from all the cities in alliance with Athens; many of them being on the coast of Asia. I know no point of time to which the mission of Arthmius can be so conveniently referred as this—when Pausanias and Artabazus were engaged in this very part of Asia, in contriving plots to get up a party in Greece. Pausanias was thus engaged for some years—before the banishment of Themistoklēs.

¹ Thucyd. i. 131. 'Ο δὲ βουλόμενος ὡς ἥκιστα ὑποπτος εἶναι καὶ πιστεύων χρήμασι διαλύσειν τὴν διαβολὴν, ἀνεχώρει τὸ δεύτερον εἰς Σπάρτην.

² Thucyd. i. 131. Καὶ ἐς μὲν τὴν εἰρηνὴν ἐσπίνετο τὸ πρῶτον ὑπὸ τῶν ἐφόρων· ἔπειτα διαπραζόμενος ὑστερον ἐξῆλθε, καὶ καθίστησιν αὐτὸν εἰς κρίσιν τοῖς βουλομένοις περὶ αὐτὸν ἐλέγχειν.

The word διαπραζόμενος indicates first, that Pausanias himself originated the efforts to get free,—next that he came to an underhand arrangement:

accuser against so powerful a man was a serious peril: to undertake the proof of specific matter of treason against him was yet more serious: nor does it appear that any Spartan ventured to do either. It was known that nothing short of the most manifest and invincible proof would be held to justify his condemnation, and amidst a long chain of acts carrying conviction when taken in the aggregate, there was no single treason sufficiently demonstrable for the purpose. Accordingly Pausanias remained not only at large but unaccused, still audaciously persisting both in his intrigues at home and his correspondence abroad with Artabazus. He ventured to assail the unshielded side of Sparta by opening negotiations with the Helots, and instigating them to revolt; promising them both liberation and admission to political privilege;¹ with a view, first to destroy the board of Ephors and render himself despot in his own country—next, to acquire through Persian help the supremacy of Greece. Some of those Helots to whom he addressed himself revealed the plot to the Ephors, who nevertheless, in spite of such grave peril, did not choose to take measures against Pausanias upon no better information—so imposing was still his name and position. But though some few Helots might inform, probably many others both gladly heard the proposition and faithfully kept the secret: we shall find, by what happened a few years afterwards, that there were a large number of them who had their spears in readiness for revolt. Suspected as Pausanias was, yet by the fears of some and the connivance of others, he was allowed to bring his plans to the very brink of consummation; and his last letters to Artabazus,² intimating that he was ready for action, and bespeaking immediate performance of the engagements concerted between them, were actually in the hands of the messenger. Sparta was saved from an outbreak of the most formidable kind, not

very probably by a bribe, though the word does not necessarily imply it. The Scholiast says so distinctly—*χρήμασι καὶ λόγοις διαπραζόμενος* δηλονότι *διακρουσόμενος τὴν κατηγορίαν*. Dr. Arnold translates *διαπραζόμενος* "having settled the business."

¹ Aristotel. Politic. iv. 13, 13; v. 1, 5; v. 6, 2; Herodot. v. 32. Aristotle

calls Pausanias *king*, though he was only *regent*: the truth is, that he had all the power of a Spartan king, and seemingly more, if we compare his treatment with that of the Prokleid king Leotyichidēs.

² Thucyd. i. 132. *ὁ μέλλων τὰς τελευταίας βασιλεῖ ἐπιστολὰς πρὸς Ἀρτάβαζον κομίζειν, ἄνθρωπος Ἀργίλιος, &c.*

by the prudence of her authorities, but by a mere accident—or rather by the fact that Pausanias was not only a traitor to his country, but also base and cruel in his private relations.

The messenger to whom these last letters were entrusted was a native of Argilus in Thrace, a favourite and faithful slave of Pausanias; once connected with him by that intimate relation which Grecian manners tolerated—and admitted even to the full confidence of his treasonable projects. It was by no means the intention of this Argilian to betray his master. But on receiving the letter to carry, he recollected with some uneasiness that none of the previous messengers had ever come back. Accordingly he broke the seal and read it, with the full view of carrying it forward to its destination if he found nothing inconsistent with his own personal safety: he had farther taken the precaution to counterfeit his master's seal, so that he could easily re-close the letter. On reading it, he found his suspicions confirmed by an express injunction that the bearer was to be put to death—a discovery which left him no alternative except to deliver it to the Ephors. But those magistrates, who had before disbelieved the Helot informers, still refused to believe even the confidential slave with his master's autograph and seal, and with the full account besides, which doubtless he would communicate at the same time, of all that had previously passed in the Persian correspondence, not omitting copies of those letters between Pausanias and Xerxes which I have already cited from Thucydides—for in no other way can they have become public. Partly from the suspicion which in antiquity always attached to the testimony of slaves, except when it was obtained under the pretended guarantee of torture—partly from the peril of dealing with so exalted a criminal—the Ephors would not be satisfied with any evidence less than his own speech and their own ears. They directed the Argilian slave to plant himself as a suppliant in the sacred precinct of Poseidon, near Cape Tænarus, under the shelter of a double tent or hut, behind which two of them concealed themselves. Apprised of this unexpected mark of alarm, Pausanias hastened to the temple, and demanded the reason: upon which the slave disclosed his knowledge of the contents of the letter, and complained

He is detected by the revelation of a slave—incredulity or fear of the Ephors.

bitterly that after long and faithful service,—with a secrecy never once betrayed, throughout this dangerous correspondence,—he was at length rewarded with nothing better than the same miserable fate which had befallen the previous messengers. Pausanias, admitting all these facts, tried to appease the slave's disquietude, and gave him a solemn assurance of safety if he would quit the sanctuary; urging him at the same time to proceed on the journey forthwith, in order that the schemes in progress might not be retarded.

All this passed within the hearing of the concealed Ephors; who at length, thoroughly satisfied, determined to arrest Pausanias immediately on his return to Sparta.

They met him in the public street not far from the temple of Athênê Chalkiœkus (or of the Brazen House). But as they came near, either their menacing looks, or a significant nod from one of them, revealed to this guilty man their purpose. He fled for refuge to the temple, which was so near that he reached it before they could overtake him. He planted himself as a suppliant, far more hopeless than the Argilian slave whom he had so recently talked over at Tænarus, in a narrow roofed chamber belonging to the sacred building; where the Ephors, not warranted in touching him, took off the roof, built up the doors, and kept watch until he was on the point of death by starvation. According to a current story¹—not recognised by Thucydides, yet consistent with Spartan manners—his own mother was the person who placed the first stone to build up the door, in deep abhorrence of his treason. His last moments being carefully observed, he was brought away just in time to expire without, and thus to avoid the desecration of the temple. The first impulse of the Ephors was to cast his body into the ravine or hollow called the Kæadas, the usual place of punishment for criminals: probably his powerful friends averted this disgrace, and he was buried not far off, until some time afterwards, under the mandate of the Delphian oracle, his body was exhumed and transported to the exact spot where he had died. However, the oracle, not satisfied even with this reinterment, pronounced the whole proceeding to be a profanation of the sanctity of Athênê, enjoining that

His arrest
and death—
atonement
made for
offended
sanctuary.

¹ Diodor. xi. 45; Cornel. Nepos, Pausan. c. 5; Polyæn. viii. 51.

two bodies should be presented to her as an atonement for the one carried away. In the very early days of Greece, or among the Carthaginians, even at this period—such an injunction would probably have produced the slaughter of two human victims: on the present occasion, Athênê, or Hikesius the tutelary god of suppliants, was supposed to be satisfied by two brazen statues; not however without some attempts to make out that the expiation was inadequate.¹

Thus perished a Greek who reached the pinnacle of renown simply from the accidents of his lofty descent and of his being general at Plataea, where it does not appear that he displayed any superior qualities. His treasonable projects implicated and brought to disgrace a man far greater than himself—the Athenian Themistoklês.

The chronology of this important period is not so fully known as to enable us to make out the precise dates of particular events. But we are obliged (in consequence of the subsequent incidents connected with Themistoklês, whose flight to Persia is tolerably well marked as to date) to admit an interval of about nine years between the retirement of Pausanias from his command at Byzantium, and his death. To suppose so long an interval engaged in treasonable correspondence, is perplexing; and we can only explain it to ourselves very imperfectly by considering that the Spartans were habitually slow in their movements, and that the suspected regent may perhaps have communicated with partisans, real or expected, in many parts of Greece. Among those whom he sought to enlist as accomplices was Themistoklês, still in great power—though, as it would seem, in declining power—at Athens. The charge of collusion with the Persians connects itself with the previous movement of political parties in that city.

The rivalry of Themistoklês and Aristeidês had been greatly appeased by the invasion of Xerxes, which had imposed upon both the peremptory necessity of cooperation against a common enemy. And apparently it was not resumed during the times which immediately succeeded the return of the Athenians to their country: at least we hear of both, in

About B.C.
467.

Themistoklês is compromised in the detected treason of Pausanias.

Position of Themistoklês at Athens—tendency of Athenian parties and politics.

¹ Thucyd. i. 133, 134; Pausanias, iii. 17, 9.

effective service and in prominent posts. Themistoklēs stands forward as the contriver of the city walls and architect of Peiræus: Aristeidēs is commander of the fleet, and first organiser of the confederacy of Delos. Moreover we seem to detect a change in the character of the latter. He had ceased to be the champion of Athenian old-fashioned landed interest, against Themistoklēs as the originator of the maritime innovations. Those innovations had now, since the battle of Salamis, become an established fact; a fact of overwhelming influence on the destinies and character, public as well as private, of the Athenians. During the expatriation at Salamis, every man, rich or poor, landed proprietor or artisan, had been for the time a seaman: and the anecdote of Kimon, who dedicated the bridle of his horse in the acropolis as a token that he was about to pass from the cavalry to service on shipboard,¹ is a type of that change of feeling which must have been impressed more or less upon every rich man in Athens. From henceforward the fleet is endeared to every man as the grand force, offensive and defensive, of the state, in which character all the political leaders agree in accepting it. We ought to add, at the same time, that this change was attended with no detriment either to the land-force or to the landed cultivation of Attica, both of which will be found to acquire extraordinary development during the interval between the Persian and Peloponnesian wars. Still the triremes, and the men who manned them, taken collectively, were now the determining element in the state. Moreover the men who manned them had just returned from Salamis, fresh from a scene of trial and danger, and from a harvest of victory, which had equalized for the moment all Athenians as sufferers, as combatants, and as patriots. Such predominance of the maritime impulse having become pronounced immediately after the return from Salamis, was farther greatly strengthened by the construction and fortification of the Peiræus—a new maritime Athens as large as the old inland city—as well as by the unexpected formation of the confederacy at Delos, with all its untried prospects and stimulating duties.

The political change arising from hence in Athens was not

¹ Plutarch, Kimon, c. 8.

less important than the military. "The maritime multitude, authors of the victory of Salamis,"¹ and instruments of the new vocation of Athens as head of the Delian confederacy, appear now ascendant in the political constitution also; not in any way as a separate or privileged class, but as leavening the whole mass, strengthening the democratical sentiment, and protesting against all recognised political inequalities. In fact, during the struggle at Salamis, the whole city of Athens had been nothing else than "a maritime multitude," among which the proprietors and chief men had been confounded, until, by the efforts of all, the common country had been reconquered. Nor was it likely that this multitude, after a trying period of forced equality, during which political privilege had been effaced, would patiently acquiesce in the full restoration of such privilege at home. We see by the active political sentiment of the German people, after the great struggles of 1813 and 1814, how much an energetic and successful military effort of the people at large, blended with endurance of serious hardship, tends to stimulate the sense of political dignity and the demand for developed citizenship: and if this be the tendency even among a people habitually passive on such subjects, much more was it to be expected in the Athenian population, who had gone through a previous training of near thirty years under the democracy of Kleisthenés. At the time when that constitution was first established,² it was perhaps the most democratical in Greece. It had worked extremely well, and had diffused among the people a sentiment favourable to equal citizenship and unfriendly to avowed privilege: so that the impressions made by the struggle at Salamis found the popular mind prepared to receive them.

Early after the return to Attica, the Kleisthenean constitution was enlarged as respects eligibility to the magistracy. According to that constitution, the fourth or last class on the Solonian census, including the considerable majority of the

¹ Aristotel. Politic. v. 3, 5. Καὶ πάλιν ὁ ναυτικὸς ὄχλος, γενόμενος αἴτιος τῆς περὶ Σαλαμῖνα νίκης, καὶ διὰ ταύτης τῆς ἡγεμονίας καὶ διὰ τὴν κατὰ θαλάσσαν δύναμιν, τὴν δημοκρατίαν ἰσχυ-

ροτέραν ἐποίησεν.

² Ὁ ναυτικὸς ὄχλος (Thucyd. viii. 72 and *passim*).

³ For the constitution of Kleisthenés, see ch. xxxi. of this History.

freemen, were not admissible to offices of state, though they possessed votes in common with the rest : no person was eligible to be a magistrate unless he belonged to one of the three higher classes. This restriction was now annulled, and eligibility extended to all the citizens. We may appreciate the strength of feeling with which such reform was demanded, when we find that it was proposed by Aristeidēs ; a man the reverse of what is called a demagogue, and a strenuous friend of the Kleisthenean constitution. No political system would work, after the Persian war, which formally excluded "the maritime multitude" from holding magistracy. I rather imagine (as has been already stated) that election of magistrates was still retained, and not exchanged for drawing lots until a certain time, though not a long time afterwards. That which the public sentiment first demanded was the recognition of the equal and open principle ; after a certain length of experience it was found that poor men, though legally qualified to be chosen, were in point of fact rarely chosen : then came the lot, to give them an equal chance with the rich. The principle of sortition or choice by lot, was never applied (as I have before remarked) to all offices at Athens—never for example to the Stratēgi or Generals, whose functions were more grave and responsible than those of any other person in the service of the state, and who always continued to be elected by show of hands.

Alteration of the Kleisthenean constitution—all citizens without exception are rendered politically admissible to office : first, universal eligibility and election of magistrates—next, sortition or drawing by lot.

In the new position into which Athens was now thrown, with so great an extension of what may be termed her foreign relations, and with a confederacy which imposed the necessity of distant military service, the functions of the Stratēgi naturally tended to become both more absorbing and complicated ; while the civil administration became more troublesome if not more difficult, from the enlargement of the city and the still greater enlargement of Peiræus—leading to an increase of town population, and especially to an increase of the metics or resident non-freemen. And it was probably about this period, during the years immediately succeeding the battle of Salamis—when the force of old habit and tradition had

Increase of the power of the Stratēgi—alteration in the functions and diminution of the importance of the Archons.

been partially enfeebled by so many stirring novelties—that the Archons were withdrawn altogether from political and military duties, and confined to civil or judicial administration. At the battle of Marathon, the Polemarch is a military commander, president of the ten Stratēgi:¹ we know him afterwards only as a civil magistrate, administering justice to the metics or non-freemen, while the Stratēgi perform military duties without him: a change not unlike that which took place at Rome, when the Prætor was created to undertake the judicial branch of the large original duties of the Consul. I conceive that this alteration, indicating as it does a change in the character of the Archons generally, must have taken place at the time which we have now reached²—a time when the Athenian establishments on all sides required a more elaborate distribution of functionaries. The distribution of so many Athenian boards of functionaries, part to do duty in the city, and part in the Peiræus, cannot have commenced until after this period, when Peiræus had been raised by Themistoklēs to the dignity of town, fortress, and state-harbour.

Adminis-
tration of
Athens en-
larged—
new func-
tionaries
appointed—
distribution
between
Athens and
Peiræus.

Such boards were the Astynomi and Agoranomi, who maintained the police of streets and markets—the Metronomi, who watched over weights and measures—the Sitophylakes, who carried into effect various state regulations respecting the custody and sale of corn—with various others who acted not less in Peiræus than in the city.³ We may presume that each of these boards was originally created as the exigency appeared to call for it, at a period later than that which we have now reached; most of these duties of detail having been at first discharged by the Archons, and afterwards (when these latter became too full of occupation) confided to separate administrators. The special and important change which characterised the period immediately succeeding the battle of Salamis, was, the more accurate line drawn between the Archons and the Stratēgi; assigning the foreign and military department entirely to the Stratēgi, and rendering the Archons purely civil

¹ Herodot. vi. 109.

² Aristotel. Πολιτεῖων Fragm. xlvii. ed. Neumann, Harpokration, v. Πολέμαρχος; Pollux, viii. 91: compare Meier und Schömann, Der Attische

Prozess, ch. ii. p. 50 seqq.

³ See Aristotel. Πολιτεῖων Fragm. ii. v. xxiii. xxxviii. l. ed. Neumann; Schömann, Antiqq. Jur. Publ. Græc. c. xli. xlii. xliii.

magistrates,—administrative as well as judicial: while the first creation of the separate boards above-named was probably an ulterior enlargement, arising out of increase of population, power, and trade, between the Persian and Peloponnesian wars. It was by some such steps that the Athenian administration gradually attained that complete development which it exhibits in practice during the century from the Peloponnesian war downward, to which nearly all our positive and direct information relates.

With this expansion both of democratical feeling and of military activity at Athens, Aristeidēs appears to have sympathized. And the popularity thus ensured to him, probably heightened by some regret for his previous ostracism, was calculated to acquire permanence from his straightforward and incorruptible character, now brought into strong relief by his function as assessor to the new Delian confederacy.

Political career and precarious tenure of Themistoklēs—bitter rivals against him—Kimon, Alkmaeon, &c.—his liability to charges of corruption.

On the other hand, the ascendancy of Themistoklēs, though so often exalted by his unrivalled political genius and daring, as well as by the signal value of his public recommendations, was as often overthrown by his duplicity of means and unprincipled thirst for money. New political opponents sprung up against him, men sympathising with Aristeidēs and far more violent in their antipathy than Aristeidēs himself. Of these the chief were Kimon (son of Miltiadēs) and Alkmaeon: moreover it seems that the Lacedæmonians, though full of esteem for Themistoklēs immediately after the battle of Salamis, had now become extremely hostile to him—a change which may be sufficiently explained from his stratagem respecting the fortifications of Athens, and his subsequent ambitious projects in reference to the Peiræus. The Lacedæmonian influence, then not inconsiderable in Athens, was employed to second the political combinations against him.¹ He is said to have given offence by manifestations of personal vanity—by continual boasting of his great services to the state, and by the erection of a private chapel, close to his own house, in honour of Artemis Aristobulē, or Artemis of admirable counsel; just as Pausanias had irritated the Lacedæmonians by inscribing his own single name on the Delphian

¹ Plutarch, Kimon, c. 16; Scholion 2, ad Aristophan. Equit. 84.

tripod, and as the friends of Aristeidês had displeased the Athenians by endless encomiums upon his justice.¹

But the main cause of his discredit was, the prostitution of his great influence for arbitrary and corrupt purposes. In the unsettled condition of so many different Grecian communities, recently emancipated from Persia, when there was past misrule to avenge, wrong-doers to be deposed and perhaps punished, exiles to be restored, and all the disturbance and suspicions accompanying so great a change of political condition as well as of foreign policy—the influence of the leading men at Athens must have been great in determining the treatment of particular individuals. Themistoklês, placed at the head of an Athenian squadron and sailing among the islands, partly for the purposes of war against Persia, partly for organising the new confederacy—is affirmed to have accepted bribes without scruple, for executing sentences just and unjust—restoring some citizens, expelling others, and even putting some to death. We learn this from a friend and guest of Themistoklês—the poet Timokreon of Ialysus in Rhodes, who had expected his own restoration from the Athenian commander, but found that it was thwarted by a bribe of three talents from his opponents; so that he was still kept in exile on the charge of *medism*. The assertions of Timokreon, personally incensed on this ground against Themistoklês, are doubtless to be considered as passionate and exaggerated: nevertheless they are a valuable memorial of the feelings of the time, and are far too much in harmony with the general character of this eminent man to allow of our disbelieving them entirely. Timokreon is as emphatic in his admiration of Aristeidês as in his censure of Themistoklês, whom he denounces as “a lying and unjust traitor.”²

Such conduct as that described by this new Archilochus, even making every allowance for exaggeration, must have caused Themistoklês to be both hated and feared among the insular allies, whose opinion was now of considerable importance to the Athenians. A similar sentiment grew up partially against him in Athens itself, and appears to have been connected with

Themistoklês is charged with accepting bribes from Persia—acquitted at Athens.

¹ Plutarch (Themistoklês, c. 22; Kimon, c. 5-8; Aristeidês, c. 25); Diodorus, xi. 54.

² Plutarch. Themist. c. 21.

suspensions of treasonable inclinations towards the Persians. As the Persians could offer the highest bribes, a man open to corruption might naturally be suspected of inclinations towards their cause; and if Themistoklēs had rendered pre-eminent service against them, so also had Pausanias, whose conduct had undergone so fatal a change for the worse. It was the treason of Pausanias—suspected and believed against him by the Athenians even when he was in command at Byzantium, though not proved against him at Sparta until long afterwards—which first seems to have raised the presumption of *medism* against Themistoklēs also, when combined with the corrupt proceedings which stained his public conduct. We must recollect also, that Themistoklēs had given some colour to these presumptions even by the stratagems in reference to Xerxes, which wore a double-faced aspect, capable of being construed either in a Persian or in a Grecian sense. The Lacedæmonians, hostile to Themistoklēs since the time when he had outwitted them respecting the walls of Athens,—and fearing him also as a supposed accomplice of the suspected Pausanias—procured the charge of *medism* to be preferred against him at Athens; by secret instigations, and as it is said, by bribes to his political opponents.¹ But no satisfactory proof could be furnished of the accusation, which Themistoklēs himself strenuously denied, not without emphatic appeals to his illustrious services. In spite of violent

¹ This accusation of treason brought against Themistoklēs at Athens, *prior to his ostracism*, and at the instigation of the Lacedæmonians—is mentioned by Diodorus (xi. 54). Thucydides and Plutarch take notice only of the second accusation, *after his ostracism*. But Diodorus has made his narrative confused, by supposing the first accusation preferred at Athens to have come after the full detection of Pausanias and exposure of his correspondence; whereas these latter events, coming after the first accusation, supplied new proofs before unknown, and thus brought on the second, after Themistoklēs had been ostracised. But Diodorus has preserved to us the important notice of this first accusation at Athens, followed by trial, acquittal, and temporary glorification of the Themistoklēs—and preceding his

ostracism.

The indictment stated by Plutarch to have been preferred against Themistoklēs by Leobotas son of Alkmaeon, at the instance of the Spartans, probably relates to the first accusation at which Themistoklēs was acquitted. For when Themistoklēs was arraigned after the discovery of Pausanias, he did not choose to stay, nor was there any actual trial; it is not therefore likely that the name of the accuser would be preserved.—Ο δὲ γραφόμενος αὐτὸν προδοσίας Λεωβότης ἦν Ἀλκμαίωνος, ἄμα συνεπατωμένους τῶν Σπαρτιατῶν (Plutarch, Themist. c. 23).

Compare the second Scholion on Aristophan. Equit. 84, and Aristeidēs, Orat. xlv. *Ἐν τῶν Τεττάρων* (vol. ii. p. 318, ed. Dindorf, p. 243, Jebb).

invectives against him from Alkmæon and Kimon, tempered indeed by a generous moderation on the part of Aristeidês,¹ his defence was successful. He carried the people with him and was acquitted of the charge. Nor was he merely acquitted, but as might naturally be expected, a reaction took place in his favour. His splendid qualities and exploits were brought impressively before the public mind, and he seemed for the time to acquire greater ascendancy than ever.²

Such a charge and such a failure, must have exasperated to the utmost the animosity between him and his chief opponents—Aristeidês, Kimon, Alkmæon, and others: and we can

Increased bitterness of feud between him and his political rivals, after this acquittal. He is ostracised.

hardly wonder that they were anxious to get rid of him by ostracism. In explaining this peculiar process, I have already stated, that it could never be raised against any one individual separately and ostensibly; and that it could never be brought into operation at all, unless its necessity were made clear, not merely to violent party men, but also to the assembled senate and people, including of course a considerable proportion of the more moderate citizens. We may reasonably conceive that the conjuncture was deemed by many dispassionate Athenians well-suited for the tutelary intervention of ostracism, the express benefit of which consisted in its separating political opponents when the antipathy between them threatened to push one or the other into extra-constitutional proceedings—especially when one of those parties was Themistoklês, a man alike vast in his abilities and unscrupulous in his morality. Probably also there were not a few who wished to revenge the previous ostracism of Aristeidês: and lastly, the friends of Themistoklês himself, elate with his acquittal and his seeming augmented popularity, might indulge hopes that the vote of ostracism would turn out in his favour, and remove one or other of his chief political opponents. From all these circumstances we learn without astonishment, that a vote of ostracism was soon after resorted to. It ended in the temporary banishment of Themistoklês.

¹ Plutarch, Aristeidês, c. 25.

² Diodor. xi. 54. τὸτε μὲν ἀπέφυγε τῇ τῆς προδοσίας κρίσει διὸ καὶ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον μετὰ τὴν ἀπόλυσιν μέγας ἦν παρὰ τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ἡγάπων γὰρ αὐτὸν διαφε-

ρόντας οἱ πολῖται· μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα, οἱ μὲν, φοβηθέντες αὐτοῦ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν, οἱ δὲ, φθονήσαντες τῇ δόξῃ, τῶν μὲν εὐεργεσιῶν ἐπελάθοντο, τὴν δὲ ἰσχὺν καὶ τὸ φρόνημα ταπεινοῦν ἔσπευδον.

He retired into exile, and was residing at Argos, whither he carried a considerable property, yet occasionally visiting other parts of Peloponnesus¹—when the exposure and death of Pausanias, together with the discovery of his correspondence, took place at Sparta. Among this correspondence were found proofs, which Thucydides seems to have considered as real and sufficient, of the privity of Themistoklēs. By Ephorus and others, he is admitted to have been solicited by Pausanias, and to have known his plans—but to have kept them secret while refusing to cooperate in them.² Probably after his exile he took a more decided share in them than before; being well-placed for that purpose at Argos, a city not only unfriendly to Sparta, but strongly believed to have been in collusion with Xerxes at his invasion of Greece. On this occasion the Lacedæmonians sent to Athens publicly to prefer a formal charge of treason against him, and to urge the necessity of trying him as a Pan-hellenic criminal before the synod of the allies assembled at Sparta.³

B.C. 478.
While in banishment under ostracism, the Lacedæmonians prefer a charge of treason against him.

Whether this latter request would have been granted or whether Themistoklēs would have been tried at Athens, we cannot tell: for no sooner was he apprised that joint envoys from Sparta and Athens had been despatched to arrest him, than he fled forthwith from Argos to Korkyra. The inhabitants of that island, though owing gratitude to him and favourably disposed, could not venture to protect him against the two most powerful states in Greece, but sent him to the neigh-

B.C. 466.

Flight and adventures of Themistoklēs.

¹ Thucyd. i. 137. ἦλθε γὰρ αὐτῷ ὕστερον ἐκ τῆς Ἀθηνῶν παρὰ τῶν φίλων, καὶ ἐξ Ἀργεῶς ἂν ὑπεξέκειτα, &c.

I follow Mr. Fynes Clinton in considering the year 471 B.C. to be the date of the ostracism of Themistoklēs. It may probably be so; there is no evidence positively to contradict it: but I think Mr. Clinton states it too confidently, as he admits that Diodorus includes, in the chapters which he devotes to one archon, events which must have happened in several different years (see Fast. Hellen. B.C. 471).

After the expedition under the command of Pausanias in 478 B.C., we have

no one date at once certain and accurate, until we come to the death of Xerxes, where Diodorus is confirmed by the Canon of the Persian kings, B.C. 465. This last event determines by close approximation and inference, the flight of Themistoklēs, the siege of Naxos, and the death of Pausanias: for the other events of this period, we are reduced to a more vague approximation, and can ascertain little beyond their order of succession.

² Thucyd. i. 135; Ephorus ap. Plutarch. de Malign. Herodoti, c. 5, p. 855; Diodor. xi. 54; Plutarch. Themist. c. 23. ³ Diodor. xi. 55:

bouring continent. Here however, being still tracked and followed by the envoys, he was obliged to seek protection from a man whom he had formerly thwarted in a demand at Athens, and who had become his personal enemy—Admêtus king of the Molossians. Fortunately for him, at the moment when he arrived, Admêtus was not at home; and Themistoklès, becoming a suppliant to his wife, conciliated her sympathy so entirely, that she placed her child in his arms and planted him at the hearth in the full solemnity of supplication to soften her husband. As soon as Admêtus returned, Themistokles revealed his name, his pursuers, and his danger—entreating protection as a helpless suppliant in the last extremity. He appealed to the generosity of the Epirotic prince not to take revenge on a man now defenceless, for offence given under such very different circumstances; and for an offence too, after all, not of capital moment, while the protection now entreated was to the suppliant a matter of life or death. Admêtus raised him up from the hearth with the child in his arms—an evidence that he accepted the appeal and engaged to protect him; refusing to give him up to the envoys, and at last only sending him away on the expression of his own wish to visit the King of Persia. Two Macedonian guides conducted him across the mountains to Pydna in the Thermaic gulf, where he found a merchant-ship about to set sail for the coast of Asia Minor, and took a passage on board; neither the master nor the crew knowing his name. An untoward storm drove the vessel to the island of Naxos, at that moment besieged by an Athenian armament. Had he been forced to land there, he would of course have been recognised and seized, but his wonted subtlety did not desert him. Having communicated both his name and the peril which awaited him, he conjured the master of the ship to assist in saving him, and not to suffer any one of the crew to land; menacing that if by any accident he were discovered, he would bring the master to ruin along with himself, by representing him as an accomplice induced by money to facilitate the escape of Themistoklès: on the other hand, in case of safety, he promised a large reward. Such promises and threats weighed with the master, who controlled his crew, and forced them to beat about during a day and a night off the coast without

seeking to land. After that dangerous interval, the storm abated and the ship reached Ephesus in safety.¹

Thus did Themistoklēs, after a series of perils, find himself safe on the Persian side of the Ægean. At Athens he was proclaimed a traitor, and his property confiscated: nevertheless (as it frequently happened in cases of confiscation), his friends secreted a considerable sum, and sent it over to him in Asia, together with the money which he had left at Argos; so that he was thus enabled liberally to reward the ship-captain who had preserved him. With all this deduction, the property which he possessed of a character not susceptible of concealment, and which was therefore actually seized, was found to amount to eighty talents, according to Theophrastus—to 100 talents, according to Theopompus. In contrast with this large sum, it is melancholy to learn that he had begun his political career with a property not greater than three talents.² The poverty of Aristeidēs at the end of his life presents an impressive contrast to the enrichment of his rival.

Themistoklēs gets over to Asia, and seeks refuge with the Persian king.

The escape of Themistoklēs, and his adventures in Persia, appear to have formed a favourite theme for the fancy and exaggeration of authors a century afterwards. We have thus many anecdotes which contradict either directly or by implication the simple narrative of Thucydidēs. Thus we are told that at the moment when he was running away from the Greeks, the Persian king also had proclaimed a reward of 200 talents for his head, and that some Greeks on the coast of Asia were watching to take him for this reward: that he was forced to conceal himself strictly near the coast, until means were found to send him up to Susa, in a closed litter, under pretence that it was a woman for the king's harem: that Mandanē, sister of Xerxes, insisted upon having him delivered up to her as an

Stories about the relations between the Persian king and Themistoklēs.

¹ Thucyd. i. 137. Cornelius Nepos (Themist. c. 8) for the most part follows Thucydidēs, and professes to do so; yet he is not very accurate, especially about the relations between Themistoklēs and Admētus. Diodorus (xi. 56) seems to follow chiefly other guides, as Plutarch does also to a great extent (Themist. c. 24-26). There were cvi-

dently different accounts of his voyage, which represented him as reaching, not Ephesus, but the Æolic Kymē. Diodorus does not notice his voyage by sea.

² Plutarch, Themist. c. 25; also Kiritias ap. Ælian. V. 11. x. 17: compare Herodot. viii. 12.

expiation for the loss of her son at the battle of Salamis: that he learnt Persian so well, and discoursed in it so eloquently, as to procure for himself an acquittal from the Persian judges, when put upon his trial through the importunity of Mandanê: that the officers of the king's household at Susa, and the satraps in his way back, threatened him with still farther perils: that he was admitted to see the king in person, after having received a lecture from the chamberlain on the indispensable duty of falling down before him to do homage, &c., with several other uncertified details,¹ which make us value more highly the narrative of Thucydides. Indeed Ephorus, Deinô, Kleitar-chus, and Herakleidês, from whom these anecdotes appear mostly to be derived, even affirmed that Themistoklês had found Xerxes himself alive and seen him; whereas Thucydides and Charon, the two contemporary authors (for the former is *nearly* contemporary), asserted that he had found Xerxes recently dead, and his son Artaxerxes on the throne.

According to Thucydides, the eminent exile does not seem to have been exposed to the least danger in Persia. He presented himself as a deserter from Greece, and was accepted as such: moreover—what is more strange, though it seems true—he was received as an actual benefactor of the Persian king, and a sufferer from the Greeks on account of such dispositions—in consequence of his communications made to Xerxes respecting the intended retreat of the Greeks from Salamis, and respecting the contemplated destruction of the Hellespontine bridge. He was conducted by some Persians on the coast up to Susa, where he addressed a letter to the king couched in the following terms, such as probably no modern European king would tolerate, except from a quaker:—"I, Themistoklês, am come to thee, having done to thy house more mischief than any other Greek, as long as I was compelled in my own defence to resist the attack of thy father—but having also done him yet greater good when I could do so with safety to myself, and when his retreat was endangered. Reward is yet owing to me for my past service: moreover, I am now here, chased away by the Greeks in consequence of my attachment to thee,² but able

Real treatment of Themistoklês in Persia.

¹ Diodor. xi. 56; Plutarch, Themist. c. 24-30.

² "Proditionem *ultra imputabant* (says Tacitus, Hist. ii. 60, respecting Paul-

still to serve thee with great effect. I wish to wait a year, and then to come before thee in person to explain my views."

Whether the Persian interpreters, who read this letter to Artaxerxes Longimanus, exactly rendered its brief and direct expression, we cannot say. But it made a strong impression upon him, combined with the previous reputation of the writer—and he willingly granted the prayer for delay: though we shall not readily believe that he was so transported as to show his joy by immediate sacrifice to the gods, by an unusual measure of convivial indulgence, and by crying out thrice in his sleep, "I have got Themistoklēs the Athenian"—as some of Plutarch's authors informed him.¹ In the course of the year granted, Themistoklēs had learned so much of the Persian language and customs as to be able to communicate personally with the king, and acquire his confidence. No Greek (says Thucydidēs) had ever before attained such a commanding influence and position at the Persian court. His ingenuity was now displayed in laying out schemes for the subjugation of Greece to Persia, which were evidently captivating to the monarch, who rewarded him with a Persian wife and large presents, sending him down to Magnesia on the Mæander, not far from the coast of Ionia. The revenues of the district round that town, amounting to the large sum of fifty talents yearly, were assigned to him for bread: those of the neighbouring seaport of Myus, for articles of condiment to his bread, which was always accounted the main nourishment: those of Lampsakus on the Hellespont, for wine.² Not knowing the amount of these two latter items,

Influence which he acquires with the Persian king.

linus and Proculus, the generals of the army of Otho, when they surrendered to Vitellius after the defeat at Bebricum), spatium longi ante prœlium itineris, fatigationem Othonianorum, permixtum vehiculis agmen, ac pleraque fortuita fraudi sue assignantes.—Et Vitellius credidit de perfidiâ, et fraudem absovit."

¹ Plutarch, Themist. c. 28.

² Thucyd. i. 138; Diodor. xi. 57. Besides the three above-named places, Neanthēs and Phanias describe the grant as being still fuller and more specific: they state that Perkôte was granted to Themistoklēs for bedding, and Palæskêpsis for clothing (Plutarch, Themist. c. 29, Athenæus, i. p. 29).

This seems to have been a frequent form of grants from the Persian and Egyptian kings, to their queens, relatives, or friends—a grant nominally to supply some particular want or taste: see Dr. Arnold's note on the passage of Thucydides. I doubt his statement however about the land-tax or rent; I do not think that it was a tenth or a fifth of the produce of the soil in these districts which was granted to Themistoklēs, but the portion of regal revenue or tribute levied in them. The Persian kings did not take the trouble to assess and collect the tribute: they probably left that to the inhabitants themselves, provided the sum total were duly paid.

we cannot determine how much revenue Themistoklēs received altogether; but there can be no doubt, judging from the revenues of Magnesia alone, that he was a great pecuniary gainer by his change of country. After having visited various parts of Asia,¹ he lived for a certain time at Magnesia, in which place his family joined him from Athens.

How long his residence at Magnesia lasted, we do not know, but seemingly long enough to acquire local estimation and leave mementos behind him. He at length died of sickness, when sixty-five years old, without having taken any step towards the accomplishment of those victorious campaigns which he had promised to Artaxerxes. That sickness was the real cause of his death, we may believe on the distinct statement of Thucydides;² who at the same time notices a rumour partially current in his own time, of poison voluntarily taken, from painful consciousness on the part of Themistoklēs himself that the promises made could never be performed—a farther proof of the general tendency to surround the last years of this distinguished man with impressive adventures, and to dignify his last moments with a revived feeling not unworthy of his earlier patriotism. The report may possibly have been designedly circulated by his friends and relatives, in order to conciliate some tenderness towards his memory; since his sons still continued citizens at Athens, and his daughters were married there. These friends farther stated that they had brought back his bones to Attica at his own express command, and buried them privately without the knowledge of the

¹ Plutarch, Themistoklēs, c. 31. *πλανώμενος πρὸς τὴν Ἀσίαν*: this statement seems probable enough, though Plutarch rejects it.

² Thucyd. i. 138. *Νοσήσας δὲ τελευτῇ τὸν βίον· λίγωνσι δὲ τινες, καὶ ἐκούσιον φαρμάκῳ ἀποθανεῖν αὐτὸν, ἀδύνατον νομίσαντα εἶναι ἐπιτελεῖσαι βασιλεῖ ἃ ἐπίσχετο.*

This current story, as old as Aristophanēs (Equit. 83, compare the Scholia), alleged that Themistoklēs had poisoned himself by drinking bull's blood (see Diodor. xi. 58). Diodorus assigns to this act of taking poison a still more sublime and patriotic character, by connecting it with a design on the part of

Themistoklēs to restrain the Persian king from warring against Greece.

Plutarch (Themist. c. 31, and Kimon, c. 18) and Diodorus both state as an unquestionable fact, that Themistoklēs died by poisoning himself; omitting even to notice the statement of Thucydides that he died of disease. Cornelius Nepos (Themist. c. 10) follows Thucydides. Cicero (Brutus, c. 11) refers the story of the suicide by poison to Clitarchus and Stratoklēs, recognising it as contrary to Thucydides. He put into the mouth of his fellow dialogist Atticus a just rebuke of the facility with which historical truth was sacrificed to rhetorical purpose.

Athenians; no condemned traitor being permitted to be buried in Attic soil. If however we even suppose that this statement was true, no one could point out with certainty the spot wherein such interment had taken place. Nor does it seem, when we mark the cautious expressions of Thucydides,¹ that he himself was satisfied of the fact. Moreover we may affirm with confidence that the inhabitants of Magnesia, when they showed the splendid sepulchral monument erected in honour of Themistoklès in their own market-place, were persuaded that his bones were really enclosed within it.

Aristeidès died about three or four years after the ostracism of Themistoklès;² but respecting the place and manner of his death, there were several contradictions among the authors whom Plutarch had before him. Some affirmed that he perished on foreign service in the Euxine sea; others, that he died at home, amidst the universal esteem and grief of his fellow-citizens. A third story, confined to the single statement of Kraterus, and strenuously rejected by Plutarch, represents Aristeidès as having been falsely accused before the Athenian judicature and condemned to a fine of fifty minæ, on the allegation of having taken bribes during the assessment of the tribute upon the allies—which fine he was unable to pay, and was therefore obliged to retire to Ionia, where he died. Dismissing this last story, we find nothing certain about his death except one fact—but that fact at the same time the most honourable of all—that he died very poor. It is even asserted that he did not leave enough to pay funeral expenses—that a sepulchre was provided for him at Phalêrum at the public cost, besides a handsome

Death of
Aristeidès—
his poverty.

¹ Thucyd. i. 138. τὰ δὲ ὁππῶτα φασὶ κομισθῆναι αὐτοῦ οἱ προσήκοοντες οἴκαδε κελεύσαντος ἐκείνου, καὶ τεθῆναι κρύφα Ἀθηναίων ἐν τῇ Ἀττικῇ· οὐ γὰρ ἐξῆν θάπτειν, ὥς ἐπὶ προδυσίᾳ φεύγοντος.

Cornelius Nepos, who here copies Thucydides, gives this statement by mistake, as if Thucydides had himself affirmed it: "Idem (sc. Thucydides) ossa ejus clam in Atticâ ab amicis sepulta, quoniam legibus non concederetur, quod proditiōnis esset damnatus, memoriæ prodidit." This shows the haste or inaccuracy with which these

secondary authors so often cite: Thucydides is certainly not a witness for the fact: if anything, he may be said to count somewhat against it.

Plutarch (Themist. c. 32) shows that the burial-place of Themistoklès, supposed to be in Attica, was yet never verified before his time: the guides of Pausanias, however, in the succeeding century, had become more confident (Pausanias, i. 1, 3).

² Respecting the probity of Aristeidès, see an interesting fragment of Eupolis the comic writer (Δήμοι, Fragm. iv. p. 457, ed. Meineke).

donation to his son Lysimachus and a dowry to each of his two daughters. In the two or three ensuing generations, however, his descendants still continued poor, and even at that remote day some of them received aid out of the public purse, from the recollection of their incorruptible ancestor. Near a century and a half afterwards, a poor man named Lysimachus, descendant of the Just Aristeidès, was to be seen at Athens near the chapel of Iacchus, carrying a mysterious tablet, and obtaining his scanty fee of two oboli for interpreting the dreams of the passers-by : Demetrius the Phalerean procured from the people, for the mother and aunt of this poor man, a small daily allowance.¹ On all these points the contrast is marked when we compare Aristeidès with Themistoklès. The latter, having distinguished himself by ostentatious cost at Olympia, and by a choregic victory at Athens, with little scruple as to the means of acquisition—ended his life at Magnesia in dishonourable affluence greater than ever, and left an enriched posterity both at that place and at Athens. More than five centuries afterwards, his descendant the Athenian Themistoklès attended the lectures of the philosopher Ammonius at Athens, as the comrade and friend of Plutarch himself.²

¹ Plutarch, *Arist.* c. 26, 27 ; Cornelius Nepos, *Arist.* c. 3 : compare Aristophan. *Vesp.* 53.

² Plutarch, *Themist.* c. 5-32.

CHAPTER XLV.

PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONFEDERACY UNDER ATHENS AS HEAD.—FIRST FORMATION AND RAPID EXPANSION OF THE ATHENIAN EMPIRE.

I HAVE already recounted, in the preceding chapter, how the Asiatic Greeks, breaking loose from the Spartan Pausanias, entreated Athens to organise a new confederacy, and to act as presiding city (Vorort)—and how this confederacy, framed not only for common and pressing objects, but also on principles of equal rights and constant control on the part of the members, attracted soon the spontaneous adhesion of a large proportion of Greeks, insular or maritime, near the *Ægean* sea. I also noticed this event as giving commencement to a new æra in Grecian politics. For whereas there had been before a tendency, not very powerful, yet on the whole steady and increasing, towards something like one Pan-hellenic league under Sparta as president—from henceforward that tendency disappears, and a bifurcation begins: Athens and Sparta divide the Grecian world between them, and bring a much larger number of its members into cooperation, either with one or the other, than had ever been so arranged before.

Consequence of the formation of the Confederacy of Delos,—Bifurcation of Grecian politics between Sparta and Athens.

Thucydides marks precisely, as far as general words can go, the character of the new confederacy during the first years after its commencement. But unhappily he gives us scarcely any particular facts; and in the absence of such controlling evidence, a habit has grown up of describing loosely the entire period between 477 B.C. and 405 B.C. (the latter date is that of the battle of *Ægos-potami*) as constituting "the Athenian empire." This word denotes correctly enough the last part, perhaps the last forty years, of the seventy-two years indicated; but it is misleading when applied to the first part: nor indeed can any single word be found which faith-

Distinction between the Confederacy of Delos, with Athens as president—and the Athenian empire which grew out of it.

fully characterizes as well the one part as the other. A great and serious change had taken place, and we disguise the fact of that change if we talk of the Athenian hegemony or headship as a portion of the Athenian empire. Thucydides carefully distinguishes the two, speaking of the Spartans as having lost, and of the Athenians as having acquired, not empire, but headship or hegemony.¹

¹ Thucyd. i. 94. ἐπεπολιόρκεσαν (Βυζάντιον) ἐν τῇδε τῇ ἡγεμονίᾳ, *i.e.* under the Spartan hegemony, before the Athenians were invited to assume the hegemony; compare ἡγησάμενοι, i. 77, and Herodot. viii. 2, 3. Next we have (i. 95) φοιτῶντες τε (the Ionians, &c.) πρὸς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἤξιον αὐτοὺς ἡγεμόνας σφῶν γενέσθαι κατὰ τὸ συγγενές. Again, when the Spartans send out Dorkis in place of Pausanias, the allies οὐκέτι ἐφίσταν τῇ ἡγεμονίᾳ. Then, as to the ensuing proceedings of the Athenians (i. 96)—παρалаβόντες δὲ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τὴν ἡγεμονίαν τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ ἐκόντων τῶν συμμάχων διὰ τὸ Πανσάνιον μίσει, &c.: compare i. 75.—ἡμῶν δὲ προσελθόντων τῶν συμμάχων καὶ αὐτῶν δεηθέντων ἡγεμόνας καταστήσαι, and vi. 76.

Then the transition from the ἡγεμονία to the ἀρχή (i. 97)—ἡγούμενοι δὲ αὐτονόμων τὸ πρῶτον τῶν συμμάχων καὶ ἀπὸ κοινῶν ξυνόδων βουλευόντων, τόσα δὲ ἐπ' ἡλθον πόλεμος τε καὶ διαχειρίσεις πραγμάτων μεταξὺ τοῦδε τοῦ πολέμου καὶ τοῦ Μηδικοῦ.

Thucydides then goes on to say that he shall notice these "many strides in advance"—which Athens made, starting from her original hegemony, so as to show in what manner the Athenian empire or ἀρχή was originally formed—ἅμα δὲ καὶ τῇς ἀρχῆς ἀπόδειξιν ἔχει τῆς τῶν Ἀθηναίων, ἐν οἷς τρόπῳ κατέστη. The same transition from the ἡγεμονία to the ἀρχή is described in the oration of the Athenian envoy at Sparta, shortly before the Peloponnesian war (i. 75): but as it was rather the interest of the Athenian orator to confound the difference between ἡγεμονία and ἀρχή, so after he has clearly stated what the relation of Athens to her allies had been at first, and how it afterwards became totally changed, Thucydides makes him slur over the distinction, and say—οὕτως οὐδ' ἡμῖς θαυμάστον οὐδὲν πεποιήκαμεν . . . εἰ ἀρχὴν τε διδομένην ἐδεξάμεθα καὶ ταύ-

την μὴ ἀνείμεν, &c.; and he then proceeds to defend the title of Athens to command on the ground of superior force and worth: which last plea is advanced a few years afterwards still more nakedly and offensively by the Athenian speakers. Read also the language of the Athenian Euphēmus at Kamarina (vi. 82), where a similar confusion appears, as being suitable to the argument.

It is to be recollected that the word *hegemony* or headship is extremely general, denoting any case of following a leader, and of obedience, however temporary, qualified, or indeed little more than honorary. Thus it is used by the Thebans to express their relation towards the Boeotian confederated towns (ἡγεμονεύεσθαι ὑφ' ἡμῶν, Thuc. iii. 61, where Dr. Arnold draws attention to the distinction between that verb and ἀρχειν, and holds language respecting the Athenian ἀρχή, more precise than his language in the note ad Thucyd. i. 94), and by the Corinthians to express their claims as metropolis of Korkyra, which were really little more than honorary—ἐπὶ τῷ ἡγεμόνες τε εἶναι καὶ τὰ εἰκότα θαυμάζεσθαι (Thucyd. i. 38); compare vii. 55. Indeed it sometimes means simply a guide (iii. 98; vii. 50).

But the words ἀρχή, ἀρχειν, ἀρχεσθαι, *voc. pass.*, are more specific in their application, and imply both superior dignity and coercive authority to a greater or less extent: compare Thucyd. v. 69; ii. 8, &c. The πόλις ἀρχὴν ἔχουσα is analogous to ἀνὴρ τύραννος (vi. 85).

Herodotus is less careful in distinguishing the meanings of these words than Thucydides: see the discussion of the Lacedæmonian and Athenian envoys with Gelo (vii. 155-162). But it is to be observed that he makes Gelo ask for the ἡγεμονία and not for the ἀρχή—putting the claim in the least offensive form: compare also the claim of the Argæians for ἡγεμονία (vii. 148).

The transition from the Athenian hegemony to the Athenian empire was doubtless gradual, so that no one could determine precisely where the former ends and the latter begins : but it had been consummated before the thirty years' truce, which was concluded fourteen years before the Peloponnesian war—and it was in fact the substantial cause of that war. Empire then came to be held by Athens—partly as a fact established, resting on acquiescence rather than attachment or consent on the minds of the subjects—partly as a corollary from necessity of union combined with her superior force : while this latter point, superiority of force as a legitimate title, stood more and more forward both in the language of her speakers and in the conceptions of her citizens. Nay, the Athenian orators of the middle of the Peloponnesian war venture to affirm that their empire had been of this same character ever since the repulse of the Persians : an inaccuracy so manifest, that if we could suppose the speech made by the Athenian Euphémus at Kamarina in 415 B.C. to have been heard by Themistoklēs or Aristeidēs fifty years before, it would have been alike offensive to the prudence of the one and to the justice of the other.

The imperial condition of Athens, that which she held at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, when her allies (except Chios and Lesbos) were tributary subjects, and when the *Ægean* sea was an Athenian lake,—was of course the period of her greatest splendour and greatest action upon the Grecian world. It was also the period most impressive to historians, orators, and philosophers—suggesting the idea of some one state exercising dominion over the *Ægean*, as the natural condition of Greece, so that if Athens lost such dominion, it would be transferred to Sparta—holding out the dispersed maritime Greeks as a tempting prize for the aggressive schemes of some new conqueror—and even bringing up by association into men's fancies the mythical Minos of Kreta, and others, as having been rulers of the *Ægean* in times anterior to Athens.

Even those who lived under the full-grown Athenian empire had before them no good accounts of the incidents between 479-450 B.C. For we may gather from the intimation of Thucydidēs, as well as from his barrenness of facts, that while

there were chroniclers both for the Persian invasion and for the times before it, no one cared for the time immediately succeeding.¹ Hence, the little light which has fallen upon this blank has all been borrowed (if we except the careful Thucydides) from a subsequent age; and the Athenian hegemony has been treated as a mere commencement of the Athenian empire.

Credit has been given to Athens for a long-sighted ambition, aiming from the Persian war downwards at results which perhaps Themistoklēs² may have partially divined, but which only time and successive accidents opened even to distant view. But such systematic anticipation of subsequent results is fatal to any correct understanding, either of the real agents or of the real period; both of which are to be explained from the circumstances preceding and actually present, with some help, though cautious and sparing, from our acquaintance with that which was then an unknown future. When Aristides and Kimon dismissed the Lacedæmonian admiral Dorkis, and drove Pausanias away from Byzantium on his second arrival, they had to deal with the problem immediately before them. They had to complete the defeat of the Persian power, still formidable—and to create and organize a confederacy as yet only inchoate. This was quite enough to occupy their attention, without ascribing to them distant views of Athenian maritime empire.

In that brief sketch of incidents preceding the Peloponnesian war, which Thucydides introduces as "the digression from this

¹ Thucyd. i. 97. τοῖς πρὸ ἐμοῦ ἀπαν ἐκλείπει ἢν τοῦτο τὸ χωρίον, καὶ ἡ τὰ πρὸ τῶν Μηδικῶν ἐκτελέσθαι ἡ αὐτὰ τὰ Μηδικὰ· τούτων δὲ ὅσπερ καὶ ἡ ψατο ἐν τῇ Ἀττικῇ ἐγγραφῇ Ἑλλάνικοι, βραχέως τε καὶ τοῖς χρόνοις οὐκ ἀκριβῶς ἐπεμνήσθη.

Hellanicus therefore had done no more than touch upon the events of this period: and he found so little good information within his reach, as to fall into chronological blunders.

² Thucyd. i. 93. τῆς γὰρ δὴ θαλάσσης πρῶτος ἐτόλμησεν εἰπεῖν ὡς ἀνθεκτὴ ἐσσι, καὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν εὐθὺς ἐγκατεσκεύαζε.

Dr. Arnold says in his note "εὐθὺς signifies probably immediately after the retreat of the Persians." I think it

refers to an earlier period—that point of time when Themistoklēs first counselled the building of the fleet, or at least when he counselled them to abandon their city and repose all their hopes in their fleet. It is only by this supposition that we get a reasonable meaning for the words ἐτόλμησε εἰπεῖν, "he was the first who dared to say"—which implies a counsel of extraordinary boldness. "For he was the first who dared to advise them to grasp at the sea, and from that moment forward he helped to establish their empire." The word ἐγκατεσκεύαζε seems to denote a collateral consequence, not directly contemplated, though divined, by Themistoklēs.

narrative,"¹ he neither gives, nor professes to give, a complete enumeration of all which actually occurred. During the interval between the first desertion of the Asiatic allies from Pausanias to Athens, in 477 B.C.—and the revolt of Naxos in 466 B.C.—he recites three incidents only: first, the siege and capture of Eion on the Strymon with its Persian garrison—next, the capture of Skyros, and appropriation of the island to Athenian kleruchs or out-citizens,—thirdly, the war with Karystus in Eubœa, and reduction of the place by capitulation. It has been too much the practice to reason as if these three events were the full history of ten or eleven years. Considering what Thucydides states respecting the darkness of this period, we might perhaps suspect that they were all which he could learn about it on good authority: and they are all, in truth, events having a near and special bearing on the subsequent history of Athens herself—for Eion was the first stepping-stone to the important settlement of Amphipolis, and Skyros in the time of Thucydides was the property of outlying Athenian citizens or kleruchs. Still, we are left in almost entire ignorance of the proceedings of Athens, as conducting the newly-established confederate force: for it is certain that the first ten years of the Athenian hegemony must have been years of most active warfare against the Persians. One positive testimony to this effect has been accidentally preserved to us by Herodotus, who mentions that "before the invasion of Xerxes, there were Persian commanders and garrisons everywhere in Thrace and the Hellespont,"² all of whom were conquered by the

The early years, after the formation of the confederacy of Delos, were years of active exertions on the part of Athens.—Our imperfect knowledge of them.

¹ Thucyd. i. 97. *ἔγραψα δὲ αὐτὰ καὶ τὴν ἐκβολὴν τοῦ λόγου ἐποίησάμην διὰ τὸδε, &c.*

² Herodot. vii. 106, 107. *Κατέστασαν γὰρ ἐνι πρότερον ταύτης τῆς ἡλώσιος ὑπαρχοὶ ἐν τῇ Θρηίκῃ καὶ τοῦ Ἑλλησπόντου πανταχῇ. Οὗτοι ὦν πάντες, οἳ τε ἐκ Θρηίκης καὶ τοῦ Ἑλλησπόντου, πλὴν τοῦ ἐν Δορίσκῃ, ὑπὸ Ἑλλήνων ὕστερον ταύτης τῆς στρατηλασίης ἐξήρρέθησαν τὸν δὲ ἐν Δορίσκῃ Μασκάμην οὐδαμοὶ κω ἐδυνάσθησαν ἐξελεῖν, πολλὰ ὦν πείρησάμενοι.*

The loose chronology of Plutarch is little to be trusted; but he, too, acknowledges the continuance of Persian

occupations in Thrace, by aid of the natives, until a period later than the battle of the Eurymedon (Plutarch, Kimon, c. 14).

It is a mistake to suppose, with Dr. Arnold in his note on Thucyd. viii. 62, "that Sestus was almost the last place held by the Persians in Europe."

Weissenborn (Hellen, oder Beiträge zur genaueren Erforschung der altgriechischen Geschichte. Jena, 1844, p. 144, note 31) has taken notice of this important passage of Herodotus, as well as of that in Plutarch; but he does not see how much it embarrasses all attempts to frame a certain chronology for those

Greeks after that invasion, with the single exception of Maskamês governor of Doriskus, who could never be taken, though many different Grecian attempts were made upon the fortress."

Of those who were captured by the Greeks, not one made any defence sufficient to attract the admiration of Xerxes, except Bogês governor of Eion. Bogês, after bravely defending himself, and refusing offers of capitulation, found his provisions exhausted, and farther resistance impracticable. He then kindled a vast funeral pile—slew his wives, children, concubines, and family, and cast them into it—threw his precious effects over the wall into the Strymon—and lastly, precipitated himself into the flames.¹ His brave despair was the theme of warm encomium among the Persians, and his relatives in Persia were liberally rewarded by Xerxes. This capture of Eion, effected by Kimon, has been mentioned (as already stated) by Thucydidês; but Herodotus here gives us to understand that it was only one of a string of enterprises, all unnoticed by Thucydidês, against the Persians. Nay, it would seem from his language that Maskamês maintained himself in Doriskus during the whole reign of Xerxes, and perhaps longer, repelling successive Grecian assaults.

The valuable indication here cited from Herodotus would be itself a sufficient proof that the first years of the Athenian hegemony were full of busy and successful hostility against the Persians. And in truth this is what we should expect. The battles of Salamis, Plataea, and Mykalê, drove the Persians out of Greece and overpowered their main armaments, but did not remove them at once from all the various posts which they occupied throughout the Ægean and Thrace. Without doubt the Athenians had to clear the coasts and the islands of a great number of different Persian detachments; an operation neither short nor easy, with the then imperfect means of siege, as we may see by the cases of Sestus and Eion; nor

Necessity of continued action against the Persians even after the battles of Plataea and Mykalê. This necessity was the cause both of the willing organisation of the Confederacy of Delos and of the maritime improvement of Athens.

two or three events which Thucydidês gives us between 476-466 B.C.

¹ Kutzén (De Atheniensium Imperio Cimonis atque Periclis tempore constituto. Grimaë, 1837. Commentatio,

i. p. 8) has good reason to call in question the stratagem ascribed to Kimon by Pausanias (viii. 8, 2) for the capture of Eion.

indeed always practicable, as the case of Doriskus teaches us. The fear of these Persians, yet remaining in the neighbourhood,¹ and even the chance of a renewed Persian invading armament, formed one pressing motive for Grecian cities to join the new confederacy; while the expulsion of the enemy added to it those places which he had occupied. It was by these years of active operations at sea against the common enemy, that the Athenians first established² that constant, systematic, and laborious training, among their own ships' crews, which transmitted itself with continual improvements down to the Peloponnesian war. It was by these, combined with present fear, that they were enabled to organise the largest and most efficient confederacy ever known among Greeks—to bring together deliberative deputies—to plant their own ascendancy as enforcers of the collective resolutions—and to raise a prodigious tax from universal contribution. Lastly, it was by the same operations, prosecuted so successfully as to remove present alarm, that they at length fatigued the more lukewarm and passive members of the confederacy, and created in them a wish either to commute personal service for pecuniary contribution, or to escape from the obligation of service in any way. The Athenian nautical training would never have been acquired—the confederacy would never have become a working reality—the fatigue and discontents among its members would never have arisen—unless there had been a real fear of the Persians, and a pressing necessity for vigorous and organised operations against them, during the ten years between 477 and 466 B.C.

As to these ten years, then, we are by no means to assume that the particular incidents mentioned by Thucydides about Eion, Skyros, Karystus, and Naxos, constitute the sum total

¹ To these "remaining operations against the Persians" the Athenian envoy at Laedæmon alludes, in his speech prior to the Peloponnesian war—*ὁμῶν μιν* (you Spartans) *οὐκ ἐβελησάντων παραμείναι πρὸς τὰ ὑπὸλοιπα τοῦ βαρβάρου, ἡμῖν δὲ προσελθόντων τῶν συμμάχων καὶ αὐτῶν δεηθέντων ἡγεμόνας καταστήναι*, &c. (Thucyd. i. 75): and again iii. 11, *τὰ ὑπὸλοιπα τῶν ἔργων*.

Compare also Plato, Menæx. c. 11. αὐτὸς δὲ ἡγγίλλετο βασιλεὺς διανοεῖσθαι

ὡς ἐπιχειρήσων πάλιν ἐπὶ τοῖς Ἕλληνας, &c.

² The Athenian nautical training begins directly after the repulse of the Persians. *Τὸ δὲ τῆς θαλάσσης ἐπιστήμονας γενέσθαι* (says Periklēs respecting the Peloponnesians, just at the commencement of the Peloponnesian war) *οὐ βραδίως αὐτοῖς προσγενήσεται· οὐδὲ γὰρ ὁμοῖς, μελετῶντες αὐτὸ εὐθὺς ἀπὸ τῶν Μηδικῶν, ἐξέργασθί πω* (Thucyd. i. 142).

of events. To contradict this assumption, I have suggested proof sufficient, though indirect, that they are only part of the stock of a very busy period—the remaining details of which, indicated in outline by the large general language of Thucydides, we are condemned not to know. Nor are we admitted to be present at the synod of Delos, which during all this time continued its periodical meetings; though it would have been highly interesting to trace the steps whereby an institution which at first promised to protect not less the separate rights of the members than the security of the whole, so lamentably failed in its object. We must recollect that this confederacy, formed for objects common to all, limited to a certain extent the autonomy of each member; both conferring definite rights, and imposing definite obligations. Solemnly sworn to by all, and by Aristeidēs on behalf of Athens, it was intended to bind the members in perpetuity—marked even in the form of the oath, which was performed by casting heavy lumps of iron into the sea never again to be seen.¹ As this confederacy was thus both perpetual and peremptory, binding each member to the rest and not allowing either retirement or evasion, so it was essential that it should be sustained by some determining authority and enforcing sanction. The determining authority was provided by the synod at Delos: the enforcing sanction was exercised by Athens as president. And there is every reason to presume that Athens, for a long time, performed this duty in a legitimate and honourable manner, acting in execution of the resolves of the synod, or at least in full harmony with its general purposes. She exacted from every member the regulated quota of men or money, employing coercion against recusants, and visiting neglect of military duty with penalties. In all these requirements she only discharged her appropriate functions as chosen leader of the confederacy. There can be no reasonable doubt that the general synod went cordially along with her² in

Confederacy of Delos—sworn to by all the members—perpetual and peremptory—not allowing retirement nor evasion.

Enforcing sanctions of Athens, strictly exercised, in harmony with the general synod.

¹ Plutarch, Aristeidēs, c. 24.

² Such concurrence of the general synod is in fact implied in the speech put by Thucydides into the mouth of the Mitylenæan envoys at Olympia, in the third year of the Peloponnesian

war: a speech pronounced by parties altogether hostile to Athens (Thucyd. iii. 11)—*ἡμὰ μὲν γὰρ μαρτυρίῃ ἐχρώμετο* (the Athenians) *μὴ ἂν τοὺς γε ἰσχυροὺς ἀκούσας, εἰ μὴ τι ἡδίκουν οἱς ἐπέσταν, ἐυστατεῖεν.*

strictness of dealing towards those defaulters who obtained protection without bearing their share of the burthen.

But after a few years, several of the confederates, becoming weary of personal military service, prevailed upon the Athenians to provide ships and men in their place, and imposed upon themselves in exchange a money-payment of suitable amount. This commutation, at first probably introduced to meet some special case of inconvenience, was found so suitable to the taste of all parties, that it gradually spread through the larger portion of the confederacy. To unwarlike allies, hating labour and privation, it was a welcome relief: while to the Athenians, full of ardour, and patient of labour as well as discipline for the aggrandisement of their country, it afforded constant pay for a fleet more numerous than they could otherwise have kept afloat. It is plain from the statement of Thucydides that this altered practice was introduced from the petition of the confederates themselves, not from any pressure or stratagem on the part of Athens.¹ But though such was its real source, it did not the less fatally degrade the allies in reference to Athens, and extinguish the original feeling of equal rights and partnership in the confederacy, with communion of danger as well as of glory, which had once bound them together. The Athenians came to consider themselves as military chiefs and soldiers, with a body of tribute-paying subjects, whom they were entitled to hold in dominion, and restrict, both as to foreign policy and internal government, to such extent as they thought expedient—but whom they were also bound to protect against foreign enemies. The military force of these subject-states was thus in a great degree transferred to Athens by their own act, just as that of so many of the native princes in India has been made over to the English.

Gradual alteration in the relations of the allies—substitution of money-payment for personal service, demanded by the allies themselves, suitable to the interests and feelings of Athens.

¹ Thucyd. i. 97-99.—Λιτίαι δὲ ἄλλαι ἦσαν τῶν ἀποστάσεων, καὶ μέγιστα, αἱ τῶν φόρων καὶ νεῶν ἐκδεῖσθαι, καὶ λειποστροφίαν, εἰ τὴν ἐγένοντο· οἱ γὰρ Ἀθηναῖοι ἀκριβῶς ἔπρασσον, καὶ λυπηροὶ ἦσαν, οὐκ εὐθεῶσιν οὐδὲ βουλομένοις ταλαιπωρεῖν προσάγοντες τὰς ἀνάγκας. Ἦσαν δὲ πῶς καὶ ἄλλως οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι οὐκέτι ὁμοίως ἐν ἧδονῃ ἔρχοντες, καὶ οὐτε ξυνεστράτευον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἴσου, βῆδιδόν τε προσάγεσθαι ἦν

αὐτοῖς τοὺς ἀφισταμένους· ὥν αὐτοὶ αἰτίοι ἐγένοντο οἱ ξύμμαχοι· διὰ γὰρ τὴν ἀπόκησιν ταύτην τῶν στρατιῶν, οἱ πλείονι αὐτῶν, ἵνα μὴ ἀπ' οἴκου ᾗσι, χρήματα ἐτάξατο ἀντὶ τῶν νεῶν τὸ ἱκνούμενον ἀνάλωμα φέρειν, καὶ τοῖς μὲν Ἀθηναίοις ἠβέζετο τὸ ναυτικὸν ἀπὸ τῆς δαπάνης ἣν ἐκείνοι συμφύροισιν, αὐτοὶ δὲ ὅποτε ἀποσταῖεν, ἀπαράσκεινοι καὶ ἄπειροι ἐς τὴν πόλεμον καθίστατο.

But the military efficiency of the confederacy against the Persians was much increased, in proportion as the vigorous resolves of Athens¹ were less and less paralysed by the contentions and irregularity of a synod: so that the war was prosecuted with greater success than ever, while those motives of alarm, which had served as the first pressing stimulus to the formation of the confederacy, became every year farther and farther removed.

Under such circumstances, several of the confederate states grew tired even of paying their tribute—and averse to continuance as members. They made successive attempts to secede: but Athens, acting seemingly in conjunction with the synod, repressed their attempts one after the other—conquering, fining, and disarming the revolvers; which was the more easily done, since in most cases their naval force had been in great part handed over to her. As these events took place, not all at once, but successively in different years—the number of mere tribute-paying allies as well as of subdued revolvers continually increasing—so there was never any one moment of conspicuous change in the character of the confederacy. The allies slid unconsciously into subjects, while Athens, without any predetermined plan, passed from a chief into a despot. By strictly enforcing the obligations of the pact upon unwilling members, and by employing coercion against revolvers, she had become unpopular in the same proportion as she acquired new power—and that too without any guilt of her own. In this position, even if she had been inclined to relax her hold upon the tributary subjects, considerations of her own safety would have deterred her from doing so; for there was reason to apprehend that they might place their strength at the disposal of her enemies. It is very certain that she never was so inclined. It would have required a more self-denying public morality than has ever been practised by any state, either ancient or modern, even to conceive the idea of relinquishing voluntarily an immense ascendancy as well as a lucrative revenue: least of all was such an idea likely to be conceived by Athenian citizens, whose ambition increased

Change in the position, as well as in the feelings of Athens.

¹ See the contemptuous remarks of Periklēs upon the debates of the Lacedæmonian allies at Sparta (Thucyd. i. 141).

with their power, and among whom the love of Athenian ascendancy was both passion and patriotism. But though the Athenians were both disposed, and qualified, to push all the advantages offered and even to look out for new—we must not forget that the foundations of their empire were laid in the most honourable causes: voluntary invitation—efforts both unwearied and successful against a common enemy—unpopularity incurred in discharge of an imperative duty—and inability to break up the confederacy, without endangering themselves as well as laying open the Ægean sea to the Persians.¹

There were two other causes, besides that which has been just adverted to, for the unpopularity of imperial Athens. First, the existence of the confederacy, imposing permanent obligations, was in conflict with the general instinct of the Greek mind, tending towards separate political autonomy of each city—as well as with the particular turn of the Ionic mind, incapable of that steady personal effort which was requisite for maintaining the synod of Delos on its first large and equal basis. Next—and this is the great cause of all—Athens, having defeated the Persians and thrust them to a distance, began to employ the force and the tribute of her subject-allies in warfare against Greeks, wherein these allies had nothing to gain from success—everything to apprehend from defeat—and a banner to fight for, offensive to Hellenic sympathies. On this head the subject-allies had great reason to complain, throughout the prolonged wars of Greek against Greek for the purpose of sustaining Athenian predominance.

Growing unpopularity of Athens throughout Greece—causes of it.

¹ The speech of the Athenian envoy at Sparta, a little before the Peloponnesian war, sets forth the growth of the Athenian empire, in the main, with perfect justice (Thucyd. i. 75, 76). He admits and even exaggerates its unpopularity, but shows that such unpopularity was, to a great extent and certainly as to its first origin, unavoidable as well as undeserved. He of course, as might be supposed, omits those other proceedings by which Athens had herself aggravated it.

Καὶ γὰρ αὐτὴν τήνδε (τὴν ἀρχὴν) ἐλάβομεν οὐ βιασάμενοι . . . ἐξ αὐτοῦ δὲ τοῦ ἔργου κατηναγκάσθημεν τὸ πρῶτον

προσπαγεῖν αὐτὴν ἐν τῷδε, μάλιστα μὲν ὑπὸ δέους, ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ τιμῇ, ὁσπερ καὶ ὠφελείας. Καὶ οὐκ ἀσφαλὲς ἔστι εἶδοκαί εἶναι, τοῖς πολλοῖς ἀπηχθήμενοις, καὶ τινων καὶ ἥδη ἀποστάτων κειραμένων, ὧμῶν τε ἡμῖν οὐκ ἐστὶ ὁμοίως φίλων ἀλλ' ὑπόπτων καὶ διαφόρων ὄντων, ἀνέκτας κινδυνεύειν καὶ γὰρ ἂν αἱ ἀποστάσεις πρὸς ὧμᾶς ἐγγίγοντο· πᾶσι δὲ ἀνεπίφθορον τὰ ξυμφέροντα τῶν μεγίστων παρὶ κινδύνων εὖ τίθεσθαι.

The whole speech well merits attentive study: compare also the speech of Periklēs at Athens, in the second year of the Peloponnesian war (Thucyd. ii. 63).

But on the point of practical grievances or oppressions, they had little ground for discontent, and little feeling of actual discontent, as I shall show more fully hereafter. Among the general body of citizens in the subject-allied cities, the feeling towards Athens was rather indifference than hatred. The movement of revolt against her proceeded from small parties of leading men, acting apart from the citizens, and generally with collateral views of ambition for themselves. The positive hatred towards her was felt chiefly by those who were not her subjects.

It is probable that the same indisposition to personal effort, which prompted the confederates of Delos to tender money-payment as a substitute for military service, also induced them to neglect attendance at the synod. But we do not know the steps whereby this assembly, at first an effective reality, gradually dwindled into a mere form, and vanished. Nothing however can more forcibly illustrate the difference of character between the maritime allies of Athens and the Peloponnesian allies of Sparta, than the fact—that while the former shrank from personal service and thought it an advantage to tax themselves in place of it—the latter were “ready enough with their bodies,” but uncomplying and impracticable as to contributions.¹ The contempt felt by these Dorian landsmen for the military efficiency of the Ionians recurs frequently, and appears even to exceed what the reality justified. But when we turn to the conduct of the latter twenty years earlier, at the battle of Lade, in the very crisis of the Ionic revolt from Persia²—we detect the same want of energy, the same incapacity of personal effort and labour, as that which broke up the Confederacy of Delos with all its beneficial promise. To appreciate fully the indefatigable activity and daring, together with the patient endurance of laborious maritime training, which characterised the Athenians of that day—we have only to contrast them with these confederates, so remarkably destitute of both. Amidst such glaring inequalities of merit, capacity, and

Synod of Delos—gradually declines in importance and vanishes. Superior qualities and merit of the Athenians as compared with the confederates of Delos generally.

¹ Thucyd. i. 141. *σύμασι δὲ ἰστοιμότεροι οἱ αὐτουργοὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἢ χρημασι πολεμείν, &c.*

² See Herodot. vi. 12, and the preceding volume of this History, chap. xxxv.

power, to maintain a confederacy of equal members was impossible. It was in the nature of things that the confederacy should either break up, or be transmuted into an Athenian empire.

I have already mentioned that the first aggregate assessment of tribute, proposed by Aristeidês and adopted by the synod at Delos, was four hundred and sixty talents in money. At that time many of the confederates paid their quota, not in money, but in ships. But this practice gradually diminished, as the commutations above alluded to, of money in place of ships, were multiplied, while the aggregate tribute of course became larger. It was no more than six hundred talents¹ at the commencement of the Peloponnesian war, forty-six years after the first formation of the confederacy; from whence we may infer that it was never at all increased upon individual members during the interval. For the difference between four hundred and sixty talents and six hundred, admits of being fully explained by the numerous commutations of service for money as well as by the acquisitions of new members, which doubtless Athens had more or less the opportunity of making. It is not to be imagined that the confederacy had attained its maximum number at the date of the first assessment of tribute: there must have been various cities, like Sinopê and Ægina, subsequently added.²

Tribute first raised by the synod of Delos—assessment of Aristeidês.

Without some such preliminary statements as those just given, respecting the new state of Greece between the Persian and Peloponnesian wars, beginning with the Athenian hegemony or headship, and ending with the Athenian empire—the reader would hardly understand the bearing of those particular events which our authorities enable us to recount; events unhappily few in number, though the period must have been full of action—and not well-authenticated as to dates. The first known enterprise of the Athenians in their new capacity (whether the first absolutely or not we cannot determine) between 476 B.C. and 466 B.C., was the conquest of the important post of Eion on the Strymon, where the Persian governor Bogês, starved out after a desperate resistance, destroyed himself rather than

Events between B.C. 476-466. Eion—Skiros—Karystos.

¹ Thucyd. ii. 13.

² Thucyd. i. 108; Plutarch, Periklês, c. 20.

capitulate, together with his family and precious effects—as has already been stated. The next events named are their enterprises against the Dolopes and Pelasgi in the island of Skyros (seemingly about 470 B.C.) and the Dryopes in the town and district of Karystus in Eubœa. To the latter, who were of a different kindred from the inhabitants of Chalkis and Eretria, and received no aid from them, they granted a capitulation: the former were more rigorously dealt with and expelled from their island. Skyros was barren, and had little to recommend it except a good maritime position and an excellent harbour; while its inhabitants, seemingly akin to the Pelasgian residents in Lemnos prior to the Athenian occupation of that spot, were alike piratical and cruel. Some Thessalian traders, recently plundered and imprisoned by them, had raised a complaint against them before the Amphictyonic synod, which condemned the island to make restitution. The mass of the islanders threw the burden upon those who had committed the crime: and these men, in order to evade payment, invoked Kimon with the Athenian armament. He conquered the island, expelled the inhabitants, and peopled it with Athenian settlers.

Athens as
guardian of
the Ægean
sea against
piracy—
The hero
Theseus.

Such clearance was a beneficial act, suitable to the new character of Athens as guardian of the Ægean sea against piracy: but it seems also connected with Athenian plans. The island lay very convenient for the communication with Lemnos (which the Athenians had doubtless reoccupied after the expulsion of the Persians¹), and became, as well as Lemnos, a recognized adjunct or outlying portion of Attica. Moreover there were old legends which connected the Athenians with it, as the tomb of their hero Theseus; whose name, as the mythical champion of democracy, was in peculiar favour at the period immediately following the return from Salamis. It was in the year 476 B.C., that the oracle had directed them to bring home the bones of Theseus from Skyros, and to prepare for that hero a splendid entombment and edifice in their new city. They had tried to effect this, but the unsocial manners of the Dolopians had prevented a search, and it was only after Kimon had taken the island that he found, or pretended to

¹ Xenophon, *Hellenic*. v. 1, 31.

find, the body. It was brought to Athens in the year 469 B.C.,¹ and after being welcomed by the people in solemn and

¹ Mr. Fynes Clinton (*Fasti Hellenicæ*, ad ann. 476 B.C.) places the conquest of Skyros by Kimon in the year 476 B.C. He says, after citing a passage from Thucyd. i. 98, and from Plutarch, Theseus, c. 36, as well as a proposed correction of Bentley, which he justly rejects—"The island was actually conquered in the year of the archon Phædon, B.C. 476. This we know from Thucyd. i. 98, and Diodor. xi. 41-48 combined. Plutarch named the archon Phædon with reference to the conquest of the island: then, by a negligence not unusual with him, connected the oracle with that fact, as a contemporary transaction: although in truth the oracle was not procured till six or seven years afterwards."

Plutarch has many sins to answer for against chronological exactness; but the charge here made against him is undeserved. He states that the oracle was given in (476 B.C.) the year of the archon Phædon; and that the body of Theseus was brought back to Athens in (469 B.C.) the year of the archon Aphepsion. There is nothing to contradict either statement; nor do the passages of Thucydides and Diodorus, which Mr. Clinton adduces, prove that which he asserts. The two passages of Diodorus have indeed no bearing upon the event; and insofar as Diodorus is in this case an authority at all, he goes against Mr. Clinton, for he states Skyros to have been conquered in 470 B.C. (Diodor. xi. 60). Thucydides only tells us that the operations against Eion, Skyros, and Karystus, took place in the order here indicated, and at some periods between 476 and 466 B.C.: but he does not enable us to determine positively the date of either. Upon what authority Mr. Clinton states that "the oracle was not procured till six or seven years afterwards" (*i. e.* after the conquest), I do not know: the account of Plutarch goes rather to show that it was procured six or seven years *before* the conquest: and this may stand good until some better testimony is produced to contradict it. As our information now stands, we have no testimony as to the year of the conquest except that of Diodorus, who assigns it to 470 B.C., but as he assigns both the conquest of

Eion, and the expeditions of Kimon against Karia and Pamphylia with the victories of Eurymedon, all to the same year, we cannot much trust his authority. Nevertheless I incline to believe him as to the date of the conquest of Skyros: because it seems to me very probable that this conquest took place in the year immediately before that in which the body of Theseus was brought to Athens, which latter event may be referred with great confidence to 469 B.C., in consequence of the interesting anecdote related by Plutarch about the first prize gained by the poet Sophoklès.

Mr. Clinton has given in his Appendix (No. vi.-viii. p. 248-253) two Dissertations respecting the chronology of the period from the Persian war down to the close of the Peloponnesian war. He has rendered much service by correcting the mistake of Dodwell, Wesseling and Mitford (founded upon an inaccurate construction of a passage in Isokratès) in supposing, after the Persian invasion of Greece, a Spartan hegemony, lasting ten years, prior to the commencement of the Athenian hegemony. He has shown that the latter must be reckoned as commencing in 477, or 476 B.C., immediately after the mutiny of the allies against Pausanias—whose command, however, need not be peremptorily restricted to one year, as Mr. Clinton (p. 252) and Dodwell maintain: for the words of Thucydides, *ἐν τῷδε τῷ ἔτη μνηστήρ*, imply nothing as to annual duration, and designate merely "the hegemony which preceded that of Athens."

But the refutation of this mistake does not enable us to establish any good positive chronology for the period between 477 and 466 B.C. It will not do to construe *πρώτον μὲν* (Thuc. i. 98) in reference to the Athenian conquest of Eion, as if it must necessarily mean "the year after" 477 B.C. If we could imagine that Thucydides had told us all the military operations between 477-466 B.C., we should be compelled to admit plenty of that "interval of inaction" against which Mr. Clinton so strongly protests (p. 252). Unhappily Thucydides has told us but a small portion of the events which really happened.

joyous procession, as if the hero himself had come back, was deposited in the interior of the city. On the spot was built the monument called the Theseium with its sacred precinct, invested with the privilege of a sanctuary for men of poor condition who might feel ground for dreading the oppressions of the powerful, as well as for slaves in case of cruel usage.¹ Such were the protective functions of the mythical hero of democracy, whose installation is interesting as marking the growing intensity of democratical feeling in Athens since the Persian war.

It was about two years or more after this incident that the first breach of union in the Confederacy of Delos took place. The important island of Naxos, the largest of the Cyclades—an island which thirty years before had boasted a large marine force and 8000 hoplites—revolted; on what special ground we do not know: but probably the greater islands fancied themselves better able to dispense with the protection of the confederacy than the smaller—at the same time that they were more jealous of Athens. After a siege of unknown duration, by Athens and the confederate force, it was forced to surrender, and reduced to the condition of a tributary subject;²

About 467-466 B.C.
First revolt among the members of the Confederacy of Delos—Naxos revolts and is reconquered.

Mr. Clinton compares the various periods of duration assigned by ancient authors to that which is improperly called the Athenian "empire"—between 477-405 B.C. (pp. 248, 249). I confess that I rather agree with Dr. Gillies, who admits the discrepancy between these authors broadly and undisguisedly, than with Mr. Clinton, who seeks to bring them into comparative agreement. His explanation is only successful in regard to one of them—Demosthenes; whose two statements (forty-five years in one place and seventy-three years in another) are shown to be consistent with each other as well as chronologically just. But surely it is not reasonable to correct the text of the orator Lykurgus from *ἐννεήκοντα* to *ἑβδομήκοντα*, and then to say that "Lykurgus may be added to the number of those who describe the period as seventy years" (p. 250). Neither are we to bring Andokidēs into harmony with others, by supposing that "his calculation ascends to the battle of Marathon, from the date of which (B.C.

490) to the battle of *Ægospotami*, are just eighty-five years" (*Ibid.*). Nor ought we to justify a computation by Demosthenes of sixty-five years, by saying "that it terminates at the Athenian defeat in Sicily" (p. 249).

The truth is, that there is more or less chronological inaccuracy in all these passages, except those of Demosthenes—and historical inaccuracy in *all* of them, not even excepting those. It is not true that the Athenians *ἦσαν τῆς θαλάσσης—ἦσαν τῶν Ἑλλήνων—προστάται ἦσαν τῶν Ἑλλήνων*—for seventy-three years. The historical language of Demosthenes, Plato, Lysias, Isokrates, Andokidēs, Lykurgus, requires to be carefully examined before we rely upon it.

¹ Plutarch (Kimon, c. 8; Theseus, c. 36). *ἔστι δὲ φύζιον οἰκίταις καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς ταπεινότεροις καὶ δεδίδοι κρείττους, ὥς καὶ τοῦ Θησέως προστατικῶν τιμῶν καὶ βοηθητικῶν γενομένων. καὶ προσδεχομένου φιλανθρώπως τὰς τῶν ταπεινότερων δειήσεις.*

² Thucyd. i. 98. It has already been

its armed ships being doubtless taken away, and its fortifications razed. Whether any fine or ulterior penalty was levied, we have no information.

We cannot doubt that the reduction of this powerful island, however untoward in its effects upon the equal and self-maintained character of the confederacy, strengthened its military force by placing the whole Naxian fleet, with new pecuniary contributions, in the hands of the chief. Nor is it surprising to hear that Athens sought both to employ this new force, and to obliterate the late act of severity by increased exertions against the common enemy. Though we know no particulars respecting operations against Persia, since the attack on Eion, such operations must have been going on; but the expedition under Kimon, undertaken not long after the Naxian revolt, was attended with memorable results. That commander, having under him 200 triremes from Athens, and 100 from the various confederates, was despatched to attack the Persians on the south-western and southern coast of Asia Minor. He attacked and drove out several of their garrisons from various Grecian settlements, both in Karia and Lykia: among others the important trading city of Phasêlis, though at first resisting and even standing a siege, was prevailed upon by the friendly suggestions of the Chians in Kimon's armament to pay a contribution of ten talents and join in the expedition. From the length of time occupied in these various undertakings, the Persian satraps had been enabled to assemble a powerful force, both fleet and army, near the mouth of the river Eurymedon in Pamphylia, under the command of Tithraustês and Pherendatês, both of the regal blood. The fleet, chiefly Phœnician, seems to have consisted of 200 ships, but a farther reinforcement of eighty Phœnician ships was expected, and was actually near at hand, so that the commanders were unwilling to hazard a battle before its arrival. Kimon, anxious for the same reason to hasten on the combat, attacked them vigorously. Partly from their inferiority of numbers, partly from discouragement at the absence of the reinforcement, they seem to have made no strenuous resistance. They were put

n.c. 466-465.
Operations
of Athens
and the con-
federacy
against
Persia.—
Defeat of
the Persians
by Kimon at
the river
Eurymedon.

stated in the preceding chapter, that | to Naxos while it was under siege, and
Themistoklês, as a fugitive, passed close | incurred great danger of being taken.

to flight and driven ashore; so speedily, and with so little loss to the Greeks, that Kimon was enabled to disembark his men forthwith, and attack the land-force which was drawn up on shore to protect them. The battle on land was long and gallantly contested, but Kimon at length gained a complete victory, dispersed the army with the capture of many prisoners, and either took or destroyed the entire fleet. As soon as his victory and his prisoners were secured, he sailed to Cyprus for the purpose of intercepting the reinforcement of eighty Phœnician ships in their way, and was fortunate enough to attack them while yet they were ignorant of the victories of the Eurymedon. These ships too were all destroyed, though most of the crews appear to have escaped ashore on the island. Two great victories, one at sea and the other on land, gained on the same day by the same armament, counted with reason among the most glorious of all Grecian exploits, and were extolled as such in the inscription on the commemorative offering to Apollo, set up out of the tithe of the spoils.¹ The

¹ For the battles of the Eurymedon, see Thucyd. i. 100; Diodor. xi. 60-62; Plutarch, Kimon, 12, 13.

The accounts of the two latter appear chiefly derived from Ephorus and Kallisthenēs, authors of the following century; and from Phanodemus, an author later still. I borrow sparingly from them, and only so far as consists with the brief statement of Thucydides. The narrative of Diodorus is exceedingly confused, indeed hardly intelligible.

Phanodemus stated the number of the Persian fleet at six hundred ships; Ephorus, at three hundred and fifty. Diodorus (following the latter) gives three hundred and forty. Plutarch mentions the expected reinforcement of eighty Phœnician ships; which appears to me a very credible circumstance, explaining the easy nautical victory of Kimon at the Eurymedon. From Thucydides we know that the vanquished fleet at the Eurymedon consisted of no more than two hundred ships. For so I venture to construe the words of Thucydides, in spite of the authority of Dr. Arnold—*Καὶ εἶλον (Ἀθηναῖοι) τρήρεις φοινίκων καὶ διέφθειραν τὰς πᾶσας ἐς (τὰς) διακοσίας*. Upon which Dr. Arnold observes,—“Amounting in all

to two hundred; that is, that the whole number of ships taken or destroyed was two hundred—not that the whole fleet consisted of no more.” Admitting the correctness of this construction (which may be defended by viii. 21), we may remark that the defeated Phœnician fleet, according to the universal practice of antiquity, ran ashore to seek protection from its accompanying land-force. When therefore this land-force was itself defeated and dispersed, the ships would *all* naturally fall into the power of the victors; or if any escaped, it would be merely by accident. Moreover, the smaller number is in this case more likely to be the truth, as we must suppose an easy naval victory, in order to leave strength for a strenuous land battle on the same day.

It is remarkable that the inscription on the commemorative offering only specifies “one hundred Phœnician ships with their crews” as having been captured (Diodor. xi. 62). The other hundred ships were probably destroyed. Diodorus represents Kimon as having captured three hundred and forty ships, though he himself cites the inscription which mentions only one hundred.

number of prisoners, as well as the booty taken by the victors, was immense.

A victory thus remarkable, which thrust back the Persians to the region eastward of Phasêlis, doubtless fortified materially the position of the Athenian confederacy against them. But it tended not less to exalt the reputation of Athens, and even to popularize her with the confederates generally, from the large amount of plunder divisible among them. Probably this increased power and popularity stood her in stead throughout her approaching contest with Thasos, at the same time that it explains the increasing fear and dislike of the Peloponnesians.

Thasos was a member of the confederacy of Delos ; but her quarrel with Athens seems to have arisen out of causes quite distinct from confederate relations. It has been already stated that the Athenians had within the last few years expelled the Persians from the important post of Eion on the Strymon, the most convenient post for the neighbouring region of Thrace, which was not less distinguished for its fertility than for its mining wealth. In the occupation of this post, the Athenians had had time to become acquainted with the productive character of the adjoining region, chiefly occupied by the Edonian Thracians ; and it is extremely probable that many private settlers arrived from Athens, with the view of procuring grants, or making their fortunes by partnership with powerful Thracians in working the gold-mines round Mount Pangæus. In so doing, they speedily found themselves in collision with the Greeks of the opposite island of Mount Thasos, who possessed a considerable strip of land with various dependent towns on the continent of Thrace, and derived a large revenue from the mines of Skaptê Hylê, as well as from others in the neighbourhood.¹ The condition of Thasos at this time (about 465 B.C.) indicates to us the progress which the Grecian states in the Ægean had made since

Revolt of
Thasos from
the confede-
racy of
Delos.—
Siege of
Thasos by
the Athe-
nians under
Kimon.—
Mines in
Thrace.

¹ About Thasos, see Herodot. vi. 46-48 ; vii. 118. The position of Ragusa in the Adriatic, in reference to the despots of Servia and Bosnia in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, was very similar to that of Athens and Thasos in regard to the Thracian princes

of the interior. In Engel's History of Ragusa we find an account of the large gains made in that city by its contracts to work the gold and silver mines belonging to these princes (Engel, Geschichte des Freystantes Ragusa, sect. 36, p. 163. Wien, 1807).

their liberation from Persia. It had been deprived both of its fortifications and of its maritime force, by order of Darius, about 491 B.C., and must have remained in this condition until after the repulse of Xerxes ; but we now find it well-fortified and possessing a powerful maritime force.

In what precise manner the quarrel between the Thasians and the Athenians of Eion manifested itself, respecting the trade and the mines in Thrace, we are not informed. But it reached such a height that the Athenians were induced to send a powerful armament against the island, under the command of Kimon.¹ Having vanquished the Thasian force at sea, they disembarked, gained various battles, and blocked up the city by land as well as by sea. And at the same time they undertook—what seems to have been part and parcel of the same scheme—the establishment of a larger and more powerful colony on Thracian ground not far from Eion.

First attempt of Athens to found a city at Ennea Hodoi on the Strymon above Eion. The attempt fails and the settlers are slain.

On the Strymon, about three miles higher up than Eion, near the spot where the river narrows itself again out of a broad expanse of the nature of a lake, was situated the Edonian town or settlement called Ennea Hodoi (Nine Ways), a little above the bridge, which here served as an important communication for all the people of the interior. Both Histæus and Aristagoras, the two Milesian despots, had been tempted by the advantages of this place to commence a settlement there : both of them had failed, and a third failure on a still grander scale was now about to be added. The Athenians sent thither a large body of colonists, ten thousand in number, partly from their own citizens, partly collected from their allies ; the temptations of the site probably rendering volunteers numerous. As far as Ennea Hodoi was concerned they were successful in conquering it and driving away the Edonian possessors. But on trying to extend themselves farther to the eastward, to a spot called Drabêkus convenient for the mining region, they encountered a more formidable resistance from a powerful alliance of Thracian tribes, who had come to aid the Edonians in decisive hostility against the new colony—probably not without instigation from the inhabitants of Thasos. All or most of the ten thousand colonists were slain in this warfare,

¹ Thucyd. i. 100, 101 ; Plutarch, Kimon, c. 14 ; Diodor. xi. 70.

and the new colony was for the time completely abandoned. We shall find it resumed hereafter.¹

Disappointed as the Athenians were in this enterprise, they did not abandon the blockade of Thasos, which held out more than two years, and only surrendered in the third year. Its fortifications were razed; its ships of war, thirty-three in number, were taken away;² its possessions and mining establishments on the opposite continent were relinquished. Moreover an immediate contribution in money was demanded from the inhabitants, over and above the annual payment assessed upon them for the future. The subjugation of this powerful island was another step in the growing dominion of Athens over her confederates.

The year before the Thasians surrendered, however, they had taken a step which deserves particular notice, as indicating the newly-gathering clouds in the Grecian political horizon. They had made secret application to the Lacedæmonians for aid, entreating them to draw off the attention of Athens by invading Attica; and the Lacedæmonians, without the knowledge of Athens, having actually engaged to comply with this request, were only prevented from performing their promise by a grave and terrible misfortune at home.³ Though accidentally unperformed, this hostile promise is a most significant event. It marks the growing fear and hatred on the part of Sparta and the Peloponnesians towards Athens, merely on general grounds of the magnitude of her power, and without any special provocation. Nay, not only had Athens given no provocation, but she was still actually included as a member of the Lacedæmonian alliance, and we

464-463 B.C.
Reduction of
Thasos after
a blockade
of two years
—It is dis-
armed and
dismantled.

Application
of the Tha-
sians to Spar-
ta for aid
—granted,
but not car-
ried into
effect—
glimpse of
hostilities
between
Sparta and
Athens.

¹ Thucyd. i. 101. Philip of Macedon, in his dispute more than a century after this period with the Athenians respecting the possession of Amphipolis, pretended that his ancestor Alexander had been the first to acquire possession of the spot after the expulsion of the Persians from Thrace (see Philippi Epistola ap. Demosthen. p. 164, K.). If this pretence had been true, Ennea Hodoi would have been in possession of the Macedonians at this time, when the

first Athenian attempt was made upon it: but the statement of Thucydides shows that it was then an Edonian township.

² Plutarch, Kimon, c. 14. Galépsus and Esymê were among the Thasian settlements on the mainland of Thrace (Thucyd. iv. 108).

³ Thucyd. i. 101. οἱ δὲ ὑπέσχοτο μὲν κρῖνα τῶν Ἀθηναίων, καὶ ἐμελλόν, διεκωλύθησαν δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ γενομένου σεισμοῦ.

shall find her presently both appealed to and acting as such. We shall hear so much of Athens, and that too with truth, as pushing and aggressive—and of Sparta as home-keeping and defensive—that the incident just mentioned becomes important to remark. The first intent of unprovoked and even treacherous hostility—the germ of the future Peloponnesian war—is conceived and reduced to an engagement by Sparta.

We are told by Plutarch, that the Athenians, after the surrender of Thasos and the liberation of the armament, had expected from Kimon some farther conquests in Macedonia—and even that he had actually entered upon that project with such promise of success, that its farther consummation was certain as well as easy. Having under these circumstances relinquished it and returned to Athens, he was accused by Periklēs and others of having been bought off by bribes from the Macedonian king Alexander; but was acquitted after a public trial.¹

During the period which had elapsed between the first formation of the confederacy of Delos and the capture of Thasos (about thirteen or fourteen years, B.C. 477-463), the Athenians seem to have been occupied almost entirely in their maritime operations, chiefly against the Persians—having been free from embarrassments immediately round Attica. But this freedom was not destined to last much longer. During the ensuing ten years, their foreign relations near home become both active and complicated; while their strength expands so wonderfully, that they are found competent at once to obligations on both sides of the Ægean sea, the distant as well as the near.

Of the incidents which had taken place in Central Greece during the twelve or fifteen years immediately succeeding the battle of Plataea, we have scarcely any information. The feelings of the time, between those Greeks who had supported and those who had resisted the Persian invader, must have remained unfriendly even after the war was at an end; while the mere occupation of the Persian numerous host must have inflicted severe damage both upon Thessaly and Bœotia. At the meeting of the Amphiktyonic synod

Trial and
acquittal of
Kimon at
Athens.

Great in-
crease of the
Athenian
power.

Proceedings
in Central
Greece be-
tween 470-
464 B.C.
Thebes and
the Bœotian
towns. Dis-
credit of
Thebes.

¹ Plutarch, Kimon, c. 14.

which succeeded the expulsion of the invaders, a reward was proclaimed for the life of the Melian Ephialtēs, who had betrayed to Xerxes the mountain-path over Cēta, and thus caused the ruin of Leonidas at Thermopylæ. Moreover, if we may trust Plutarch, it was even proposed by Lacedæmon that all the *medising* Greeks should be expelled from the synod¹—a proposition which the more long-sighted views of Themistoklēs successfully resisted. Even the stronger measure of razing the fortifications of all the extra-Peloponnesian cities, from fear that they might be used to aid some future invasion, had suggested itself to the Lacedæmonians—as we see from their language on the occasion of rebuilding the walls of Athens. In regard to Bœotia, it appears that the headship of Thebes as well as the coherence of the federation was for the time almost suspended. The destroyed towns of Platæa and Thespiæ were restored, and the latter in part repeopled,² under Athenian influence. The general sentiment of Peloponnesus as well as of Athens would have sustained these towns against Thebes, if the latter had tried at that time to enforce her supremacy over them in the name of “ancient Bœotian right and usage.”³ The Theban government was then in discredit for its previous *medism*—even in the eyes of Thebans themselves;⁴ while the party opposed to Thebes in the other towns was so powerful, that many of them would probably have been severed from the federation to become allies of Athens like Platæa, if the interference of Lacedæmon had not arrested such a tendency. Lacedæmon was in every other part of Greece an enemy to organized aggregation of cities, either equal or unequal, and was constantly bent on keeping the little autonomous communities separate:⁵ whence she sometimes became by accident the protector of the weaker cities against compulsory alliance imposed upon them by the stronger. The interest of her own ascendancy was in

Sparta restores and upholds the supremacy of Thebes over the lesser Bœotian towns.

¹ Plutarch, Themistokl. c. 20.

² See the case of Sikinnus, the person through whom Themistoklēs communicated with Xerxes before the battle of Salamis, and for whom he afterwards procured admission among the batch of newly-introduced citizens at Thespiæ (Herodot. viii. 75).

³ Τὰ τῶν Βοιωτῶν πάτρια—τὰ κοινὰ τῶν πᾶσαν Βοιωτῶν πάτρια (Thucyd. iii. 61-65).

⁴ Thucyd. iii. 62.

⁵ See among many other evidences, the remarkable case of the Olynthian confederacy (Xenophon, Hellen. v. 2, 16).

this respect analogous to that of the Persians when they dictated the peace of Antalkidas—of the Romans in administering their extensive conquests—and of the kings of Mediæval Europe in breaking the authority of the barons over their vassals. But though such was the policy of Sparta elsewhere, her fear of Athens, which grew up during the ensuing twenty years, made her act differently in regard to Bœotia. She had no other means of maintaining that country as her own ally and as the enemy of Athens, except by organising the federation effectively, and strengthening the authority of Thebes. It is to this revolution in Spartan politics that Thebes owed the recovery of her ascendancy¹—a revolution so conspicuously marked, that the Spartans even aided in enlarging her circuit and improving her fortifications. It was not without difficulty that she maintained this position even when recovered, against the dangerous neighbourhood of Athens—a circumstance which made her not only a vehement partisan of Sparta, but even more furiously anti-Athenian than Sparta, down to the close of the Peloponnesian war.

The revolution, just noticed, in Spartan politics towards Bœotia, did not manifest itself until about twenty years after the commencement of the Athenian maritime confederacy. During the course of those twenty years, we know that Sparta had had more than one battle to sustain in Arcadia, against the towns and villages of that country, in which she came forth victorious : but we have no particulars respecting these incidents. We also know that a few years after the Persian invasion, the inhabitants of Elis concentrated themselves from many dispersed townships into the one main city of Elis :² and it seems probable that Lepreum in Triphylia, and one or two of the towns of Achaia, were either formed or enlarged by a similar process near about the same time.³ Such aggregation of towns out of preëxisting separate villages was not conformable to the views, nor favourable to the ascendancy of Lacedæmon. But there can be little doubt that her foreign policy after the Persian invasion was both embarrassed and discredited by the misconduct of her two contemporary kings, Pausanias

Events in
Pelopon-
nesus—Ar-
cadia—Elis,
&c.

¹ Diodor. xi. 81 ; Justin, iii. 6. ² Diodor. xi. 54 ; Strabo, viii. p. 337.

³ Strabo, viii. pp. 337, 348, 356.

(who though only regent was practically equivalent to a king) and Leotychidēs—not to mention the rapid development of Athens and Peiræus.

Moreover, in the year B.C. 464 (the year preceding the surrender of Thasos to the Athenian armament), a misfortune of yet more terrific moment befel Sparta. A violent earthquake took place in the immediate neighbourhood of Sparta itself, destroying a large portion of the town, and a vast number of lives, many of them Spartan citizens. It was the judgement of the earth-shaking god Poseidon (according to the view of the Lacedæmonians themselves) for a recent violation of his sanctuary at Tænarus, from whence certain suppliant Helots had been dragged away not long before for punishment: ¹ not improbably some of those Helots whom Pausanias had instigated to revolt. The sentiment of the Helots, at all times one of enmity towards their masters, appears at this moment to have been unusually inflammable: so that an earthquake at Sparta, especially an earthquake construed as divine vengeance for Helot blood recently spilt, was sufficient to rouse many of them at once into revolt, together with some even of the Periœki. The insurgents took arms and marched directly upon Sparta, which they were on the point of mastering during the first moments of consternation, had not the bravery and presence of mind of the young king Archidamus re-animated the surviving citizens and repelled the attack. But though repelled, the insurgents were not subdued. They maintained the field against the Spartan force, sometimes with considerable advantage, since Acimnêstus (the warrior by whose hand Mardonius had fallen at Plataea) was defeated and slain with 300 followers in the plain of Stenyklêrus, overpowered by superior numbers. ² When at length defeated, they occupied and fortified the memorable hill of Ithômê, the ancient citadel of their Messenian forefathers. Here they made a long and obstinate defence, supporting themselves doubtless by incursions throughout Laconia. Defence indeed was not difficult, seeing that the Lacedæmonians were at that time confessedly incapable of assailing even the most imperfect species of fortification. After the siege had lasted

Terrible
earthquake
at Sparta—
464 B.C.
Revolt of
the Helots.

¹ Thucyd. i. 101-128; Diodor. xi. 62.

² Herodot. ix. 64.

some two or three years, without any prospect of success, the Lacedæmonians, beginning to despair of their own sufficiency for the undertaking, invoked the aid of their various allies, among whom we find specified the Æginetans, the Athenians, and the Platæans.¹ The Athenian troops are said to have consisted of 4000 men, under the command of Kimon; Athens being still included in the list of Lacedæmonian allies.

So imperfect were the means of attacking walls at that day, even for the most intelligent Greeks, that this increased force made no immediate impression on the fortified hill of Ithômê. And when the Lacedæmonians saw that their Athenian allies were not more successful than they had been themselves, they soon passed from surprise into doubt, mistrust, and apprehension. The troops had given no ground for such a feeling, while Kimon their general was notorious for his attachment to Sparta. Yet the Lacedæmonians could not help suspecting the ever-wakeful energy and ambition of these Ionic strangers whom they introduced into the interior of Laconia. Calling to mind their own promise—though doubtless a secret promise—to invade Attica not long before, for the benefit of the Thasians—they even began to fear that the Athenians might turn against them, and listen to solicitations for espousing the cause of the besieged. Under the influence of such apprehensions, they dismissed the Athenian contingent forthwith, on pretence of having no farther occasion for them; while all the other allies were retained, and the siege or blockade went on as before.²

The Lacedæmonians invoke the aid of their allies against the revolted Helots,—March of the Athenians under Kimon into Laconia to aid them.

¹ Thucyd. i. 102; iii. 54; iv. 57.

² Thucyd. i. 102. τὴν μὲν ἐποψίαν οὐ δηλοῦντες, εἰκότες δὲ ὅτι οὐδὲν προσδέονται αὐτῶν ἔτι.

Mr. Fynes Clinton (Fast. Hellen. ann. 464-461 B.C.) following Plutarch, recognises two Lacedæmonian requests to Athens, and two Athenian expeditions to the aid of the Spartans, both under Kimon; the first in 464 B.C., immediately on the happening of the earthquake and consequent revolt—the second in 461 B.C., after the war had lasted some time.

In my judgement, there is no ground for supposing more than one application made to Athens, and one expedition.

The duplication has arisen from Plutarch, who has construed too much as historical reality the comic exaggeration of Aristophanes (Aristoph. Lysistrat. 1138; Plutarch, Kimon, 16). The heroine of the latter, Lysistrata, wishing to make peace between the Lacedæmonians and Athenians, and reminding each of the services which they had received from the other, might permit herself to say to the Lacedæmonians—"Your envoy Perikleidas came to Athens, pale with terror, and put himself as a suppliant at the altar to entreat our help as a matter of life and death, while Poseidon was still shaking the earth and the Messenians were pressing

This dismissal, ungracious in the extreme and probably rendered even more offensive by the habitual roughness of Spartan dealing, excited the strongest exasperation both among the Athenian soldiers and the Athenian people—an exasperation heightened by circumstances immediately preceding. For the resolution to send auxiliaries into Laconia, when the Lacedæmonians first applied for them, had not been taken without considerable debate at Athens. The party of Periklēs and Ephialtēs, habitually in opposition to Kimon, and partisans of the forward democratical movement, had strongly discountenanced it, and conjured their countrymen not to assist in renovating and strengthening their most formidable rival. Perhaps the previous engagement of the Lacedæmonians to invade Attica on behalf of the Thasians may have become known to them, though not so formally as to exclude denial. And even supposing this engagement to have remained unknown at that time to every one, there were not wanting other grounds to render the policy of refusal

Mistrust conceived by the Lacedæmonians of their Athenian auxiliaries, who are dismissed from Laconia. Displeasure and change of policy at Athens.

you hard : then Kimon with 4000 hoplites went and achieved your complete salvation." This is all very telling and forcible, as a portion of the Aristophanic play, but there is no historical truth in it except the fact of an application made and an expedition sent in consequence.

We know that the earthquake took place at the time when the siege of Thasos was yet going on, because it was the reason which prevented the Lacedæmonians from aiding the besieged by an invasion of Attica. But Kimon commanded at the siege of Thasos (Plutarch, Kimon, c. 14), accordingly he could not have gone as commander to Laconia at the time when this first expedition is alleged to have been undertaken.

Next, Thucydides acknowledges no more than one expedition ; nor indeed does Diodorus (xl. 64), though this is of minor consequence. Now mere silence on the part of Thucydides, in reference to the events of a period which he only professes to survey briefly, is not always a very forcible negative argument. But in this case, his account of the expedition of 461 B.C., with its very important consequences, is such as to exclude the supposition that *he knew*

of any prior expedition, two or three years earlier. Had he known of any such, he could not have written the account which now stands in his text. He dwells especially on the prolongation of the war, and on the incapacity of the Lacedæmonians for attacking walls, as the reasons why they invoked the Athenians as well as their other allies : he implies that the presence of the latter in Laconia was a new and threatening incident : moreover, when he tells us how much the Athenians were incensed by their abrupt and mistrustful dismissal, he could not have omitted to notice as an aggravation of this feeling, that only two or three years before, they had rescued Lacedæmon from the brink of ruin. Let us add, that the supposition of Sparta, the first military power in Greece, and distinguished for her unintermitting discipline, being reduced all at once to a condition of such utter helplessness as to owe her safety to foreign intervention—is highly improbable in itself ; inadmissible except on very good evidence.

For the reasons here stated, I reject the first expedition into Laconia mentioned in Plutarch.

plausible. But Kimon—with an earnestness which even the philo-Laconian Kritias afterwards characterised as a sacrifice of the grandeur of Athens to the advantage of Lacedæmon¹—employed all his credit and influence in seconding the application. The maintenance of alliance with Sparta on equal footing—peace among the great powers of Greece and common war against Persia—together with the prevention of all farther democratical changes in Athens—were the leading points of his political creed. As yet, both his personal and political ascendancy were predominant over his opponents. As yet, there was no manifest conflict, which had only just begun to show itself in the case of Thasos, between the maritime power of Athens and the union of land-force under Sparta: and Kimon could still treat both of these phenomena as coexisting necessities of Hellenic well-being. Though noway distinguished as a speaker, he carried with him the Athenian assembly by appealing to a large and generous patriotism, which forbade them to permit the humiliation of Sparta. “Consent not to see Hellas lamed of one leg and Athens drawing without her yoke-fellow;”²—such was his language, as we learn from his friend and companion the Chian poet Ion; and in the lips of Kimon it proved effective. It is a speech of almost melancholy interest, since ninety years passed over before such an appeal was ever again addressed to an Athenian assembly.³ The despatch of the auxiliaries was thus dictated by a generous sentiment, to the disregard of what might seem political prudence. And we may imagine the violent reaction which took place in Athenian feeling, when the Lacedæmonians repaid them by singling out their troops from all the other allies as objects of insulting suspicion. We may imagine the triumph of Periklēs and Ephialtēs, who had opposed the mission—and the vast loss of influence to Kimon, who had brought it about—when Athens received again into her public assembly the hoplites sent back from Ithômê.

Both in the internal constitution, indeed (of which more

¹ Plutarch, Kimon, c. 16.

² Plutarch, Kimon, c. 16. Ὁ δ' Ἴων ἀπομνημονεύει καὶ τὸν λόγον, ᾧ μάλιστα τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἐκίνησε, παρακαλῶν μὴτε τὴν Ἑλλάδα χωλὴν, μὴτε τὴν πόλιν ἔτε-

ρῶσθαι, περιδεῖν γεγενημένην.

³ See Xenophon, Hellenic. vi.—about 372 B.C.—a little before the battle of Leuktra.

presently), and in the external policy, of Athens, the dismissal of these soldiers was pregnant with results. The Athenians immediately passed a formal resolution to renounce the alliance between themselves and Lacedæmon against the Persians. They did more: they looked out for land-enemies of Lacedæmon, with whom to ally themselves.

The Athenians renounce the alliance of Sparta, and contract alliance with Argos. Position of Argos—her conquest of Mykênæ and other towns.

Of these by far the first, both in Hellenic rank and in real power, was Argos. That city, neutral during the Persian invasion, had now recovered the effects of the destructive defeat suffered about thirty years before from the Spartan king Kleomenês. The sons of the ancient citizens had grown to manhood, and the temporary predominance of the Pericœki, acquired in consequence of the ruinous loss of citizens in that defeat, had been again put down. In the neighbourhood of Argos, and dependent upon it, were situated Mykenæ, Tiryns, and Mideæ—small in power and importance, but rich in mythical renown. Disdaining the inglorious example of Argos at the period of danger, these towns had furnished contingents both to Thermopylæ and Platæa, which their powerful neighbour had been unable either to prevent at the time or to avenge afterwards, from fear of the intervention of Lacedæmon. But so soon as the latter was seen to be endangered and occupied at home, with a formidable Messenian revolt, the Argeians availed themselves of the opportunity to attack not only Mykenæ and Tiryns, but also Orneæ, Mideæ, and other semi-dependent towns around them. Several of these were reduced; and the inhabitants, robbed of their autonomy, were incorporated with the domain of Argos: but the Mykenæans, partly from the superior gallantry of their resistance, partly from jealousy of their mythical renown, were either sold as slaves or driven into banishment.¹ Through these victories Argos was now more powerful than ever, and the propositions of alliance made to her by Athens, while strengthening both the two against Lacedæmon, opened to her a new chance of recovering her lost headship in Peloponnesus. The Thessalians became members of this new

¹ Diodor. xi. 65; Strabo, viii. p. 372; Pausan. ii. 16, 17, 25. Diodorus places this incident in 468 B.C.: but as it undoubtedly comes after the earthquake at

Sparta, we must suppose it to have happened about 463 B.C. See Mr. Fynes Clinton, *Fasti Hellenici*, Appendix, 8.

alliance, which was a defensive alliance against Lacedæmon : and hopes were doubtless entertained of drawing in some of the habitual allies of the latter.

The new character which Athens had thus assumed, as a competitor for landed alliances not less than for maritime ascendancy, came opportunely for the protection of the neighbouring town of Megara. It appears that Corinth, perhaps instigated like Argos by the helplessness of the Lacedæmonians, had been making border encroachments on the one side upon Kleônæ—on the other side upon Megara :¹ on which ground the latter, probably despairing of protection from Lacedæmon, renounced the Lacedæmonian connexion, and obtained permission to enrol herself as an ally of Athens.² This was an acquisition of signal value to the Athenians, since it both opened to them the whole range of territory across the outer Isthmus of Corinth to the interior of the Krissæan Gulf, on which the Megarian port of Pêgæ was situated—and placed them in possession of the passes of Mount Geraneia, so that they could arrest the march of a Peloponnesian army over the Isthmus, and protect Attica from invasion. It was moreover of great importance in its effects on Grecian politics : for it was counted as a wrong by Lacedæmon, gave deadly offence to the Corinthians, and lighted up the flames of war between them and Athens ; their allies the Epidaurians and Æginetans taking their part. Though Athens had not yet been guilty of unjust encroachment against any Peloponnesian state, her ambition and energy had inspired universal awe ; while the maritime states in the neighbourhood, such as Corinth, Epidaurus, and Ægina, saw these terror-striking qualities threatening them at their own doors, through her alliance with Argos and Megara. Moreover, it is probable that the ancient feud between the Athenians and Æginetans, though dormant since a little before the Persian invasion, had never been appeased or forgotten : so that the Æginetans, dwelling within sight of Peiræus, were at once best able to appreciate, and most likely to dread, the enormous maritime power now possessed by Athens. Periklês was wont to call Ægina the eyesore of

About 461-460 B.C.
Megara becomes allied with Athens.
Growing hatred of Corinth and the neighbouring Peloponnesian states towards Athens.

¹ Plutarch, Kimon, c. 17.

² Thucyd. i. 103.

Peiræus:¹ but we may be sure that Peiræus, grown into a vast fortified port within the existing generation, was in a much stronger degree the eyesore of Ægina.

The Athenians were at this time actively engaged in prosecuting the war against Persia, having a fleet of no less than two hundred sail, equipped by or from the confederacy collectively, now serving in Cyprus and on the Phœnician coast. Moreover the revolt of the Egyptians under Inaros (about 460 B.C.) opened to them new means of action against the Great King. Their fleet, by invitation of the revolters, sailed up the Nile to Memphis, where there seemed at first a good prospect of throwing off the Persian dominion. Yet in spite of so great an abstraction from their disposable force, their military operations near home were conducted with unabated vigour: and the inscription which remains—a commemoration of their citizens of the Erechtheid tribe who were slain in one and the same year in Cyprus, Egypt, Phœnicia, the Halieis, Ægina, and Megara—brings forcibly before us that energy which astonished and even alarmed their contemporaries.

Energetic simultaneous action of the Athenians—in Cyprus, Phœnicia, Egypt, and Greece.—They build the first "Long Wall" from Megara to Nisæa.

Their first proceedings at Megara were of a nature altogether novel, in the existing condition of Greece. It was necessary for the Athenians to protect their new ally against the superiority of Peloponnesian land-force, and to ensure a constant communication with it by sea. But the city (like most of the ancient Hellenic towns) was situated on a hill at some distance from the sea, separated from its port Nisæa by a space of nearly one mile. One of the earliest proceedings of the Athenians was to build two lines of wall, near and parallel to each other, connecting the city with Nisæa; so that the two thus formed one continuous fortress, wherein a standing Athenian garrison was maintained, with the constant means of succour from Athens in case of need. These "Long Walls," though afterwards copied in other places and on a larger scale, were at that juncture an ingenious invention, for the purpose of extending the maritime arm of Athens to an inland city.

The first operations of Corinth however were not directed

¹ Plutarch, Periklēs, c. 8.

against Megara. The Athenians, having undertaken a landing in the territory of the Halieis (the population of the southern Argolic peninsula, bordering on Trœzen and Hermionê), were defeated on land by the Corinthian and Epidaurian forces, possibly it may have been in this expedition that they acquired possession of Trœzen, which we find afterwards in their dependance, without knowing when it became so. But in a sea-fight which took place off the island of Kekryphaleia (between Ægina and the Argolic peninsula) the Athenians gained the victory. After this victory and defeat,—neither of them apparently very decisive,—the Æginetans began to take a more energetic part in the war, and brought out their full naval force together with that of their allies—Corinthians, Epidaurians, and other Peloponnesians; while Athens equipped a fleet of corresponding magnitude, summoning her allies also; though we do not know the actual numbers on either side. In the great naval battle which ensued off the island of Ægina, the superiority of the new nautical tactics acquired by twenty years' practice of the Athenians since the Persian war—over the old Hellenic ships and seamen, as shown in those states where at the time of the battle of Marathon the maritime strength of Greece had resided—was demonstrated by a victory most complete and decisive. The Peloponnesian and Dorian seamen had as yet had no experience of the improved seacraft of Athens, and when we find how much they were disconcerted with it even twenty-eight years afterwards at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, we shall not wonder at its destructive effect upon them in this early battle. The maritime power of Ægina was irrecoverably ruined. The Athenians captured seventy ships of war, landed a large force upon the island, and commenced the siege of the city by land as well as by sea.¹

If the Lacedæmonians had not been occupied at home by the blockade of Ithômê, they would have been probably induced to invade Attica as a diversion to the Æginetans; especially as the Persian Megabazus came to Sparta at this time on the part of Artaxerxes to prevail upon them to do so, in order that the Athenians might be constrained to retire

¹ Thucyd. i. 105; Lysias, Orat. Funer. c. 10; Diodor. xi. 78.

from Egypt. This Persian brought with him a large sum of money, but was nevertheless obliged to return without effecting his mission.¹ The Corinthians and Epidaurians however, while they carried to Ægina a reinforcement of 300 hoplites, did their best to aid her farther by an attack upon Megara; which place, it was supposed, the Athenians could not possibly relieve without withdrawing their forces from Ægina, inasmuch as so many of their men were at the same time serving in Egypt. But the Athenians showed themselves equal to all these three exigencies at one and the same time—to the great disappointment of their enemies. Myrônides marched from Athens to Megara at the head of the citizens in the two extremes of military age, old and young; these being the only troops at home. He fought the Corinthians near the town, gaining a slight, but debateable, advantage, which he commemorated by a trophy, as soon as the Corinthians had returned home. But the latter, when they arrived at home, were so much reproached by their own old citizens, for not having vanquished the refuse of the Athenian military force,² that they returned back at the end of twelve days and erected a trophy on their side, laying claim to a victory in the past battle. The Athenians, marching out of Megara, attacked them a second time, and gained on this occasion a decisive victory. The defeated Corinthians were still more unfortunate in their retreat; for a body of them, missing their road, became entangled in a space of private ground enclosed on every side by a deep ditch, and having only one narrow entrance. Myrônides, detecting this fatal mistake, planted his hoplites at the entrance to prevent their escape, and then surrounded the enclosure with his light-armed troops, who with their missile weapons slew all the Corinthian hoplites, without possibility either of flight or resistance. The bulk of the Corinthian army effected their retreat, but the destruction of this detachment was a sad blow to the city.³

The Athenians besiege Ægina. The Corinthians, Epidaurians, &c. attack—are defeated by the Athenians under Myrônides.

¹ Thucyd. i. 109.

² Lysias, Orat. Funebr. c. 10. *ἐνίκων μαχόμενοι ἀπασαν τὴν δύναμιν τὴν ἐκείνων τοῖς ῥῆθι ἀπειρηκόσι καὶ τοῖς οὐκ ἀναμείνους, &c.*

The incident mentioned by Thucydides about the Corinthians, that the

old men of their own city were so indignant against them on their return, is highly characteristic of Grecian manners—*κακισόμενοι ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει πρεσβυτέρων, &c.*

³ Thucyd. i. 106. *πῶθος μέγα τοῦτο Κορινθίους ἐγένετο.* Compare Diodor.

458-457 B.C.
The Long
Walls be-
tween
Athens and
Peiræus are
projected—
espoused by
Periklēs, op-
posed by
Kimon—
political con-
tentions at
Athens—im-
portance of
the Long
Walls.

Splendid as the success of the Athenians had been during this year, both on land and at sea, it was easy for them to foresee that the power of their enemies would presently be augmented by the Lacedæmonians taking the field. Partly on this account—partly also from the more energetic phase of democracy, and the long-sighted views of Periklēs, which were now becoming ascendent in the city—the Athenians began the stupendous undertaking of connecting Athens with the sea by means of long walls. The idea of this measure had doubtless been first suggested by the recent erection of long walls, though for so much smaller a distance, between Megara and Nisæa: for without such an intermediate stepping-stone, the project of a wall forty stadia (= about $4\frac{1}{2}$ Engl. miles) to join Athens with Peiræus, and another wall of thirty-five stadia (= nearly 4 Engl. miles) to join it with Phalêrum, would have appeared extravagant even to the sanguine temper of Athenians—as it certainly would have seemed a few years earlier to Themistoklēs himself. Coming as an immediate sequel of great recent victories, and while Ægina, the great Dorian naval power, was prostrate and under blockade, it excited the utmost alarm among the Peloponnesians—being regarded as the second great stride,¹ at once conspicuous and of lasting effect, in Athenian ambition, next to the fortification of Peiræus.

But besides this feeling in the bosom of enemies, the measure was also interwoven with the formidable contention of political parties then going on at Athens. Kimon had been recently ostracised; and the democratical movement pressed by Periklēs and Ephialtēs (of which more presently) was in its full tide of success; yet not without a violent and unprincipled opposition on the part of those who supported the existing constitution. Now the long walls formed a part of the foreign policy of Periklēs, continuing on a gigantic scale the plans of Themistoklēs when he first schemed the Peiræus.

xi. 78, 79—whose chronology however is very misleading.

¹ Καὶ τῶνδε ὁμοῖς αἴτιοι, τὸ τε πρῶτον ἰδόντες αὐτοὺς τὴν πόλιν μετὰ τὰ Μηδικὰ κρατῆναι, καὶ ὕστερον τὰ μακρὰ στήσαι.

τελῆ—*τελῆ*—is the language addressed by the Corinthians to the Spartans, in reference to Athens, a little before the Peloponnesian war (Thucyd. i. 69).

They were framed to render Athens capable of carrying on war against any superiority of landed attack, and of bidding defiance to the united force of Peloponnesus. But though thus calculated for contingencies which a long-sighted man might see gathering in the distance, the new walls were, almost on the same grounds, obnoxious to a considerable number of Athenians: to the party recently headed by Kimon, who were attached to the Lacedæmonian connexion, and desired above all things to maintain peace at home, reserving the energies of the state for anti-Persian enterprise: to many landed proprietors in Attica, whom they seemed to threaten with approaching invasion and destruction of their territorial possessions: to the rich men and aristocrats of Athens, averse to a still closer contact and amalgamation with the maritime multitude in Peiræus: lastly, perhaps, to a certain vein of old Attic feeling, which might look upon the junction of Athens with the separate demes of Peiræus and Phalærum as effacing the special associations connected with the holy rock of Athênê. When to all these grounds of opposition, we add, the expense and trouble of the undertaking itself, the interference with private property, the peculiar violence of party which happened then to be raging, and the absence of a large proportion of military citizens in Egypt—we shall hardly be surprised to find that the projected long walls brought on a risk of the most serious character both for Athens and her democracy. If any farther proof were wanting of the vast importance of these long walls, in the eyes both of friends and of enemies, we might find it in the fact that their destruction was the prominent mark of Athenian humiliation after the battle of Ægospotami, and their restoration the immediate boon of Pharnabazus and Konon after the victory of Knidus.

Under the influence of the alarm now spread by the proceedings of Athens, the Lacedæmonians were prevailed upon to undertake an expedition out of Peloponnesus, although the Helots in Ithômê were not yet reduced to surrender. Their force consisted of 1500 troops of their own, and 10,000 of their various allies, under the regent Nikomêdês. The ostensible motive, or the pretence, for this march, was the protection of the

Expedition
of the Lacedæmonians
into Boeotia
—they re-
store the
ascendency
of Thebes.

little territory of Doris against the Phokians, who had recently invaded it and taken one of its three towns. The mere approach of so large a force immediately compelled the Phokians to relinquish their conquest, but it was soon seen that this was only a small part of the objects of Sparta, and that her main purpose, under instigation of the Corinthians, was, to arrest the aggrandisement of Athens. It could not escape the penetration of Corinth, that the Athenians might presently either enlist or constrain the towns of Bœotia into their alliance, as they had recently acquired Megara, in addition to their previous ally Platæa : for the Bœotian federation was at this time much disorganized, and Thebes, its chief, had never recovered her ascendancy since the discredit of her support lent to the Persian invasion. To strengthen Thebes and to render her ascendancy effective over the Bœotian cities, was the best way of providing a neighbour at once powerful and hostile to the Athenians, so as to prevent their farther aggrandisement by land : it was the same policy as Epaminondas pursued eighty years afterwards, in organizing Arcadia and Messenê against Sparta. Accordingly the Peloponnesian force was now employed partly in enlarging and strengthening the fortifications of Thebes herself, partly in constraining the other Bœotian cities into effective obedience to her supremacy ; probably by placing their governments in the hands of citizens of known oligarchical politics,¹ and perhaps banishing suspected opponents. To this scheme the Thebans lent themselves with earnestness ; promising to keep down for the future their border neighbours, so as to spare the necessity of armies coming from Sparta.²

But there was also a farther design, yet more important, in contemplation by the Spartans and Corinthians. The oligarchical opposition at Athens were so bitterly hostile to the Long Walls, to Periklês, and to the democratical movement, that several of them opened a secret negociation with the Peloponnesian leaders, inviting them into Attica, and en-

¹ Diodor. xii. 81 ; Justin, iii. 6. Τῆς μὲν τῶν Θηβαίων πόλεως μείζονα τὴν περίβολον κατεσκεύασαν, τὰς δ' ἐν Βοιωτίᾳ πόλεις ἠνάγκασαν ὑποτάττεσθαι τοῖς Θηβαίοις.

² Diodor. l. c. It must probably be

to the internal affairs of Bœotia, somewhere about this time, full as they were of internal dissension, that the dictum and simile of Periklês allude—which Aristotle notices in his Rhetoric. iii. 4, 2.

treating their aid in an internal rising for the purpose not only of putting a stop to the Long Walls, but also of subverting the democracy. The Peloponnesian army, while prosecuting its operations in Bœotia, waited in hopes of seeing the Athenian malcontents in arms, and encamped at Tanagra on the very borders of Attica for the purpose of immediate cooperation with them. The juncture was undoubtedly one of much hazard for Athens, especially as the ostracised Kimon and his remaining friends in the city were suspected of being implicated in the conspiracy. But the Athenian leaders, aware of the Lacedæmonian operations in Bœotia, knew also what was meant by the presence of the army on their immediate borders—and took decisive measures to avert the danger. Having obtained a reinforcement of 1000 Argians and some Thessalian horse, they marched out to Tanagra, with the full Athenian force then at home; which must of course have consisted chiefly of the old and the young, the same who had fought under Myrônidēs at Megara; for the blockade of Ægina was still going on. Nor was it possible for the Lacedæmonian army to return into Peloponnesus without fighting; for the Athenians, masters of the Megarid, were in possession of the difficult high lands of Geraneia, the road of march along the isthmus; while the Athenian fleet, by means of the harbour of Pêgæ, was prepared to intercept them if they tried to come by sea across the Krissæan Gulf, by which way it would appear that they had come out. Near Tanagra a bloody battle took place between the two armies, wherein the Lacedæmonians were victorious, chiefly from the desertion of the Thessalian horse who passed over to them in the very heat of the engagement.¹ But though the advantage was on their side, it was not sufficiently decisive to favour the contemplated rising in Attica. Nor did the Peloponnesians gain anything by it except an undisturbed retreat over the high lands of Geraneia, after having partially ravaged the Megarid.

Though the battle of Tanagra was a defeat, yet there were circumstances connected with it which rendered its effects highly beneficial to Athens. The ostracised Kimon presented himself on the field, as soon as the army had passed over the

Intention of the Spartan army in Bœotia to threaten Athens, and sustain the Athenian oligarchical party, opposed to the Long Walls.

Battle of Tanagra—defeat of the Athenians.

¹ Thucyd. i. 107.

boundaries of Attica, requesting to be allowed to occupy his station as a hoplite, and fight in the ranks of his tribe—the Cēnēis. But such was the belief, entertained by the members of the senate and by his political enemies present, that he was an accomplice in the conspiracy known to be on foot, that permission was refused, and he was forced to retire. In departing he conjured his personal friends, Euthippus (of the deme Anaphlystus) and others, to behave in such a manner as might wipe away the stain resting upon his fidelity, and in part also upon theirs. His friends retained his panoply and assigned to it the station in the ranks which he would himself have occupied: they then entered the engagement with desperate resolution and one hundred of them fell side by side in their ranks. Periklēs, on his part, who was present among the hoplites of his own tribe the Akamantis, aware of this application and repulse of Kimon, thought it incumbent upon him to display not merely his ordinary personal courage, but an unusual recklessness of life and safety, though it happened that he escaped unwounded. All these incidents brought about a generous sympathy and spirit of compromise among the contending parties at Athens; while the unshaken patriotism of Kimon and his friends discountenanced and disarmed those conspirators who had entered into correspondence with the enemy, at the same time that it roused a repentant admiration towards the ostracised leader himself. Such was the happy working of this new sentiment that a decree was shortly proposed and carried—proposed too by Periklēs himself—to abridge the ten years of Kimon's ostracism, and permit his immediate return.¹ We may recollect that under circumstances partly analogous, Themistoklēs had himself proposed the restoration of his rival Aristeidēs from ostracism, a little before the battle

Effects of the battle—generous behaviour of Kimon—he is recalled from ostracism.

Compromise and reconciliation between the rival leaders and parties at Athens.

¹ Plutarch, Kimon, c. 14; Periklēs, c. 10. Plutarch represents the Athenians as having recalled Kimon from fear of the Lacedæmonians who had just beaten them at Tanagra, and for the purpose of procuring peace. He adds that Kimon obtained peace for them forthwith. Both these assertions are incorrect. The extraordinary suc-

cesses in Bœotia, which followed so quickly after the defeat at Tanagra, show that the Athenians were under no impressions of fear at that juncture, and that the recall of Kimon proceeded from quite different feelings. Moreover the peace with Sparta was not made till some years afterwards.

of Salamis,¹ and in both cases, the suspension of enmity between the two leaders was partly the sign, partly also the auxiliary cause, of reconciliation and renewed fraternity among the general body of citizens. It was a moment analogous to that salutary impulse of compromise, and harmony of parties, which followed the extinction of the Oligarchy of Four Hundred, forty-six years afterwards, and on which Thucydides dwells emphatically as the salvation of Athens in her distress—a moment rare in free communities generally, not less than among the jealous competitors for political ascendancy at Athens.²

So powerful was this burst of fresh patriotism and unanimity after the battle of Tanagra, which produced the recall of Kimon and appears to have overlaid the pre-existing conspiracy, that the Athenians were quickly in a condition to wipe off the stain of their defeat. It was on the sixty-second

¹ Plutarch, Themistoklēs, c. 10.

² Plutarch, Kimon, c. 17; Periklēs, c. 10; Thucyd. viii. 97. Plutarch observes, respecting this reconciliation of parties after the battle of Tanagra, after having mentioned that Periklēs himself proposed the restoration of Kimon—

Οὕτω τότε πολιτικά μιν ἦσαν αἱ διαφοραὶ, μέτριοι δὲ οἱ θυμοὶ καὶ πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν εὐανάκλητοι σύμφερον, ἣ δὲ φιλοτιμία πάντων ἐπικρατοῦσα τῶν παθῶν τοῖς τῆς πατρίδος ὑπεχώρει καίροις.

Which remarks are very analogous to those of Thucydides in recounting the memorable proceedings of the year 411 B.C., after the deposition of the oligarchy of Four Hundred (Thucyd. viii. 97).

Καὶ οὐχ ἥκιστα δὴ τὸν πρῶτον χρόνον ἐπὶ γε ἡμῶν Ἀθηναῖοι φαίνονται εὖ πολιτεύσαντες· μετρία γὰρ ἦ τε ἐς τοὺς ὀλίγους καὶ τοὺς πολλοὺς ξυγκρασις ἐγένετο, καὶ ἐκ ποτῶν τῶν πραγμάτων γενομένων τοῦτο πρῶτον ἀνήνεγκε τὴν πόλιν. Dr. Arnold says in his note—"It appears that the constitution as now fixed was at first, in the opinion of Thucydides, the best that Athens had ever enjoyed within his memory; that is, the best since the complete ascendancy of the democracy effected under Periklēs. But how long a period is meant to be included by the words τὸν πρῶτον χρόνον, and when and how did the implied change take place? Τὸν πρῶτον χρόνον can hardly apply to the whole remaining term of the war, as if this improved

constitution had been first subverted by the triumph of the oligarchy under the Thirty, and then superseded by the restoration of the old democracy after their overthrow. Yet Xenophon mentions no intermediate change in the government between the beginning of his history and the end of the war," &c.

I think that the words εὖ πολιτεύσαντες are understood by Dr. Arnold in a sense too special and limited—as denoting merely the new constitution, or positive organic enactments, which the Athenians now introduced. It appears to me that the words are of wider import; meaning the general temper of political parties both reciprocally towards each other and towards the commonwealth; their inclination to relinquish antipathies to accommodate points of difference, and to co-operate with each other heartily against the enemy, suspending those *ιδίαι φιλοτιμίας, ιδίας διαβολὰς περὶ τῆς τοῦ δήμου προστασίας* (ii. 65) noticed as having been so mischievous before. Of course any constitutional arrangements introduced at such a period would partake of the moderate and harmonious spirit then prevalent, and would therefore form a part of what is commended by Thucydides: but his commendation is not confined to them specially. Compare the phrase ii. 38. *ἐλευθέρως δὲ τὰ τε πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν πολιτεύμεν*, &c.

day after the battle that they undertook an aggressive march under Myrônidês into Bœotia : the extreme precision of this date—being the single case throughout the summary of events between the Persian and Peloponnesian wars wherein Thucydidês is thus precise—marks how strong an impression it made upon the memory of the Athenians. At the battle of Cœnophyta, engaged against the aggregate Theban and Bœotian forces—or, if Diodorus is to be trusted, in two battles, of which that of Cœnophyta was the last—Myrônidês was completely victorious. The Athenians became masters of Thebes as well as of the remaining Bœotian towns : reversing all the arrangements recently made by Sparta—establishing democratical governments—and forcing the aristocratical leaders, favourable to Theban ascendancy and Lacedæmonian connexion, to become exiles. Nor was it only Bœotia which the Athenians thus acquired : Phokis and Lokris were both successively added to the list of their dependent allies—the former being in the main friendly to Athens and not disinclined to the change, while the latter were so decidedly hostile that one hundred of their chiefs were detained and sent to Athens as hostages. The Athenians thus extended their influence—maintained through internal party-management, backed by the dread of interference from without in case of need—from the borders of the Corinthian territory, including both Megara and Pêgæ, to the strait of Thermopylæ.¹

These important acquisitions were soon crowned by the completion of the Long Walls and the conquest of Ægina. That island, doubtless starved out by its protracted blockade, was forced to capitulate on condition of destroying its fortifications, surrendering all its ships of war, and submitting to annual tribute as a dependent ally of Athens. The reduction of this once powerful maritime city marked Athens as mistress of the sea on the Peloponnesian coast not less than on the Ægean. Her admiral Tolmidês displayed her strength by sailing round Peloponnesus, and even by the insult of burning the Lacedæmonian ports of Methônê and of Gythium. He took Chalkis, a possession of the Corinthians, and Naupaktus

B.C. 456.
Victory of
Cœnophyta
gained by
the Athe-
nians—they
acquire as-
cendancy
over all
Bœotia,
Phokis, and
Lokris.

B.C. 455.
Completion
of the Long
Walls—
conquest of
Ægina,
which is dis-
armed, dis-
mantled, and
rendered
tributary.

¹ Thucyd. i. 108 ; Diodor. xi. 81, 82.

belonging to the Ozolian Lokrians, near the mouth of the Corinthian Gulf—disembarked troops near Sikyon, with some advantage in a battle against opponents from that town—and either gained or forced into the Athenian alliance not only Zakynthos and Kephallēnia, but also some of the towns of Achaia; for we afterwards find these latter attached to Athens without knowing when the connexion began.¹ During the ensuing year the Athenians renewed their attack upon Sikyon, with a force of 1000 hoplites under Periklēs himself, sailing from the Megarian harbour of Pêgæ in the Krissæan Gulf. This eminent man, however, gained no greater advantage than Tolmidēs—defeating the Sikyonian forces in the field and driving them within their walls. He afterwards made an expedition into Akarnania, taking the Achæan allies in addition to his own forces, but miscarried in his attack on Cēniadæ and accomplished nothing. Nor were the Athenians more successful in a march undertaken this same year against Thessaly, for the purpose of restoring Orestes, one of the exiled princes or nobles of Pharsalus. Though they took with them an imposing force, including their Bœotian and Phokian allies, the powerful Thessalian cavalry forced them to keep in a compact body and confined them to the ground actually occupied by their hoplites: while all their attempts against the city failed, and their hopes of internal rising were disappointed.²

The Athenians first sail round Peloponnesus—their operations in the Gulf of Corinth.

B.C. 454.

Had the Athenians succeeded in Thessaly, they would have acquired to their alliance nearly the whole of extra-Peloponnesian Greece. But even without Thessaly their power was prodigious, and had now attained a maximum height from which it never varied except to decline. As a counterbalancing loss against so many successes, we have to reckon their ruinous defeat in Egypt, after a war of six years against the Persians (B.C. 460-455). At first they had gained brilliant advantages, in conjunction with the insurgent prince Inarōs; expelling the Persians from all Memphis except the strongest part called the White Fortress. And such was the alarm of the Persian king Artaxerxes at the presence of the Athenians in Egypt, that he sent Mega-

Defeat and losses of the Athenians in Egypt.

¹ Thucyd. i. 108-115; Diodor. xi. 84.

² Thucyd. i. 111; Diodor. xi. 85.

bazus with a large sum of money to Sparta, in order to induce the Lacedæmonians to invade Attica. This envoy however failed, and an augmented Persian force, being sent to Egypt under Megabyzus, son of Zopyrus,¹ drove the Athenians and their allies, after an obstinate struggle, out of Memphis into the island of the Nile called Prosôpitis. Here they were blocked up for eighteen months, until at length Megabyzus turned the arm of the river, laid the channel dry, and stormed the island by land. A very few Athenians escaped by land to Kyrênê: the rest were either slain or made captive, and Inarôs himself was crucified. And the calamity of Athens was farther aggravated by the arrival of fifty fresh Athenian ships, which, coming after the defeat, but without being aware of it, sailed into the Mendesian branch of the Nile, and thus fell unawares into the power of the Persians and Phœnicians, very few either of the ships or men escaping. The whole of Egypt became again subject to the Persians, except Amyrtæus, who contrived by retiring into the inaccessible fens still to maintain his independence. One of the largest armaments ever sent forth by Athens and her confederacy was thus utterly ruined.²

It was about the time of the destruction of the Athenian army in Egypt, and of the circumnavigation of Peloponnesus by Tolmidês, that the internal war, carried on by the Lacedæmonians against the Helots or Messenians at Ithômê, ended. These besieged men, no longer able to stand out against a protracted blockade, were forced to abandon this last fortress of ancient Messenian independence, stipulating for a safe retreat from Peloponnesus with their wives and families; with the proviso that if any one of them ever returned to Peloponnesus, he should become the slave of the first person who seized him. They were established by Tolmidês at Naupaktus (recently taken by the Athenians from the Ozolian Lokrians),³ where they will be found rendering good service to Athens in the following wars.

B.C. 455.
The revolted
Helots in
Laconia
capitulate
and leave
the country.

¹ Herodot. iii. 160.

² Thucyd. i. 104, 109, 110; Diodor. xi. 77; xii. 3. The story of Diodorus in the first of these two passages—that most of the Athenian forces were allowed to come back under a favourable capitulation granted by the Persian generals—is contradicted by the total ruin which he himself states to have befallen them in the latter passages, as well as by Thucydides.

³ Thucyd. i. 103; Diodor. xi. 84.

After the victory of Tanagra, the Lacedæmonians made no farther expeditions out of Peloponnesus for several succeeding years, not even to prevent Bœotia and Phokis from being absorbed into the Athenian alliance. The reason of this remissness lay, partly, in their general character; partly, in the continuance of the siege of Ithômê, which occupied them at home; but still more, perhaps, in the fact that the Athenians, masters of the Megarid, were in occupation of the road over the high lands of Geraneia, and could therefore obstruct the march of any army out from Peloponnesus. Even after the surrender of Ithômê, the Lacedæmonians remained inactive for three years, after which time a formal truce was concluded with Athens by the Peloponnesians generally, for five years longer.¹ This truce was concluded in a great degree through the influence of Kimon,² who was eager to resume effective operations against the Persians; while it was not less suitable to the political interest of Periklês that his most distinguished rival should be absent on foreign service,³ so as not to interfere with his influence at home. Accordingly Kimon, having equipped a fleet of 200 triremes from Athens and her confederates, set

Truce for five years concluded between Athens and the Lacedæmonians, through the influence of Kimon. Fresh expeditions of Kimon against Persia.

B.C. 455-452.

B.C. 452-447.

¹ Thucyd. i. 112.

² Theopompus, *Fragm.* 92, ed. Didot; Plutarch, *Kimon*, c. 18; Diodor. xi. 86.

It is to be presumed that this is the peace which Æschinês (De Fals. Legat. c. 54, p. 300) and Andokidês (De Pace, c. 1) state to have been made by Miltiadês son of Kimon, proxenus of the Lacedæmonians; assuming that Miltiadês son of Kimon is put by them, through lapse of memory, for Kimon son of Miltiadês. But the passages of these orators involve so much both of historical and chronological inaccuracy, that it is unsafe to cite them, and impossible to amend them except by conjecture. Mr. Fynes Clinton (*Fasts Hellen.* Appendix, 8, p. 257) has pointed out some of these inaccuracies; and there are others besides, not less grave, especially in the oration ascribed to Andokidês. It is remarkable that both of them seem to recognise only *two* long walls, the northern and the southern wall; whereas in the time of Thucydidês there were *three* long walls:

the two near and parallel, connecting Athens with Peiræus, and a third connecting it with Phalêrum. This last was never renewed, after all of them had been partially destroyed at the disastrous close of the Peloponnesian war; and it appears to have passed out of the recollection of Æschinês, who speaks of the two walls as they existed in his time.

³ Plutarch, *Periklês*, c. 10, and *Reipublic. Gerend. Præcep.* p. 812.

An understanding to this effect between the two rivals is so natural that we need not resort to the supposition of a secret agreement concluded between them through the mediation of Elpinikê sister of Kimon, which Plutarch had read in some authors. The charms as well as the intrigues of Elpinikê appear to have figured conspicuously in the memoirs of Athenian biographers; they were employed by one party as a means of calumniating Kimon, by the other for discrediting Periklês.

sail for Cyprus, from whence he despatched sixty ships to Egypt, at the request of the insurgent prince Amyrtæus, who was still maintaining himself against the Persians amidst the fens—while with the remaining armament he laid siege to Kitium. In the prosecution of this siege, he died either of disease or of a wound. The armament, under his successor, Anaxikratês, became so embarrassed for want of provisions that they abandoned the undertaking altogether, and went to fight the Phœnician and Kilikian fleet near Salamis in Cyprus. They were here victorious, first on sea and afterwards on land, though probably not on the same day, as at the Eurymedon; after which they returned home, followed by the sixty ships which had gone to Egypt for the purpose of aiding Amyrtæus.¹

Death of
Kimon at
Cyprus—
victories of
the Athenian
fleet—it re-
turns home.

From this time forward no farther operations were undertaken by Athens and her confederacy against the Persians. And it appears that a convention was concluded between them, whereby the Great King on his part promised two things: To leave free, undisturbed, and untaxed, the Asiatic maritime Greeks, not sending troops within a given distance of the coast: To refrain from sending any ships of war either westward of Phasêlis (others place the boundary at the Chelidonean islands, rather more to the westward) or within the Kyanean rocks at the confluence of the Thracian Bosphorus with the Euxine. On their side the Athenians agreed to leave him in undisturbed possession of Cyprus and Egypt. Kallias, an Athenian of distinguished family, with some others of his countrymen, went up to Susa to negotiate this convention, and certain envoys from Argos, then in alliance with Athens, took the opportunity of going thither at the same time, to renew the friendly understanding which their city had established with Xerxes at the period of his invasion of Greece.²

No farther
expeditions
of the Athe-
nians against
Persia—
convention
concluded
between
them.

¹ Thucyd. i. 112; Diodorus, xii. 13. Diodorus mentions the name of the general Anaxikratês. He affirms farther that Kimon lived not only to take Kitium and Mallus, but also to gain these two victories. But the authority of Thucydides, superior on every ground to Diodorus, is more particularly superior as to the death of Kimon, with whom he was connected by relationship.

² Herodot. vii. 151; Diodor. xii. 3, 4; Demosthenês (De Falsa Legat. c. 77, p. 428 R.: compare De Rhodior. Libert. c. 13, p. 199) speaks of this peace as τὴν ὑπὸ πάντων θρυλλουμένην εἰρήνην. Compare Lykurgus cont. Leokrat. c. 17, p. 187; Isokratês (Panegyri. c. 33, 34, p. 244; Areopagitici. c. 37, pp. 150, 229; Panathenæic. c. 20, p. 360).

As is generally the case with treaties after hostility—this convention did little more than recognise the existing state of things, without introducing any new advantage or disadvantage on either side, or calling for any measures to be taken in consequence of it. We may hence assign a reasonable ground for the silence of Thucydides, who does not even notice the convention as having been made: we are to recollect always that in the interval between the Persian and Peloponnesian wars, he does not profess to do more than glance briefly at the main events. But the boastful and inaccurate authors of the ensuing century, orators, rhetors, and historians, indulged in so much exaggeration and untruth respecting this convention, both as to date and as to details—and extolled as something so glorious the fact of having imposed such hard conditions on the Great King—that they have raised a suspicion against themselves. Especially, they have occasioned critics to ask the very natural question, how this splendid achievement of Athens came to be left unnoticed by Thucydides? Now the answer to such question is, that the treaty itself was really of no great moment: it is the state of facts and relations implied in the treaty, and existing substantially before it was concluded, which constitutes the real glory of Athens. But to the later writers, the treaty stood forth as the legible evidence of facts which in their time were past and gone: while Thucydides and his contemporaries, living in the actual fulness of the Athenian empire, would certainly not appeal to the treaty as an evidence, and might well pass it over even as an event, when studying to condense the narrative. Though Thucydides has not mentioned the treaty, he says nothing which disproves its reality, and much which is in full harmony with it. For we may

Mistakes and exaggerations respecting this convention—doubts raised as to its historical reality. Discussion of those doubts—confirmatory hints of Thucydides.

The loose language of these orators makes it impossible to determine what was the precise limit in respect of vicinity to the coast. Isokrates is careless enough to talk of the river Halys as the boundary; Demosthenes states it as "a day's course for a horse."

The two boundaries marked by sea, on the other hand, are both clear and natural, in reference to the Athenian empire—the Kyanean rocks at one end

—Phaselis or the Chelidonean islands (there is no material distance between these two last-mentioned places) on the other.

Dahlmann, at the end of his Dissertation on the reality of this Kimonian peace, collects the various passages of authors wherein it is mentioned: among them are several out of the rhetor Aristides (Forschungen, p. 140-148).

show even from him,—1. That all open and direct hostilities between Athens and Persia ceased, after the last mentioned victories of the Athenians near Cyprus: that this island is renounced by Athens, not being included by Thucydides in his catalogue of Athenian allies prior to the Peloponnesian war;¹ and that no farther aid is given by Athens to the revolted Amyrtæus in Egypt. 2. That down to the time when the Athenian power was prostrated by the ruinous failure at Syracuse, no tribute was collected by the Persian satraps in Asia Minor from the Greek cities on the coast, nor were Persian ships of war allowed to appear in the waters of the Ægean,² nor was the Persian king admitted to be sove-

¹ Thucyd. ii. 14.

² Thucyd. viii. 5, 6, 56. As this is a point on which very erroneous representations have been made by some learned critics, especially by Dahlmann and Manso (see the treatises cited in the subsequent note, p. 426), I transcribe the passage of Thucydides. He is speaking of the winter of B.C. 412, immediately succeeding the ruin of the Athenian army at Syracuse, and after redoubled exertions had been making (even some months before that ruin actually took place) to excite active hostile proceedings against Athens from every quarter (Thucyd. vii. 25): it being seen that there was a promising opportunity for striking a heavy blow at the Athenian power. The satrap Tissaphernes encouraged the Chians and Erythræans to revolt, sending an envoy along with them to Sparta with persuasions and promises of aid—*ἐπήγετο καὶ ὁ Τισσαφέρνης τοὺς Πελοποννησίους καὶ ὑπισχνεῖτο τροφήν παρέχειν*. "Τὰς βασιλείας γὰρ νεωστὶ ἐτύγχανε πεπραγμένους τοὺς ἐκ τῆς αὐτοῦ ἀρχῆς φόρους, οὓς δὲ Ἀθηναίους ἀπὸ τῶν Ἑλληνίδων πόλεων οὐ δυνάμενος πρόσσεσθαι ἐπωφείλησε. Τοὺς τε οὖν φόρους μᾶλλον ἐνόμιζε κομείσθαι, κακώσας τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, καὶ ὅσα βασιλεῖ ξυμμάχους Λακεδαιμονίους ποιήσειν, &c. In the next chapter, Thucydides tells us that the satrap Pharnabazus wanted to obtain Lacedæmonian aid in the same manner as Tissaphernes for his satrapy also, in order that he might detach the Greek cities from Athens and be able to levy the tribute upon them. Two Greeks go to Sparta, sent by Pharnabazus, *ὅπως αὐτὸς κομίσαιεν ἐς τὸν Ἑλλησπυντον, καὶ*

αὐτοὺς, εἰ δύναιτο ἔπειτα ὁ Τισσαφέρνης προῦθμεῖτο, τὰς τε ἐν τῇ αὐτοῦ ἀρχῇ πόλεις Ἀθηναίων ἀποστήσει διὰ τοῦς φόρους, καὶ ἂν αὐτοῦ βασιλεῖ τὴν ξυμμαχίαν τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων ποιήσει.

These passages (strange to say) are considered by Manso and Dahlmann as showing that the Grecian cities on the Asiatic coast, though subject to the Athenian empire, continued nevertheless to pay their tribute regularly to Susa. To me the passages appear to disprove this very supposition; they show that it was essential for the satrap to detach these cities from the Athenian empire, as a means of procuring tribute from them to Persia: that the Athenian empire, while it lasted, prevented him from getting any tribute from the cities subject to it. Manso and Dahlmann have overlooked the important meaning of the adverb of time *νεωστὶ*—"lately." By that word Thucydides expressly intimates that the court of Susa *had only recently* demanded from Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus, tribute from the maritime Greeks within their satrapies: and he implies that *until recently no such demand* had been made upon them. The court of Susa, apprised doubtless by Grecian exiles and agents of the embarrassments into which Athens had fallen, conceived this a suitable moment for exacting tributes, to which doubtless it always considered itself entitled, though the power of Athens had compelled it to forego them. Accordingly the demand was now for the first time sent down to Tissaphernes, and he "*became a debtor for them*" to the court (*ἐπωφείλησε*), until he could collect them: which he could not at first do,

reign of the country down to the coast. Granting, therefore, that we were even bound, from the silence of Thucydides, to infer that no treaty was concluded, we should still be obliged also to infer, from his positive averments, that a state of historical fact, such as the treaty acknowledged and prescribed, became actually realised. But when we reflect farther, that Herodotus¹ certifies the visit of Kallias and

even then, embarrassed as Athens was—and which, *à fortiori*, he could not have done before, when Athens was in full power.

We learn from these passages two valuable facts. 1. That the maritime Asiatic cities belonging to the Athenian empire paid no tribute to Susa, from the date of the full organization of the Athenian confederacy down to a period after the Athenian defeat in Sicily. 2. That nevertheless these cities always continued, throughout this period, to stand rated in the Persian king's books each for its appropriate tribute; the court of Susa waiting for a convenient moment to occur, when it should be able to enforce its demands, from misfortune accruing to Athens.

This state of relations, between the Asiatic Greeks and the Persian court under the Athenian empire, authenticated by Thucydides, enables us to explain a passage of Herodotus, on which also both Manso and Dahlmann have dwelt (p. 94) with rather more apparent plausibility, as proving their view of the case. Herodotus, after describing the re-arrangement and re-measurement of the territories of the Ionic cities by the satrap Artaphernes (about 493 B.C. after the suppression of the Ionic revolt), proceeds to state that he assessed the tribute of each with reference to this new measurement, and that the assessment remained unchanged until his own (Herodotus's) time—*καὶ τὰς χώρας σφείων μετρήσας κατὰ παρασάγγας . . . φόρους ἔταξε ἐκδοσέσσι, οἱ κατὰ χώραν διατελείουσι ἔχοντες ἐκ τούτου τοῦ χρόνου αἰεὶ ἔτι καὶ ἐς ἐμὴν, ὡς ἐτάχθησαν ἐξ Ἀρταφέρνηος· ἐτάχθησαν δὲ σχεδὸν κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ τὰ καὶ πρότερον εἶχον* (vi. 42). Now Dahlmann and Manso contend that Herodotus here affirms the tribute of the Ionic cities to Persia to have been continuously and regularly paid down to his own time. But in my judgement this is a mistake; Herodotus speaks not about the *payment*,

but about the *assessment*: and these were two very different things, as Thucydides clearly intimates in the passage which I have cited above. The *assessment* of all the Ionic cities in the Persian king's books remained unaltered all through the Athenian empire; but the *payment* was not enforced until immediately before 412 B.C., when the Athenians were supposed to be too weak to hinder it. It is evident by the account of the general Persian revenues, throughout all the satrapies, which we find in the third book of Herodotus, that he had access to official accounts of the Persian finances, or at least to Greek secretaries who knew those accounts. He would be told that these assessments remained unchanged from the time of Artaphernes downward: whether they were *realised* or not was another question, which the "books" would probably not answer, and which he might or might not know.

The passages above cited from Thucydides appear to me to afford positive proof that the Greek cities on the Asiatic coast paid no tribute to Persia during the continuance of the Athenian empire. But if there were no such positive proof, I should still maintain the same opinion. For if these Greeks went on paying tribute, what is meant by the phrases, of their having "*revolted* from Persia," of their "*having been liberated* from the king" (*οἱ ἀποστάντες βασιλεῖς Ἕλληνας—οἱ ἀπὸ τοῦ βασιλέως καὶ Ἑλληνιστῶν ἦδη ἀπεστηκότες ἀπὸ βασιλέως—οἱ ἀπὸ βασιλέως νεωστὶ ἡλευθέρωντο*. Thucyd. i. 18, 89, 95)?

So much respecting the payment of tribute. As to the other point—that between 477 and 412 B.C., no Persian ships were tolerated along the coast of Ionia, which coast, though claimed by the Persian king, was not recognised by the Greeks as belonging to him—proof will be found in Thucyd. viii. 56: compare Diodor. iv. 26.

¹ Herodot. viii. 151. Diodorus also

other Athenian envoys to the court of Susa, we can assign no other explanation of such visit so probable as the reality of this treaty. Certainly no envoys would have gone thither during a state of recognized war; and though it may be advanced as possible that they may have gone with the view to conclude a treaty, and yet not have succeeded—this would be straining the limits of possibility beyond what is reasonable.¹

states that this peace was concluded by Kallias the Athenian (xii. 4).

¹ I conclude, on the whole, in favour of this treaty as an historical fact—though sensible that some of the arguments urged against it are not without force. Mr. Mitford and Dr. Thirlwall (ch. xvii. p. 474), as well as Manso and Dahlmann, not to mention others, have impugned the reality of the treaty; and the last-mentioned author particularly has examined the case at length and set forth all the grounds of objection; urging, among some which are really serious, others which appear to me weak and untenable (Manso, *Sparta*, vol. iii. Beylage, x. p. 471; Dahlmann, *Forschungen auf dem Gebiete der Geschichte*, vol. i. Ueber den Kimonischen Frieden, p. 1-148). Boeckh admits the treaty as an historical fact.

If we deny altogether the historical reality of the treaty, we must adopt some such hypothesis as that of Dahlmann (p. 40):—"The distinct mention and averment of such a peace as having been formally concluded, appears to have first arisen among the schools of the rhetors at Athens, shortly after the peace of Antalkidas, and as an oratorical antithesis to oppose to that peace."

To which we must add the supposition, that some persons must have taken the trouble to cause this fabricated peace to be engraved on a pillar, and placed either in the Metróon or somewhere else in Athens among the records of Athenian glories. For that it was so engraved on a column is certain (Theopompus ap. Harpokration. Ἀρκτοῖς γράμμασι). The suspicion started by Theopompus (and founded on the fact that the peace was engraved, not in ancient Attic, but in Ionic letters—the latter sort having been only legalized in Athens after the archonship of Eukleidés), that this treaty was a subsequent invention and not an historical reality, does not weigh with me

very much. Assuming the peace to be real, it would naturally be drawn up and engraved in the character habitually used among the Ionic cities of Asia Minor, since they were the parties most specially interested in it; or it might even have been re-engraved, seeing that nearly a century must have elapsed between the conclusion of the treaty and the time when Theopompus saw the pillar. I confess that the hypothesis of Dahlmann appears to me more improbable than the historical reality of the treaty. I think it more likely that there *was* a treaty, and that the orators talked exaggerated and false matters respecting it—rather than that they fabricated the treaty from the beginning with a deliberate purpose, and with the false name of an envoy conjoined.

Dahlmann exposes justly and forcibly (an easy task indeed) the loose, inconsistent and vain-glorious statements of the orators respecting this treaty. The chronological error by which it was asserted to have been made shortly after the victories of the Eurymedon (and was thus connected with the name of Kimon), is one of the circumstances which have most tended to discredit the attesting witnesses; but we must not forget that Ephorus (assuming that Diodorus in this case copies Ephorus, which is highly probable—xii. 3, 4) did not fall into this mistake, but placed the treaty in its right chronological place, after the Athenian expedition under Kimon against Cyprus and Egypt in 450-449 B.C. Kimon died before the great results of this expedition were consummated, as we know from Thucydides: on this point Diodorus speaks equivocally, but rather giving it to be understood that Kimon lived to complete the whole, and then died of sickness.

The absurd exaggeration of Isokratés, that the treaty bound the Persian kings

We may therefore believe in the reality of this treaty between Athens and Persia, improperly called the Kimonian treaty: improperly, since not only was it concluded after the death of Kimon, but the Athenian victories by which it was immediately brought on, were gained after his death. Nay more—the probability is, that if Kimon had lived, it would not have been concluded at all. For his interest as well as his glory led him to prosecute the war against Persia, since he was no match for his rival Periklēs either as a statesman or as an orator, and could only maintain his popularity by the same means whereby he had earned it—victories and plunder at the cost of the Persians. His death ensured more complete ascendancy to Periklēs, whose policy and character were of a cast altogether opposite:¹ while even Thucydidēs, son of Melēsias, who succeeded Kimon his relation as leader of the anti-Perikleian party, was also a man of the senate and public assembly rather than of campaigns and conquests. Averse to distant enterprises and precarious acquisitions, Periklēs was only anxious to maintain unimpaired the Hellenic ascendancy of Athens, now at its very maximum. He was well aware that the undivided force and vigilance of Athens would not be too much for this object—nor did they in fact prove sufficient, as we shall presently see. With such dispositions he was naturally glad to conclude a peace, which excluded the Persians from all the coasts of Asia Minor westward of the Chelidoneans, as well as from all the waters of the Ægean, under the simple condition of renouncing on the part of Athens farther aggressions against Cyprus, Phœnicia, Kilikia, and Egypt. The Great King on his side had had sufficient experience of Athenian energy to fear the consequences of such aggressions, if prosecuted. He did not lose much by relinquishing formally a tribute which at the time he could have little hope of realizing, and which of course he intended to resume on the first favourable opportunity. Weighing all these circumstances, we shall find that the peace, improperly called Kimonian, results naturally from the position and feelings of the contracting parties.

Thucydidēs,
son of Melēs-
ias, suc-
ceeds Kimon
as leading
opponent of
Periklēs.

not to come westward of the river Halys, has also been very properly censured. He makes this statement in two different orations (Areopagitie, p. 150; Panathenaic, p. 462).
¹ Plutarch, Periklēs, c. 21-28.

B.C. 449.
Transfer of
the common
fund of the
confederacy
from Delos
to Athens.—
Gradual
passage of
the confede-
racy into an
Athenian
empire.

Athens was now at peace both abroad and at home, under the administration of Periklês, with a great empire, a great fleet, and a great accumulated treasure. The common fund collected from the contributions of the confederates, and originally deposited at Delos, had before this time been transferred to the acropolis at Athens. At what precise time such transfer took place, we cannot state. Nor are we enabled to assign the successive stages whereby the confederacy, chiefly with the freewill of its own members, became transformed from a body of armed and active warriors under the guidance of Athens, into disarmed and passive tribute-payers defended by the military force of Athens: from allies free, meeting at Delos, and self-determining—into subjects isolated, sending their annual tribute, and awaiting Athenian orders. But it would appear that the change had been made before this time. Some of the more resolute of the allies had tried to secede, but Athens had coerced them by force, and reduced them to the condition of tribute-payers without ships or defence. Chios, Lesbos, and Samos were now the only allies free and armed on the original footing. Every successive change of an armed ally into a tributary—every subjugation of a seceder—tended of course to cut down the numbers, and enfeeble the authority, of the Delian synod. And what was still worse, it altered the reciprocal relation and feelings both of Athens and her allies—exalting the former into something like a despot, and degrading the latter into mere passive subjects.

Of course the palpable manifestation of the change must have been the transfer of the confederate fund from Delos to Athens. The only circumstance which we know respecting this transfer is, that it was proposed by the Samians¹—the second power in the confederacy, inferior only to Athens, and least of all likely to favour any job or sinister purpose of the Athenians. It is farther said that when the Samians proposed it, Aristeidês characterised it as a motion unjust, but useful: we may reasonably doubt, however, whether it was made during his lifetime. When the synod at Delos ceased to be so fully attended as to command

Transfer of
the fund was
proposed by
the Samians.

¹ Plutarch, Aristeidês, c. 25.

respect—when war was lighted up not only with Persia, but with Ægina and Peloponnesus—the Samians might not unnaturally feel that the large accumulated fund, with its constant annual accessions, would be safer at Athens than at Delos, which latter island would require a permanent garrison and squadron to ensure it against attack. But whatever may have been the grounds on which the Samians proceeded, when we find them coming forward to propose the transfer, we may fairly infer that it was not displeasing, and did not appear unjust, to the larger members of the confederacy; and that it was no high-handed and arbitrary exercise of power, as it is often called, on the part of Athens.

After the conclusion of the war with Ægina, and the consequences of the battle of Cænophyta, the position of Athens became altered more and more. She acquired a large catalogue of new allies, partly tributary, like Ægina—partly in the same relation as Chios, Lesbos, and Samos; that is, obliged only to a conformity of foreign policy and to military service. In this last category were Megara, the Bœotian cities, the Phokians, Lokrians, &c. All these, though allies of Athens, were strangers to Delos and the confederacy against Persia; and accordingly that confederacy passed insensibly into a matter of history, giving place to the new conception of imperial Athens with her extensive list of allies, partly free, partly subject. Such transition, arising spontaneously out of the character and circumstances of the confederates themselves, was thus materially forwarded by the acquisitions of Athens extraneous to the confederacy. She was now not merely the first maritime state in Greece, but perhaps equal to Sparta even in land-power—possessing in her alliance Megara, Bœotia, Phokis, Lokris, together with Achæa and Trœzen in Peloponnesus. Large as this aggregate already was, both at sea and on land, yet the magnitude of the annual tribute, and still more the character of the Athenians themselves, superior to all Greeks in that combination of energy and discipline which is the grand cause of progress, threatened still farther increase. Occupying the Megarian harbour of Pêgæ, the Athenians had full means of naval action on both sides of the Corinthian Isthmus: but what

Position of Athens with a numerous alliance both of inland and maritime states.

was of still greater importance to them, by their possession of the Megarid and of the high lands of Geraneaia, they could restrain any land-force from marching out of Peloponnesus, and were thus (considering besides their mastery at sea) completely unassailable in Attica.

Ever since the repulse of Xerxes, Athens had been advancing in an uninterrupted course of power and prosperity at home, as well as of victory and ascendancy abroad—to which there was no exception except the ruinous enterprise in Egypt. Looking at the position of Greece therefore about 488 B.C.,—after the conclusion of the five years' truce between the Peloponnesians and Athens, and of the so-called Kimonian peace between Persia and Athens,—a discerning Greek might well calculate upon farther aggrandisement of this imperial state as the tendency of the age. And accustomed as every Greek was to the conception of separate town-autonomy as essential to a freeman and a citizen, such prospect could not but inspire terror and aversion. The sympathy of the Peloponnesians for the islanders and ultra-maritime states, who constituted the original confederacy of Athens, was not considerable. But when the Dorian island of Ægina was subjugated also, and passed into the condition of a defenceless tributary, they felt the blow sorely on every ground. The ancient celebrity, and eminent service rendered at the battle of Salamis, of this memorable island, had not been able to protect it; while those great Æginetan families, whose victories at the sacred festival-games Pindar celebrates in a large proportion of his odes, would spread the language of complaint and indignation throughout their numerous "guests" in every Hellenic city. Of course, the same anti-Athenian feeling would pervade those Peloponnesian states who had been engaged in actual hostility with Athens—Corinth, Sikyon, Epidaurus, &c., as well as Sparta, the once recognised head of Hellas, but now tacitly degraded from her pre-eminence, baffled in her projects respecting Bœotia, and exposed to the burning of her port at Gythium without being able even to retaliate upon Attica. Putting all those circumstances together, we may comprehend the powerful feeling of dislike and apprehension now diffused so widely over Greece against the upstart despot-city; whose ascendancy, newly-

acquired, maintained by superior force, and not recognised as legitimate—threatened nevertheless still farther increase. Sixteen years hence, this same sentiment will be found exploding into the Peloponnesian war. But it became rooted in the Greek mind during the period which we have now reached, when Athens was much more formidable than she had come to be at the commencement of that war. We can hardly explain or appreciate the ideas of that later period, unless we take them as handed down from the earlier date of the five years' truce (about 451-446 B.C.).

Formidable as the Athenian empire both really was and appeared to be, however, this wide-spread feeling of antipathy proved still stronger, so that instead of the threatened increase, the empire underwent a most material diminution. This did not arise from the attack of open enemies; for during the five years' truce, Sparta undertook only one movement, and that not against Attica: she sent troops to Delphi, in an expedition dignified with the name of the Sacred War—expelled the Phokians, who had assumed to themselves the management of the temple—and restored it to the native Delphians. To this the Athenians made no direct opposition: but as soon as the Lacedæmonians were gone, they themselves marched thither and placed the temple again in the hands of the Phokians, who were then their allies.¹ The Delphians were members of the Phokian league, and there was a dispute of old standing as to the administration of the temple—whether it belonged to them separately or to the Phokians collectively. The favour of those who administered it counted as an element of considerable moment in Grecian politics; the sympathies of the leading Delphians led them to embrace the side of Sparta, but the Athenians now hoped to counteract this tendency by means of their preponderance in Phokis. We are not told that the Lacedæmonians took any ulterior step in consequence of their views being frustrated by Athens—a significant evidence of the politics of that day.

Commencement of reverses and decline of power to Athens.

The blow which brought down the Athenian empire from this its greatest exaltation was struck by the subjects themselves. The Athenian ascendancy over Boeotia, Phokis, Lokris,

¹ Thucyd. i. 112: compare Philochor. Fragm. 88, ed. Didot.

and Eubœa, was maintained, not by means of garrisons, but through domestic parties favourable to Athens, and a suitable form of government—just in the same way as Sparta maintained her influence over her Peloponnesian allies.¹ After the victory of Œenophyta, the Athenians had broken up the governments in the Bœotian cities established by Sparta before the battle of Tanagra, and converted them into democracies at Thebes and elsewhere. Many of the previous leading men had thus been sent into exile: and as the same process had taken place in Phokis and Lokris, there was at this time a considerable aggregate body of exiles, Bœotian, Phokian, Lokrian, Eubœan, Æginetan, &c., all bitterly hostile to Athens, and ready to join in any attack upon her power. We learn farther that the democracy² established at Thebes after the battle of Œenophyta was ill-conducted and disorderly: which circumstance laid open Bœotia still farther to the schemes of assailants on the watch for every weak point.

These various exiles, all joining their forces and concerting measures with their partisans in the interior, succeeded in mastering Orchomenus, Chæroneia, and some other less important places in Bœotia. The Athenian general Tolmidês marched to expel them, with 1000 Athenian hoplites and an auxiliary body of allies. It appears that this march was undertaken in haste and rashness. The hoplites of Tolmidês, principally youthful volunteers and belonging to the best families of Athens, disdained the enemy too much to await a larger and more commanding force: nor would the people listen even to Periklês, when he admonished them that the march would be full of hazard, and adjured them not to attempt it without greater numbers as well as greater caution.³ Fatally indeed were his predictions justified. Though Tolmidês was successful in his first enterprise—the recapture of Chæro-

¹ Thucyd. i. 19. Λακεδαιμόνιοι, οὐχ ὑποτελείς ἔχοντες φόρου τοὺς συμμάχους, κατ' ὀλιγαρχίαν δὲ σφίσι αὐτοῖς μόνον ἐπιτηδείως ὅπως πολιτεύουσιν θεραπεύοντες—the same also i. 76-144.

² Aristotel. Politic. v. 2, 6. Καὶ ἐν θήβαις μετὰ τὴν ἐν Οἰνοφύτοις μάχην, κακῶς πολιτευομένων, ἡ δημοκρατία διεφθάρη.

³ Plutarch, Periklês, c. 18; also his

comparison between Periklês and Fabius Maximus, c. 3.

Kleinias, father of the celebrated Alkibiadês, was slain in this battle: he had served thirty-three years before at the sea-fight of Artemisium; he cannot therefore be numbered among the youthful warriors, though a person of the first rank (Plutarch, Alkibiad. c. 1).

neia, wherein he placed a garrison—yet in his march, probably incautious and disorderly, when departing from that place, he was surprised and attacked unawares, near Korôneia, by the united body of exiles and their partisans. No defeat in Grecian history was ever more complete or ruinous. Tolmidês himself was slain, together with many of the Athenian hoplites, while a large number of them were taken prisoners. In order to recover these prisoners, who belonged to the best families in the city, the Athenians submitted to a convention whereby they agreed to evacuate Bœotia altogether. In all the cities of that country the exiles were restored, the democratical government overthrown, and Bœotia was transformed from an ally of Athens into her bitter enemy.¹ Long indeed did the fatal issue of this action dwell in the memory of the Athenians,² and inspire them with an apprehension of Bœotian superiority in heavy armour on land. But if the hoplites under Tolmidês had been all slain on the field, their death would probably have been avenged and Bœotia would not have been lost—whereas in the case of living citizens, the Athenians deemed no sacrifice too great to redeem them. We shall discover hereafter in the Lacedæmonians a feeling very similar, respecting their brethren captured at Sphacteria.

The calamitous consequences of this defeat came upon Athens in thick and rapid succession. The united exiles, having carried their point in Bœotia, proceeded to expel the philo-Athenian government both from Phokis and Lokris, and to carry the flame of revolt into Eubœa. To this important island Periklês himself proceeded forthwith, at the head of a powerful force; but before he had time to complete the reconquest, he was summoned home by news of a still more formidable character. The Megarians had revolted from Athens. By a conspiracy previously planned, a division of hoplites from Corinth, Sikyon, and Epidaurus, was already admitted as garrison into their city: the Athenian soldiers who kept watch over the long walls had been overpowered

B.C. 445.
Revolt of
Phokis,
Lokris,
Eubœa, and
Megara:
invasion of
Attica by
the Peloponnesians
under the
Lacedæmonian king
Pleistoanax.

¹ Thucyd. i. 113; Diodor. xii. 6. Plataea appears to have been considered as quite dis severed from Bœotia: it remained in connexion with Athens as intimately as before.

² Xenophon, Memorabil. iii. 5, 4.

and slain, except a few who escaped into the fortified part of Nisæa. As if to make the Athenians at once sensible how seriously this disaster affected them, by throwing open the road over Geranea—Pleistoanax king of Sparta was announced as already on his march for an invasion of Attica. He did in truth conduct an army, of mixed Lacedæmonians and Peloponnesian allies, into Attica, as far as the neighbourhood of Eleusis and the Thriasian plain. He was a very young man, so that a Spartan of mature years, Kleandridés, had been attached to him by the Ephors as adjutant and counsellor. Periklès (it is said) persuaded both the one and the other, by means of large bribes, to evacuate Attica without advancing to Athens. We may fairly doubt whether they had force enough to adventure so far into the interior, and we shall hereafter observe the great precautions with which Archidamus thought it necessary to conduct his invasion, during the first year of the Peloponnesian war, though at the head of a more commanding force. Nevertheless, on their return, the Lacedæmonians, believing that they might have achieved it, found both of them guilty of corruption. Both were banished: Kleandridés never came back, and Pleistoanax himself lived for a long time in sanctuary near the Temple of Athênê at Tegea, until at length he procured his restoration by tampering with the Pythian priestess, and by bringing her bought admonitions to act upon the authorities at Sparta.¹

So soon as the Lacedæmonians had retired from Attica, Periklès returned with his forces to Eubœa, and reconquered the island completely. With that caution which always distinguished him as a military man, so opposite to the fatal rashness of Tolmidés, he took with him an overwhelming force of fifty triremes and 5000 hoplites. He admitted most of the Eubœan towns to surrender, altering the government of Chalkis by the expulsion of the wealthy oligarchy called the Hippobotæ. But the inhabitants of Histiaïa at the north of the island, who had taken an Athenian merchantman and massacred all the crew, were more severely dealt with—the free population being all or in great part ex-

Eubœa reconquered by Periklès.

¹ Thucyd. i. 114; v. 16; Plutarch, Periklès, c. 22.

pelled, and the land distributed among Athenian kleruchs or out-settled citizens.¹

Yet the reconquest of Eubœa was far from restoring Athens to the position which she had occupied before the fatal engagement of Korôneia. Her land-empire was irretrievably gone, together with her recently acquired influence over the Delphian oracle; and she reverted to her former condition of an exclusively maritime potentate. For though she still continued to hold Nisæa and Pégæ, yet her communication with the latter harbour was now cut off by the loss of Megara and its appertaining territory, so that she thus lost her means of acting in the Corinthian Gulf, and of protecting as well as of constraining her allies in Achaia. Nor was the port of Nisæa of much value to her, disconnected from the city to which it belonged, except as a post for annoying that city.

Humiliation and despondency of Athens.—Conclusion of the thirty years' truce.—Diminution of Athenian power.

Moreover, the precarious hold which she possessed over unwilling allies had been demonstrated in a manner likely to encourage similar attempts among her maritime subjects; attempts which would now be seconded by Peloponnesian armies invading Attica. The fear of such a combination of embarrassments, and especially of an irresistible enemy carrying ruin over the flourishing territory round Eleusis and Athens, was at this moment predominant in the Athenian mind. We shall find Periklês, at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war fourteen years afterwards, exhausting all his persuasive force, and not succeeding without great difficulty, in prevailing upon his countrymen to endure the hardship of invasion—even in defence of their maritime empire, and when events had been gradually so ripening as to render the prospect of war familiar, if not inevitable. But the late series of misfortunes had burst upon them so rapidly and unexpectedly, as to discourage even Athenian confidence, and to render the prospect of continued war full of gloom and danger. The prudence of Periklês would doubtless counsel the surrender of their remaining landed possessions or alliances, which had now become unprofitable, in order to purchase peace. But we may be sure that nothing short of extreme temporary despondency

¹ Thucyd. i. 114; Plutarch, Periklês, c. 23; Diodor. xii. 7.

could have induced the Athenian assembly to listen to such advice, and to accept the inglorious peace which followed. A truce for thirty years was concluded with Sparta and her allies, in the beginning of 445 B.C., whereby Athens surrendered Nisæa, Pégæ, Achaia, and Trœzen—thus abandoning Peloponnesus altogether,¹ and leaving the Megarians (with their full territory and their two ports) to be included among the Peloponnesian allies of Sparta.

It was to the Megarians, especially, that the altered position of Athens after this truce was owing: it was their secession from Attica and junction with the Peloponnesians, which laid open Attica to invasion. Hence arose the deadly hatred on the part of the Athenians towards Megara, manifested during the ensuing years—a sentiment the more natural, as Megara had spontaneously sought the alliance of Athens a few years before as a protection against the Corinthians, and had then afterwards, without any known ill-usage on the part of Athens, broken off from the alliance and become her enemy, with the fatal consequence of rendering her vulnerable on the land-side. Under such circumstances we shall not be surprised to find the antipathy

¹ Thucyd. i. 114, 115; ii. 21; Diodor. xii. 5. I do not at all doubt that the word Achaia here used means the country in the north part of Peloponnesus, usually known by that name. The suspicions of Gœller and others, that it means, not this territory, but some unknown town, appear to me quite unfounded. Thucydides had never noticed the exact time when the Athenians acquired Achaia as a dependent ally, though he notices the Achæans (i. 111) in that capacity. This is one argument, among many, to show that we must be cautious in reasoning from the silence of Thucydides against the reality of an event—in reference to this period between the Persian and Peloponnesian wars, where his whole summary is so brief.

In regard to the chronology of these events, Mr. Fynes Clinton remarks, "The disasters in Bœotia produced the revolt of Eubœa and Megara about eighteen months after, in Anthestêrion 445 B.C.; and the Peloponnesian invasion of Attica, on the expiration of the five years' truce" (ad ann. 447 B.C.).

Mr. Clinton seems to me to allow a longer interval than is probable: I incline to think that the revolt of Eubœa and Megara followed more closely upon the disasters in Bœotia, in spite of the statement of archons given by Diodorus: *ὁ πᾶσι ὕστερον*, the expression of Thucydides, means probably no more than three or four months; and the whole series of events were evidently the product of one impulse. The truce having been concluded in the beginning of 445 B.C., it seems reasonable to place the revolt of Eubœa and Megara, as well as the invasion of Attica by Pleistoanax, in 446 B.C.—and the disasters in Bœotia either in the beginning of 446 B.C., or the close of 447 B.C.

It is hardly safe to assume, moreover (as Mr. Clinton does ad ann. 450, as well as Dr. Thirlwall, Hist. Gr. ch. xvii. p. 478), that the five years' truce must have been actually expired before Pleistoanax and the Lacedæmonians invaded Attica: the thirty years' truce, afterwards concluded, did not run out its full time.

of the Athenians against Megara strongly pronounced, inso-much that the system of exclusion which they adopted against her was among the most prominent causes of the Peloponnesian war.

Having traced what we may call the foreign relations of Athens down to this thirty years' truce, we must notice the important internal and constitutional changes which she had experienced during the same interval.

CHAPTER XLVI.

CONSTITUTIONAL AND JUDICIAL CHANGES AT ATHENS
UNDER PERIKLÊS.

THE period which we have now passed over appears to have been that in which the democratical cast of Athenian public life was first brought into its fullest play and development, as to judicature, legislation, and administration.

The great judicial change was made by the methodical distribution of a large proportion of the citizens into distinct judicial divisions, by the great extension of their direct agency in that department, and by the assignment of a constant pay to every citizen so engaged. It has been already mentioned, that even under the democracy of Kleisthenês, and until the time succeeding the battle of Plataea, large powers still remained vested both in the individual archons and in the senate of Areopagus (which latter was composed exclusively of the past archons after their year of office, sitting in it for life); though the check exercised by the general body of citizens, assembled for law-making in the Ekklesia and for judging in the Heliaea, was at the same time materially increased. We must farther recollect, that the distinction between powers administrative and judicial, so highly valued among the more elaborate governments of modern Europe, since the political speculations of the last century, was in the early history of Athens almost unknown. Like the Roman kings,¹

First establishment of the democratical judicial system at Athens.

Union in the same hands, of functions both administrative and judicial in early Athens—great powers of the magistrates, as well as of the senate of Areopagus.

¹ See K. F. Hermann, *Griechische Staatsalterthümer*, sect. 53-107, and his treatise *De Jure et Auctoritate Magistratum ap. Athen.* p. 53 (Heidelb. 1829); also Rein, *Römisches Privatrecht*, pp. 26, 408. Leipz. 1836. M. Laboulaye also insists particularly upon the confusion of administrative and judiciary functions among the Romans (*Essai sur*

les Loix Criminelles des Romains, pp. 23, 79, 107, &c.). Compare Sir G. C. Lewis, *Essay on the Government of Dependencies*, p. 42, with his citation from Hugo, *Geschichte des Römischen Rechts*, p. 42. Sir G. Lewis has given just and valuable remarks upon the goodness of the received classification of powers as a theory, and upon the ex-

and the Roman consuls before the appointment of the Prætor, the Athenian archons not only administered, but also exercised jurisdiction, voluntary as well as contentious—decided disputes, inquired into crimes, and inflicted punishment. Of the same mixed nature were the functions of the senate of Areopagus, and even of the annual senate of Five Hundred, the creation of Kleisthenès. The Stratègi, too, as well as the archons, had doubtless the double competence, in reference to military, naval, and foreign affairs, of issuing orders and of punishing by their own authority disobedient parties: the *imperium* of the magistrates, generally, enabled them to enforce their own mandates, as well as to decide in cases of doubt whether any private citizen had or had not been guilty of infringement. Nor was there any appeal from these magisterial judgements: though the magistrates were subject, under the Kleisthenean constitution, to personal responsibility for their general behaviour, before the people judicially assembled, at the expiration of their year of office—and to the farther animadversion of the Ekklesia (or public deliberative assembly) meeting periodically during the course of that year: in some of which assemblies, the question might formally be raised for deposing any magistrate even before his year was expired.¹ Still, in spite of such partial checks, the accumulation, in the same hand, of powers to administer, judge, punish, and decide civil disputes, without

tent to which the separation of them either has been, or can be, carried in practice: see also Note E. in the same work, p. 347.

The separation of administrative from judicial functions appears unknown in early societies. M. Meyer observes, respecting the judicial institutions of modern Europe, "Anciennement les fonctions administratives et judiciaires n'étoient pas distinctes. Du temps de la liberté des Germains et même long temps après, les plaids de la nation ou ceux du comté rendoient la justice et administroient les intérêts nationaux ou locaux dans une seule et même assemblée: sous le régime féodal, le roi ou l'empereur dans son conseil, sa cour, son parlement composé des hauts barons ecclésiastiques et laïcs, exerçoit tous les droits de souveraineté comme de jus-

tice: dans la commune, le bailli, mayeur, ou autre fonctionnaire nommé par le prince, administroient les intérêts communaux et jugeoient les bourgeois de l'avis de la communauté entière, des corporations qui la composoient, ou des autorités et conseils qui la représentoient: on n'avoit pas encore soupçonné que le jugement d'une cause entre particuliers pût être étranger à la cause commune."—Meyer, *Esprit des Institutions Judiciaires*, book v. chap. 11, vol. iii. p. 339; also chap. 18, p. 383.

¹ A case of such deposition of an archon by vote of the public assembly, even before the year of office was expired, occurs in Demosthenès cont. Theokrin. c. 7; another, the deposition of a stratègi, in Demosthen. cont. Timoth. c. 3.

any other canon than the few laws then existing, and without any appeal—must have been painfully felt, and must have often led to corrupt, arbitrary, and oppressive dealing. And if this be true of individual magistrates, exposed to annual accountability, it is not likely to have been less true of the senate of Areopagus, which, acting collectively, could hardly be rendered accountable, and in which the members sat for life.¹

I have already mentioned that shortly after the return of the expatriated Athenians from Salamis, Aristeidēs had been impelled by the strong democratical sentiment which he found among his countrymen to propose the abolition of all pecuniary qualification for magistracies, so as to render every citizen legally eligible. This innovation, however, was chiefly valuable as a victory and as an index of the predominant sentiment. Notwithstanding the enlarged promise of eligibility, little change probably took place in the fact, and rich men were still most commonly chosen. Hence the magistrates, possessing the large powers administrative and judicial above described—and still more the senate of Areopagus, which sat for life—still belonging almost entirely to the wealthier class, remained animated more or less with the same oligarchical interests and sympathies, which manifested themselves in the abuse of authority. At the same time the democratical sentiment among the mass of Athenians went on steadily increasing from the time of Aristeidēs to that of Periklēs: Athens became more and more maritime, the population of Peiræus augmented in number as well as in importance, and the spirit even of the poorest citizen was stimulated by that collective aggrandisement of his city to which he himself individually contributed. Before twenty years had elapsed, reckoning from the battle of Platæa, this new fervour of democratical sentiment made itself felt in the political contests of Athens, and found able champions in Periklēs and

¹ Æschinēs (cont. Ktesiphont. c. 9, p. 373) speaks of the senate of Areopagus as *πρεσβυτοι*, and so it was doubtless understood to be: but it is difficult to see how accountability could be practically enforced against such a body. They could only be responsible in this

sense—that if any one of their number could be proved to have received a bribe, he would be individually punished. But in this sense the *dikasteries* themselves would also be responsible: though it is always affirmed of them that they were not responsible.

Ephialtès, rivals of what may be called the conservative party headed by Kimon.

We have no positive information that it was Periklès who introduced the lot, in place of election, for the choice of archons and various other magistrates. But the change must have been introduced nearly at this time, and with a view of equalizing the chances of office to every candidate, poor as well as rich, who chose to give in his name and who fulfilled certain personal and family conditions ascertained in the dokimasy or preliminary examination. But it was certainly to Periklès and Ephialtès that Athens owed the elaborate constitution of her popular Dikasteries or Jury-courts regularly paid, which exercised so important an influence upon the character of the citizens. These two eminent men deprived both the magistrates, and the senate of Areopagus, of all the judicial and penal competence which they had hitherto possessed, save and except the power of imposing a small fine. This judicial power, civil as well as criminal, was transferred to numerous dikasts, or panels of jurors selected from the citizens; 6000 of whom were annually drawn by lot, sworn, and then distributed into ten panels of 500 each; the remainder forming a supplement in case of vacancies. The magistrate, instead of deciding causes or inflicting punishment by his own authority, was now constrained to impanel a jury—that is, to submit each particular case, which might call for a penalty greater than the small fine to which he was competent, to the judgement of one or other among these numerous popular dikasteries. Which of the ten he should take, was determined by lot, so that no one knew beforehand what dikastery would try any particular cause. The magistrate himself presided over it during the trial and submitted to it the question at issue, together with the results of his own preliminary examination; after which came the speeches of accuser and accused with the statements of their witnesses. So also the civil judicature, which had before been exercised in controversies between man and man by the archons, was withdrawn from them and transferred to these dikasteries under the presidency of an archon. It is to be remarked, that the system

Political parties in Athens. Periklès, and Ephialtès, democratically; Kimon, oligarchical or conservative.

Democratical Dikasteries or Jury-courts, constituted by Periklès and Ephialtès. How these Dikasteries were arranged.

of reference to arbitration, for private causes,¹ was extensively applied at Athens. A certain number of public arbitrators were annually appointed, to one of whom (or to some other citizen adopted by mutual consent of the parties), all private disputes were submitted in the first instance. If dissatisfied with the decision, either party might afterwards carry the matter before the dikastery; but it appears that in many cases the decision of the arbitrator was acquiesced in without this ultimate resort.

I do not here mean to affirm that there never was any trial by the people before the time of Periklēs and Ephialtēs. I doubt not that before their time the numerous judicial assembly, called Heliaea, pronounced upon charges against accountable magistrates as well as upon various other accusations of public importance; and perhaps in some cases separate bodies of them may have been drawn by lot for particular trials. But it is not the less true, that the systematic distribution and constant employment of the numerous dikasts of Athens cannot have begun before the age of these two statesmen, since it was only then that the practice of paying them began. For so large a sacrifice of time on the part of poor men, wherein M. Boeckh states² (in somewhat exaggerated language) that "nearly

Pay to the
dikasts in-
troduced
and made
regular.

¹ Respecting the procedure of arbitration at Athens, and the public as well as private arbitrators, see the instructive treatise of Hudtwalcker, *Ueber die öffentlichen und Privat-Schiedsrichter (Dieteten) zu Athen*: Jena, 1812.

Each arbitrator seems to have sat alone to inquire into and decide disputes: he received a small fee of one drachma from both parties; also an additional fee when application was made for delay (p. 16). Parties might by mutual consent fix upon any citizen to act as arbitrator: but there were a certain number of public arbitrators, elected or drawn by lot from the citizens every year; and a plaintiff might bring his cause before any one of these. They were liable to be punished under *εὐνομα*, at the end of their year of office, if accused and convicted of corruption or unfair dealing.

The number of these public Dietete or arbitrators was unknown when Hudtwalcker's book was published. An

inscription since discovered by Professor Ross and published in his work, *Ueber die Demen von Attika*, p. 22, records the names of all the Dietete for the year of the archon Antiklēs, B.C. 325, with the name of the tribe to which each belonged.

The total number is 104: the number in each tribe is unequal: the largest number is in Kekropis, which furnishes sixteen: the smallest in Candionis, which sends only three. They must have been either elected or drawn by lot from the general body of citizens, without any reference to tribes. The inscription records the names of the Dietete for this year B.C. 325, in consequence of their being crowned or receiving a vote of thanks from the people. The fragment of a like inscription for the year B.C. 337, also exists.

² Public Economy of the Athenians, book ii. chap. xiv. p. 227, Engl. transl.

M. Boeckh must mean that the whole 6000, or nearly the whole, were em-

one third of the citizens sat as judges every day," cannot be conceived without an assured remuneration. From and after the time of Periklês, these dikasteries were the exclusive assemblies for trial of all causes civil as well as criminal, with some special exceptions, such as cases of homicide and a few others: but before his time, the greater number of such causes had been adjudged either by individual magistrates or by the senate of Areopagus. We may therefore conceive how great and important was the revolution wrought by that statesman, when he first organised these dikastic assemblies into systematic action, and transferred to them nearly all the judicial power which had before been exercised by magistrates and senate. The position and influence of these latter became radically altered. The most commanding functions of the archon were abrogated, so that he retained only the power of receiving complaints, inquiring into them, exercising some small preliminary interference with the parties for the furtherance of the cause or accusation, fixing the day for trial, and presiding over the dikastic assembly by whom peremptory verdict was pronounced. His administrative functions remained unaltered, but his powers, inquisitorial and determining, as a judge, passed away.¹

The magistrates are deprived of their judicial, and confined to administrative functions.

In reference to the senate of Areopagus also, the changes introduced were not less considerable. That senate, anterior to the democracy in point of date, and standing alone in the enjoyment of a life-tenure, appears to have exercised an undefined and extensive control which long continuance had gradually consecrated. It was invested with a kind of religious respect, and believed to possess mysterious traditions

Senate of Areopagus—its antiquity—semi-religious character—large and undefined controlling power.

employed every day. It appears to me that this supposition greatly overstates both the number of days, and the number of men, actually employed. For the inference in the text, however, a much smaller number is sufficient.

See the more accurate remark of Schömann, *Antiquit. Juris Public. Græcor.*, sect. lxxi. p. 310.

¹ Aristotel. *Politic.* ii. 9, 3. Καὶ τὴν μὲν ἐν Ἀρείῳ πάγῃ βουλὴν Ἐφιάλτης ἐκόλουσε καὶ Περικλῆς· τὰ δὲ δικαστήρια μισθοφόρα κατέστησε Περικλῆς· καὶ τοῦ-

τον δὲ τὸν τρόπον ἕκαστος τῶν δημαγωγῶν προήγαγεν, ἀβίων εἰς τὴν εἰν δημοκρατίαν. φαίνεται δ' οὐ κατὰ τὴν Σόλωνος γενέσθαι τοῦτο προαίρεσιν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἀπὸ συμπτώματος. Τῆς ναυαρχίας γὰρ ἐν τοῖς Μηδικοῖς ὁ δῆμος αἴτιος γενόμενος ἐφρονεματίσθη, καὶ δημαγωγοῦς ἔλαβε φαύλους, ἀντιπολιτευομένων τῶν ἐκτεικῶν ἐπεὶ Σόλων γ' εἰκε τὴν ἀναγκαιοτάτην ἀποδιδόναι τῷ δήμῳ δύναμιν, τὸ τὰς ἀρχὰς αἰρεῖσθαι καὶ εὐθύνειν· μηδὲ γὰρ τοῦτου κύριος ἦν ὁ δῆμος, δοῦλος ἂν εἴη καὶ πολέμιος.

emanating from a divine source.¹ Especially, the cognizance which it took of intentional homicide was a part of old Attic religion not less than of judicature. Though put in the background for a time after the expulsion of the Peisistratids, it had gradually recovered itself when recruited by the new archons under the Kleisthenean constitution; and during the calamitous sufferings of the Persian invasion, its forwardness and patriotism had been so highly appreciated as to procure for it an increased sphere of ascendancy. Trials for homicide were only a small part of its attributions. It exercised judicial competence in many other cases besides: and what was of still greater moment, it maintained a sort of censorial police over the lives and habits of the citizens—it professed to enforce a tutelary and paternal discipline beyond that which the strict letter of the law could mark out, over the indolent, the prodigal, the undutiful, and the deserters from old rite and custom. To crown all, the senate of Areopagus also exercised a supervision over the public assembly, taking care that none of the proceedings of those meetings should be such as to infringe the established laws of the country. These were powers immense as well as undefined, not derived from any formal grant of the people, but having their source in immemorial antiquity and sustained by general awe and reverence. When we read the serious expressions of this sentiment in the mouths of the later orators—Demosthenés, Æschinés, or Deinarchus—we shall comprehend how strong it must have been a century and a half before them, at the period of the Persian invasion. Isokratés, in his Discourse usually called *Areopagiticus*, written a century and a quarter after that invasion, draws a picture of what the senate of Areopagus had been while its competence was yet undiminished, and ascribes to it a power of interference little short of paternal despotism, which he asserts to have been

¹ Deinarchus cont. Demosthen. Or. i. p. 91. φυλάττει τὰς ἀπορρήτους διαθήκας, ἐν αἷς τὰ τῆς πόλεως σωτήρια κεῖται, &c. So also Æschinés calls this senate τὴν σκυθρωπὴν καὶ τῶν μεγίστων κυρίαν βουλήν (cont. Ktesiphont. c. 9, p. 373: compare also cont. Timarchum, c. 16, p. 41; Demosth. cont. Aristokrat. c. 65, p. 641). Plutarch, Solon, c. 19. τὴν ἐνω βουλήν ἐπίσκοπον πάντων καὶ

φύλακα τῶν νόμων. &c.

Ἐδίκασον οὖν οἱ Ἀρεοπαγῖται περὶ πάντων σχεδὸν τῶν σφαλμάτων καὶ παρανομιών, ὡς ἀπαντὰ φησὶν Ἀνδρότιων ἐν πρώτῃ καὶ Φιλόχορος ἐν δευτέρῃ καὶ τρίτῃ τῶν Ἀτθίδων (Philochorus, Fr. 17-58, ed. Didot, p. 19, ed. Siebelis).

See about the Areopagus, Schömann, Antiq. Jur. Att. sect. lxvi.; K. F. Hermann, Griech. Staatsalterthümer, sect. 109.

most salutary and improving in its effect. That the picture of this rhetor is inaccurate—and to a great degree indeed ideal, insinuating his own recommendations under the colour of past realities—is sufficiently obvious. But it enables us to presume generally the extensive regulating power of the senate of Areopagus, in affairs both public and private, at the time which we are now describing.

Such powers were pretty sure to be abused. When we learn that the Spartan senate¹ was lamentably open to bribery, we can hardly presume much better of the life-sitting elders at Athens. But even if their powers had been guided by all that beneficence of intention which Isokratês affirms, they were in their nature such as could only be exercised over a passive and stationary people: while the course of events at Athens, at that time peculiarly, presented conditions altogether the reverse. During the pressure of the Persian invasion, indeed, the senate of Areopagus had been armed with more than ordinary authority, which it had employed so creditably as to strengthen its influence and tighten its supervision during the period immediately following. But that same trial had also called forth in the general body of the citizens a fresh burst of democratical sentiment, and an augmented consciousness of force, both individual and national. Here then were two forces, not only distinct but opposite and conflicting, both put into increased action at the same time.² Nor was this all: a novel cast was just then given to Athenian life and public habits by many different circumstances—the enlargement of the city, the creation of the fortified port and new town of Peiræus, the introduction of an increased nautical population, the active duties of Athens as head of the Delian confederacy, &c. All

Large powers of the senate of Areopagus, in part abused, became inconsistent with the feelings of the people after the Persian invasion. New interest and tendencies then growing up at Athens.

¹ Aristotel. Politic. ii. 6, 18.

² Aristotle particularly indicates these two conflicting tendencies in Athens, the one immediately following the other, in a remarkable passage of his Politics (v. 3, 5):—

Μεταβάλλουσι δὲ καὶ εἰς ὀλιγαρχίαν καὶ εἰς δῆμον καὶ εἰς πολιτείαν ἐκ τοῦ εὐδοκίμησαι τι ἢ αὐτῇθ' ἢ ἀρχεῖον ἢ μόριον τῆς πόλεως· οἷον, ἡ ἐν Ἀρείῳ πύργῳ βουλὴ εὐδοκίμησασα ἐν τοῖς Μηδι-

κοῖς ἔδοξε συντονωτέραν ποιῆσαι τὴν πολιτείαν. Καὶ πάλιν ὁ παντικὸς βῆλος γενόμενος αἰτίος τῆς περὶ Σαλαμῖνα νίκης καὶ διὰ ταύτης τῆς ἡγεμονίας καὶ διὰ τὴν κατὰ θάλατταν δύναμιν, τὴν δημοκρατίαν ἰσχυροτέραν ἐποίησεν.

The word *συντονωτέραν* ("stricter, more rigid") stands opposed in another passage to *ἀνιμίννας* (iv. 3, 5).

these circumstances tended to open new veins of hope and feeling, and new lines of action, in the Athenians between 480-460 B.C., and by consequence to render the interference of the senate of Areopagus, essentially old-fashioned and conservative as it was, more and more difficult. But at the very time when prudence would have counselled that it should have been relaxed or modified, the senate appear to have rendered it stricter, or at least to have tried to do so; which could not fail to raise against them a considerable body of enemies. Not merely the democratical innovators, but also the representatives of new interests generally at Athens, became opposed to the senate as an organ of vexatious repression, employed for oligarchical purposes.¹

From the character of the senate of Areopagus and the ancient reverence with which it was surrounded, it served naturally as a centre of action to the oligarchical or conservative party: that party which desired to preserve the Kleisthenean constitution unaltered—with undiminished authority, administrative as well as judicial, both to individual magistrates and to the collective Areopagus. Of this sentiment, at the time of which we are now speaking, Kimon was the most conspicuous leader. His brilliant victories at the Eurymedon, as well as his exploits in other warlike enterprises, doubtless strengthened very much his political influence at home. The same party also probably included the large majority of rich and old families at Athens; who, so long as the magistracies were elected and not chosen by lot, usually got themselves chosen, and had every interest in keeping the power of such offices as high as they could. Moreover the party was farther strengthened by the pronounced support of Sparta, imparted chiefly through Kimon, proxenus of Sparta at Athens. Of course such aid could only have been indirect, yet it appears to have been of no inconsiderable moment—for when we consider that Ægina had been in ancient feud with Athens, and Corinth in a temper more hostile than friendly, the good

Senate of Areopagus—a centre of action for the conservative party and Kimon.

¹ Plutarch, Reipub. Ger. Præcept. p. 805. *Ὅτε ἀγνοῶ δὲ, ὅτι βουλὴν τινεὶ ἐπαχθῆ καὶ ὀλιγαρχικὴν κολούσαντες, ὥσπερ Ἐφιδίλτης Ἀθήνησι καὶ Φορμίων παρ' Ἡλείοις, δύναμιν ἕμα καὶ δόξαν*

ἔσχον.

About the oligarchical character of the Areopagites, see Deinarchus cont. Demosthen. pp. 46, 98.

feeling of the Lacedæmonians might well appear to Athenian citizens eminently desirable to preserve: and the philo-Laconian character of the leading men at Athens contributed to disarm the jealousy of Sparta during that critical period while the Athenian maritime ascendancy was in progress.¹

The political opposition between Periklès and Kimon was hereditary, since Xanthippus the father of the former had been the accuser of Miltiadès the father of the latter. Both were of the first families in the city, and this, combined with the military talents of Kimon and the great statesmanlike superiority of Periklès, placed both the one and the other at the head of the two political parties which divided Athens. Periklès must have begun his political career very young, since he maintained a position first of great influence, and afterwards of unparalleled moral and political ascendancy, for the long period of forty years, against distinguished rivals, bitter assailants, and unscrupulous libellers (about 467-428 B.C.). His public life began about the time when Themistoklès was ostracised, and when Aristeidès was passing off the stage, and he soon displayed a character which combined the pecuniary probity of the one with the resource and large views of the other; superadding to both, a discretion and mastery of temper never disturbed—an excellent musical and lettered education received from Pythokleidès—an eloquence such as no one before had either heard or conceived—and the best philosophy which the age afforded. His military duties as a youthful citizen were faithfully and strenuously performed, but he was timid in his first political approaches to the people—a fact perfectly in unison with the caution of his temperament, but which some of his biographers² explained by saying that he was afraid of being ostracised, and that his countenance resembled that of the despot Peisistratus. We may be pretty sure however that this personal resemblance (like the wonderful dream ascribed to his mother³ when pregnant of him) was an after-thought of enemies when his ascendancy was already established—and that young beginners were in little danger of ostracism. The complexion of

Opposition
between
Kimon and
Periklès—
inherited
from their
fathers—
character
and working
of Periklès.

¹ Plutarch, Kimon, c. 16; Themistoklès, c. 20.

² Plutarch, Periklès, c. 4-7 seq.

³ Herodot. vi. 131.

political parties in Athens had greatly changed since the days of Themistoklès and Aristeidès. For the Kleisthenean constitution, though enlarged by the latter after the return from Salamis to the extent of making all citizens without exception eligible for magistracy, had become unpopular with the poorer citizens and to the keener democratical feeling which now ran through Athens and Peiræus.

It was to this democratical party—the party of movement against that of resistance, or of reformers against conservatives, if we are to employ modern phraseology—that Periklès devoted his great rank, character, and abilities. From the low arts, which it is common to ascribe to one who espouses the political interests of the poor against the rich, he was remarkably exempt. He was indefatigable in his attention to public business; but he went little into society, and disregarded almost to excess the airs of popularity. His eloquence was irresistibly impressive; yet he was by no means prodigal of it, taking care to reserve himself, like the Salaminian trireme, for solemn occasions, and preferring for the most part to employ the agency of friends and partisans.¹ Moreover he imbibed from his friend and teacher Anaxagoras a tinge of physical philosophy which greatly strengthened his mind² and armed him against many of the reigning superstitions—but which at the same time tended to rob him of the sympathy of the vulgar, rich as well as poor. The arts of demagoguery were in fact much more cultivated by the oligarchical Kimon; whose open-hearted familiarity of manner was extolled, by his personal friend the poet Ion, in contrast with the reserved and stately demeanour of his rival Periklès. Kimon employed the rich plunder, procured by his maritime expeditions, in public decorations as well as in largesses to the poorer citizens; throwing open his fields and fruits to all the inhabitants of his deme, and causing himself to be attended in public by well-dressed slaves, directed to tender their warm tunics in exchange for the threadbare garments of those who seemed in want. But the property of Periklès was adminis-

Reserved, philosophical, and business-like habits of Periklès—his little pains to court popularity—less of the demagogue than Kimon.

¹ Plutarch, Reipub. Gerend. Præcept. p. 812; Periklès, c. 5, 6, 7.

² Plato, Phædrus, c. 54, p. 270; Plutarch, Periklès, c. 8; Xenoph. Memor. i. 2, 46.

tered with a strict, though benevolent economy, by his ancient steward Evangelus—the produce of his lands being all sold, and the consumption of his house supplied by purchase in the market.¹ It was by such regularity that his perfect and manifest independence of all pecuniary seduction was sustained. In taste, in talent, and in character, Kimon was the very opposite of Periklès: a brave and efficient commander, a lavish distributor, a man of convivial and amorous habits—but incapable of sustained attention to business, untaught in music or letters, and endued with Laconian aversion to rhetoric and philosophy; while the ascendancy of Periklès was founded on his admirable combination of civil qualities—probity, firmness, diligence, judgement, eloquence, and power of guiding partisans. As a military commander, though noway deficient in personal courage, he rarely courted distinction and was principally famous for his care of the lives of the citizens, discountenancing all rash or distant enterprises. His private habits were sober and recluse: his chief conversation was with Anaxagoras, Protagoras,² Zeno, the musician Damon, and other philosophers—while the tenderest domestic attachment bound him to the engaging and cultivated Aspasia.

Such were the two men who stood forward at this time as most conspicuous in Athenian party-contest—the expanding democracy against the stationary democracy of the past generation, which now passed by the name of oligarchy—the ambitious and talkative energy, spread even among the poor population, which was now forming more and more the characteristic of Athens, against the unlettered and uninquiring valour of the conquerors of Marathon.³

Ephialtès, son of Sophônidès, was at this time the leading auxiliary, seemingly indeed the equal of Periklès, and noway inferior to him in personal probity, though he was a poor man.⁴ As to aggressive political warfare, he was even more active than Periklès, who appears throughout his long public

Ephialtès, belonging to the democratical party, and originally equal to Periklès in influence. Efforts of Ephialtès against magisterial abuse.

¹ Plutarch, Periklès, c. 9, 16; Kimon, c. 10; Reipubl. Gerend. Præcept. p. 818.

² The personal intercourse between Periklès and Protagoras is attested by the interesting fragment of the latter

which we find in Plutarch, Consolat. ad Apollonium, c. 33, p. 119.

³ Aristophan. Nubes, 972, 1000 seq. and Ranæ, 1071.

⁴ Plutarch, Kimon, c. 10; Ælian, V. H. ii. 43; xi. 9.

life to have manifested but little bitterness against political enemies. Unfortunately our scanty knowledge of the history of Athens brings before us only some general causes and a few marked facts. The details and the particular persons concerned are not within our sight: yet the actual course of political events depends everywhere mainly upon these details, as well as upon the general causes. Before Ephialtēs advanced his main proposition for abridging the competence of the senate of Areopagus, he appears to have been strenuous in repressing the practical abuse of magisterial authority, by accusations brought against the magistrates at the period of their regular accountability. After repeated efforts to check the practical abuse of these magisterial powers,¹ Ephialtēs and Periklēs were at last conducted to the proposition of cutting them down permanently, and introducing an altered system.

Such proceedings naturally provoked extreme bitterness of party feeling. It is probable that this temper may have partly dictated the accusation preferred against Kimon (about 463 B.C.) after the surrender of Thasos, for alleged reception of bribes from the Macedonian prince Alexander—an accusation of which he was acquitted. At this time the oligarchical or Kimonian party was decidedly the most powerful: and when the question was proposed for sending troops to aid the Lacedæmonians in reducing the revolted Helots on Ithômê, Kimon carried the people along with him to comply, by an appeal to their generous feelings, in spite of the strenuous opposition of Ephialtēs.² But when Kimon and the Athenian hoplites returned home, having been dismissed by Sparta under circumstances of insulting suspicion (as has been mentioned in the preceding chapter), the indignation of the citizens was extreme. They renounced their alliance with Sparta, and entered into amity with Argos. Of course the influence of Kimon, and the position of the oligarchical party, was materially changed by this incident. And in the existing bitterness of political parties, it is not surprising that his opponents should take the opportunity for proposing soon

Kimon and his party, more powerful than Ephialtēs and Periklēs, until the time when the Athenian troops were dismissed from Laconia. (Ostracism of Kimon.

¹ Plutarch, Periklēs, c. 10: compare Valer. Maxim. iii. 8, 4. 'Εφιάλτην μὲν οὖν, φοβερόν ὄντα τοῖς ὀλιγαρχικοῖς καὶ περὶ τὰς εὐθύναις καὶ διώξεις τῶν τὸν

δῆμον ἀδικούντων ἀπαραίτητον, ἐκίβου-
λέσαντες οἱ ἐχθροὶ δι' Ἀριστοδίκου τοῦ
Ταραγρικοῦ κρυφαίως ἀνέκλινον, &c.

² Plutarch, Kimon, c. 16.

afterwards a vote of ostracism¹—a challenge, indeed, which may perhaps have been accepted not unwillingly by Kimon and his party, since they might still fancy themselves the strongest, and suppose that the sentence of banishment would fall upon Ephialtès or Periklès. However, the vote ended in the expulsion of Kimon, a sure proof that his opponents were now in the ascendent. On this occasion, as on the preceding, we see the ostracism invoked to meet a period of intense political conflict, the violence of which it would at least abate, by removing for the time one of the contending leaders.

It was now that Periklès and Ephialtès carried their important scheme of judicial reform. The senate of Areopagus was deprived of its discretionary censorial power, as well as of all its judicial competence, except that which related to homicide. The individual magistrates, as well as the senate of Five Hundred, were also stripped of their judicial attributes (except the power of imposing a small fine²), which were transferred to the newly-created panels of salaried dikasts, lotted off in ten divisions from the aggregate Heliæa. Ephialtès³ first brought down the laws of Solon from the acropolis to the neighbourhood of the market place, where the dikasteries sat—a visible proof that the judicature was now popularised.

In the representations of many authors, the full bearing of this great constitutional change is very inadequately conceived. What we are commonly told is, that Periklès was the first to assign a salary to these numerous dikasteries at Athens. He bribed the people with the public money (says Plutarch), in order to make head against Kimon, who bribed them out of his own private purse : as if the pay were the main feature in the case, and as if all which Periklès did was, to make himself popular by paying the dikasts for judicial service which they had before rendered gratuitously. The truth is, that this numerous army of dikasts, distributed into ten regiments, and

Measures carried by Ephialtès and Periklès to abridge the power of the senate of Areopagus as well as of individual magistrates. Institution of the paid dikasteries.

¹ Plutarch, Kimon, c. 17. Οἱ δὲ πρὸς ὄργην ἀπελθόντες ἦδη τοῖς λακωνίζουσι φανερώς ἐχάλεταινον, καὶ τὸν Κίμωνι μικρὰς ἐπιλαβέμενοι προφάσεως ἐξωστράκισαν εἰς ἑτὴ δίκα.

I transcribe this passage as a specimen of the inaccurate manner in which the ostracism is so often described. Plutarch says—"The Athenians took ad-

vantage of a slight pretence to ostracise Kimon:" but it was a peculiar characteristic of ostracism that it had no pretence: it was a judgement passed without specific or assigned cause.

² Demosthen. cont. Euerget. et Mnesibul. c. 12.

³ Harpokration—"Ο κατωθεν νόμος—Pollux, xiii. 128.

summoned to act systematically throughout the year, was now for the first time organised: the commencement of their pay is also the commencement of their regular judicial action.

Separation
of judicial
from admin-
istrative
functions.

What Periklēs really effected was, to sever for the first time from the administrative competence of the magistrates that judicial authority which had originally gone along with it. The great men who had been accustomed to hold these offices were lowered both in influence and authority:¹ while on the other hand a new life, habit, and sense of power, sprung up among the poorer citizens. A plaintiff having cause of civil action, or an accuser invoking punishment against citizens guilty of injury either to himself or to the state, had still to address himself to one or other of the archons, but it was only with a view of ultimately arriving before the dikastery by whom the cause was to be tried. While the magistrates acting individually were thus restricted to simple administration and preliminary police, they experienced a still more serious loss of power in their capacity of members of the Areopagus, after the year of archonship was expired. Instead of their previous unmeasured range of supervision and interference, they were now deprived of all judicial sanction beyond that small power of fining which was still left both to individual magistrates, and to the senate of Five Hundred. But the cognizance of homicide was still expressly reserved to them—for the procedure, in this latter case religious not less than judicial, was so thoroughly consecrated by ancient feeling, that no reformer could venture to disturb or remove it.²

¹ Aristot. Polit. iv. 5, 6. ἔτι δ' οἱ ταῖς ἀρχαῖς ἐγκαλοῦντες τὸν δῆμόν φασι δεῖν κρίνειν ὃ δ' ἀσμένως δέχεται τὴν πρόκλησιν· ὥστε καταλύονται πᾶσαι αἱ ἀρχαί, &c. : compare vi. 1, 8.

The remark of Aristotle is not justly applicable to the change effected by Periklēs, which transferred the power taken from the magistrates, not to the people, but to certain specially constituted, though numerous and popular dikasteries, sworn to decide in conformity with known and written laws. Nor is the separation of judicial competence from administrative, to be characterised as "dissolving or extinguishing magisterial authority." On the contrary, it

is conformable to the best modern notions. Periklēs cannot be censured for having effected this separation, however persons may think that the judicature which he constituted was objectionable.

Plato seems also to have conceived administrative power as essentially accompanied by judicial (Legg. vi. p. 767) — πάντα ἀρχοντα ἀναγκαῖον καὶ δικαστὴν εἶναι τινῶν—an opinion doubtless perfectly just, up to a certain narrow limit: the separation between the two sorts of powers cannot be rendered *absolutely* complete.

² Demosthen. cont. Neær. p. 1372; cont. Aristokrat. p. 642.

Meier (Altischer Prozess, p. 143)

It was upon this same ground probably that the stationary party defended *all* the prerogatives of the senate of Areopagus

thinks that the senate of Arcopagus was also deprived of its cognizance of homicide as well as of its other functions, and that this was only restored after the expulsion of the Thirty. He produces as evidence a passage of Lysias (*De Cæde Eratosthenis*, p. 31-33).

M. Boeckh and O. Müller adopt the same opinion as Meier, and seemingly on the authority of the same passage (see the Dissertation of O. Müller on the *Eumenides* of Æschylus, p. 113, Eng. transl.). But in the first place, this opinion is contradicted by an express statement in the anonymous biographer of Thucydides, who mentions the trial of Pylilampēs for murder before the Areopagus; and contradicted also, seemingly, by Xenophon (*Memorals* iii. 5, 20); in the next place, the passage of Lysias appears to me to bear a different meaning. He says, *καὶ πατρίων ἐστὶ καὶ ἐφ' ὧμῶν ἀποδίδουσι τοῦ φόνου τὰς δίκας δικάζου*: now (even if we admit the conjectural reading *ἐφ' ὧμῶν* in place of *ἐφ' ὧμῶν* to be correct) still this restoration of functions to the Arcopagus refers naturally to the restored democracy after the violent interruption occasioned by the oligarchy of the Thirty. Considering how many persons the Thirty caused to be violently put to death, and the complete subversion of all the laws which they introduced, it seems impossible to suppose that the Arcopagus could have continued to hold its sittings and try accusations for intentional homicide, under their government. On the return of the democracy after the Thirty were expelled, the functions of the senate of Arcopagus would return also.

If the supposition of the eminent authors mentioned above were correct—if it were true that the Arcopagus was deprived not only of its supervising function generally, but also of its cognizance of homicide, during the fifty-five years which elapsed between the motion of Ephialtēs and the expulsion of the Thirty—this senate must have been without any functions at all during that long interval; it must have been for all practical purposes non-existent. But during so long a period of total suspension, the citizens would have lost all their respect for it; it could not have retained so much influence as we

know that it actually possessed immediately before the Thirty (Lysias c. Eratosth. c. 11, p. 126); and it would hardly have been revived after the expulsion of the Thirty. Whereas by preserving during that period its jurisdiction in cases of homicide, apart from those more extended privileges which had formerly rendered it obnoxious, the ancient traditional respect for it was kept alive, and it was revived after the fall of the Thirty as a venerable part of the old democracy; even apparently with some extension of privileges.

The inferences which O. Müller wishes to draw, as to the facts of these times, from the *Eumenides* of Æschylus, appear to me ill-supported. In order to sustain his view that by virtue of the proposition of Ephialtēs "the Arcopagus almost entirely ceased to be a high Court of Judicature" (sect. 36, p. 109), he is forced to alter the chronology of the events, and to affirm that the motion of Ephialtēs must have been carried subsequently to the representation of the *Eumenides*, though Diodorus mentions it in the year next but one before, and there is nothing to contradict him. All that we can safely infer from the very indistinct allusions in Æschylus, is, that he himself was full of reverence for the Arcopagus, and that the season was one in which party bitterness ran so high as to render something like civil war (*ἐμφύλιον ἄρην*, v. 864) within the scope of reasonable apprehension. Probably he may have been averse to the diminution of the privileges of the Arcopagus by Ephialtēs: yet even thus much is not altogether certain, inasmuch as he puts it forward prominently and specially as a tribunal for homicide, exercising this jurisdiction by inherent prescription, and confirmed in it by the *Eumenides* themselves. Now when we consider that such jurisdiction was precisely the thing confirmed and left by Ephialtēs to the Arcopagus, we might plausibly argue that Æschylus, by enhancing the solemnity and predicting the perpetuity of the remaining privilege, intended to conciliate those who resented the recent innovations, and to soften the hatred between the two opposing parties.

The opinion of Boeckh, O. Müller, and Meier,—respecting the withdrawal

—denouncing the curtailments proposed by Ephialtēs as impious and guilty innovations.¹ How extreme their resentment became, when these reforms were carried—and how fierce was the collision of political parties at this moment—we may judge by the result. The enemies of Ephialtēs caused him to be privately assassinated, by the hand of a Bœotian of Tanagra named Aristodikus. Such a crime—rare in the political annals of Athens, for we come to no known instance of it afterwards until the oligarchy of the Four Hundred in 411 B.C.—marks at once the gravity of the change now introduced, the fierceness of the opposition offered, and the unscrupulous character of the conservative party. Kimon was in exile and had no share in the deed. Doubtless the assassination of Ephialtēs produced an effect unfavourable in every way to the party who procured it. The popular party in their resentment must have become still more attached to the judicial reforms just assured to them, while the hands of Periklēs, the superior leader left behind and now acting singly, must have been materially strengthened.

It is from this point that the administration of that great man may be said to date: he was now the leading adviser (we might almost say Prime Minister) of the Athenian people. His first years were marked by a series of brilliant successes—already mentioned—the acquisition of Megara as an ally, and the victorious war against Corinth and Ægina. But when he proposed the great and valuable improvement of the Long Walls, thus making one city of Athens and Peiræus, the same oligarchical party, which had op-

Commence-
ment of the
great ascend-
ency of Peri-
klēs, after
the death of
Ephialtēs.
Compromise
between him
and Kimon.
Brilliant suc-
cesses of
Athens, and
era of the
maximum of
her power.

from the senate of Areopagus of the judgements on homicide, by the proposition of Ephialtēs—has been discussed and (in my judgement) refuted by Forchhammer—in a valuable Dissertation—*De Areopago non privalo per Ephialten Homicidii Judiciis*. Kiel, 1828.

¹ This is the language of those authors whom Diodorus copied (Diodor. xi. 77) —*οὐ μὴν ἀθρόως γε διέφυγε τῆλικούτοις ἀνομήμασιν ἐπιβαλλόμενος* (Ephialtēs), ἀλλὰ τῆς νυκτὸς ἀναρεθείς, ἀθλον ἔσχε τὴν τοῦ βίου τελευτήν. Compare Pausanias, i.

29, 15.

Plutarch (Periklēs, c. 10) cites Aristotle as having mentioned the assassination of Ephialtēs. Antipho, however, states that the assassin was never formally known or convicted (*De Cæde Hero*, c. 68).

The enemies of Periklēs circulated a report (mentioned by Idomeneus), that it was he who had procured the assassination of Ephialtēs, from jealousy of the superiority of the latter (Plutarch, Periklēs, c. 10). We may infer from this report how great the eminence of Ephialtēs was.

posed his judicial changes and assassinated Ephialtès, again stood forward in vehement resistance. Finding direct opposition unavailing, they did not scruple to enter into treasonable correspondence with Sparta—invoking the aid of a foreign force for the overthrow of the democracy: so odious had it become in their eyes, since the recent innovations. How serious was the hazard incurred by Athens, near the time of the battle of Tanagra, has been already recounted; together with the rapid and unexpected reconciliation of parties after that battle, principally owing to the generous patriotism of Kimon and his immediate friends. Kimon was restored from ostracism on this occasion, before his full time had expired; while the rivalry between him and Periklès henceforward becomes mitigated, or even converted into a compromise,¹ whereby the internal affairs of the city were left to the one, and the conduct of foreign expeditions to the other. The successes of Athens during the ensuing ten years were more brilliant than ever, and she attained the maximum of her power: which doubtless had a material effect in imparting stability to the democracy, as well as to the administration of Periklès—and enabled both the one and the other to stand the shock of those great public reverses, which deprived the Athenians of their dependent landed alliances, during the interval between the defeat of Korôneia and the thirty years' truce.

Along with the important judicial revolution brought about by Periklès, were introduced other changes belonging to the same scheme and system.

Thus a general power of supervision, both over the magistrates and over the public assembly, was vested in seven magistrates, now named for the first time, called Nomophylakes, or Law-Guardians, and doubtless changed every year. These Nomophylakes sat alongside of the Proëdri or presidents both in the senate and in the public assembly, and were charged with the duty of interposing whenever any step was taken or any proposition

Other constitutional changes.—The Nomophylakes.

¹ The intervention of Elpinikê, the sister of Kimon, in bringing about this compromise between her brother and Periklès, is probable enough (Plutarch, Periklès, c. 10, and Kimon, c. 14). Clever and engaging, she seems to have played an active part in the political intrigues of the day; but we are not at all called upon to credit the scandals insinuated by Eupolis and Stesimbrotus.

made contrary to the existing laws. They were also empowered to constrain the magistrates to act according to law.¹ We do not know whether they possessed the presidency of a dikastery—that is, whether they could themselves cause one of the panels of jurors to be summoned, and put an alleged delinquent on his trial before it, under their presidency—or whether they were restricted to entering a formal protest, laying the alleged illegality before the public assembly. To appoint magistrates however, invested with this special trust of watching and informing, was not an unimportant step; for it would probably enable Ephialtēs to satisfy many objectors who feared to abolish the superintending power of the Areopagus without introducing any substitute. The Nomophylakes were honoured with a distinguished place at the public processions and festivals, and were even allowed (like the Archons) to enter the senate of Areopagus after their year of office had expired: but they never acquired any considerable power such as that senate had itself exercised. Their interference must have been greatly superseded by the introduction, and increasing application of the Graphē Paranomōn, presently to be explained. They are not even noticed in the description of that misguided assembly which condemned the six generals, after the battle of Arginusæ, to be tried by a novel process which violated legal form not less than substantial justice.² After the expulsion of the Thirty, the senate of Areopagus was again invested with a supervision over magistrates, though without anything like its ancient ascendancy.

Another important change, which we may with probability refer to Periklēs, is, the institution of the Nomothetæ. These

¹ We hear about these Nomophylakes in a distinct statement cited from Philochorus, by Photius, Lexic. p. 674, Porson. Νομοφύλακες ἑταροὶ εἰσι τῶν θεσμοθετῶν, ὡς φιλόχορος ἐν ζ'. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀρχοῦντες ἀνέβαινον εἰς Ἄρειον πάγον ἵστεφανώμενοι, οἱ δὲ νομοφύλακες χρύσια στρόφια ὄγοντες καὶ ταῖς θεαῖς ἐναντίον ἀρχόντων ἐκαθίζοντο καὶ τὴν πομπὴν ἔκπεμπον τῇ Παλλάδι· τὰς δὲ ἀρχὰς ἡγάγακον τοῖς νόμοις χρῆσθαι καὶ ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ καὶ ἐν τῇ βουλῇ μετὰ τῶν προέδρων ἐκάθοντο, καλοῦντες τὰ ἀσύμφορα τῇ πόλει πράττειν ἔπειτα δὲ ἦσαν καὶ κατέστησαν, ὡς φιλόχορος, ὅτε Ἐφιάλτης

μόνη κατέλιπε τῇ ἐξ Ἄρειον πάγου βουλῇ τὰ ὑπὲρ τοῦ σώματος.

Harpokration, Pollux, and Suidas, give substantially the same account of these magistratures, though none except Photius mentions the exact date of their appointment. There is no adequate ground for the doubt which M. Boeckh expresses about the accuracy of this statement: see Schömann, Ant. Jur. Pub. Græc. sect. lvi.; and Cicero, Legg. iii. 20.

² See Xenophon, Hellenic. i. 7; Andokidēs de Mysteriis, p. 40.

men were in point of fact dikasts, members of the 6000 citizens annually sworn in that capacity. But they were not, like the dikasts for trying causes, distributed into panels or regiments known by a particular letter and acting together throughout the entire year : they were lotted off to sit together only on special occasion and as the necessity arose. According to the reform now introduced, the Ekklesia or public assembly, even with the sanction of the senate of Five Hundred, became incompetent either to pass a new law or to repeal a law already in existence ; it could only enact a *psephism*—that is, properly speaking, a decree applicable only to a particular case ; though the word was used at Athens in a very large sense, sometimes comprehending decrees of general as well as permanent application. In reference to laws, a peculiar judicial procedure was established. The Thesmothetæ were directed annually to examine the existing laws, noting any contradictions or double laws on the same matter ; and in the first prytany (tenth part) of the Attic year, on the eleventh day, an Ekklesia was held, in which the first business was to go through the laws *seriatim*, and submit them for approval or rejection ; first beginning with the laws relating to the senate, next coming to those of more general import, especially such as determined the functions and competence of the magistrates. If any law was condemned by the vote of the public assembly, or if any citizen had a new law to propose, the third assembly of the Prytany was employed, previous to any other business, in the appointment of Nomothetæ and in the provision of means to pay their salary. Previous notice was required to be given publicly by every citizen who had new propositions of the sort to make, in order that the time necessary for the sitting of the Nomothetæ might be measured according to the number of matters to be submitted to their cognizance. Public advocates were farther named to undertake the formal defence of all the laws attacked, and the citizen who proposed to repeal them had to make out his case against this defence, to the satisfaction of the assembled Nomothetæ. These latter were taken from the 6000 sworn dikasts, and were of different numbers according to circumstances : sometimes we hear of them as 500, sometimes as

The Nomothetæ—distinction between laws and psephisms or special decrees—process by which laws were enacted and repealed.

1000—and we may be certain that the number was always considerable.

The effect of this institution was, to place the making or repealing of laws under the same solemnities and guarantees as the trying of causes or accusations in judicature. We must recollect that the citizens who attended the Ekklesia or public assembly were not sworn like the dikasts; nor had they the same solemnity of procedure, nor the same certainty of hearing both sides of the question set forth, nor the same full preliminary notice. How much the oath sworn was brought to act upon the minds of the dikasts, we may see by the frequent appeals to it in the orators, who contrast them with the unsworn public assembly.¹ And there can be no doubt that the Nomothetæ afforded much greater security than the public assembly, for a proper decision. That security depended upon the same principle as we see to pervade all the constitutional arrangements of Athens; upon a fraction of the people casually taken, but sufficiently numerous to have the same interest with the whole,—not permanent but delegated for the occasion,—assembled under a solemn sanction,—and furnished with a full exposition of both sides of the case. The power of passing psephism, or special decrees, still remained with the public assembly, which was doubtless much more liable to be surprised into hasty or inconsiderate decision than either the Dikastery or the Nomothetæ—in spite of the necessity of

¹ Demosthen. *conl. Timokrat. c. 20*, pp. 725, 726. "Ἀρ' οὖν τῇ δοκεῖ συμφέρειν τῇ πόλει τοιοῦτος νόμος, ὅτι δικαστηρίου γνώσεως αὐτὸς ἐνριώτερος ἵσται, καὶ τὰς ἐκ τῶν ἡμωμοκώτων γνώσεις τοῖς ἀνωμότοις προστάζει λύειν;—Ἐνθυμείσθε, ἀπὸ τοῦ δικαστηρίου καὶ τῆς καταγνώσεως οἱ διεπῆδησαν (Timokratēs) ἐπὶ τὸν δῆμον, ἐκκλείπων τὸν ἡδικηκότα! compare Demosthen. *cont. Eubulid. c. 15*.

See, about the Nomothetæ, Schömann, *De Comitibus*, ch. vii. p. 248 *seqq.*, and Platner, *Prozess und Klagen bey den Attikern*, Abschn. ii. 3, p. 33 *seqq.*

Both of them maintain, in my opinion erroneously, that the Nomothetæ are an institution of Solon. Demosthenēs indeed ascribes it to Solon (Schömann, p. 268): but this counts in my view for nothing, when I see that all the laws

which he cites for governing the proceedings of the Nomothetæ, bear unequivocal evidence of a time much later. Schömann admits this to a certain extent, and in reference to the style of these laws—"Illorum quidem fragmentorum, quæ in Timokratēa extant, recentiorem Solonis ætate formam atque orationem apertum est." But it is not merely the style which proves them to be of post-Solonian date: it is the mention of post-Solonian institutions, such as the ten prytanies into which the year was divided, the ten statues of the Eponymi—all derived from the creation of the ten tribes by Kleisthenēs. On the careless employment of the name of Solon by the orators whenever they desire to make a strong impression on the dikasts, I have already remarked.

previous authority from the senate of Five Hundred, before any proposition could be submitted to it.

As an additional security both to the public assembly and the Nomothetæ against being entrapped into decisions contrary to existing law, another remarkable provision has yet to be mentioned—a provision probably introduced by Periklês at the same time as the formalities of law-making by means of specially delegated Nomothetæ. This was the *Graphê Paranomôn*—indictment for informality or illegality—which might be brought on certain grounds against the proposer of any law or any psephism, and rendered him liable to punishment by the dikastery. He was required in bringing forward his new measure to take care that it should not be in contradiction with any pre-existing law—or if there were any such contradiction, to give formal notice of it, to propose the repeal of that which existed, and to write up publicly beforehand what his proposition was—in order that there might never be two contradictory laws at the same time in operation, nor any illegal decree passed either by the senate or by the public assembly. If he neglected this precaution, he was liable to prosecution under the *Graphê Paranomôn*, which any Athenian citizen might bring against him before the dikastery, through the intervention and under the presidency of the Thesmothetæ.

Graphê Paranomôn—indictment against the mover of illegal or unconstitutional propositions.

Judging from the title of this indictment, it was originally confined to the special ground of formal contradiction between the new and the old. But it had a natural tendency to extend itself: the citizen accusing would strengthen his case by showing that the measure which he attacked contradicted not merely the letter, but the spirit and purpose of existing laws—and he would proceed from hence to denounce it as generally mischievous and disgraceful to the state. In this unmeasured latitude we find the *Graphê Paranomôn* at the time of Demosthenês. The mover of a new law or psephism, even after it had been regularly discussed and passed, was liable to be indicted, and had to defend himself not only against alleged informalities in his procedure, but also against alleged mischiefs in the substance of his measure. If found guilty by the dikastery, the punishment inflicted upon him by them was not fixed, but variable according to circumstances. For the

indictment belonged to that class wherein, after the verdict of guilty, first a given amount of punishment was proposed by the accuser, next another and lighter amount was named by the accused party against himself—the dikastery being bound to make their option between one and the other, without admitting any third modification—so that it was the interest even of the accused party to name against himself a measure of punishment sufficient to satisfy the sentiment of the dikasts, in order that they might not prefer the more severe proposition of the accuser. At the same time, the accuser himself (as in other public indictments) was fined in the sum of 1000 drachms, unless the verdict of guilty obtained at least one-fifth of the suffrages of the dikastery. The personal responsibility of the mover, however, continued only one year after the introduction of this new law. If the accusation was brought at a greater distance of time than one year, the accuser could invoke no punishment against the mover, and the sentence of the dikasts neither absolved nor condemned anything but the law. Their condemnation of the law with or without the author, amounted *ipso facto* to a repeal of it.

Such indictment against the author of a law or of a decree might be preferred either at some stage prior to its final enactment—as after its acceptance simply by the senate, if it was a decree, or after its approval by the public assembly, and prior to its going before the Nomothetæ, if it was a law—or after it had reached full completion by the verdict of the Nomothetæ. In the former case the indictment staid its farther progress until sentence had been pronounced by the dikasts.

This regulation is framed in a thoroughly conservative spirit, to guard the existing laws against being wholly or partially nullified by a new proposition. As, in the procedure of the Nomothetæ, whenever any proposition was made for distinctly repealing any existing law, it was thought unsafe to entrust the defence of the law so assailed to the chance of some orator gratuitously undertaking it. Paid advocates were appointed for the purpose. So also, when any citizen made a new positive proposition, sufficient security was not supposed to be afforded by the chance of opponents rising up at the time. Accordingly, a

Working of the Graphê Paranomôn.
—Conservative spirit in which it is framed.—
Restraint upon new propositions, and upon the unlimited initiative belonging to every citizen.

farther guarantee was provided in the personal responsibility of the mover. That the latter, before he proposed a new decree or a new law, should take care that there was nothing in it inconsistent with existing laws—or, if there were, that he should first formally bring forward a direct proposition for the repeal of such pre-existent law—was in no way unreasonable. It imposed upon him an obligation such as he might perfectly well fulfil. It served as a check upon the use of that right, of free speech and initiative in the public assembly, which belonged to every Athenian without exception,¹ and which was cherished by the democracy as much as it was condemned by oligarchical thinkers. It was a security to the dikasts, who were called upon to apply the law to particular cases, against the perplexity of having conflicting laws quoted before them, and being obliged in their verdict to set aside either one or the other. In modern European governments, even the most free and constitutional, laws have been both made and applied either by select persons or select assemblies, under an organization so different as to put out of sight the idea of personal responsibility on the proposer of a new law. Moreover, even in such assemblies, private initiative has either not existed at all, or has been of comparatively little effect, in law-making; while in the application of laws when made, there has always been a permanent judicial body exercising an action of its own, more or less independent of the legislature, and generally interpreting away the texts of contradictory laws so as to keep up a tolerably consistent course of forensic tradition. But at Athens, the fact that the proposer of a new decree, or of a new law, had induced the senate or the public assembly to pass it, was by no means supposed to cancel his personal responsibility, if the proposition was illegal. He had deceived the senate or the people, in deliberately keeping back from them a fact which he knew, or at least might and ought to have known.

But though a full justification may thus be urged on behalf of the *Graphê Paranómōn*, as originally conceived and

¹ The privation of this right of public speech (*παρρησία*) followed on the condemnation of any citizen to the punishment called *ἀτίμια*, disfranchisement, entire or partial (Demosthen. cont.

Near. p. 1352, c. 9; cont. Meidiam, p. 545, c. 27). Compare for the oligarchical sentiment, Xenophon, *Republ. Athen.* i. 9.

intended, it will hardly apply to that indictment as applied afterwards in its plenary and abusive latitude. Thus *Æschinês* indicts *Ktesiphon* under it for having under certain circumstances proposed a crown to *Demosthenês*. He begins by showing that the proposition was illegal—for this was the essential foundation of the indictment: he then goes on farther to demonstrate, in a splendid harangue, that *Demosthenês* was a vile man and a mischievous politician: accordingly (assuming the argument to be just) *Ktesiphon* had deceived the people in an aggravated way—first by proposing a reward under circumstances contrary to law, next by proposing it in favour of an unworthy man. The first part of the argument only is of the essence of the *Graphê Paranomôn*; the second part is in the nature of an abuse growing out of it,—springing from that venom of personal and party enmity which is inseparable, in a greater or less degree, from free political action, and which manifested itself with virulence at Athens, though within the limits of legality. That this indictment, as one of the most direct vents for such enmity, was largely applied and abused at Athens, is certain. But though it probably deterred unpractised citizens from originating new propositions, it did not produce the same effect upon those orators who made politics a regular business, and who could therefore both calculate the temper of the people, and reckon upon support from a certain knot of friends. *Aristophon*, towards the close of his political life, made it a boast that he had been thus indicted and acquitted seventy-five times. Probably the worst effect which it produced was that of encouraging the vein of personality and bitterness which pervades so large a proportion of Attic oratory, even in its most illustrious manifestations; turning deliberative into judicial eloquence, and interweaving the discussion of a law or decree along with a declamatory harangue against the character of its mover. We may at the same time add that the *Graphê Paranomôn* was often the most convenient way of getting a law or a psephism repealed, so that it was used even when the annual period had passed over, and when the mover was therefore out of danger—the indictment being then brought only against the law or decree, as in the

Abusive extension of the *Graphê Paranomôn* afterwards.

It was often used as a simple way of procuring the repeal of an existing law—without personal aim against the author of the law.

case which forms the subject of the harangue of Demosthenēs against Leptinēs. If the speaker of this harangue obtained a verdict, he procured at once the repeal of the law or decree, without proposing any new provision in its place; which he would be required to do—if not peremptorily, at least by common usage—if he carried the law for repeal before the Nomothetæ.

The dikasteries provided under the system of Periklēs varied in number of members: we never hear of less than 200 members—most generally of 500—and sometimes also of 1000, 1500, 2000 members, on important trials.¹ Each man received pay from the Numbers and pay of the dikasts, as provided by Periklēs. treasurers called Kolakretæ, after his day's business was over, of three oboli or half a drachm: at least this was the amount paid during the early part of the Peloponnesian war. M. Boeckh supposes that the original pay proposed by Periklēs was one obolus, afterwards tripled by Kleon; but his opinion is open to much doubt. It was indispensable to propose a measure of pay sufficient to induce citizens to come, and come frequently, if not regularly. Now one obolus seems to have proved afterwards an inadequate temptation even to the ekklesiasts (or citizens who attended the public assembly), who were less frequently wanted, and must have had easier sittings, than the dikasts: much less therefore would it be sufficient in the case of the latter. I incline to the belief that the pay originally awarded was three oboli:² the rather, as these new

¹ See Meier, Attisch. Prozess, p. 139. Andokidēs mentions a trial under the indictment of γραφή παρανόμων, brought by his father Leogoras against a senator named Speusippus, wherein 6000 dikasts sat—that is the entire body of Heliasts. However, the loose speech so habitual with Andokidēs renders this statement very uncertain (Andokidēs de Mysteriis, p. 3, § 29).

See Matthiæ, De Judiciis Atheniensium, in his Miscellanea Philologica, vol. i. p. 252. Matthiæ questions the reading of that passage in Demosthenēs (cont. Meidiam, p. 585), wherein 200 dikasts are spoken of as sitting in judgement; he thinks it ought to be περὶ τὰς ἀπορίων instead of διακοσίους—but this alteration would be rash.

² See on this question, Boeckh, Public Econ. of Athens, ch. xv. p. 233;

K. F. Hermann, Griech. Staatsalt. § 134.

The proof which M. Boeckh brings to show, first, that the original pay was one obolus—next that Kleon was the first to introduce the triobolus—is in both cases very inconclusive.

Certain passages from the Scholiast, stating that the pay of the dikasts fluctuated (οὐκ ἔστηκεν—ἄλλοτε ἄλλως ἰδίᾳ) do not so naturally indicate a rise from one obolus to three, as a change backwards and forwards according to circumstances. Now it seems that there were some occasions when the treasury was so very poor that it was doubtful whether the dikasts could be paid; see Lysias, cont. Epikrat. c. 1; cont. Nikomach. c. 22; and Aristophan. Equit. 1370. The amount of pay may therefore have been sometimes affected by this cause.

institutions seem to have nearly coincided in point of time with the transportation of the confederate treasure from Delos to Athens—so that the Exchequer would then appear abundantly provided. As to the number of dikasts actually present on each day of sitting, or the minimum number requisite to form a sitting, we are very imperfectly informed. Though each of the ten panels or divisions of dikasts included 500 individuals, seldom probably did all of them attend. But it also seldom happened, probably, that all the ten divisions sat on the same day: there was therefore an opportunity of making up deficiencies in division A—when its lot was called and when its dikasts did not appear in sufficient numbers—from those who belonged to division B or Δ, besides the supplementary dikasts who were not comprised in any of the ten divisions: though on all these points we cannot go beyond conjecture. Certain it is, however, that the dikasteries were always numerous, and that none of the dikasts could know in what causes they would be employed, so that it was impossible to tamper with them beforehand.¹

Such were the great constitutional innovations of Periklēs and Ephialtēs—changes full of practical results—the transformation, as well as the complement, of that democratical system which Kleisthenēs had begun, and to which the tide of Athenian feeling had been gradually mounting up during the preceding twenty years. The entire force of these changes is generally not perceived, because the popular dikasteries and the Nomothetæ are so often represented as institutions of Solon, and as merely supplied with pay by Periklēs. This erroneous supposition prevents all clear view of the growth

¹ There is a remarkable passage on this point in the treatise of Xenophon, *De Republic. Athen.* iii. 6. He says,—
 Φέρε δὲ, ἀλλὰ φησὶ τις χρῆναι δικάζειν μὲν, ἐλάττους δὲ δικάζειν. Ἀνάγκη τοίνυν, ἐὰν μὲν πολλὰ (both Weiske and Schneider substitute πολλὰ here in place of ὀλίγα, which latter makes no sense), ποιεῖνται δικαστήρια, ὀλίγοι ἐν ἑκάστῳ ἔσονται τῷ δικαστηρίῳ ὥστε καὶ διασκευάσθαι ῥάδιον ἔσται πρὸς ὀλίγους δικαστάς, καὶ συνδεκάσαι (so Schneider and Matthiæ in place of συνδεδέκασαι) πολλὰ ἥττω δικαίως δικάζειν.

That there was a good deal of bribery

at Athens, where individuals could be approached and dealt with, is very probable (see Xenoph. *de Repub. Ath.* iii. 3): and we may well believe that there were also particular occasions on which money was given to the dikasts, some of whom were punished with death for such corrupt receipt (*Æschinēs* cont. *Timarch.* c. 17-22, p. 12-15). But the passage above quoted from Xenophon, an unfriendly witness, shows that the precautions taken to prevent corruption of the dikasteries were well devised and successful, though these precautions might sometimes be eluded.

of the Athenian democracy by throwing back its last elaborations to the period of its early and imperfect start. To strip the magistrates of all their judicial power, except that of imposing a small fine, and the Areopagus of all its jurisdiction except in cases of homicide—providing popular, numerous, and salaried dikasts to decide all the judicial business at Athens as well as to repeal and enact laws—this was the consummation of the Athenian democracy. No serious constitutional alteration (I except the temporary interruptions of the Four Hundred and the Thirty) was afterwards made until the days of Macedonian interference. As Periklēs made it, so it remained in the days of Demosthenēs—though with a sensible change in the character, and abatement in the energies, of the people, rich as well as poor.

The Athenian democracy, as constituted by Periklēs, remained substantially unaltered afterwards down to the loss of Athenian independence—excepting the temporary interruptions of the Four Hundred and the Thirty.

In appreciating the practical working of these numerous dikasteries at Athens, in comparison with such justice as might have been expected from individual magistrates, we have to consider, first—That personal and pecuniary corruption seems to have been a common vice among the leading men of Athens and Sparta, when acting individually or in boards of a few members, and not uncommon even with the kings of Sparta,—next, That in the Grecian cities generally, as we know even from the oligarchical Xenophon (he particularly excepts Sparta), the rich and great men were not only insubordinate to the magistrates, but made a parade of showing that they cared nothing about them.¹ We know also from the same unsuspected source,² that while the

Working of the numerous dikasteries—their large numbers essential to exclude corruption or intimidation—liability of individual magistrates to corruption.

¹ Xenophon, *De Republ. Laced.* c. 8, 2. *Τεκμαίρομαι δὲ ταῦτα, ὅτι ἐν μὲν ταῖς ἄλλαις πόλεσιν οἱ δυνατώτεροι οὕτως βούλονται δοκεῖν τὰς ἀρχὰς φοβεῖσθαι, ἀλλὰ νομίζουσι τοῦτο ἀνελεύθερον εἶναι· ἐν δὲ τῇ Σπάρτῃ οἱ κράτιστοι καὶ ὑπάρχοντες μάλιστα τὰς ἀρχὰς, &c.*

Respecting the violent proceedings committed by powerful men at Thebes, whereby it became almost impossible to procure justice against them for fear of being put to death, see Dikæarchus, *Vit. Græc. Fragm.* ed. Fabr. p. 143, and Polybius, xx. 4, 6; xxiii. 2.

² Xenophon, *Memorab.* iii. 5, 18. *Μηδαμῶς, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, ἃ Περικλείης, οὕτως ἤγου ἀνηκίστω πονηρίᾳ νοσεῖν Ἀθηναίους· Οὐχ ὁρᾷς, ὡς ἐβτακτοὶ μὲν εἰσιν ἐν τοῖς ναυτικοῖς, εὐτάκτους δ' ἐν τοῖς γυμνικοῖς ἀγῶσι πεῖθονται τοῖς ἐπιστάταις, οὐδὲν δὲ καταβέβηκτον ἐν τοῖς χοροῖς ὑπηρετοῦσι τοῖς διδασκάλοις; Τοῦτο γάρ τοι, ἔφη, καὶ θαυμαστόν ἐστι τὸ τοὺς μὲν τοιοῦτους πειθαρχεῖν τοῖς ἐφεστῶσι, τοὺς δὲ ὁπλίτας, καὶ τοὺς ἰππεῖς, οἱ δοκοῦσι καλοκαγαθία προκρίσθαι τῶν πολιτῶν, ἀπειθεστάτους εἶναι πάντων.*

poorer Athenian citizens who served on shipboard were distinguished for the strictest discipline, the hoplites or middling burghers who formed the infantry were less obedient, and the rich citizens who served on horseback the most disobedient of all. To make rich and powerful criminals effectively amenable to justice has indeed been found so difficult everywhere, until a recent period of history, that we should be surprised if it were otherwise in Greece. When we follow the reckless demeanour of rich men like Kritias, Alkibiadēs,¹ and Meidias, even under the full-grown democracy of Athens, we may be sure that their predecessors under the Kleisthenean constitution would have been often too formidable to be punished or kept down by an individual archon of ordinary firmness,²

¹ See Xenophon, *Memorab.* i. 2, 12-25; Thucyd. vi. 15, and the speech which he gives as spoken by Alkibiadēs in the assembly, vi. 17; Plutarch, *Alkibiad.* c. 7-8-16, and the Oration of Demosthenēs against Meidias throughout; also *Fragm.* V. of the *Πέλαργοι* of Aristophanēs, Meineke, ii. p. 1128.

² Sir Thomas Smith, in his *Treatise on the Commonwealth of England*, explains the Court of Star Chamber as originally constituted in order "to deal with offenders too stout for the ordinary course of justice." The abundant compounds of the Greek language furnish a single word exactly describing this same class of offenders—*Ἰδιοδικαί*—the title of one of the lost comedies of Eupolis; see Meineke, *Historia Critica Comicorum Græcorum*, vol. i. p. 145.

Dean Tucker observes, in his *Treatise on Civil Government*, "There was hardly a session of parliament from the time of Henry III. to Henry VIII., but laws were enacted for restraining the feuds, robberies and oppressions of the barons and their dependents on the one side—and to moderate and check the excesses and extortions of the royal purveyors on the other; these being the two capital evils then felt. Respecting the tyranny of the ancient baronage, even squires as well as others were not ashamed to wear the liveries of their leaders, and to glory in every badge of distinction, whereby they might be known to be retained as the bullies of such or such great men, and to engage in their quarrels, just or unjust, right or wrong. The histories of those times, together with the statutes of the realm,

inform us that they associated (or as they called it, *confederated* together) in great bodies, parading on horseback in fairs and markets, and clad in armour, to the great terror of peaceable subjects: nay, that they attended their lords to parliament, equipped in the same military dress, and even dared sometimes to present themselves before the judge of assize, and to enter the courts of justice in a hostile manner—while their principals sat with the judges on the bench, intimidating the witnesses, and influencing the juries by looks, nods, signs and signals." (*Treatise concerning Civil Government*, p. 337, by Josiah Tucker, D.D., London, 1781).

The whole chapter (pp. 301-355) contains many statutes and much other matter, illustrating the intimidation exercised by powerful men in those days over the course of justice.

A passage among the *Fragmenta* of Sallust, gives a striking picture of the conduct of powerful citizens under the Roman Republic. (*Fragm. lib.* i. p. 158, ed. Delph.)

"At discordia, et avaritia, et ambitio, et cætera secundis rebus oriri sueta mala, post Carthaginis excidium maximè aucta sunt. Nam injuriæ validiorum, et ob eas discessio plebis à Patribus, aliæque dissensiones domi fuere jam inde à principio: neque amplius, quam regibus exactis, dum metus à Tarquinio et bellum grave cum Etruriâ positum est, sequo et modesto jure agitatum: dein, servili imperio patres plebem exercere: de vitâ atque tergo, regio more consulere: agro pellere, et à cæteris expertibus, soli in imperio agere.

even assuming him to be upright and well-intentioned. Now the dikasteries established by Periklès were inaccessible both to corruption and intimidation: their number, their secret suffrage, and the impossibility of knowing beforehand what individuals would sit in any particular cause, prevented both the one and the other. And besides that, the magnitude of their number, extravagant according to our ideas of judicial business, was essential to this tutelary effect¹—it served farther

Quibus serviliis, et maximè fœnoris onere, oppressa plebes, cum assiduâ bellis tributum simul et militiam toleraret, armata Montem Sacrum et Aventinum insedit. Tumque tribunos plebis, et alia sibi jura paravit. Discordiarum et certaminis utrimque finis fuit secundum bellum Punicum."

Compare the exposition of the condition of the cities throughout Europe in the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth centuries, in Hüllmann's *Städtewesen des Mittelalters*, especially vol. iii. pp. 196-199 *seqq.*

The memorable institution which spread through nearly all the Italian cities during these centuries, of naming as Podestà or supreme magistrate a person not belonging to the city itself, to hold office for a short time—was the expedient which they resorted to for escaping the extreme perversion of judicial and administrative power, arising out of powerful family connexions. The restrictions which were thought necessary to guard against either favour or antipathies on the part of the Podestà, are extremely singular (Hüllmann, vol. iii. pp. 252-261 *seqq.*).

"The proceeding of the patrician families in these cities (observes Hüllmann) in respect to the debts which they owed, was among the worst of the many oppressions to which the trading classes were exposed at their hands—one of the greatest abuses which they practised by means of their superior position. How often did they even maltreat their creditors, who came to demand merely what was due to them!" (*Städtewesen*, vol. ii. p. 229.)

Machiavel's History of Florence illustrates, throughout, the inveterate habit of the powerful families to set themselves above the laws and judicial authority. Indeed he seems to regard this as an incorrigible chronic malady in society, necessitating ever-recurring

disputes between powerful men and the body of the people. "The people (he says) desire to live according to the laws; the great men desire to overrule the laws: it is therefore impossible that the two should march in harmony."

"Volendo il popolo vivere secondo le leggi, e i potenti comandare a quelle, non è possibile che capino insieme" (Machiavelli, *Istorie Fiorentine*, liv. ii. p. 79, ad ann. 1282).

The first book of the interesting tale, called the *Promessi Sposi*, of Manzoni,—itself full of historical matter, and since published with illustrative notes by the historian Canlù—exhibits a state of judicial administration, very similar to that above described, in the Milanese, during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries; demonstrated by repeated edicts, all ineffectual, to bring powerful men under the real control of the laws.

Because men of wealth and power, in the principal governments of modern Europe, are now completely under the control of the laws, the modern reader is apt to suppose that this is the natural state of things. It is therefore not unimportant to produce some references (which might be indefinitely multiplied) reminding him of the very different phenomena which past history exhibits almost everywhere.

¹ The number of Roman judices employed to try a criminal cause under the *questiones perpetuæ* in the last century and a half of the Republic, seems to have varied between 100, 75, 70, 56, 51, 52, 32, &c. (Laboulaye, *Essai sur les Loix Criminelles des Romains*, p. 336. Paris, 1845).

In the time of Augustus, there was a total of 4000 judices at Rome, distributed into four decuries (Pliny, *H. N.* xxxiii. 1, 11).

The venality as well as the party corruption of these Roman judices or jurors, taken from the senatorial and

to render the trial solemn and the verdict imposing on the minds of parties and spectators, as we may see by the fact, that in important causes the dikastery was doubled or tripled. Nor was it possible by any other means than numbers¹ to give dignity to an assembly of citizens, of whom many were poor, some old, and all were despised individually by rich accused persons who were brought before them—as Aristophanês and Xenophon give us plainly to understand.² If we

equestrian orders, the two highest and richest orders in the state,—was well known and flagrant (Appian, *Bell. Civ.* i. 22, 35, 37; Laboulaye, *ibid.* p. 217-227; Walter, *Geschichte des Römischen Rechts*, ch. xxviii. sect. 237, 238; Asconius in Cicero, *Verrin.* pp. 141-145, ed. Orell.; and Cicero himself, in the remarkable letter to Atticus, *Ep. ad Attic.* i. 16).

¹ Numerous dikasteries taken by lot seem to have been established in later times in Rhodes and other Grecian cities (though Rhodes was not democratically constituted) and to have worked satisfactorily. Sallust says (in his *Oratio II.* ad Cæsarem de Republicâ ordinandâ, p. 561, ed. Cort.), “Judices à paucis probari, regnum est; ex pecuniâ legi, inhonestum. Quare omnes primæ classis judicare placet; sed numero plures quam judicant. Neque Rhodios, neque alias civitates unquam suorum judiciorum penituit; ubi promiscuè dives et pauper, ut cuique sors tulit, de maximis rebus juxtâ ac de minimis disceptat.”

The necessity of a numerous judicature, in a republic where there is no standing army or official force professionally constituted, as the only means of enforcing public-minded justice against powerful criminals, is insisted upon by Machiavel, *Discorsi sopra Tito Livio*, lib. i. c. 7.

“Potrebbe ancora allegare, a fortificazione della soprascritta conclusione, l'accidente seguito pur in Firenze contra Piero Soderini: il quale al tutto seguì per non essere in quella republica alcuno modo di accuse contro alla ambizione dei potenti cittadini: perchè lo accusare un potente a otto giudici in una republica, non basta: bisogna che i giudici siano assai, perchè pochi sempre fanno a modo de' pochi,” &c.: compare the whole of the same chapter.

I add another remarkable passage of

Machiavel—*Discorso sulla Riforma* (of Florence, addressed to Pope Leo X.), pp. 119, 120, vol. iv. of the complete edition of his works, 1813.

“E necessarissimo in una repubblica questo ricorso, perchè i pochi cittadini non hanno ardire di punire gli uomini grandi, e però bisogna che a tale effetto concorrano assai cittadini, acciòchè il giudicio si nasconda, e nascondendosi, ciascuno si possa scusare.”

² Aristophan. *Vesp.* 570; Xenophon, *Rep. Ath.* i. 18. We are not to suppose that *all* the dikasts who tried a cause were very poor: Demosthenês would not talk to very poor men as to “the slave whom each of them might have left at home” (Demosthenês cont. Stephan. A. c. 26, p. 1127).

It was criminal by law in the dikasts to receive bribes in the exercise of their functions, as well as in every citizen to give money to them (Demosth. cont. Steph. B. c. 13, p. 1137). And it seems perfectly safe to affirm that in practice the dikasts were never tampered with beforehand: had the fact been otherwise, we must have seen copious allusions to it in the many free-spoken pleadings which remain to us (just as there are in the Roman orators): whereas in point of fact there are hardly any such allusions. The word *δικαστήριον* (in Isokratês de Pac. Or. viii. p. 169, sect. 63) does not allude to obtaining by corrupt means verdicts of dikasts in the dikastery, but to obtaining by such means votes for offices in the public assembly, where the election took place by show of hands. Isokratês says that this was often done in his time, and so perhaps it may have been; but in the case of the dikasteries, much better security was taken against it.

The statement of Aristotle (from his *Πολιτεία*, *Fragm.* xi. p. 69, ed. Neumann: compare Harpokration v. *δικαστήριον*; Plutarch, *Coriolan.* c. 14; and

except the strict and peculiar educational discipline of Sparta, these numerous dikasteries afforded the only organ which Grecian politics could devise, for getting redress against powerful criminals, public as well as private, and for obtaining a sincere and uncorrupt verdict.

Taking the general working of the dikasteries, we shall find that they are nothing but Jury-trial applied on a scale broad, systematic, unaided, and uncontrolled, beyond all other historical experience—and that they therefore exhibit in exaggerated proportions both the excellences and the defects characteristic of the jury-system, as compared with decision by trained and professional judges. All the encomiums, which it is customary to pronounce upon jury-trial, will be found predicable of the Athenian dikasteries in a still greater degree; all the reproaches, which can be addressed on good ground to the dikasteries, will apply to modern juries also, though in a less degree. Such parallel is not less just, though the dikasteries, as the most democratical feature of democracy itself, have been usually criticised with marked disfavour—every censure or sneer or joke against them which can be found in ancient authors, comic as well as serious, being accepted as true almost to the letter; while juries are so popular an institution, that their merits have been overstated (in England at least) and their defects kept out of sight. The theory of the Athenian dikastery, and the theory of jury-trial, as it has prevailed in England since the Revolution of 1688, are one and the same: recourse to a certain number of private

The Athenian dikasteries are jury-trial applied on the broadest scale—exhibiting both its excellences and its defects in an exaggerated form.

Pollux, viii. 121) intimates that Anytus was the first person who taught the art τοῦ δικάζειν τὰ δικάστηρια, a short time before the battle of Ægospotami. But besides that the information on this point is to the last degree vague, we may remark that between the defeat of the oligarchy of Four Hundred, and the battle of Ægospotami, the financial and political condition of Athens was so exceedingly embarrassed, that it may well be doubted whether she could maintain the paid dikasteries on the ordinary footing. Both all the personal service of the citizens, and all the public money, must have been put in requisition at that time for defence against the enemy, without leaving any surplus for other

purposes; there was not enough even to afford constant pay to the soldiers and sailors (compare Thucyd. vi. 91; viii. 69, 71, 76, 86). If therefore in this time of distress, the dikasteries were rarely convoked, and without any certainty of pay, a powerful accused person might find it more easy to tamper with them beforehand, than it had been before, or than it came to be afterwards, when the system was regularly in operation. We can hardly reason with safety therefore, from the period shortly preceding the battle of Ægospotami, either to that which preceded the Sicilian expedition, or to that which followed the subversion of the Thirty.

citizens, taken by chance or without possibility of knowing beforehand who they will be, sworn to hear fairly and impartially plaintiff and defendant, accuser and accused, and to find a true verdict according to their consciences upon a distinct issue before them. But in Athens this theory was worked out to its natural consequences; while English practice, in this respect as in so many others, is at variance with English theory. The jury, though an ancient and a constant portion of the judicial system, has never been more than a portion—kept in subordination, trammels, and pupilage, by a powerful crown and by judges presiding over an artificial system of law. In the English state trials, down to a period not long before the Revolution of 1688, any jurors who found a verdict contrary to the dictation of the judge were liable to fine; and at an earlier period (if a second jury on being summoned found an opposite verdict) even to the terrible punishment of attain¹. And though, for the last century and a half, the verdict of the jury has been free as to matters of fact, new trials having taken the place of the old attain^t—yet the ascendancy of the presiding judge over their minds, and his influence over the procedure as the authority on matters of law, has always been such as to overrule the natural play of their feelings and

¹ Mr. Jardine, in his interesting and valuable publication, *Criminal Trials*, vol. i. p. 115, after giving an account of the trial of Sir Nicholas Throckmorton in 1553, for high treason, and his acquittal, observes—"There is one circumstance in this trial, which ought not to be passed over without an observation. It appears that after the trial was over, the jury were required to give recognizances to answer for their verdict, and were afterwards imprisoned for nearly eight months and heavily fined by a sentence of the Star-chamber. Such was the security which the trial by jury afforded to the subject in those times; and such were the perils to which jurors were then exposed, who ventured to act upon their conscientious opinions in state prosecutions! But even these proceedings against the jury, monstrous as they appear to our improved notions of the administration of justice, must not be considered as a wanton exercise of unlawful power on this particular occasion. The fact is that the judges of England had for cen-

turies before exercised a similar authority, though not without some murmuring against it; and it was not until more than a century after it, in the reign of Charles II., that a solemn decision was pronounced against its legality."

.... "In the reign of James I. it was held by the Lord Chancellor Egerton, together with the two Chief Justices and the Chief Baron, that when a party indicted is *found guilty on the trial*, the jury shall not be questioned; but on the other side, when the jury hath *acquitted* a felon or a traitor against manifest proof, they may be charged in the Star-chamber for their partiality in finding a manifest offender not guilty. After the abolition of the Star-chamber, there were several instances in the reign of Charles II., in which it was resolved that both grand and petit juries might be fined for giving verdicts against plain evidence and the directions of the court." Compare Mr. Amos's *Notes on Fortescue, De Laudibus Legum Angliæ*, c. 27.

judgement as men and citizens¹—sometimes to the detriment, much oftener to the benefit (always excepting political trials), of substantial justice. But in Athens the dikasts judged of the law as well as of the fact. The laws were not numerous, and were couched in few, for the most part familiar, words. To determine how the facts stood, and whether, if the facts were undisputed, the law invoked was properly applicable to them, were parts of the integral question submitted to them, and comprehended in their verdict. Moreover, each dikastery construed the law for itself without being bound to follow the decisions of those which had preceded it, except in so far as such analogy might really influence the convictions of the members. They were free, self-judging persons—unassisted by the schooling, but at the same time untrammelled by the awe-striking ascendancy, of a professional judge—obeying the spontaneous inspirations of their own consciences, and recognising no authority except the laws of the city, with which they were familiar.

Trial by jury, as practised in England since 1688, has been politically most valuable, as a security against the encroachments of an anti-popular executive. Partly for this reason, partly for others not necessary to state here, it has had greater credit as an instrument of judicature generally, and has been supposed to produce much more of what is good in English

The encomiums usually pronounced upon the jury-trial would apply yet more strongly to the Athenian dikasteries.

¹ Respecting the French juries, M. Cottu (*Réflexions sur la Justice criminelle*, p. 79) remarks,—

"Le désir ardent de bien faire dont les jurés sont généralement animés, et la crainte de s'égarer, les jette dans une obéissance passive à l'impulsion qui leur est donnée par le président de la Cour d'Assise, et si ce magistrat sait s'emparer de leur estime, alors leur confiance en lui ne connait plus de bornes. Ils le considèrent comme l'étoile qui doit les guider dans l'obscurité qui les environne, et pleins d'un respect aveugle pour son opinion, ils n'attendent que la manifestation qu'il leur en fait pour la sanctionner par leur déclaration. Ainsi au lieu de deux juges que l'accusé devoit avoir, il n'en a bien souvent qu'un seul, qui est le président de la Cour d'Assise."

Anselm Feuerbach (in the second part of his work, *Ueber die Oeffent-*

lichkeit und Mündlichkeit der Gerechtigkeitspflege, which contains his review of the French judicial system, *Ueber die Gerichtsverfassung Frankreichs*, Abth. iii. H. v. p. 477) confirms this statement from a large observation of the French courts of justice.

The habit of the French juries, in so many doubtful cases, to pronounce a verdict of guilty by a majority of seven against five (in which case the law threw the burden of actual condemnation upon the judges present in court, directing their votes to be counted along with those of the jury) is a remarkable proof of this aversion of the jury to the responsibility of decision: see Feuerbach, *ibid.* p. 481 *seq.* Compare also the treatise of the same author, *Betrachtungen über das Geschwornen-Gericht*, p. 186-198.

administration of justice, than really belongs to it. Amidst the unqualified encomiums so frequently bestowed upon the honesty, the unprejudiced rectitude of appreciation, the practical instinct for detecting falsehood and resisting sophistry, in twelve citizens taken by hazard and put into a jury-box—comparatively little account is taken either of the aids, or of the restrictions, or of the corrections in the shape of new trials, under which they act, or of the artificial forensic medium into which they are plunged for the time of their service: so that the theory of the case presumes them to be more of spontaneous agents, and more analogous to the Athenian dikasts, than the practice confirms. Accordingly, when we read these encomiums in modern authors, we shall find that both the direct benefits ascribed to jury-trial in ensuring pure and even-handed justice, and still more its indirect benefits in improving and educating the citizens generally—might have been set forth yet more emphatically in a laudatory harangue of Periklês about the Athenian dikasteries. If it be true that an Englishman or an American counts more certainly on an impartial and uncorrupt verdict from a jury of his country than from a permanent professional judge, much more would this be the feeling of an ordinary Athenian, when he compared the dikasteries with the archon. The juror hears and judges under full persuasion that he himself individually stands in need of the same protection or redress invoked by others: so also did the dikast. As to the effects of jury-trial in diffusing respect to the laws and constitution—in giving to every citizen a personal interest in enforcing the former and maintaining the latter—in imparting a sentiment of dignity to small and poor men, through the discharge of a function exalted as well as useful—in calling forth the patriotic sympathies, and exercising the mental capacities of every individual—all these effects were produced in a still higher degree by the dikasteries at Athens; from their greater frequency, numbers, and spontaneity of mental action, without any professional judge, upon whom they could throw the responsibility of deciding for them.¹

¹ I transcribe from an eminent lawyer of the United States—Mr. Livingston, author of a Penal Code for the State of Louisiana (Preface, p. 12-16) an elo-

quent panegyric on Trial by Jury. It contains little more than the topics commonly insisted on, but it is expressed with peculiar warmth, and with the

On the other hand, the imperfections inherent in jury-trial were likewise disclosed in an exaggerated form under the

greater fulness, inasmuch as the people of Louisiana, for whom the author was writing, had no familiarity with the institution and its working. The reader will observe that almost everything here said, in recommendation of the jury, might have been urged by Periklès with much truer and wider application, in enforcing his transfer of judicial power from individual magistrates to the *dikasteries*.

"By our constitution (*i. e.* in Louisiana), the right of a trial by jury is secured to the accused, but it is not exclusively established. This however may be done by law, and there are so many strong reasons in its favour, that it has been thought proper to insert in the code a precise declaration that in all criminal prosecutions, the trial by jury is a privilege which cannot be renounced. Were it left entirely at the option of the accused, a desire to propitiate the favour of the judge, ignorance of his interest, or the confusion incident to his situation, might induce him to waive the advantage of a trial by his country, and thus by degrees accustom the people to a spectacle which they ought never to behold—a single man determining the fact, applying the law, and disposing at his will of the life, liberty, and reputation of a citizen. . . . Those who advocate the present disposition of our laws say—admitting the trial by jury to be an advantage, the law does enough when it gives the accused the option to avail himself of its benefits: he is the best judge whether it will be useful to him: and it would be unjust to direct him in so important a choice. This argument is specious, but not solid. There are reasons, and some have already been stated, to show that this choice cannot be freely exercised. There is moreover another interest besides that of the culprit to be considered. If he be guilty, the state has an interest in his conviction: and whether guilty or innocent, it has a higher interest,—that the fact should be fairly canvassed before judges inaccessible to influence, and unbiassed by any false views of official duty. It has an interest in the character of its administration of justice, and a paramount duty to perform in rendering it free from suspicion. It is not true

therefore to say, that the laws do enough when they give the choice between a fair and impartial trial, and one that is liable to the greatest objections. They must do more—they must restrict that choice, so as not to suffer an ill-advised individual to degrade them into instruments of ruin, though it should be voluntarily inflicted; or of death, though that death should be suicide."

"Another advantage of rendering this mode of trial obligatory is, that it diffuses the most valuable information among every rank of citizens: it is a school, of which every jury that is impanelled is a separate class, where the dictates of the laws and the consequence of disobedience to them are practically taught. The frequent exercise of these important functions moreover gives a sense of dignity and self-respect, not only becoming to the character of a free citizen, but which adds to his private happiness. Neither party-spirit, nor intrigue, nor power, can deprive him of his share in the administration of justice, though they can humble the pride of every other office and vacate every other place. Every time he is called upon to act in this capacity, he must feel *that though placed in perhaps the humblest station, he is yet the guardian of the life, the liberty, and the reputation of his fellow-citizens against injustice and oppression; and that while his plain understanding has been found the best refuge for innocence, his incorruptible integrity is pronounced a sure pledge that guilt will not escape.* A state whose most obscure citizens are thus individually elevated to perform these august functions; who are alternately the defenders of the injured, the dread of the guilty, the vigilant guardians of the constitution; without whose consent no punishment can be inflicted, no disgrace incurred; who can by their voice arrest the blow of oppression, and direct the hand of justice where to strike—such a state can never sink into slavery, or easily submit to oppression. Corrupt rulers may pervert the constitution: ambitious demagogues may violate its precepts: foreign influence may control its operations: but while the people enjoy the trial by jury, taken by

Athenian system. Both juror and dikast represent the average man of the time and of the neighbourhood, exempt indeed from pecuniary corruption or personal fear, —deciding according to what he thinks justice or to some genuine feeling of equity, mercy, religion,

Imperfections of jury-trial—exaggerated in the procedure of the dikasteries.

lot from among themselves, they cannot cease to be free. The information it spreads, the sense of dignity and independence it inspires, the courage it creates—will always give them an energy of resistance that can grapple with encroachments, and a renovating spirit that will make arbitrary power despair. The enemies of freedom know this: they know how admirable a vehicle it is, to convey the contagion of those liberal principles which attack the vitals of their power, and they therefore guard against its introduction with more care than they would take to avoid pestilential disease. In countries where it already exists, they insidiously endeavour to innovate, because they dare not openly destroy: changes inconsistent with the spirit of the institution are introduced, under the plausible pretext of improvement: *the common class of citizens are too ill-informed to perform the functions of jurors—a selection is necessary.* This choice must be confided to an agent of executive power, and must be made among the most eminent for education, wealth, and respectability: so that after several successive operations of political chemistry, a shining result may be obtained, freed indeed from all republican dross, but without any of the intrinsic value that is found in the rugged, but inflexible integrity, and incorruptible worth, of the original composition. Men impanelled by this process bear no resemblance but in name to the sturdy, honest, unlettered jurors who derive no dignity but from the performance of their duties; and the momentary exercise of whose functions gives no time for the work of corruption or the influence of fear. By innovations such as these the institution is so changed as to leave nothing to attach the affections or awaken the interest of the people, and it is neglected as an useless, or abandoned as a mischievous contrivance."

Consistently with this earnest admiration of jury-trial, Mr. Livingston, by the provisions of his code, limits very

materially the interference of the presiding judge, thus bringing back the jurors more nearly to a similarity with the Athenian dikasts (p. 85): "I restrict the charge of the judge to an opinion of the law and to the repetition of the evidence, *only when required by any one of the jury.* The practice of repeating all the testimony from notes,—always (from the nature of things) imperfectly, not seldom inaccurately, and sometimes carelessly taken,—has a double disadvantage: it makes the jurors, who rely more on the judge's notes than on their own memory, inattentive to the evidence; and it gives them an imperfect copy of that which the nature of the trial by jury requires that they should record in their own minds. Forced to rely upon themselves, the necessity will quicken their attention, and it will be only when they disagree in their recollection that recourse will be had to the notes of the judge." Mr. Livingston goes on to add, that the judges, from their old habits acquired as practising advocates, are scarcely ever neutral—always take a side—and generally against the prisoners on trial.

The same considerations as those which Mr. Livingston here sets forth to demonstrate the value of jury-trial, are also insisted upon by M. Charles Comte, in his translation of Sir Richard Phillips's Treatise on Juries, enlarged with many valuable reflections on the different shape which the jury-system has assumed in England and France (*Des Pouvoirs et des Obligations des Jurys*, traduit de l'Anglois, par Charles Comte, 2nd ed. Paris, 1828, with preliminary *Considérations sur le Pouvoir Judiciaire*, pp. 100 *sepp.*).

The length of this note forbids my citing anything farther either from the eulogistic observations of Sir Richard Phillips or from those of M. Comte: but they would be found (like those of Mr. Livingston) even more applicable to the dikasteries of Athens than to the juries of England and America.

or patriotism, which in reference to the case before him he thinks as good as justice—but not exempt from sympathies, antipathies, and prejudices, all of which act the more powerfully because there is often no consciousness of their presence, and because they even appear essential to his idea of plain and straightforward good sense. According as a jury is composed of Catholics or Protestants, Irishmen or Englishmen, tradesmen, farmers, or inhabitants of a frontier on which smuggling prevails,—there is apt to prevail among them a corresponding bias. At the time of any great national delusion, such as the Popish Plot—or of any powerful local excitement, such as that of the Church and King mobs at Birmingham in 1791 against Dr. Priestley and the Dissenters—juries are found to perpetrate what a calmer age recognises to have been gross injustice. A jury, who disapprove of the infliction of capital punishment for a particular crime, will acquit prisoners in spite of the clearest evidence of guilt. It is probable that a delinquent, indicted for any state offence before the dikastery at Athens,—having only a private accuser to contend against, with equal power of speaking in his own defence, of summoning witnesses and of procuring friends to speak for him—would have better chance of a fair trial than he would now have anywhere except in England and the United States of America; and better than he would have had in England down to the seventeenth century.¹ Juries

¹ Mr. Jardine (Criminal Trials, Introduction, p. 8) observes, that the "proceedings against persons accused of state offences in the earlier periods of our history, do not deserve the name of trials: they were a mere mockery of justice," &c.

Respecting what English juries have been, it is curious to peruse the following remarks of Mr. Daines Barrington, Observations on the Statutes, p. 409. In remarking on a statute of Henry VII. A.D. 1494, he says—

"The 21st chapter recites—'That perjury is much and customarily used within the city of London, among such persons as passen and been impanelled in issue, joined between party and party.'

"This offence hath been before this statute complained of in preambles to several laws, being always the perjury

of a *juror*, who finds a verdict contrary to his oath, and not that which we hear too much of at present, in the witnesses produced at a trial.

"In the Dance of Death, written originally in French by Macharel, and translated by John Lydgate in this reign, with some additions to adapt it to English characters—a juryman is mentioned, who had often been bribed for giving a false verdict, which shows the offence to have been very common. The sheriff, who summoned the jury, was likewise greatly accessory to this crime, by summoning those who were most partial and prejudiced. Carew, in his account of Cornwall, informs us that it was a common article in an attorney's bill to charge *pro amicitia viccomitis*.

"It is likewise remarkable, that partiality and perjury in jurors of the city

bring the common feeling as well as the common reason of the public—or often indeed only the separate feeling of particular fractions of the public—to dictate the application of the law to particular cases. They are a protection against anything worse—especially against such corruption or servility as are liable to taint permanent official persons—but they cannot possibly reach anything better. Now the dikast trial at Athens effected the same object, and had in it only the same ingredients of error and misdecision, as the English jury: but it had them in stronger dose,¹ without the counteracting authority of a judge, and

of London is more particularly complained of than in other parts of England, by the preamble of this and other statutes. Stow informs us that in 1468, many jurors of this city were punished by having papers fixed on their heads, stating their offence of having been tampered with by the parties to the suit. He likewise complains that this crying offence continued in the time of Queen Elizabeth, when he wrote his account of London: and Fuller, in his English Worthies, mentions it as a proverbial saying, that London juries hang half and save half. Grafton also, in his Chronicle, informs us that the Chancellor of the diocese of London was indicted for a murder, and that the bishop wrote a letter to Cardinal Wolsey, in behalf of his officer, to stop the prosecution, 'because London juries were so prejudiced, that they would find Abel guilty for the murder of Cain.'

"The punishment for a false verdict by the petty jury is by writ of attain: and the statute directs, that half of the grand jury, when the trial is *per medietatem linguæ*, shall be strangers, not Londoners.

'And there's no London jury, but are led in evidence as far by common fame, As they are by present deposition.'
(Ben Jonson's Magnetic Lady, Act III. Sc. 3.)

"It appears by 15 Henry VI. c. 5 (which likewise recites the great increase of perjury in jurors and in the strongest terms), that in every attain there were thirteen defendants—the twelve jurors who gave the verdict and the plaintiff or defendant who had obtained it, who therefore was supposed to have used corrupt means to procure it. For this reason, if the verdict was given in favour of the crown, no attain could be

brought, because the king could not be joined as a defendant with the jury who were prosecuted."

Compare also the same work, p. 394. 457, and Mr. Amos's Notes on Fortescue de Landih. Leg. Angliæ, c. 27.

¹ In France, jury-trial was only introduced for the first time by the Constituent Assembly in 1790; and then only for Criminal procedure: I transcribe the following remarks on the working of it from the instructive article in Merlin's 'Répertoire de Jurisprudence,' article *Jurés*. Though written in a spirit very favourable to the jury, it proclaims the reflections of an observing lawyer on the temper and competence of the jurymen whom he had seen in action, and on their disposition to pronounce the verdict according to the *feeling* which the case before them inspired.

"Pourquoi faut-il qu'une institution qui rassure les citoyens contre l'endurcissement et la prévention si funeste à l'innocence, que peut produire l'habitude de juger les crimes . . . qu'une institution qui donne pour juges à un accusé, des citoyens indépendans de toute espèce d'influence, ses pairs, ses égaux . . . pourquoi faut-il que cette institution, dont les formes sont simples, touchantes, patriarcales, dont la théorie flatte et entraîne l'esprit par une séduction irrésistible, ait été si souvent méconnue, trompée par l'ignorance et la pusillanimité, prostituée peut-être par une vile et coupable corruption?

"Rendons pourtant justice aux erreurs, même à la prévarication, des jurés: ils ont trop de fois acquitté les coupables, mais il n'a pas encore été prouvé qu'ils eussent jamais fait couler une goutte de sang innocent: et si l'on pouvoit sup-

without the benefit of a procedure such as has now been obtained in England. The feelings of the dikasts counted for

poser qu'ils eussent vu quelquefois le crime là où il n'y en avait qu'une apparence trompeuse et fautive, ce ne serait pas leur conscience qu'il faudrait accuser : ce serait la fatalité malheureuse des circonstances qui auraient accompagné l'accusation, et qui aurait trompé de même les juges les plus pénétrants et les plus exercés à rechercher la vérité et à la démêler du mensonge.

"Mais les reproches qu'ont souvent mérités les jurés, c'est d'avoir cédé à une fautive commination, ou à l'intérêt qu'étoient parvenus à leur inspirer les familles d'accusés qui avoient un rang dans la société : c'est souvent d'être sortis de leurs attributions, qui se bornent à apprécier les faits, et les juger d'une manière différente de la loi. *J'ai vu cent exemples de ces usurpations de pouvoir et de ce despotisme des jurés.*

Trop souvent ils ont voulu voir une action innocente, là où la loi avoit dit qu'il y avoit un crime, et alors ils n'ont pas craint de se jouer de la vérité pour tromper et éluder la loi." "Sera-t-il possible d'améliorer l'institution des jurés, et d'en prévenir les écarts souvent trop scandaleux ? Gardons-nous d'en douter. Que l'on commence par composer le jury de propriétaires intéressés à punir le crime pour le rendre plus rare : que surtout on en éloigne les artisans, les petits cultivateurs, hommes chez qui sans doute la probité est heureusement fort commune, mais dont l'esprit est peu exercé, et qui accoutumés aux déférences, aux égards, cèdent toujours à l'opinion de ceux de leurs collègues dont le rang est plus distingué : ou qui, familiarisés seulement avec les idées relatives à leur profession, n'ont jamais eu, dans tout le reste, que des idées d'emprunt ou d'inspiration. On sait qu'aujourd'hui ce sont ces hommes qui dans presque toute la France forment toujours la majorité des jurés : mettez au milieu d'eux un homme d'un état plus élevé, d'un esprit délié, d'une élocution facile, il entraînera ses collègues, il décidera la délibération : et si cet homme a le jugement faux ou le cœur corrompu, cette délibération sera nécessairement mauvaise.

"Mais pourra-t-on parvenir à vaincre l'insouciance des propriétaires riches et éclairés, à leur faire abandonner leurs

affaires, leurs familles, leurs habitudes, pour les entraîner dans les villes, et leur y faire remplir des fonctions qui tourmentent quelquefois la probité, et donnent des inquiétudes d'autant plus vives que la conscience est plus délicate ? Pourquoi non ? Pourquoi les mêmes classes de citoyens qui dans les huit ou dix premiers mois de 1792, se portaient avec tant de zèle à l'exercice de ces fonctions, les fuiraient-elles aujourd'hui ? surtout si, pour les y rappeler, la loi fait mouvoir les deux grands ressorts qui sont dans sa main, si elle s'engage à récompenser l'exactitude, et à punir la négligence ?" (Merlin, Répertoire de Jurisprudence, art. *Jurés*, p. 97.)

In these passages it deserves notice, that what is particularly remarked about juries, both English and French, is, their reluctance to convict accused persons brought before them. Now the character of the Athenian dikasts, as described by Mr. Mitford and by many other authors, is the precise reverse of this : an extreme severity and cruelty, and a disposition to convict all accused persons brought before them, upon little or no evidence—especially rich accused persons. I venture to affirm that to ascribe to them such a temper generally, is not less improbable in itself, than unsupported by any good evidence. In the speeches remaining to us from defendants, we do indeed find complaints made of the severity of the dikasteries : but in those speeches which come from accusers, there are abundance of complaints to the contrary—of over-indulgence on the part of the dikasteries, and consequent impunity of criminals. Nor does Aristophanes—by whom most modern authors are guided even when they do not quote him—when fairly studied, bear out the temper ascribed by Mr. Mitford to the dikasts ; even if we admitted Aristophanes to be a faithful and trustworthy witness, which no man who knows his picture of Sokratès will be disposed to do. Aristophanes takes hold of every quality which will raise a laugh against the dikasts, and his portrait of them as Wasps was well-calculated for this purpose—to describe them as boiling over with acrimony, irritation, impatience to find some one whom they could convict and

more, and their reason for less : not merely because of their greater numbers, which naturally heightened the pitch of feeling in each individual—but also because the addresses of orators or parties formed the prominent part of the procedure, and the depositions of witnesses only a very subordinate part. The dikast¹ therefore heard little of the naked facts, the

punish. But even he, when he comes to describe these dikasts in action, represents them as obeying the appeals to their pity, as well as those to their anger—as being yielding and impressionable when their feelings are approached on either side, and unable, when they hear the exculpatory appeal of the accused, to maintain the anger which had been raised by the speech of the accuser. (See Aristophan. *Vesp.* 574, 713, 727, 974.) Moreover, if from the *Vespæ* we turn to the *Nubes*, where the poet attacks the sophists and not the dikasts, we are there told that the sophists could arm any man with fallacies and subterfuges which would enable him to procure acquittal from the dikasts, whatever might be the crime committed.

I believe that this open-mindedness, and impressibility of the feelings on all sides, by art, eloquence, prayers, tears, invectives, &c., is the true character of the Athenian dikasts. And I also believe that they were, as a general rule, more open to commiseration than to any other feeling—like what is above said respecting the French jurymen : *εὐκλῆτος πρὸς ὀργήν* (*ὁ Ἀθηναίων δῆμος*), *εὐμετάθετος πρὸς ἔλεον*—this expression of Plutarch about the Athenian demos is no less true about the dikasts : compare also the description given by P'liny (*H. N.* xxxv. 10) of the memorable picture of the Athenian demos by the painter Parrhasius.

¹ That the difference between the dikast and the jurymen, in this respect, is only one of degree, I need hardly remark. M. Merlin observes, "Je ne pense pas, comme bien des gens, que pour être propre aux fonctions de juré, il suffise d'avoir une intelligence ordinaire et de la probité. Si l'accusé paroissoit seul aux débats avec les témoins, il ne faudroit sans doute que du bon sens pour reconnoître la vérité dans des déclarations faites avec simplicité et dégagées de tout raisonnement : mais il y parolt assisté presque toujours d'un ou de plusieurs défenseurs qui par des

interpellations captieuses, embarrassent ou égarent les témoins : et par une discussion subtile, souvent sophistique, quelquefois éloquent, enveloppent la vérité des nuages, et rendent l'évidence même problématique. Certes, il faut plus que de bonnes intentions, il faut plus que du bon sens, pour ne pas se laisser entraîner à ces fausses lueurs, pour se garantir des écarts de la sensibilité, et pour se maintenir immuablement dans la ligne du vrai, au milieu de ces impulsions données en même temps à l'esprit et au cœur." (Merlin, *Répertoire de Jurisprudence*, art. *Juré*, p. 98.)

At Athens, there were no professional advocates : the accuser and the accused (or the plaintiff and defendant, if the cause was civil), each appeared in person with their witnesses, or sometimes with depositions which the witnesses had sworn to before the archon : each might come with a speech prepared by Antipho (*Thucyd.* viii. 68) or some other rhetor : each might have one or more *ὑπογέγραυτοι* to speak on his behalf after himself, but seemingly only out of the space of time allotted to him by the clepsydra. In civil causes, the defendant must have been perfectly acquainted with the plaintiff's case, since besides the *Anakrisis* or preliminary examination before the archon, the cause had been for the most part already before an arbitrator. In a criminal case the accused party had only the *Anakrisis* to guide him, as to the matter of which he was to be accused : but it appears from the prepared speeches of accused parties which we now possess, that this *Anakrisis* must have been sufficiently copious to give him a good idea of that which he had to rebut. The accuser was condemned to a fine of 1000 drachms, if he did not obtain on the verdict one-fifth of the votes of the dikasts engaged.

Antipho not only composed speeches for pleaders before the dikastery, but also gave them valuable advice generally as to the manner of conducting their case, &c., though he did not himself

appropriate subjects for his reason—but he was abundantly supplied with the plausible falsehoods, calumnies, irrelevant statements and suggestions, &c., of the parties, and that too in a manner skilfully adapted to his temper. To keep the facts of the case before the jury, apart from the falsehood and colouring of parties, is the most useful function of the modern judge, whose influence is also considerable as a restraint upon the pleader. The helps to the reason of the dikast were thus materially diminished, while the action upon his feelings, of anger as well as of compassion, was sharpened, as compared with the modern juror.¹ We see in the remaining productions of the Attic orators how much there is of plausible deception, departure from the true issue, and appeals to sympathies, antipathies, and prejudices of every kind, addressed to the dikasteries.² Of course such artifices were

speak before the dikastis: so also Ktesiklēs the λογογράφος (Demosthenēs cont. Theokrin. c. 5) acted as general adviser or attorney. Xenophon (Memor. i. 2, 51) notices the persons "who knew how to furnish advice and aid to those engaged in a suit at law" (οἱ συνδικεῖν ἐπιστάμενοι) as analogous to the surgeon when a man was sick; though they bore no current professional name.

¹ Aristotle in the first and second chapters of his *Treatise de Rhetoricā*, complains that the teachers and writers on rhetoric who preceded him, treated almost entirely of the different means of working on the feelings of the dikasts, and of matters "extraneous to the real question which the dikasts ought to try" (περὶ τῶν ἔξω τοῦ πράγματος τὰ πλεῖστα πραγματεύονται· διαβολή γὰρ καὶ ἁλεις καὶ ὀργή, οὐ περὶ τοῦ πράγματος ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸν δικάστην, &c., i. 1, 1: compare i. 2, 3, and iii. 1, 2).

This is sufficient to show how prominent such appeals to the feelings of the dikasts were, in actual fact and practice, even if we did not know it from the perusal of the orations themselves.

Respecting the habit of accused persons to bring their wives and children before the dikasts as suppliants for them to obtain mercy or acquittal, see Aristophan. *Vesp.* 567-976; Andokidēs de *Mysteriis* (ad finem), and Lysias *Orat.* iv. de *Vulnere* (ad finem).

² To a person accustomed to the judicature of modern Europe, conducted

throughout all its stages by the instrumentality of professional men (judges, advocates, attorneys, &c.), and viewed by the general public as a matter in which no private citizen either could act or ought to act for himself—nothing is more remarkable in reading the Attic judicial orations (to a certain extent also the Roman) than the entire absence of this professional feeling, and the exhibition of justice both invoked and administered by private citizens exclusively. The nearest analogy to this, which modern justice presents, is to be found in the Courts of Requests and other courts for trying causes limited to small sums of property—too small to be worth the notice of judges and lawyers.

These Courts, in spite of their direct and important bearing on the welfare and security of the poorer classes, have received little elucidation. The History of the Birmingham Court of Requests, by Mr. William Hutton (lately republished by Messrs. Chambers), forms an exception to this remark, and is full of instruction in respect to the habits, the conduct, and the sufferings of poor persons. It furnishes, besides, the closest approach that I know to the feelings of Athenian dikasts and pleaders, though of course with many important differences. Mr. Hutton was for many years unremitting in his attendance as a Commissioner, and took warm interest in the honourable working of the Court. His remarks upon the position, the

resorted to by opposite speakers in each particular trial. We have no means of knowing to what extent they actually perverted the judgement of the hearers.¹ Probably the frequent habit of sitting in dikastery gave them a penetration in detecting sophistry not often possessed by non-professional citizens. Nevertheless it cannot be doubted that in a considerable proportion of cases, success depended less upon the intrinsic merits of a case, than upon apparent airs of innocence and truth-telling, dexterity of statement, and good general character, in the parties, their witnesses, and the friends who addressed the court on their behalf. The accusatory speeches in Attic oratory, wherein punishment is invoked upon an alleged delinquent, are expressed with a bitterness which is now banished from English criminal judicature, though it was common in the state trials of two centuries ago. Against them may be set the impassioned and emphatic appeals made by defendants and their friends to the commiseration of the dikasts; appeals the more often successful, because they came last, immediately before decision was pronounced. This is true of Rome as well as of Athens.²

duties, and the difficulties of the Commissioners, illustrated by numerous cases given in detail, are extremely interesting, and represent thoughts which must have often suggested themselves to intelligent dikasts at Athens.

"Law and equity (he says, p. 34) often vary. If the Commissioners cannot decide *against* law, they can decide *without* it. Their oath binds them to proceed according to *good conscience* (*περὶ ὧν οὐκ εἰσὶ νόμοι, γνώμη τῇ δικαιοτάτῃ*—was the oath of the Athenian dikast). A man only needs information to be able to decide."

A few words from p. 36, about the sources of misjudgement. "Misinformation is another source of evil: both parties equally treat the Commissioners with deceit. The only people who can throw light upon the subject will not.

"It is difficult not to be won by the first speaker, if he carries the air of mildness and is master of his tale; or not to be biased in favour of infirmity or infancy. Those who cannot assist themselves, we are much inclined to assist.

"Nothing dissolves like tears. Though they arise from weakness, they are powerful advocates, which instantly

disarm, particularly those which the afflicted wish to hide. They come from the heart and will reach it, if the judge has a heart to reach. Distress and pity are inseparable.

"Perhaps there never was a judge, from seventeen to seventy, who could look with indifference upon beauty in distress; if he could, he was unfit to be a judge. He should be a stranger to decision who is a stranger to compassion. All these matters influence the man, and warp his judgement."

This is a description, given by a perfectly honest and unprofessional judge, of his own feelings when on the bench. It will be found illustrated by frequent passages in the Attic pleadings, where they address themselves to the feelings here described in the bosom of the dikasts.

¹ Demosthenēs (cont. Phormio. p. 913, c. 2) emphatically remarks how much more cautious witnesses were of giving false testimony before the numerous dikastery, than before the arbitrator.

² Asconius gives an account of the begging off and supplication to the judges at Rome, when sentence was

As an organ for judicial purposes, the Athenian dikasteries were thus a simple and plenary manifestation of jury-trial, with its inherent excellences and defects both brought out in exaggerated relief. They ensured a decision at once uncorrupt, public-minded, and imposing—together with the best security which the case admitted against illegal violences on the part of the rich and great.¹ Their extreme publicity—as well as their simple and oral procedure, divested of that verbal and ceremonial technicality which marked the law of Rome even at its outset, was no small benefit. And as the verdicts of the dikasts, even when wrong, depended upon causes of misjudgement common to them with the general body of the citizens, so they never appeared to pronounce unjustly, nor lost the confidence of their fellow-citizens generally. But whatever may have been their defects as judicial instruments, as a stimulus both to thought and speech, their efficacy was unparalleled, in the circumstances of Athenian society. Doubtless they would not have produced the same effect if established at Thebes or Argos. The susceptibilities of the Athenian mind, as well as the previous practice and expansive tendencies of democratical citizenship, were also essential conditions—and that genuine taste for sitting in judgement and hearing both sides fairly, which, however Aristophanès may caricature and deride it, was alike honourable and useful to the people. The first establishment of the dikasteries is nearly coincident with the great improvement of Attic tragedy in passing from Æschylus to Sophoklès. The same develop-

Powerful effects to the dikasteries in exercising and stimulating the intellect and feelings of individual citizens.

about to be pronounced upon Scaurus, whom Cicero defended (Cic. Orat. pro Scauro, p. 28, ed. Orell.): "Laudaverunt Scaurum consulares novem—Horum magna pars per tabellas laudaverunt, qui aberant: inter quos Pompeius quoque. Unus præterea adolescens laudavit, frater ejus, Faustus Cornelius, Syllæ filius. Is in laudatione multa humiliter et cum lacrimis locutus non minus audientes permovit, quam Scaurus ipse permoverat. Ad genua judicum, cum sententiæ ferrentur, bifariam se dividerunt qui pro eo rogabant: ab uno latere Scaurus ipse et M. Glabrio, sororis filius, et Paulus, et P. Lentulus, et L. Æmilius Buca, et C. Memmius,

supplicaverunt: ex alterâ parte Sylla Faustus, frater Scauri, et T. Annius Milo, et T. Peducaeus, et C. Calo, et M. Octavius Lænas."

Compare also Cicero, Brutus, c. 23, about the defence of Sergius Galba; Quintilian, I. O. ii. 15.

¹ Plato, in his Treatise de Legibus (vi. p. 768), adopts all the distinguishing principles of the Athenian dikasteries. He particularly insists, that the citizen who does not take his share in the exercise of this function, conceives himself to have no concern or interest in the commonwealth—τὸ παράπαν τῆς πόλεως οὐ μέτοχος εἶναι.

ment of the national genius, now preparing splendid manifestations both in tragic and comic poetry, was called with redoubled force into the path of oratory, by the new judicial system. A certain power of speech now became necessary, not merely for those who intended to take a prominent part in politics, but also for private citizens to vindicate their rights or repel accusations, in a court of justice. It was an accomplishment of the greatest practical utility, even apart from ambitious purposes; hardly less so than the use of arms or the practice of the gymnasium. Accordingly, the teachers of grammar and rhetoric, and the composers of written speeches to be delivered by others, now began to multiply and to acquire an unprecedented importance—as well at Athens as under the contemporary democracy of Syracuse,¹ in which also some form of popular judicature was established. Style and speech began to be reduced to a system, and so communicated; not always happily, for several of the early rhetors² adopted an artificial, ornate, and conceited manner, from which Attic good taste afterwards liberated itself. But the very character of a teacher of rhetoric as an art,—a man giving precepts and putting himself forward in show-lectures as a model for others, is a feature first belonging to the Periklean age, and indicates a new demand in the minds of the citizens.

We begin to hear, in the generation now growing up, of the rhetor and the sophist, as persons of influence and celebrity. These two names denoted persons of similar moral and intellectual endowments, or often indeed the same person, considered in different points of view;³

Necessity of learning to speak—growth of professional teachers of rhetoric—professional composers of speeches for others.

Rhetors and sophists.

¹ Aristot. ap. Cicero. Brut. c. 12. "Itaque cum sublati in Sicilia tyrannis res private longo intervallo judiciis repeterentur, tum primum quod esset acuta ea gens et controversa natura, artem et præcepta Siculus Coracem et Tisiam conscripsisse," &c. Compare Diodor. xi. 87; Pausan. vi. 17, 8.

² Especially Gorgias; see Aristotel. Rhetor. iii. 1, 26; Timæus, Fr.; Dionys. Halicarn. De Lysiâ Judicium, c. 3; also Foss, Dissertatio de Gorgia Leontino, p. 20 (Halle, 1828); and Westermann, Geschichte der Beredsamkeit in

Griechenland und Rom, sect. 30, 31.

³ Plato (Gorgias, c. 20-75; Protagoras, c. 9). Lysias is sometimes designated as a sophist (Demosth. cont. Neær. c. 7, p. 1351; Athenæ. xiii. p. 592). There is no sufficient reason for supposing with Taylor (Vit. Lysiæ, p. 56, ed. Dobson) that there were two persons named Lysias, and that the person here named is a different man from the author of the speeches which remain to us: see Mr. Fynes Clinton, Fast. H. p. 360, Appendix, c. 20.

either as professing to improve the moral character—or as communicating power and facility of expression—or as suggesting premises for persuasion, illustrations on the common-places of morals and politics, argumentative abundance on matters of ordinary experience, dialectical subtlety in confuting an opponent, &c.¹ Antipho of the deme Rhamnus in Attica, Thrasymachus of Chalkêdon, Tisias of Syracuse, Gorgias of Leontini, Protagoras of Abdêra, Prodikus of Keôs, Theodôrus of Byzantium, Hippias of Elis, Zeno of Elea, were among the first who distinguished themselves in these departments of teaching. Antipho was the author of the earliest composed speech really spoken in a dikastery and preserved down to the later critics.² These men were mostly not citizens of Athens, though many of them belonged to towns comprehended in the Athenian empire, at a time when important judicial causes belonging to these towns were often carried up to be tried at Athens—while all of them looked to that city as a central point of action and distinction. The term *Sophist*, which Herodotus³ applies with sincere respect to men of distinguished wisdom such as Solon, Anacharsis, Pythagoras, &c., now came to be applied to these teachers of virtue, rhetoric, conversation, and disputation; many of whom professed acquaintance with the

¹ See the first book of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* (alluded to in a former note) for his remarks on the technical teachers of rhetoric before his time. He remarks (and Plato had remarked before him) (i. 1 and 2) that their teaching was for the most part thoroughly narrow and practical, bearing exclusively on what was required for the practice of the dikastery (περὶ τοῦ δικάζεσθαι πάντες πειρῶνται τεχνολογεῖν): compare also a remarkable passage in his *Treatise de Sophisticis Elenchis*, c. 32 ad finem. And though he himself lays down a far more profound and comprehensive theory of rhetoric and all matters appertaining to it (in a treatise which has rarely been surpassed in power of philosophical analysis), yet when he is recommending his speculation to notice, he appeals to the great practical value of rhetorical teaching, as enabling a man to "help himself" and fight his own battles in case of need—*Ἀποκόνει τῷ*

σώματι μὲν ἀσχερὸν μὴ δύνασθαι βοηθεῖν ἑαυτῷ, λόγῳ δὲ οὐκ ἀσχερὸν (i. 1, 3: compare iii. 1, 2; Plato, *Gorgias*, c. 41-55; *Protagoras*, c. 9; *Phædrus*, c. 43-50; *Euthydem.* c. 1-31; and *Xenophon*, *Memorab.* iii. 12, 2, 3).

See also the character of Proxenus in the *Anabasis* of *Xenophon*, ii. 6, 16; *Plutarch*, *Vit. X. Orator.* p. 307; *Aristoph.* *Nubes*, 1108; *Xenophon*, *Memorab.* i. 2, 48; *Plato*, *Alkibiadês*, i. c. 31, p. 119; and a striking passage in *Plutarch's* life of *Cato* the elder, c. 1.

² *Plutarch*, *Vit. X. Orator.* p. 832; *Quintilian*, iii. 1, 10. Compare *Van Spaan* (or *Ruhnken*), *Dissertatio de Antiphonte Oratore Attico*, pp. 8, 9, prefixed to *Dobson's* edition of *Antipho* and *Andokidês*. *Antipho* is said to have been the teacher of the historian *Thucydidês*. The statement of *Plutarch* that the father of *Antipho* was also a sophist, can hardly be true.

³ *Herodot.* i. 29; iv. 95.

whole circle of human science, physical as well as moral (then narrow enough), so far as was necessary to talk about any portion of it plausibly and effectively, and to answer any question which might be proposed to them. Though they passed from one Grecian town to another, partly in the capacity of envoys from their fellow-citizens, partly as exhibiting their talents to numerous hearers, with much renown and large gain,¹—they appear to have been viewed with jealousy and dislike by a large portion of the public.² For at a time when every citizen pleaded his own cause before the dikastery, they imparted, to those who were rich enough to purchase it, a peculiar skill in the common weapons, which made them like fencing-masters or professional swordsmen amidst a society of untrained duellists.³ Moreover Sokratēs, —himself a product of the same age, a disputant on the same subjects, and bearing the same name of a *Sophist*⁴—but

¹ Plato (Hippias Major, c. 1, 2; Menon, p. 95; and Gorgias, c. 1, with Stallbaum's note); Diodor. xii. 53; Pausan. vi. 17, 8.

² Xenophon, Memorab. i. 2, 31. To teach or learn the art of speech was the common reproach made by the vulgar against philosophers and lettered men—τὸ κοινῇ τοῖς φιλοσόφοις ἐπὶ τῶν πολλῶν ἐπιτιμώμενον (Xenoph. Memor. i. 2, 31). Compare Æschinēs cont. Timarch. about Demosthenēs, c. 25, 27, which illustrates the curious fragment of Sophoklēs, 865. Οἱ γὰρ γύμναστροι καὶ λέγειν ἢ σκηκεῖται.

³ Such is probably the meaning of that remarkable passage in which Thucydides describes the Athenian rhetor Antiphon (viii. 68): 'Ἀντιφῶν, ἀνὴρ Ἀθηναίων ἀρετῇ τε οὐκ ἐνὸς ἑστέρος, καὶ κρατίστος ἐνθυμηθῆναι γενόμενος καὶ ἂν γνώη εἰπεῖν καὶ ἐς μὲν δῆμον οὐ παρών οὐδ' ἐς ἄλλον ἀγῶνα ἰκοῦστος οὐδένα. ἀλλ' ὑπόπτως τῷ πλήθει διὰ δόξαν δεινότητος διακείμενος, τοὺς μέντοι ἀγωνιζομένους καὶ ἐν δικαστηρίῳ καὶ ἐν δῆμῳ, πλείστα εἰς ἀρετὴν, ὅστις ἐμβουλευσάμενός τι, συνάμενος ὠφελεῖν.' "Inde illa circa occultandam eloquentiam simulatio," observes Quinilian, Inst. Or. iv. 1, 8.

Compare Plato (Protagoras, c. 8; Phædrus, c. 86), Isokratēs cont. Sophistas, Or. xiii. p. 295, where he com-

plains of the teachers—οἵτινες ἐνέσχοιτο, δικάζεσθαι διδάσκειν, ἐκλεξάμενοι τὸ δυσχερέστατον τῶν ὀνομάτων, ὃ τῶν φθορούτων ἔργον εἶη λέγειν, ἀλλ' οὐ τῶν προεστώτων τῆς τοιαύτης παιδείας, Demosthen. De Fals. Legat. c. 70, 71, p. 417-420; and Æschin. cont. Ktesiphon, c. 9, p. 371—κακοῦργον σοφιστὴν, οἰόμενον ῥήμασι τοὺς νόμους ἀμυρῆσειν.

⁴ Æschinēs cont. Timarch. c. 34, p. 74. Τμεῖς μὲν, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, Σωκράτην μὲν τὸν σοφιστὴν ἀπεκτείνατε, ὅτι Κριτίαν ἐφάνη πεπαιδευκῶς, ἐνα τῶν τριάκοντα τῶν τὸν δῆμον καταλυσάντων.

Among the sophists whom Isokratēs severely criticises, he evidently seems to include Plato, as may be seen by the contrast between δόξα and ἐπιστήμη, which he particularly notes, and which is so conspicuously set forth in the Platonic writings (Isokratēs cont. Sophistas, Or. xiii. p. 293; also p. 295). We know also that Lysias called both Plato and Æschinēs the disciple of Sokratēs, by the name of *Sophists* (Aristeidēs, Orat. Platonic. xlii. Τίτρε τῶν τεττάρων, p. 407, vol. ii. ed. Dindorf). Aristeidēs remarks justly that the name *Sophist* was a general name, including all the philosophers, teachers, and lettered men.

The general name *Sophists*, in fact, included good, bad, and indifferent, like "the philosophers, the political

despising political and judicial practice, and looking to the production of intellectual stimulus and moral impressions upon his hearers—Sokratês—or rather, Plato speaking through the person of Sokratês—carried on throughout his life a constant polemical warfare against the sophists and rhetors, in that negative vein in which he was unrivalled. And as the works of these latter have not remained, it is chiefly from the observations of their opponents that we know them; so that they are in a situation such as that in which Sokratês himself would have been, if we had been compelled to judge of him only from the *Clouds* of Aristophanês, or from those unfavourable impressions respecting his character which we know, even from the *Apologies* of Plato and Xenophon, to have been generally prevalent at Athens.

Polemics of Sokratês, himself a sophist, against the sophists generally.

This is not the opportunity however for trying to distinguish the good from the evil in the working of the sophists and rhetors. At present it is enough that they were the natural product of the age; supplying those wants, and answering to that stimulus, which arose partly from the deliberations of the *Ekklesia*, but still more from the contentions before the *dikastery*,—in which latter a far greater number of citizens took active part, with or without their own consent. The public and frequent *dikasteries* constituted by Periklês opened to the Athenian mind precisely that career of improvement which was best suited to its natural aptitude. They were essential to the development of that demand out of which grew not only Grecian oratory, but also, as secondary products, the speculative moral and political philosophy, and the didactic analysis of rhetoric and grammar, which long survived after Grecian creative genius had passed away.¹ And it was one

Sophists and rhetors were the natural product of the age and of the democracy.

economists, the metaphysicians," &c. I shall take a future opportunity of examining the indiscriminate censures against them as a class, which most modern writers have copied implicitly from the polemics of ancient times. This examination will be found in ch. 67 of the present history.

¹ Xenoph. *Memor.* i. 2, 31. λόγων τέχνην μὴ διδάσκειν. Xenophon ascribes

the passing of this law to a personal hatred of Kritias against Sokratês, and connects it with an anecdote exceedingly puerile, when considered as the alleged cause of that hatred, as well as of the consequent law. But it is evident that the law had a far deeper meaning, and was aimed directly at one of the prominent democratical habits.

of the first measures of the oligarchy of Thirty, to forbid, by an express law, any teaching of the art of speaking. Aristophanês derides the Athenians for their love of talk and controversy, as if it had enfeebled their military energy; but in his time most undoubtedly, that reproach was not true—nor did it become true, even in part, until the crushing misfortunes which marked the close of the Peloponnesian war. During the course of that war, restless and energetic action was the characteristic of Athens even in a greater degree than oratory or political discussion, though before the time of Demosthenês a material alteration had taken place.

The establishment of these paid dikasteries at Athens was thus one of the most important and prolific events in all Grecian history. The pay helped to furnish a maintenance for old citizens, past the age of military service. Elderly men were the best persons for such a service, and were preferred for judicial purposes both at Sparta, and as it seems, in heroic Greece.

Nevertheless, we need not suppose that *all* the dikasts were either old or poor, though a considerable proportion of them were so, and though Aristophanês selects these qualities as among the most suitable subjects for his ridicule. Periklês has been often censured for this institution, as if he had been the first to ensure pay to dikasts who before served for nothing, and had thus introduced poor citizens into courts previously composed of citizens above poverty. But in the first place, this supposition is not correct in point of fact, inasmuch as there were no such constant dikasteries previously acting without pay; next, if it had been true, the habitual exclusion of the poor citizens would have nullified the popular working of these bodies, and would have prevented them from answering any longer to the reigning sentiment at Athens. Nor could it be deemed unreasonable to assign a regular pay to those who thus rendered regular service. It was indeed an essential item in the whole scheme¹ and purpose, so that the suppression of the pay

¹ Thucyd. viii. 67. Compare a curious passage, even in reference to the time of Demosthenês, in the speech of that orator contra Boetum de Nomine, c. 5. καὶ εἰ μισθὸς ἐπαρίσθη τοῖς δικαστηρίοις, εἰσῆγγον ἂν με θῆλον ὅτι, &c.

of itself seems to have suspended the dikasteries, while the oligarchy of Four Hundred was established—and it can only be discussed in that light. As the fact stands, we may suppose that the 6000 Heliasts who filled the dikasteries were composed of the middling and poorer citizens indiscriminately ; though there was nothing to exclude the richer, if they chose to serve.

CHAPTER XLVII.

FROM THE THIRTY YEARS' TRUCE, FOURTEEN YEARS BEFORE THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR, DOWN TO THE BLOCKADE OF POTIDÆA, IN THE YEAR BEFORE THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR.

THE judicial alterations effected at Athens by Periklês and Ephialtês, described in the preceding chapter, gave to a large proportion of the citizens direct jury functions and an active interest in the constitution, such as they had never before enjoyed ; the change being at once a mark of previous growth of democratical sentiment during the past, and a cause of its farther development during the future. The Athenian people were at this time ready for personal exertion in all directions. Military service on land or sea was not less conformable to their dispositions than attendance in the ekklesia or in the dikastery at home. The naval service especially was prosecuted with a degree of assiduity which brought about continual improvement in skill and efficiency ; while the poorer citizens, of whom it chiefly consisted, were more exact in obedience and discipline than any of the more opulent persons from whom the infantry or the cavalry were drawn.¹ The maritime multitude, in addition to self-confidence and courage, acquired by this laborious training an increased skill, which placed the Athenian navy every year more and more above the rest of Greece. And the perfection of this force became the more indispensable as the Athenian empire was now again confined to the sea and seaport towns ; the reverses immediately preceding the thirty years' truce having broken up all Athenian land ascendancy over Megara, Bœotia, and the other continental territories adjoining to Attica.

Personal activity now prevalent among the Athenian citizens—empire of Athens exclusively maritime, after the thirty years' truce.

¹ Xenophon, *Memorab.* iii. 5, 18.

The maritime confederacy—originally commenced at Delos under the headship of Athens, but with a common synod and deliberative voice on the part of each member—had now become transformed into a confirmed empire on the part of Athens, over the remaining states as foreign dependencies; all of them rendering tribute except Chios, Samos, and Lesbos. These three still remained on their original footing of autonomous allies, retaining their armed force, ships, and fortifications, with the obligation of furnishing military and naval aid when required, but not of paying tribute. The discontinuance of the deliberative synod, however, had deprived them of their original security against the encroachments of Athens. I have already stated generally the steps (we do not know them in detail) whereby this important change was brought about, gradually and without any violent revolution—for even the transfer of the common treasure from Delos to Athens, which was the most palpable symbol and evidence of the change, was not an act of Athenian violence, since it was adopted on the proposition of the Samians. The change resulted in fact almost inevitably from the circumstances of the case, and from the eager activity of the Athenians contrasted with the backwardness and aversion to personal service on the part of the allies. We must recollect that the confederacy, even in its original structure, was contracted for permanent objects, and was permanently binding by the vote of its majority, like the Spartan confederacy, upon every individual member.¹ It was destined to keep out the Persian fleet, and to maintain the police of the Ægean. Consistently with these objects, no individual member could be allowed to secede from the confederacy, and thus to acquire the benefit of protection at the cost of the remainder: so that when Naxos and other members actually did secede, the step was taken as a revolt, and Athens only performed her duty as president of the confederacy in reducing them. By every such reduction, as well as by that exchange of personal service for money-

Chios, Samos, and Lesbos were now the only free allies of Athens, on the same footing as the original confederates of Delos—the rest were subject and tributary.

¹ Thucyd. v. 30: about the Spartan confederacy—*εἰρημένον, κύριον εἶναι, ὅ, τι ἂν τὸ πλεῖστον τῶν συμμάχων ψηφίσσεται, ἢν μὴ τι θεῶν ἢ ἡρώων κώλυμα ᾖ.*

payment, which most of the allies voluntarily sought, the power of Athens increased, until at length she found herself with an irresistible navy in the midst of disarmed tributaries, none of whom could escape from her constraining power,—and mistress of the sea, the use of which was indispensable to them. The synod of Delos, even if it had not before become partially deserted, must have ceased at the time when the treasure was removed to Athens—probably about 460 B.C., or shortly afterwards.

The relations between Athens and her allies were thus materially changed, by proceedings which gradually evolved themselves and followed one upon the other without any preconcerted plan. She became an imperial or despot city, governing an aggregate of dependent subjects all without their own active concurrence, and in many cases doubtless contrary to their own sense of political right. It was not likely that they should conspire unanimously to break up the confederacy, and discontinue the collection of contribution from each of the members; nor would it have been at all desirable that they should do so: for while Greece generally would have been a great loser by such a proceeding, the allies themselves would have been the greatest losers of all, inasmuch as they would have been exposed without defence to the Persian and Phœnician fleets. But the Athenians committed the capital fault of taking the whole alliance into their own hands, and treating the allies purely as subjects, without seeking to attach them by any form of political incorporation or collective meeting and discussion—without taking any pains to maintain community of feeling or idea of a joint interest—without admitting any control, real or even pretended, over themselves as managers. Had they attempted to do this, it might have proved difficult to accomplish,—so powerful was the force of geographical dissemination, the tendency to isolated civic life, and the repugnance to any permanent extramural obligations, in every Grecian community. But they do not appear to have ever made the attempt. Finding Athens exalted by circumstances to empire, and the allies degraded into subjects, the Athenian statesmen grasped at the exaltation as a matter of pride as

Athens took no pains to inspire her allies with the idea of a common interest—nevertheless the allies were gainers by the continuance of her empire.

well as profit.¹ Even Periklēs, the most prudent and far-sighted of them, betrayed no consciousness that an empire without the cement of some all-pervading interest or attachment, although not practically oppressive, must nevertheless have a natural tendency to become more and more unpopular, and ultimately to crumble in pieces. Such was the course of events which, if the judicious counsels of Periklēs had been followed, might have been postponed, though it could not have been averted.

Instead of trying to cherish or restore the feelings of equal alliance, Periklēs formally disclaimed it. He maintained that Athens owed to her subject allies no account of the money received from them, so long as she performed her contract by keeping away the Persian enemy and maintaining the safety of the Ægean waters.² This was, as he represented, the obligation which Athens had undertaken; and provided it were faithfully discharged, the allies had no right to ask questions or exercise control. That it was faithfully discharged no one could deny. No ship of war except from Athens and her allies was ever seen between the eastern and western shores of the Ægean. An Athenian fleet of sixty triremes was kept on duty in these waters, chiefly manned by Athenian citizens, and beneficial as well from the protection afforded to commerce as for keeping the seamen in constant pay and training.³ And such was the effective superintendence maintained, that in the disastrous period preceding the thirty years' truce, when Athens lost Megara and Bœotia, and with difficulty recovered Eubœa, none of her numerous maritime subjects took the opportunity to revolt.

Conception of Periklēs—Athens, an imperial city, owing protection to the subject allies; who, on their part, owed obedience and tribute.

The total of these distinct tributary cities is said to have amounted to 1000, according to a verse of Aristophanēs⁴ which cannot be under the truth, though it may well be, and probably is, greatly above the truth. The total annual tribute collected at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, and probably also for the years preceding it, is given by Thucy-

¹ Thucyd. ii. 63. τῆς δὲ πόλεως ὁμᾶς εἰκὸς τῷ τιμωμένῳ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἔρχεσθαι, ὅπερ πάντες ἀγάλλεσθαι, βοηθεῖν, καὶ μὴ φύγειν τοὺς πόρους, ἢ μηδὲ τὰς τιμὰς διώ-

κειν, &c.

² Plutarch, Periklēs, c. 12.

³ Plutarch, Periklēs, c. 11.

⁴ Aristophan. Vesp. 707.

didés at about 600 talents. Of the sums paid by particular states, however, we have little or no information.¹ It was

¹ The island of Kythéra was conquered by the Athenians from Sparta in 425 B.C., and the annual tribute then imposed upon it was four talents (Thucyd. iv. 57). In the Inscription No. 143, ap. Boeckh Corp. Inscr., we find some names enumerated of tributary towns with the amount of tribute opposite to each, but the stone is too much damaged to give us much information. Tyrodiza in Thrace paid 1000 drachms: some other towns, or junctions of towns, not clearly discernible, are rated at 1000, 2000, 3000 drachms, one talent, and even ten talents. This inscription must be anterior to 413 B.C., when the tribute was converted into a five per cent. duty upon imports and exports: see Boeckh, Public Econ. of Athens, and his notes upon the above-mentioned Inscription.

It was the practice of Athens not always to rate each tributary city separately, but sometimes to join several in one collective rating; probably each responsible for the rest. This seems to have provoked occasional remonstrances from the allies, in some of which the rhetor Antipho was employed to furnish the speech which the complainants pronounced before the dikastery: see Antipho ap. Harpokration, v. Ἀντίφης—Συγγελοίς. It is greatly to be lamented that the orations composed by Antipho for the Samothrakians and Lindians (the latter inhabiting one of the three separate towns in the island of Rhodes) have not been preserved.

Since my first edition, M. Boeckh has published a second edition of his Public Economy of the Athenians, with valuable additions and enlargements. Among the latter are included several Inscriptions (published also for the most part in Rangabe's Antiquités Helléniques) recently found at Athens, and illustrating the tribute raised by ancient Athens from her subject-allies. M. Boeckh has devoted more than half his second volume (from p. 369 to p. 747) to an elaborate commentary for the elucidation of these documents.

Had it been our good fortune to recover these Inscriptions complete, we should have acquired important and authentic information respecting the Athenian Tribute-system. But they are

very imperfectly legible, and require at every step conjectural restoration as well as conjectural interpretation. To extract from them a consistent idea of the entire system, M. Boeckh has recourse to several hypotheses, which appear to me more ingenious than convincing.

The stones (or at least several among them) form a series of records, belonging to successive years or other periods, inscribed by the Thirty Logistæ or Auditors (Boeckh, p. 584). The point of time from which they begin is not positively determinable. Rangabe supposes it to be Olymp. 82, 1. (452 B.C.), while Boeckh puts it later—Olymp. 83, 2, B.C. 447 (p. 594-596). They reach down, in his opinion, to B.C. 406.

As to the amount of tribute demanded from or paid by the allies, collectively or individually, nothing certain appears to me obtainable from these Inscriptions; which vary surprisingly (as Boeckh observes p. 615, 626, 628, 646) in the sums placed opposite to the same name. We learn however something about the classification of the subject allies. They were distributed under five general heads,—1. Karian Tribute. 2. Ionic Tribute. 3. Insular Tribute. 4. Hellespontine Tribute. 5. Thracian Tribute. Under the first head, Karian, we find specified 62 names of cities; under the second, Ionic, 42 names; under the third, Insular, 41; under the fourth, Hellespontine, 50; under the fifth, Thracian, 68. The total of these (with the addition of four undecipherable names not aggregated to either class) makes 267 names of tributary cities (Boeckh, p. 619). Undoubtedly all the names of tributaries are not here included. Boeckh supposes that an approximation to the actual total may be made, by adding one-fifth more, making in all 334 tributaries (p. 663). This shows a probable minimum, but little more.

Allusion is made in the Inscriptions to certain differences in the mode of assessment. Some are self-assessed cities, πόλεις αὐτὰς φόρον ταξιδμεναι—others are cities inscribed by private individuals on the tribute roll, πόλεις ἀπὸ ἰδιωτῶν ἐνέγραψαν φόρον φέρειν (p. 613-616). These two heads (occurring in three different Inscriptions) seem to

placed under the superintendence of the *Hellenotamiæ*; originally officers of the confederacy but now removed from Delos to Athens, and acting altogether as an Athenian treasury-board. The sum total of the Athenian revenue¹ from all sources, including this tribute, at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war is stated by Xenophon at 1000 talents. Customs, harbour and market dues, receipt from the silver-mines at Laurium, rents of public property, fines from judicial sentences, a tax per head upon slaves, the annual payment made by each metic, &c., may have made up a larger sum than 400 talents: which sum, added to the 600 talents from tribute, would make the total named by Xenophon. But a verse of Aristophanês² during the ninth year of the Peloponnesian war (B.C. 422) gives the general total of that time as "nearly 2000 talents:" this is in all probability much above the truth, though we may reasonably imagine that the amount of tribute-money levied upon the allies had been augmented during the interval. I think that the alleged duplication of the tribute by Alkibiadês, which Thucydidês nowhere notices, is not borne out by any good evidence, nor can I believe that it ever reached the sum of 1200 talents.³

point to a date not long after the first establishment of the tribute. It appears that the Athenian *kleruchs* or outlying citizens were numbered among the tributaries, and were assessed (as far as can be made out) at the highest rate (p. 631).

There are a few Inscriptions in which the sum placed opposite to the name of each city is extremely high; but in general the sum recorded is so small, that Boeckh affirms it not to represent the whole tribute assessed, but only that small fraction of it (according to him $\frac{1}{16}$) which was paid over as a compliment of perquisite to the goddess *Athênê*. His hypothesis on this subject rests, in my judgement, upon no good proof, nor can I think that these Inscriptions at all help us to discover the actual aggregate of tribute raised. He speaks too emphatically about the heavy pressure of it upon the allies. Nothing in Thucydidês warrants this belief; moreover, we know distinctly from him that until the year 413 B.C., the total tribute was something not so much as 5 per cent. upon imports and exports

(Thucyd. vii. 28). How much less it was we do not know; but it certainly did not reach that point. Mitford seems struck with the lightness of the tax (see a note in this History, ch. lxi.). It is possible that the very high assessments, which appear on a few of the stones appended to some names of insular tributaries, may refer to a date later than 413 B.C. during the closing years of the war, when Athens was struggling under the most severe pressure and peril (Boeckh, p. 547 *sq.*).

¹ Xenophon, *Anab.* vii. 1, 27. οὐ μείων χιλίων ταλάντων: compare Boeckh, *Public Econ.* of Athens, b. iii. ch. 7, 15, 19.

² Aristophan. *Vesp.* 660. τέλων' ἔγγυς δισχίλια.

³ Very excellent writers on Athenian antiquity (Boeckh, *Public Econ.* of Athens, c. 15, 19, b. iii.; Schömann, *Antiq. J. P. Att. sect.* lxxiv.; K. F. Hermann, *Gr. Staatsalterthümer*, sect. 157: compare however a passage in Boeckh, ch. 17, p. 421, Eng. transl., where he seems to be of an opposite opinion) accept this statement, that the

Whatever may have been the actual magnitude of the Athenian budget, however, prior to the Peloponnesian war, we

tribute levied by Athens upon her allies was doubled some years after the commencement of the Peloponnesian war (at which time it was 600 talents), and that it came to amount to 1200 talents. Nevertheless, I cannot follow them, upon evidence no stronger than *Æschinēs* (*Fals. Leg.* c. 54, p. 301), *Andokidēs* (*De Pace*, c. 1, s. 9), and *Pseudo-Andokidēs*, *cont. Alkib.* s. 11.

Both *Andokidēs* and *Æschinēs*, who seems to copy him, profess to furnish a general but brief sketch of Athenian history for the century succeeding the Persian invasion. But both are so full of historical and chronological inaccuracies, that we can hardly accept their authority, when opposed by any negative probabilities, as sufficient for an important matter of fact. In a note on the chapter immediately preceding I have already touched upon their extraordinary looseness of statement—pointed out by various commentators, among them particularly by Mr. Fynes Clinton: see above, chap. xlv.

The assertion that the tribute from the Athenian allies was raised to a sum of 1200 talents annually, comes to us only from these orators as original witnesses; and in them it forms part of a tissue of statements alike confused and incorrect. But against it we have a powerful negative argument—the perfect silence of *Thucydides*. Is it possible that that historian would have omitted all notice of a step so very important in its effects, if Athens had really adopted it? He mentions to us the commutation by Athens of the tribute from her allies into a duty of 5 per cent. payable by them on their exports and imports (*vii.* 28)—this was in the nineteenth year of the war—413 B.C. But anything like the duplication of the tribute all at once, would have altered much more materially the relations between Athens and her allies, and would have constituted in the minds of the latter a substantive grievance such as to aggravate the motive for revolt in a manner which *Thucydides* could hardly fail to notice. The orator *Æschinēs* refers the augmentation of the tribute, *not* to 1200 talents, to the time succeeding the peace of *Nikias*; *M. Boeckh* (*Public Econ. of Athens*, b. iii. ch. 15-19, p. 400-434)

supposes it to have taken place earlier than the representation of the *Vespæ* of *Aristophanes*, that is, about three years before that peace, or 423 B.C. But this would have been just before the time of the expedition of *Brasidas* into Thrace, and his success in exciting revolt among the dependencies of Athens. Now if Athens had doubled her tribute upon all the allies, just before that expedition, *Thucydides* could not have omitted to mention it, as increasing the chances of success to *Brasidas*, and helping to determine the resolutions of the *Akanthians* and others, which were by no means adopted unanimously or without hesitation, to revolt.

In reference to the Oration to which I here refer as that of *Pseudo-Andokidēs* against *Alkibiadēs*, I made some remarks in chap. xxxi. of this History, tending to show it to be spurious and of a time considerably later than that to which it purports to belong. I will here add one other remark, which appears to me decisive, tending to the same conclusion.

The oration professes to be delivered in a contest of ostracism between *Nikias*, *Alkibiadēs*, and the speaker. One of the three (he says) must necessarily be ostracised, and the question is to determine which of the three: accordingly the speaker dwells upon many topics calculated to raise a bad impression of *Alkibiadēs*, and a favourable impression of himself.

Among the accusations against *Alkibiadēs*, one is, that after having recommended in the assembly of the people that the inhabitants of *Melos* should be sold as slaves, he had himself purchased a *Melian* woman among the captives, and had had a son by her: it was criminal (argues the speaker) to beget offspring by a woman whose relations he had contributed to cause to be put to death, and whose city he had contributed to ruin (c. 8).

Upon this argument I do not here touch, any farther than to bring out the point of chronology. The speech, if delivered at all, must have been delivered, at the earliest, nearly a year after the capture of *Melos* by the Athenians: it may be of later date, but it cannot possibly be earlier.

know that during the larger part of the administration of Periklēs, the revenue including tribute was so managed as to leave a large annual surplus; insomuch that a treasure of coined money was accumulated in the Acropolis during the years preceding the Peloponnesian war—which treasure when at its maximum reached the great sum of 9700 talents (= 2,230,000*l.*), and was still at 6000 talents, after a serious drain for various purposes, at the moment when that war began.¹ This system of public economy, constantly laying by a considerable sum year after year—in which Athens stood alone, since none of the Peloponnesian states had any public reserve whatever,² goes far of itself to vindicate Periklēs from the charge of having wasted the public money in mischievous distributions for the purpose of obtaining popularity, and also to exonerate the Athenian Demos from that reproach of a greedy appetite for living by the public purse which it is common to advance against them. After the death of Kimon

Large amount of revenue laid by and accumulated by Athens, during the years preceding the Peloponnesian war.

Now Melos surrendered in the winter immediately preceding the great expedition of the Athenians to Sicily in 415 B.C., which expedition sailed about mid-summer (Thucyd. v. 116; vi. 30). Nikias and Alkibiadēs both went as commanders of that expedition: the latter was recalled to Athens for a trial on the charge of impiety about three months afterwards, but escaped in the way home, was condemned and sentenced to banishment in his absence, and did not return to Athens until 407 B.C., long after the death of Nikias, who continued in command of the Athenian armament in Sicily, enjoying the full esteem of his countrymen, until its complete failure and ruin before Syracuse—and who perished himself afterwards as a Syracusan prisoner.

Taking these circumstances together, it will at once be seen that there never can have been any time, ten months or more after the capture of Melos, when Nikias and Alkibiadēs could have been exposed to a vote of ostracism at Athens. The thing is absolutely impossible: and the oration in which such historical and chronological incompatibilities are embodied, must be spurious; furthermore it must have been composed long after the pretended time of delivery,

when the chronological series of events had been forgotten.

I may add that the story of this duplication of the tribute by Alkibiadēs is virtually contrary to the statement of Plutarch, probably borrowed from Æschinēs, who states that the demagogues gradually increased (κατὰ μικρόν) the tribute to 1300 talents (Plutarch, Aristeid. c. 24).

¹ Thucyd. ii. 13.

² Thucyd. i. 80. The foresight of the Athenian people, in abstaining from immediate use of public money and laying it up for future wants, would be still more conspicuously demonstrated, if the statement of Æschinēs the orator were true, that they got together 7000 talents between the peace of Nikias and the Sicilian expedition. M. Boeckh believes this statement, and says, "It is not impossible that 1000 talents might have been laid by every year, as the amount of tribute received was so considerable" (Public Economy of Athens, ch. xx. p. 446, Eng. trans.). I do not believe the statement: but M. Boeckh and others, who do, ought in fairness to set it against the many remarks which they pass in condemnation of the democratic prodigality.

no farther expeditions were undertaken against the Persians. Even for some years before his death, not much appears to have been done. The tribute money thus remained unexpended, and kept in reserve, as the presidential duties of Athens prescribed, against future attack, which might at any time be renewed.

Though we do not know the exact amount of the other sources of Athenian revenue, however, we know that tribute received from allies was the largest item in it.¹ And altogether the exercise of empire abroad became a prominent feature in Athenian life, and a necessity to Athenian sentiment, not less than democracy at home. Athens was no longer, as she had been once, a single city, with Attica for her territory. She was a capital or imperial city—a despot-city, was the expression used by her enemies, and even sometimes by her own citizens²—with many dependencies attached to her, and bound to follow her orders. Such was the manner in which not merely Periklēs and the other leading statesmen, but even the humblest Athenian citizen, conceived the dignity of Athens. The sentiment was one which carried with it both personal pride and stimulus to active patriotism. To establish Athenian interests among the dependent territories was one important object in the eyes of Periklēs. While discouraging all distant³ and rash enterprises, such as invasion of Egypt or Cyprus, he planted out many kleruchies, and colonies of Athenian citizens inter-

Pride felt by Athenian citizens in the imperial power of their city.

¹ Thucyd. i. 122-143; ii. 13. The *πρυτανισμός*, or duty of two per cent. upon imports and exports at the Peiræus, produced to the state a revenue of thirty-six talents in the year in which it was farmed by Andokidēs, somewhere about 400 B.C., after the restoration of the democracy at Athens from its defeat and subversion at the close of the Peloponnesian war (Andokidēs de Mysteriis, c. 23, p. 65). This was at a period of depression in Athenian affairs, and when trade was doubtless not near so good as it had been during the earlier part of the Peloponnesian war.

It seems probable that this must have been the most considerable permanent source of Athenian revenue next to the tribute; though we do not know what rate of customs-duty was imposed at

the Peiræus during the Peloponnesian war. Comparing together the two passages of Xenophon (Republ. Ath. 1, 17, and Aristophan. Vesp. 657), we may suppose that the regular and usual rate of duty was one per cent. or one *ἑκατοστή*—while in case of need this may have been doubled or tripled—*τὰς τοσάδς ἑκατοστὰς* (see Boeckh, b. iii. ch. 1-4, p. 298-318, Eng. trans.). The amount of revenue derived even from this source, however, can have borne no comparison to the tribute.

² By Periklēs, Thucyd. ii. 63. By Kleon, Thucyd. iii. 37. By the envoys at Mēlos, v. 89. By Euphemus, vi. 85. By the hostile Corinthians, i. 124, as a matter of course.

³ Plutarch, Periklēs, c. 20.

mingled with allies, on islands and parts of the coast. He conducted 1000 citizens to the Thracian Chersonese, 500 to Naxos, and 250 to Andros. In the Chersonese, he farther repelled the barbarous Thracian invaders from without, and even undertook the labour of carrying a wall of defence across the isthmus which connected the peninsula with Thrace; since the barbarous Thracian tribes, though expelled some time before by Kimon,¹ had still continued to renew their incursions from time to time. Ever since the occupation of the elder Miltiadês about eighty years before, there had been in this peninsula many Athenian proprietors, apparently intermingled with half-civilized Thracians: the settlers now acquired both greater numerical strength and better protection, though it does not appear that the cross-wall was permanently maintained. The maritime expeditions of Periklês even extended into the Euxine sea, as far as the important Greek city of Sinôpê, then governed by a despot named Timesilaus, against whom a large proportion of the citizens were in active discontent. Lamachus was left with thirteen Athenian triremes to assist in expelling the despot, who was driven into exile along with his friends and party. The properties of these exiles were confiscated, and assigned to the maintenance of six hundred Athenian citizens, admitted to equal fellowship and residence with the Sinôpians. We may presume that on this occasion Sinôpê became a member of the Athenian tributary alliance, if it had not been so before: but we do not know whether Kotyôra and Trapezus, dependencies of Sinôpê farther eastward, which the 10,000 Greeks found on their retreat fifty years afterwards, existed in the time of Periklês or not. Moreover the numerous and well-equipped Athenian fleet under the command of Periklês produced an imposing effect upon the barbarous princes and tribes along the coast,² contributing certainly to the security of Grecian trade, and probably to the acquisition of new dependent allies.

It was by successive proceedings of this sort that many detachments of Athenian citizens became settled in various portions of the maritime empire of the city—some rich, investing their property in the islands as more secure (from the

Numerous
Athenian
citizens
planted out
as *kleruchs*
by Periklês.
Chersonesus
of Thrace.
Sinôpê.

¹ Plutarch, Kimon, c. 14.

² Plutarch, Periklês, c. 19, 20.

incontestable superiority of Athens at sea) even than Attica, which since the loss of the Megarid could not be guarded against a Peloponnesian land invasion¹—others poor, and hiring themselves out as labourers.² The islands of Lemnos, Imbros, and Skyros, as well as the territory of Estiæa, on the north of Eubœa, were completely occupied by Athenian proprietors and citizens: other places were partially so occupied. And it was doubtless advantageous to the islanders to associate themselves with Athenians in trading enterprises, since they thereby obtained a better chance of the protection of the Athenian fleet. It seems that Athens passed regulations occasionally for the commerce of her dependent allies, as we see by the fact that shortly before the Peloponnesian war she excluded the Megarians from all their ports. The commercial relations between Peiræus and the Ægean reached their maximum during the interval immediately preceding the Peloponnesian war. These relations were not confined to the country east and north of Attica: they reached also the western regions. The most important settlements founded by Athens during this period were, Amphipolis in Thrace and Thurii in Italy.

Amphipolis was planted by a colony of Athenians and other Greeks, under the conduct of the Athenian Agnon, in 437 B.C. It was situated near the river Strymon in Thrace, on the eastern bank, and at the spot where the Strymon resumes its river-course after emerging from the lake above. It was originally a township or settlement of the Edonian Thracians, called Ennea Hodoi or Nine Ways—in a situation doubly valuable, both as being close upon the bridge over the Strymon, and as a convenient centre for the ship-timber and gold and silver mines of the neighbouring region. It was distant about three English miles from the Athenian settlement of Eion at the mouth of the river. The previous unsuccessful attempts to

¹ Xenophon, Rep. Ath. ii. 16. τὴν μὲν οὐσίαν τοῖς νῆσοις παρατίθενται, πιστεύοντες τῇ ἀρχῇ τῇ κατὰ θάλασσαν· τὴν δὲ Ἀττικὴν γῆν περιορῶσι τεμνομένην, γινώσκοντες ὅτι εἰ αὐτὴν ἐλθέσουσιν, ἐτίρων ἀγαθῶν μειζόνων στερήσονται.

Compare also Xenophon (Memorabil. ii. 8, 1, and Symposium, iv. 31).

² See the case of the free labourer and the hushandman at Naxos, Plato, Euthyphro. c. 3.

form establishments at Ennea Hodoi have already been noticed—first that of Histiaëus the Milesian, followed up by his brother Aristagoras (about 497-496 B.C.), next that of the Athenians about 465 B.C. under Leagrus and others—on both which occasions the intruding settlers had been defeated and expelled by the native Thracian tribes, though on the second occasion the number sent by Athens was not less than 10,000.¹ So serious a loss deterred the Athenians for a long time from any repetition of the attempt. But it is highly probable that individual Athenian citizens, from Eion and from Thasus, connected themselves with powerful Thracian families, and became in this manner actively engaged in mining—to their own great profit, as well as to the profit of the city collectively, since the property of the kleruchs, or Athenian citizens occupying colonial lands, bore its share in case of direct taxes being imposed on property generally. Among such fortunate adventurers we may number the historian Thucydides himself; seemingly descended from Athenian parents intermarrying with Thracians, and himself married to a wife either Thracian or belonging to a family of Athenian colonists in that region, through whom he became possessed of a large property in the mines, as well as of great influence in the districts around.² This was one of the various ways in which the collective power of Athens enabled her chief citizens to enrich themselves individually.

The colony under Agnon, despatched from Athens in the year 437 B.C., appears to have been both numerous and well-sustained, inasmuch as it conquered and maintained the valuable position of Ennea Hodoi in spite of those formidable Edonian neighbours who had baffled the two preceding attempts. Its name of Ennea Hodoi was exchanged for that of Amphipolis—the hill on which the new town was situated being bounded on three sides by the river. The settlers seem to have been of mixed extraction, com-

Situation
and impor-
tance of
Amphipolis.

¹ Thucyd. i. 100.

² Thucyd. iv. 105; Marcellinus, Vit. Thucyd. c. 19. See Roscher, *Leben des Thucydides*, ch. i. 4, p. 96, who gives a genealogy of Thucydides, as far as it can be made out with any probability. The historian was connected by blood with Miltiadēs and Kimon, as well as

with Olorus king of one of the Thracian tribes, whose daughter Hegesipylē was wife of Miltiadēs the conqueror of Marathon. In this manner therefore he belonged to one of the ancient heroic families of Athens and even of Greece, being an Æakid through Ajax and Phileus (Marcellin. c. 2).

prising no large proportion of Athenians. Some were of Chalkidic race, others came from Argilus, a Grecian city colonised from Andros, which possessed the territory on the western bank of the Strymon immediately opposite to Amphipolis,¹ and which was included among the subject allies of Athens. Amphipolis, connected with the sea by the Strymon and the port of Eion, became the most important of all the Athenian dependencies in reference to Thrace and Macedonia.

The colony of Thurii on the coast of the Gulf of Tarentum in Italy, near the site and on the territory of the ancient Sybaris, was founded by Athens about seven years earlier than Amphipolis, not long after the conclusion of the Thirty years' truce with Sparta, B.C. 443. Since the destruction of the old Sybaris by the Krotoniates, in 509 B.C., its territory had for the most part remained unappropriated. The descendants of the former inhabitants, dispersed at Laüs and in other portions of the territory, were not strong enough to establish any new city: nor did it suit the views of the Krotoniates themselves to do so. After an interval of more than sixty years, however,

during which one unsuccessful attempt at occupation had been made by some Thessalian settlers, these Sybarites at length prevailed upon the Athenians to undertake and protect the re-colonization; the proposition having been made in vain to the Spartans. Lampon and Xenokritus, the former a prophet and interpreter of oracles, were sent by Periklês with ten ships as chiefs of the new colony of Thurii, founded under the auspices of Athens. The settlers, collected from all parts of Greece, included Dorians, Ionians, islanders, Bœotians, as well as Athenians. But the descendants of the ancient Sybarites procured themselves to be treated as privileged citizens, monopolising for themselves the possession of political powers as well as the most valuable lands in the immediate vicinity of the walls; while their wives also assumed an offensive pre-eminence over the other women of the city in the public religious processions. Such spirit of privilege and monopoly appears to have been a frequent manifestation among the ancient colonies, and often fatal either to their

Foundation, by the Athenians, of Thurii, on the southern coast of Italy.

Conduct of the refugee inhabitants of the ruined Sybaris—their encroachments in the foundation of Thurii: they are expelled, and Thurii reconstituted.

¹ Thucyd. iv. 102; v. 6.

tranquillity or to their growth; sometimes to both. In the case of Thurii, founded under the auspices of the democratical Athens, it was not likely to have any lasting success. And we find that after no very long period, the majority of the colonists rose in insurrection against the privileged Sybarites, either slew or expelled them, and divided the entire territory of the city upon equal principles among the colonists of every different race. This revolution enabled them to make peace with the Krotoniates, who had probably been unfriendly so long as their ancient enemies the Sybarites were masters of the city and likely to turn its powers to the purpose of avenging their conquered ancestors. And the city from this time forward, democratically governed, appears to have flourished steadily and without internal dissension for thirty years, until the ruinous disasters of the Athenians before Syracuse occasioned the overthrow of the Athenian party at Thurii. How miscellaneous the population of Thurii was, we may judge from the denominations of the ten tribes—such was the number of tribes established, after the model of Athens—Arkas, Achaïs, Eleia, Bœotia, Amphiktyonis, Doris, Ias, Athenais, Eubots, Nesiôtis. From this mixture of race they could not agree in recognizing or honouring an Athenian *Ækist*, or indeed any *Ækist* except Apollo.¹ The Spartan general Kleandridas, banished a few years before for having suffered himself to be bribed by Athens along with king Pleistoanax, removed to Thurii and was appointed general of the citizens in their war against Tarentum. That war was ultimately adjusted by the joint foundation of the new city of Herakleia half-way between the two—in the fertile territory called Siritis.²

The most interesting circumstance respecting Thurii is, that the rhetor Lysias, and the historian Herodotus, were both domiciliated there as citizens. The city was connected with Athens, yet seemingly only by a feeble tie; it was not numbered among the tributary subject allies.³ From the circumstance, that so small a proportion of the settlers at Thurii were native

Herodotus and Lysias—both domiciliated as citizens at Thurii. Few Athenian citizens settled there as colonists.

¹ Diodor. xii. 35.

² Diodor. xii. 11, 12; Strabo, vi. 264; Plutarch, Periklès, c. 22.

³ The Athenians pretended to no subject allies beyond the Ionian Gulf,

Thucyd. vi. 14: compare vi. 45, 104; vii. 34. Thucydides does not even mention Thurii, in his catalogue of the allies of Athens at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war (Thucyd. ii. 15).

Athenians, we may infer that not many of the latter at that time were willing to put themselves so far out of connexion with Athens—even though tempted by the prospect of lots of land in a fertile and promising territory. And Periklēs was probably anxious that those poor citizens, for whom emigration was desirable, should rather become *kleruchs* in some of the islands or ports of the *Ægean*, where they would serve (like the colonies of Rome) as a sort of garrison for the maintenance of the Athenian empire.¹

The fourteen years between the Thirty years' truce and the breaking out of the Peloponnesian war, are a period of full maritime empire on the part of Athens—partially indeed resisted, but never with success. They are a period of peace with all cities extraneous to her own empire; and of splendid decorations to the city itself, emanating from the genius of Pheidias and others, in sculpture as well as in architecture.

Since the death of Kimon, Periklēs had become, gradually but entirely, the first citizen in the commonwealth.

Period from
445-431 B.C.
Athens at
peace. Her
political
condition.
Rivalry of
Periklēs with
Thucydidēs
son of
Melēsias.

His qualities told for more, the longer they were known, and even the disastrous reverses which preceded the Thirty years' truce had not overthrown him, since he had protested against that expedition of Tolmidēs into *Bœotia* out of which they first arose. But if the personal influence of Periklēs had increased, the party opposed to him seems also to have become stronger and better organised than before; and to have acquired a leader in many respects more effective than Kimon—Thucydidēs son of Melēsias. The new chief was a near relative of Kimon, but of a character and talents more analogous to that of Periklēs; a statesman and orator rather than a general, though competent to both functions if occasion demanded, as every leading man in those days was required to be. Under Thucydidēs, the political and parliamentary opposition against Periklēs assumed a constant character and organisation, such as Kimon with his exclusively military aptitudes had never been able to establish. The aristocratical party in the commonwealth—the "honourable and respectable" citizens, as we find them styled, adopting their own

¹ Plutarch, Periklēs, c. 11.

nomenclature—now imposed upon themselves the obligation of undeviating regularity in their attendance on the public assembly, sitting together in a particular section so as to be conspicuously parted from the *Demos*. In this manner their applause and dissent, their mutual encouragement to each other, their distribution of parts to different speakers, was made more conducive to the party purposes than it had been before when these distinguished persons were intermingled with the mass of citizens.¹ Thucydidēs himself was eminent as a speaker, inferior only to Periklēs—perhaps hardly inferior even to him. We are told that in reply to a question put to him by Archidamus, whether Periklēs or he were the better wrestler, Thucydidēs replied—"Even when I throw him, he denies that he has fallen, gains his point, and talks over those who actually saw him fall."²

Such an opposition, made to Periklēs in all the full licence which a democratical constitution permitted, must have been both efficient and embarrassing. But the pointed severance of the aristocratical chiefs, which Thucydidēs son of Melēsias introduced, contributed probably at once to rally the democratical majority round Periklēs, and to exasperate the bitterness of party conflict.³ As far as we can make out the grounds of the opposition, it turned partly upon the pacific policy of Periklēs towards the Persians, partly upon his expenditure for home ornament. Thucydidēs contended that Athens was disgraced in the eyes of the Greeks by having drawn the confederate treasure from Delos to her own acropolis, under pretence of greater security—and then employing it, not in prosecuting war against the Persians,⁴ but in beauti-

Points of contention between the two parties.
1. Peace with Persia.
2. Expenditure of money for the decoration of Athens.

¹ Compare the speech of Nikias, in reference to the younger citizens and partisans of Alkibiadēs sitting together near the latter in the assembly—*οὓς ἐγὼ ὁρῶν νῦν ἐνθάδε τῷ αὐτῷ ἀνδρὶ παρακελευστούς καθημένους φοβούμαι, καὶ τοῖς πρεσβυτέροις ἀντιπαρακείμενοι μὴ κατασχυνθῆναι, εἰ τῷ τις παρακῆσθαι τῶνδε, &c.* (Thucyd. vi. 13). See also Aristophanēs, *Ekklesiāz*. 298 *seq.*, about partisans sitting near together.

² Plutarch, Periklēs, c. 8. *Ὅταν ἐγὼ καταβαλῶ παλαιῶν, ἐκεῖνος ἀντιλέγων ὡς*

οὐ πέτωκε, νικῶ, καὶ μεταπειθεὶ τοὺς ὁρῶντας.

³ Plutarch, Periklēs, c. 11. *ἡ δ' ἐκείνων ἑμιλλα καὶ φιλοτιμία τῶν ἀνδρῶν βαρυτάτην τομὴν τεμουσα τῆς πόλεως, τὸ μὲν δῆμον, τὸ δ' ὀλίγους ἐποίησε καλεῖσθαι.*

⁴ Plutarch, Periklēs, c. 12. *διέβαλλον ἐν ταῖς ἐκκλησίαις βουόντες, ὥς δ' μὲν δῆμος ἀδοξεῖ καὶ κακῶς ἀκούει τὰ κοινὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων χρήματα πρὸς αὐτὸν ἐκ δόλου μεταγαγόν, ἡ δ' ἔρεστιν αὐτῷ πρὸς τοὺς ἐγκαλοῦντας εὐπρεπεστάτη τῶν προφάσεων, δεισάτω τοὺς βαρβάρους ἐκείθεν*

fying Athens by new temples and costly statues. To this Periklēs replied that Athens had undertaken the obligation, in consideration of the tribute money, to protect her allies and keep off from them every foreign enemy—that she had accomplished this object completely at the present, and retained a reserve sufficient to guarantee the like security for the future—that under such circumstances, she owed no account to her allies of the expenditure of the surplus, but was at liberty to employ it for purposes useful and honourable to the city. In this point of view it was an object of great public importance to render Athens imposing in the eyes both of the allies and of Hellas generally, by improved fortifications,—by accumulated embellishment, sculptural and architectural,—and by religious festivals, frequent, splendid, musical, and poetical.

Such was the answer made by Periklēs in defence of his policy against the opposition headed by Thucydidēs. And considering the grounds of the debate on both sides, the answer was perfectly satisfactory. For when we look at the very large sum which Periklēs continually kept in reserve in the treasury, no one could reasonably complain that his expenditure for ornamental purposes was carried so far as to encroach upon the exigencies of defence. What Thucydidēs and his partisans appear to have urged, was that this common fund should still continue to be spent in aggressive warfare against the Persian king, in Egypt and elsewhere—conformably to the projects pursued by Kimon during his life.¹ But Periklēs was right in contending that such outlay would have been simply wasteful; of no use either to Athens or her allies, though risking all the chances of distant defeat, such as had been experienced a few years before in Egypt. The Persian force was already kept away both from the waters of the Ægean and the coast of Asia, either by the stipulations of the treaty of Kallias, or (if that treaty be supposed apocryphal) by a conduct practically the same as those stipulations would have enforced. The *allies*

Defence of
Periklēs
perfectly
good against
his political
rivals.

ἀνελίσθαι καὶ φυλάττειν ἐν ὀχυρῇ τὰ κοινὰ, ταύτην ἀνέφηκε Περικλῆς, &c.

Compare the speech of the Lesbians, and their complaints against Athens, at the moment of their revolt in the fourth year of the Peloponnesian war (Thucyd.

iii. 10); where a similar accusation is brought forward—ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐύρωμεν αὐτοὺς (the Athenians) τὴν μὲν τοῦ Μηδοῦ ἐχθρὰν ἀνιέντας, τὴν δὲ τῶν ξυμμάχων δοῦλῶσιν ἐπαγομένους, &c.

¹ Plutarch, Periklēs, c. 20.

indeed might have had some ground of complaint against Periklês, either for not reducing the amount of tribute required from them, seeing that it was more than sufficient for the legitimate purposes of the confederacy,—or for not having collected their positive sentiment as to the disposal of it. But we do not find that this was the argument adopted by Thucydîdês and his party; nor was it calculated to find favour either with aristocrats, or democrats, in the Athenian assembly.

Admitting the injustice of Athens—an injustice common to both the parties in that city, not less to Kimon than to Periklês—in acting as despot instead of chief, and in discontinuing all appeal to the active and hearty concurrence of her numerous allies; we shall find that the schemes of Periklês were nevertheless eminently Pan-Hellenic. In strengthening and ornamenting Athens, in developing the full activity of her citizens, in providing temples, religious offerings, works of art, solemn festivals, all of surpassing attraction,—he intended to exalt her into something greater than an imperial city with numerous dependent allies. He wished to make her the centre of Grecian feeling, the stimulus of Grecian intellect, and the type of strong democratical patriotism combined with full liberty of individual taste and aspiration. He wished not merely to retain the adherence of the subject states, but to attract the admiration and spontaneous deference of independent neighbours, so as to procure for Athens a moral ascendancy much beyond the range of her direct power. And he succeeded in elevating the city to a visible grandeur,¹ which made her appear even much stronger than she really was—and which had the farther effect of softening to the minds of her subjects the humiliating sense of obedience; while it served as a normal school, open to strangers from all quarters, of energetic action even under full licence of criticism—of elegant pursuits economically followed—and of a love for knowledge without enervation of character. Such were the views of Periklês in regard to his country, during the years which preceded the Peloponnesian war. We find them recorded in his celebrated Funeral Oration pronounced in the first year of that war—an exposition for ever

Pan-Hellenic schemes and sentiment of Periklês.

¹ Thucyd. i. 10.

memorable of the sentiment and purpose of Athenian democracy, as conceived by its ablest president.

So bitter however was the opposition made by Thucydídēs and his party to this projected expenditure—so violent and pointed did the scission of aristocrats and democrats become—that the dispute came after no long time to that ultimate appeal which the Athenian constitution provided for the case of two opposite and nearly equal party leaders—a vote of ostracism. Of the particular details which preceded this ostracism, we are not informed; but we see clearly that the general position was such as the ostracism was intended to meet. Probably the vote was proposed by the party of Thucydídēs, in order to procure the banishment of Periklēs, the more powerful person of the two, and the most likely to excite popular jealousy. The challenge was accepted by Periklēs and his friends, and the result of the voting was such that an adequate legal majority condemned Thucydídēs to ostracism.¹ And it seems that the majority must have been very decisive, for the party of Thucydídēs was completely broken by it. We hear of no other single individual equally formidable, as a leader of opposition, throughout all the remaining life of Periklēs.

The ostracism of Thucydídēs apparently took place about two years² after the conclusion of the Thirty years' truce (443-442 B.C.), and it is to the period immediately following, that the great Perikleian works belong. The southern wall of the acropolis had been built out of the spoils brought by Kimon from his Persian expeditions; but the third of the long walls connecting Athens with the harbour was the proposition of Periklēs, at what precise time we do not know. The long walls originally completed (not long after the battle of Tanagra, as has already been stated), were two, one from Athens to Peiræus, another from Athens to Phalærum: the space

¹ Plutarch, Periklēs, c. 11-14. Τέλος δὲ πρὸς τὸν Θουκυδίδην εἰς ἀγῶνα περὶ τοῦ ὀστράκου καταστάς καὶ διακινδυνεύσας, ἐκείνον μὲν ἐξίβαλε, κατέλυσε δὲ τὴν ἀντιτεταγμένην ἐταιρίαν. See, in reference to the principle of the ostracism, a remarkable incident

at Magnesia, between two political rivals, Krētínēs and Hermeías: also the just reflections of Montesquieu, *Esprit des Loix*, xxvi. c. 17; xxix. c. 7.

² Plutarch, Periklēs, c. 16: the indication of time however is vague.

between them was broad, and if in the hands of an enemy, the communication with Peiræus would be interrupted. Accordingly Periklēs now induced the people to construct a third or intermediate wall, running parallel with the first wall to Peiræus, and within a short distance¹ (seemingly near one furlong) from it: so that the communication between the city and the port was placed beyond all possible interruption, even assuming an enemy to have got within the Phalæric wall. It was seemingly about this time, too, that the splendid docks and arsenal in Peiræus, alleged by Isokratēs to have cost 1000 talents, were constructed;² while the town itself of Peiræus was laid out anew with straight streets intersecting at right angles. Apparently this was something new in Greece—the towns generally, and Athens itself in particular, having been built without any symmetry, or width, or continuity of streets.³ Hippodamus the Milesian, a man of considerable attainments in the physical philosophy of the age, derived much renown as the earliest town architect, for having laid out the Peiræus on a regular plan. The market-place, or one of them at least, permanently bore his name—the Hippodamian agora.⁴ At a time when so many great architects were displaying their genius in the construction of temples, we are not surprised to hear that the structure of towns began to be regularised also. Moreover we are told that the new colonial town of Thurii, to which Hippodamus went as a settler, was also constructed in the same systematic form as to straight and wide streets.⁵

The new scheme upon which the Peiræus was laid out was not without its value as one visible proof of the naval grandeur of Athens. But the buildings in Athens and on the acropolis formed the real glory of the Periklean age. A new theatre, termed the Odeon, was constructed for musical and poetical representations at the

Odeon,
Parthenon,
Propylæa.
Other temples, Statues
of Athênê.

¹ Plato, *Gorgias*, p. 455, with Scholia; Plutarch, *Periklēs*, c. 13; Forchhammer, *Topographie von Athen*, in *Kieler Philologische Studien*, p. 279-282. See the map of Athens and its environs, at the end of this volume.

² Isokratēs, *Orat.* vii.; *Areopagit.* p. 153, c. 27.

³ See Dikæarchus, *Vit. Græciæ*, *Fragm.* ed. Fuhr. p. 140: compare the

description of Plataea in Thueydides, ii. 3.

All the older towns now existing in the Grecian islands are put together in this same manner—narrow, muddy, crooked ways—few regular continuous lines of houses: see Ross, *Reisen in den Griechischen Inseln*, Letter xxvii. vol. ii. p. 20.

⁴ Aristotle, *Politic.* ii. 5, 1; Xenophon, *Hellen.* ii. 4, 1; Harpokration, v. *ἱπποδάμεια*. ⁵ Diodor. xii. 9.

great Panathenaic solemnity. Next, the splendid temple of Athênê, called the Parthenon, with all its masterpieces of decorative sculpture, friezes, and reliefs : lastly, the costly portals erected to adorn the entrance of the acropolis, on the western side of the hill, through which the solemn processions on festival days were conducted. It appears that the Odeon and the Parthenon were both finished between 445 and 437 B.C. : the Propylæa somewhat later, between 437 and 431 B.C., in which latter year the Peloponnesian war began.¹ Progress was also made in restoring or re-constructing the Erechtheion, or ancient temple of Athênê Polias, the patron goddess of the city—which had been burnt in the invasion of Xerxes. But the breaking out of the Peloponnesian war seems to have prevented the completion of this, as well as of the great temple of Dêmêtêr, at Eleusis, for the celebration of the Eleusinian mysteries—that of Athênê at Sunium—and that of Nemesis at Rhamnus. Nor was the sculpture less memorable than the architecture. Three statues of Athênê, all by the hand of Pheidias, decorated the acropolis—one colossal, 47 feet high, of ivory, in the Parthenon²—a second of bronze, called the Lemnian Athênê—a third of colossal magnitude, also in bronze, called Athênê Promachos, placed between the Propylæa and the Parthenon, and visible from afar off, even to the navigator approaching Peiræus by sea.

It is not of course to Periklês that the renown of these splendid productions of art belongs. But the great sculptors and architects, by whom they were conceived and executed, belonged to that same period of expanding and stimulating Athenian democracy, which likewise called forth creative genius in oratory, in dramatic poetry, and in philosophical speculation. One man especially, of immortal name,—Pheidias,—born a little before the battle of Marathon, was the original mind in whom the sublime ideal conceptions of genuine art appear to have disengaged themselves from that stiffness of execution, and adherence to a consecrated type, which marked the efforts of

Illustrious
artists and
architects—
Pheidias,
Iktinos,
Kallikratês.

¹ Leake, *Topography of Athens*, Append. ii. and iii. p. 328-336, 2nd edit.

² See Leake, *Topography of Athens*, 2nd ed. p. 111, Germ. transl. O. Müller

(De Phidiæ Vitâ, p. 18) mentions no less than eight celebrated statues of Athênê, by the hand of Pheidias—four in the acropolis of Athens.

his predecessors.¹ He was the great director and superintendent of all those decorative additions, whereby Periklēs imparted to Athens a majesty such as had never before belonged to any Grecian city. The architects of the Parthenon and the other buildings—Iktinus, Kallikratēs, Korœbus, Mnesiklēs, and others—worked under his instructions, and he had besides a school of pupils and subordinates, to whom the mechanical part of his labours was confided. With all the great contributions which Pheidias made to the grandeur of Athens, his last and greatest achievement was far away from Athens—the colossal statue of Zeus, in the great temple of Olympia, executed in the years immediately preceding the Peloponnesian war. This stupendous work was sixty feet high, of ivory and gold, embodying in visible majesty some of the grandest conceptions of Grecian poetry and religion. Its effect upon the minds of all beholders, for many centuries successively, was such as never has been, and probably never will be, equalled in the annals of art, sacred or profane.

Considering these prodigious achievements in the field of art only as they bear upon Athenian and Grecian history, they are phænomena of extraordinary importance. When we learn the profound impression which they produced upon Grecian spectators of a later age, we may judge how immense was the effect upon that generation which saw them both begun and finished. In the year 480 B.C. Athens had been ruined by the occupation of Xerxes. Since that period, the Greeks had seen, first the rebuilding and fortifying of the city on an enlarged scale—next, the addition of Peiræus with its docks and magazines—thirdly, the junction of the two by the long walls, thus including the most numerous concentrated population, wealth, arms, ships, &c. in Greece²—lastly, the rapid creation of so many new miracles of art—the sculptures of Pheidias as well as the paintings of the Thasian painter Polygnôtus, in the temple of Theseus, and in the portico called Pækilê. Plutarch observes³ that the celerity with which the

Effect of these creations of art and architecture upon the minds of contemporaries.

¹ Plutarch, Periklēs, c. 13-15: O. Müller, *De Phidie Vita*, p. 34-60; also his work, *Archäologie der Kunst*, sect. 108-113.

² Thucyd. i. 80. καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀπα-

σιν ἄριστα ἐξήρτυνται, πλοῦτιν τε ἰδίῃ καὶ δημοσίῃ καὶ ναυσὶ καὶ ἵπποις καὶ ὄπλοις, καὶ ὅχλῳ ὅσος οὐκ ἐν ἄλλῃ ἐνί γε χωρίῳ Ἑλληνικῇ ἴσθιν, &c.

³ Plutarch, Periklēs, c. 13.

works were completed was the most remarkable circumstance connected with them ; and so it probably might be, in respect to the effect upon the contemporary Greeks. The gigantic strides by which Athens had reached her maritime empire were now immediately succeeded by a series of works which stamped her as the imperial city of Greece, gave to her an appearance of power even greater than the reality, and especially put to shame the old-fashioned simplicity of Sparta.¹ The cost was doubtless prodigious, and could only have been borne at a time when there was a large treasure in the acropolis, as well as a considerable tribute annually coming in. If we may trust a computation which seems to rest on plausible grounds, it cannot have been much less than 3000 talents in the aggregate (about 690,000*l.*).² The expenditure of so large a sum was of course a source of great private gain to contractors, tradesmen, merchants, artisans of various descriptions &c. concerned in it. In one way or another, it distributed itself over a large portion of the whole city. And it appears that the materials employed for much of the work were designedly of the most costly description, as being most consistent with the reverence due to the gods. Marble was rejected as too common for the statue of Athênê, and ivory employed in its place.³ Even the gold with which it was surrounded weighed not less than forty talents.⁴ A large expenditure for such purposes, considered as pious towards the gods, was at the same time imposing in reference to Grecian feeling, which regarded with admiration every variety of public show and magnificence, and repaid with grateful deference the rich men who indulged in it. Periklês knew well that the visible splendour of the city, so new to all his contemporaries, would cause her great power to appear greater still, and would thus procure for her a real, though unacknowledged influence—perhaps

¹ Thucyd. i. 10.

² See Leake, *Topography of Athens*, Append. iii. p. 329, 2nd edit. Germ. transl. Colonel Leake, with much justice, contends that the amount of 2012 talents, stated by Harpokration out of Philochorus as the cost of the Propylæa alone, must be greatly exaggerated. Mr. Wilkins (*Atheniensia*, p. 84) expresses the same opinion ; remarking that the transport of marble from Pente-

likus to Athens is easy, and on a descending road.

Demetrius Phalereus (ap. Cicer. de Officiis, ii. 17) blamed Periklês for the large sum expended upon the Propylæa. It is not wonderful that he uttered this censure, if he had been led to rate the cost of them at 2012 talents.

³ Valer. Maxim. i. 7, 2.

⁴ Thucyd. ii. 13.

even an ascendancy—over all cities of the Grecian name. And it is certain that even among those who most hated and feared her, at the outbreak of the Peloponnesian war, there prevailed a powerful sentiment of involuntary deference.

A step taken by Periklēs, apparently not long after the commencement of the Thirty years' truce, evinces how much this ascendancy was in his direct aim, and how much he connected it with views both of harmony and usefulness for Greece generally. He prevailed upon the people to send envoys to every city of the Greek name, great and small, inviting each to appoint deputies for a congress to be held at Athens. Three points were to be discussed in this intended congress.

Attempt of Periklēs to convene a general congress at Athens, of deputies from all the Grecian states.

1. The restitution of those temples which had been burnt by the Persian invaders. 2. The fulfilment of such vows, as on that occasion had been made to the gods. 3. The safety of the sea and of maritime commerce for all.

Twenty elderly Athenians were sent round to obtain the convocation of this congress at Athens—a Pan-Hellenic congress for Pan-Hellenic purposes. But those who were sent to Bœotia and Peloponnesus completely failed in their object, from the jealousy, noway astonishing, of Sparta and her allies. Of the rest we hear nothing, for this refusal was quite sufficient to frustrate the whole scheme.¹ It is to be remarked that the dependent allies of Athens appear to have been summoned just as much as the cities perfectly autonomous; so that their tributary relation to Athens was not understood to degrade them. We may sincerely regret that such congress did not take effect, as it might have opened some new possibilities of converging tendency and alliance for the dispersed fractions of the Greek name—a comprehensive benefit not likely to be entertained at Sparta even as a project, but which might perhaps have been realised under Athens, and seems in this

¹ Plutarch, Periklēs, c. 17. Plutarch gives no precise date, and O. Müller (*De Phidiæ Vitâ*, p. 9) places these steps, for convocation of a congress, before the first war between Sparta and Athens and the battle of Tanagra—i.e. before 460 B.C. But this date seems to me improbable: Thebes was not yet renovated in power, nor had Bœotia as

yet recovered from the fruits of her alliance with the Persians; moreover, neither Athens nor Periklēs himself seems to have been at that time in a situation to conceive so large a project; which suits in every respect much better for the later period, after the Thirty years' truce, but before the Peloponnesian war.

case to have been sincerely aimed at by Periklēs. The events of the Peloponnesian war, however, extinguished all hopes of any such union.

The interval of fourteen years, between the beginning of the Thirty years' truce and that of the Peloponnesian war, was by no means one of undisturbed peace to Athens. In the sixth year of that period occurred the formidable revolt of Samos.

That island appears to have been the most powerful of all the allies of Athens.¹ It surpassed even Chios or Lesbos, standing on the same footing as these two: that is, paying no tribute-money—a privilege when compared with the body of the allies,—but furnishing ships and men when called upon, and retaining, subject to this condition, its complete autonomy, its oligarchical government, its fortifications, and its military force. Like most of the other islands near the coast, Samos possessed a portion of territory on the Asiatic mainland, between which and the territory of Milētus lay the small town of Priēnē, one of the twelve original members contributing to the Pan-Ionic solemnity. Respecting the possession of this town of Priēnē, a war broke out between the Samians and Milesians, in the sixth year of the Thirty years' truce (B.C. 440-439). Whether the town had before been independent, we do not know, but in this war the Milesians were worsted, and it fell into the hands of the Samians. The defeated Milesians, enrolled as they were among the tributary allies of Athens, complained to her of the conduct of the Samians, and their complaint was seconded by a party in Samos itself, opposed to the oligarchy and its proceedings. The Athenians required the two disputing cities to bring the matter before discussion and award at Athens. But the Samians refused to comply:² whereupon an arma-

B.C. 440.
Revolt of
Samos
from the
Athenians.

¹ Thucyd. i. 115; viii. 76; Plutarch, Periklēs, c. 28.

² Thucyd. i. 115; Plutarch, Periklēs, c. 25. Most of the statements which appear in this chapter of Plutarch (over and above the concise narrative of Thucydides) appear to be borrowed from exaggerated party stories of the day. We need make no remark upon the story, that Periklēs was induced to take the side of Milētus against Samos by the fact that Aspasia was a native of

Milētus. Nor is it at all more creditable, that the satrap Pissuthnes, from goodwill towards Samos, offered Periklēs 10,000 golden staters as an inducement to spare the island. It may perhaps be true, however, that the Samian oligarchy, and those wealthy men whose children were likely to be taken as hostages, tried the effect of large bribes upon the mind of Periklēs to prevail upon him not to alter the government.

ment of forty ships was despatched from Athens to the island, and established in it a democratical government ; leaving in it a garrison, and carrying away to Lemnos fifty men and as many boys from the principal oligarchical families, to serve as hostages. Of these families, however, a certain number retired to the mainland, where they entered into negotiations with Pissuthnes the satrap of Sardes, to procure aid and restoration. Obtaining from him seven hundred mercenary troops, and passing over in the night to the island, by previous concert with the oligarchical party, they overcame the Samian democracy as well as the Athenian garrison, who were sent over as prisoners to Pissuthnes. They were farther lucky enough to succeed in stealing away from Lemnos their own recently deposited hostages, and they then proclaimed open revolt against Athens, in which Byzantium also joined. It seems remarkable, that though by such a proceeding they would of course draw upon themselves the full strength of Athens, yet their first step was to resume aggressive hostilities against Milêtus,¹ whither they sailed with a powerful force of seventy ships, twenty of them carrying troops.

Immediately on the receipt of this grave intelligence, a fleet of sixty triremes—probably all that were in complete readiness—was despatched to Samos under ten generals, two of whom were Periklês himself and the poet Sophoklês,² both seemingly included among the ten ordinary Stratêgi of the year. But it was necessary to employ sixteen of these ships, partly in summoning contingents from Chios and Lesbos, to which islands Sophoklês went in person ;³ partly in keeping watch off the coast of Karia for the arrival of the Phœnician fleet, which report stated to be approaching ; so that Periklês had only forty-four ships remaining in his squadron. Yet he did not hesitate to attack the Samian fleet of seventy ships on his way back from Milêtus, near the island of Tragia, and was

Athenian
armament
against
Samos,
under Peri-
klês, Sopho-
klês, the
tragedian,
&c.

¹ Thucyd. i. 114, 115.

² Strabo, xiv. p. 638 ; Schol. Aristides, t. iii. p. 485, Dindorf.

³ See the interesting particulars recounted respecting Sophoklês by the Chian poet Ion, who met and conversed with him during the course of this expedition (Athenæus, xiii. p. 603). He represents the poet as uncommonly

pleasing and graceful in society, but no way distinguished for active capacity. Sophoklês was at this time in peculiar favour, from the success of his tragedy Antigone the year before. See the chronology of these events discussed and elucidated in Boeckh's preliminary Dissertation to the Antigone, c. 6-9.

victorious in the action. Presently he was reinforced by forty ships from Athens, and by twenty-five from Chios and Lesbos, so as to be able to disembark at Samos, where he overcame the Samian land-force and blocked up the harbour with a portion of his fleet, surrounding the city on the land-side with a triple wall. Meanwhile the Samians had sent Stesagoras with five ships to press the coming of the Phœnician fleet, and the report of their approach became again so prevalent that Periklēs felt obliged to take sixty ships (out of the total 125) to watch for them off the coast of Kaunos and Karia, where he cruised for about fourteen days. The Phœnician fleet¹ never came in sight, though Diodorus affirms that it was actually on its voyage. Pissuthnes certainly seems to have promised, and the Samians to have expected it. Yet I incline to believe that, though willing to hold out hopes and encourage revolt among the Athenian allies, the satrap did not choose openly to violate the convention of Kallias, whereby the Persians were forbidden to send a fleet westward of the Chelidonian promontory. The departure of Periklēs, however, so much weakened the Athenian fleet off Samos, that the Samians, suddenly sailing out of their harbour in an opportune moment, at the instigation and under the command of one of their most eminent citizens, the philosopher Melissus—surprised and disabled the blockading squadron, and even gained a victory over the remaining fleet before the ships could be fairly got clear of the land.² For fourteen days they remained masters of the sea, carrying in and out all that they thought proper. It was not until the return of Periklēs that they were again blockaded. Reinforcements however were now multiplied to the investing squadron—from Athens, forty ships under Thucydides,³ Agnon, and Phormion, and twenty under Tlepolemus

Doubtful and prolonged contest—great power of Samos—it is at last reconquered, disarmed, and dismantled.

¹ Diodor. xi. 27.

² Plutarch, Periklēs, c. 26. Plutarch seems to have had before him accounts respecting this Samian campaign not only from Ephorus, Stesimbrotus, and Duris, but also from Aristotle: and the statements of the latter must have differed thus far from Thucydides, that he affirmed Melissus the Samian general to have been victorious over Periklēs himself, which is not to be reconciled

with the narrative of Thucydides.

The Samian historian Duris, living about a century after this siege, seems to have introduced many falsehoods respecting the cruelties of Athens; see Plutarch, *l. c.*

³ It appears very improbable that this Thucydides can be the historian himself. If it be Thucydides son of Melēsias, we must suppose him to have been restored from ostracism before the

and Antiklēs, besides thirty from Chios and Lesbos—making altogether near two hundred sail. Against this overwhelming force Melissus and the Samians made an unavailing attempt at resistance, but were presently quite blocked up, and remained so for nearly nine months until they could hold out no longer. They then capitulated, being compelled to raze their fortifications, to surrender all their ships of war, to give hostages for their future conduct, and to make good by stated instalments the whole expense of the enterprise, said to have reached 1000 talents. The Byzantines too made their submission at the same time.¹

Two or three circumstances deserve notice respecting this revolt, as illustrating the existing condition of the Athenian empire. First, that the whole force of Athens, together with the contingents from Chios and Lesbos, was necessary in order to crush it, so that Byzantium, which joined in the revolt, seems to have been left unassailed. Now it is remarkable that none of the dependent allies near Byzantium or anywhere else, availed themselves of so favourable an opportunity to revolt also: a fact which seems plainly to imply that there was little positive discontent then prevalent among them. Had the revolt spread to other cities, probably Pissuthnes might have realised his promise of bringing up the Phœnician fleet, which would have been a serious calamity for the Ægean

None of the other allies of Athens, except Byzantium, revolted at the same time.

regular time—a supposition indeed now inadmissible in itself, but which there is nothing else to countenance. The author of the *Life of Sophoklēs*, as well as most of the recent critics, adopt this opinion.

On the other hand, it may have been a third person named Thucydides; for the name seems to have been common, as we might guess from the two words of which it is compounded. We find a third Thucydides mentioned viii. 92—a native of Pharsalus: and the biographer Marcellinus seems to have read of many persons so called (*Θουκυδίδαι πολλοί*, p. xvi, ed. Arnold). The subsequent history of Thucydides son of Melesias is involved in complete obscurity. We do not know the incident to which the remarkable passage in Aristophanes (*Acharn.* 703) alludes—compare Vespe,

946: nor can we confirm the statement which the Scholiast cites from Idomeneus, to the effect that Thucydides was banished and fled to Artaxerxes; see Bergk. *Reliq. Com. Att.* p. 61.

¹ Thucyd. i. 117; Diodor. xii. 27, 28; Isokratēs, *De Permutat. Or.* xv. sect. 118; Corn. Nep. *Vit. Timoth.* c. 1.

The assertion of Ephorus (see Diodorus, xii. 28, and Ephori *Fragm.* 117, ed. Marx, with the note of Marx) that Periklēs employed battering machines against the town, under the management of the Klazomenian Artemon, was called in question by Herakleides Ponticus, on the ground that Artemon was a contemporary of Anakreon, near a century before: and Thucydides represents Periklēs to have captured the town altogether by blockade.

Greeks, and was only kept off by the unbroken maintenance of the Athenian empire.

Next, the revolted Samians applied for aid, not only to Pissuthnes, but also to Sparta and her allies; among whom at a special meeting the question of compliance or refusal was formally debated. Notwithstanding the Thirty years' truce then subsisting, of which only six years had elapsed, and which had been noway violated by Athens—many of the allies of Sparta voted for assisting the Samians. What part Sparta herself took, we do not know—but the Corinthians were the main and decided advocates for the negative. They not only contended that the truce distinctly forbade compliance with the Samian request, but also recognised the right of each confederacy to punish its own recusant members. And this was the decision ultimately adopted, for which the Corinthians afterwards took credit in the eyes of Athens, as its chief authors.¹ Certainly, if the contrary policy had been pursued, the Athenian empire might have been in great danger—the Phœnician fleet would probably have been brought in also—and the future course of events greatly altered.

Again, after the reconquest of Samos, we should assume it almost as a matter of certainty that the Athenians would renew the democratical government which they had set up just before the revolt. Yet if they did so, it must have been again overthrown, without any attempt to uphold it on the part of Athens. For we hardly hear of Samos again, until twenty-seven years afterwards, the latter division of the Peloponnesian war, in 412 B.C., and it then appears with an established oligarchical government of *Geôtori* or landed proprietors, against which the people make a successful rising during the course of that year.² As Samos remained, during the interval between 439 B.C. and 412 B.C., unfortified, deprived of its fleet, and enrolled among the tribute-paying allies of Athens—and as it nevertheless either retained, or acquired, its oligarchical government; so we may conclude that Athens cannot have systematically interfered to democratise by violence the subject-allies, in cases where the

Application of the Samians to Sparta for aid against Athens—it is refused chiefly through the Corinthians.

Government of Samos after the reconquest—doubtful whether the Athenians renewed the democracy which they had recently established.

¹ Thucyd. i. 40, 41.

² Thucyd. viii. 21.

natural tendency of parties ran towards oligarchy. The condition of Lesbos at the time of its revolt (hereafter to be related) will be found to confirm this conclusion.¹

On returning to Athens after the reconquest of Samos, Periklēs was chosen to pronounce the funeral oration over the citizens slain in the war, to whom, according to custom, solemn and public obsequies were celebrated in the suburb called Kerameikus. This custom appears to have been introduced shortly after the Persian war,² and would doubtless contribute to stimulate the patriotism of the citizens, especially when the speaker elected to deliver it was possessed of the personal dignity as well as the oratorical powers of Periklēs. He was twice public funeral orator by the choice of the citizens; once after the Samian success, and a second time in the first year of the Peloponnesian war. His discourse on the first occasion has not reached us,³ but the second has been fortunately preserved (in substance at least) by Thucydidēs, who also briefly describes the funeral ceremony—doubtless the same on all occasions. The bones of the deceased warriors were exposed in tents three days before the ceremony, in order that the relatives of each might have the opportunity of bringing offerings. They were then placed in coffins of cypress and carried forth on carts to the public burial-place at the Kerameikus; one coffin for each of the ten tribes, and one empty couch, formally laid out, to represent those warriors whose bones had not been discovered or collected. The female relatives of each followed the carts, with loud wailings, and after them a numerous procession both of citizens and strangers. So soon as the bones had been consigned to the

Funeral oration pronounced by Periklēs upon the Athenian citizens slain in the Samian war.

¹ Compare Wachsmuth, *Hellenische Alterthumskunde*, sect. 58, vol. ii. p. 82.

² See Westermann, *Geschichte der Beredsamkeit in Griechenland und Rom*; Diodor. xi. 33; Dionys. Hal. A. R. v. 17.

Periklēs, in the funeral oration preserved by Thucydidēs (ii. 35-40), begins by saying—Οἱ μὲν πολλοὶ τῶν ἐνθάδε εἰρηκότων ἤδη ἔπαινοῦσι τὸν προσθέντα τῷ νόμῳ τὸν λόγον τόνδε, &c.

The Scholiast, and other commentators (K. F. Weber and Westermann among the number), make various guesses as to what celebrated man is

here designated as the introducer of the custom of a funeral harangue. The Scholiast says, Solon: Weber fixes on Kimon: Westermann, on Aristeidēs: another commentator on Themistoklēs. But we may reasonably doubt whether any one very celebrated man is specially indicated by the words τὸν προσθέντα. To commend the introducer of the practice, is nothing more than a phrase for commending the practice itself.

³ Some fragments of it seem to have been preserved in the time of Aristotle: see his treatise de Rhetoricā, i. 7; iii. 10, 3.

grave, some distinguished citizen, specially chosen for the purpose, mounted on an elevated stage and addressed to the multitude an appropriate discourse. Such was the effect produced by that of Periklēs after the Samian expedition, that when he had concluded, the audience present testified their emotion in the liveliest manner, and the women especially crowned him with garlands like a victorious athlete.¹ Only Elpinikē, sister of the deceased Kimon, reminded him that the victories of her brother had been more felicitous, as gained over Persians and Phœnicians, and not over Greeks and kinsmen. And the contemporary poet Ion, the friend of Kimon, reported what he thought an unseemly boast of Periklēs—to the effect that Agamemnon had spent ten years in taking a foreign city, while *he* in nine months had reduced the first and most powerful of all the Ionic communities.² But if we possessed the actual speech pronounced, we should probably find that he assigned all the honour of the exploit to Athens and her citizens generally, placing their achievement in favourable comparison with that of Agamemnon and his host—not himself with Agamemnon.

Whatever may be thought of this boast, there can be no doubt that the result of the Samian war not only rescued the Athenian empire from great peril,³ but rendered it stronger than ever: while the foundation of Amphipolis, which was effected two years afterwards, strengthened it still farther. Nor do we hear, during the ensuing few years, of any farther tendencies to disaffection among its members, until the period immediately before the Peloponnesian war. The feeling common among them towards Athens, seems to have been neither attachment nor hatred, but simple indifference and acquiescence in her supremacy. Such amount of positive discontent as really existed among them, arose, not from actual hardships suffered, but from the general political instinct of the Greek mind—desire of separate autonomy;

¹ Compare the enthusiastic demonstrations which welcomed Brasidas at Skiōnē (Thucyd. iv. 121).

² Plutarch, Periklēs, c. 28; Thucyd. ii. 34.

³ A short fragment remaining from

the comic poet Eupolis (Κόλακες, Fr. xvi. p. 493, ed. Meineke), attests the anxiety at Athens about the Samian war, and the great joy when the island was reconquered: compare Aristophan. Vesp. 283.

which manifested itself in each city, through the oligarchical party, whose power was kept down by Athens—and was stimulated by the sentiment communicated from the Grecian communities without the Athenian empire. According to that sentiment, the condition of a subject-ally of Athens was treated as one of degradation and servitude. In proportion as fear and hatred of Athens became predominant among the allies of Sparta, these latter gave utterance to the sentiment more and more emphatically, so as to encourage discontent artificially among the subject-allies of the Athenian empire. Possessing complete mastery of the sea, and every sort of superiority requisite for holding empire over islands, Athens had yet no sentiment to appeal to in her subjects, calculated to render her empire popular, except that of common democracy, which seems at first to have acted without any care on her part to encourage it, until the progress of the Peloponnesian war made such encouragement a part of her policy. And even had she tried to keep up in the allies the feeling of a common interest and the attachment to a permanent confederacy, the instinct of political separation would probably have baffled all her efforts. But she took no such pains. With the usual morality that grows up in the minds of the actual possessors of power, she conceived herself entitled to exact obedience as her right. Some of the Athenian speakers in Thucydides go so far as to disdain all pretence of legitimate power, even such as might fairly be set up; resting the supremacy of Athens on the naked plea of superior force.¹ As the allied cities were mostly under democracies—through the indirect influence rather than the systematic dictation of Athens—yet each having its own internal aristocracy in a state of opposition; so the movements for revolt against Athens originated with the aristocracy or with some few citizens apart; while the people, though sharing more or less in the desire for autonomy, had yet either a fear of their own aristocracy or a sympathy with Athens, which made them always backward in revolting, sometimes decidedly opposed

¹ Thucyd. iii. 37; ii. 63. See the conference, at the island of Melos in the sixteenth year of the Peloponnesian war (Thucyd. v. 89 *seq.*), between the Athenian commissioners and the Melians.

I think however that this conference is less to be trusted as based in reality, than the speeches in Thucydides generally—of which more hereafter.

to it. Neither Periklēs nor Kleon indeed lays stress on the attachment of the people as distinguished from that of the Few, in these dependent cities. But the argument is strongly insisted on by Diodotus¹ in the discussion respecting Mitylênê after its surrender: and as the war advanced, the question of alliance with Athens or Sparta became more and more identified with the internal preponderance of democracy or oligarchy in each.²

We shall find that in most of those cases of actual revolt where we are informed of the preceding circumstances, the step is adopted or contrived by a small number of oligarchical malcontents, without consulting the general voice; while in those cases where the general assembly is consulted beforehand, there is manifested indeed a preference for autonomy, but nothing like a hatred of Athens or decided inclination to break with her. In the case of Mitylênê,³ in the fourth year of the war, it was the aristocratical government which revolted, while the people, as soon as they obtained arms, actually declared in favour of Athens. And the secession of Chios, the greatest of all the allies, in the twentieth year of the Peloponnesian war—even after all the hardships which the allies had been called upon to bear in that war, and after the ruinous disasters which Athens had sustained before Syracuse—was both prepared beforehand and accomplished by secret negotiations of the Chian oligarchy, not only without the concurrence, but against the inclination, of their own people.⁴ In like manner, the revolt of Thasos would not have occurred, had not the Thasian democracy been previously subverted by the Athenian Peisander and his oligarchical confederates. So in Akanthus, in Amphipolis, in Mendê, and those other Athenian dependencies which were wrested from Athens by Brasidas—we find the latter secretly introduced by a few

¹ Thucyd. iii. 47. *Nûn μὲν γὰρ ὁμὴν ὁ δῆμος ἐν ἀπόσσει ταῖς πόλεσιν εὐνοῦς ἐστί, καὶ ἡ οὐ συναφίσταται τοῖς ὀλίγοις, ἢ ἐὰν βιασθῇ, ὑπάρχει τοῖς ἀποστήσασιν πολέμιος εὐθὺς, &c.*

² See the striking observations of Thucydides, iii. 82, 83; Aristotel. Politic. v. 6, 9.

³ Thucyd. iii. 27.

⁴ Thucyd. viii. 9-14. He observes also, respecting the Thasian oligarchy

just set up in lieu of the previous democracy by the Athenian oligarchical conspirators who were then organising the revolution of the Four Hundred at Athens—that they immediately made preparations for revolting from Athens—*ἐνέβη οὖν αὐτοῖς μάλιστα ἃ ἐβούλοντο, τὴν πόλιν τε ἀκινδύνως ὀρθοῦσθαι, καὶ τὸν ἐναντιωσόμενον δῆμον καταλελύσθαι* (viii. 64).

conspirators. The bulk of the citizens do not hail him at once as a deliverer, like men sick of Athenian supremacy: they acquiesce, not without debate, when Brasidas is already in the town, and his demeanour, just as well as conciliating, soon gains their esteem. But neither in Akanthus nor in Amphipolis would he have been admitted by the free decision of the citizens, if they had not been alarmed for the safety of their friends, their properties, and their harvest, still exposed in the lands without the walls.¹ These particular examples warrant us in affirming, that though the oligarchy in the various allied cities desired eagerly to shake off the supremacy of Athens, the people were always backward in following them, sometimes even opposed, and hardly ever willing to make sacrifices for the object. They shared the universal Grecian desire for separate autonomy,² and felt the Athenian empire as an extraneous pressure which they would have been glad to shake off, whenever the change could be made with safety. But their condition was not one of positive hardship, nor did they overlook the hazardous side of such a change—partly from the coercive hand of Athens—partly from new enemies against whom Athens had hitherto protected them—and not least from their own oligarchy. Of course the different allied cities were not all animated by the same feelings, some being more averse to Athens than others.

The particular modes, in which Athenian supremacy pressed upon the allies and excited complaints, appear to have been chiefly three. 1. The annual tribute. 2. The encroachments or other misdeeds committed by individual Athenians, taking advantage of their superior position: citizens either planted out by the city as Kleruchs (out-settlers), on the lands of those allies who had been subdued—or serving in the naval armaments—or sent round as inspectors—or placed in occasional garrison—or carrying on some private speculation. 3. The obligation under which the allies were laid of bringing a large proportion of their judicial trials to be settled before the dikasteries at Athens.

Particular
grievances
complained
of in the
dealing of
Athens with
her allies.

As to the tribute, I have before remarked that its amount

¹ Thucyd. iv. 86, 88, 106, 123.

² See the important passage, Thucyd. viii. 48.

had been but little raised from its first settlement down to the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, at which time it was 600 talents yearly.¹ It appears to have been reviewed, and the apportionment corrected, in every fifth year, at which period the collecting officers may probably have been changed. Afterwards, probably, it became more burdensome, though when, or in what degree, we do not know: but the alleged duplication of it (as I have already remarked) is both uncertified and improbable. The same gradual increase may probably be affirmed respecting the second head of inconvenience—vexation caused to the allies by individual Athenians, chiefly officers of armaments or powerful citizens.² Doubtless this was always more or less a real grievance, from the moment when the Athenians became despots in place of chiefs. But it was probably not very serious in extent until after the commencement of the Peloponnesian war, when revolt on the part of the allies became more apprehended, and when garrisons, inspectors, and tribute-gathering ships became more essential in the working of the Athenian empire.

But the third circumstance above-noticed—the subjection of the allied cities to the Athenian dikasteries—has been more dwelt upon as a grievance than the second, and seems to have been unduly exaggerated. We can hardly doubt that the beginning of this jurisdiction exercised by the Athenian dikasteries dates with the synod of Delos, at the time of the first formation of the confederacy. It was an indispensable

Disputes and offences in and among the subject-allies, were brought for trial before the dikasteries at Athens.

¹ Xenophon, *Repub.* Athen. iii. 5. *πλὴν αἱ τάξεις τοῦ φόρου τοῦτο δὲ γίνε-
ται ὡς τὰ πολλὰ δι' ἑτους πέμπτου.*

² Xenophon, *Repub.* Athen. i. 14. *Περὶ δὲ τῶν συμμάχων, οἱ ἐκκλίοντες
σκοφαντοῦσιν, ὡς δοκοῦσι, καὶ μισοῦσι
τοὺς χρηστοὺς, &c.*

Who are the persons designated by the expression of *οἱ ἐκκλίοντες*, appears to be specified more particularly a little farther on (i. 18); it means the generals, the officers, the envoys, &c., sent forth by Athens.

In respect to the Kleruchies, or out-settlements of Athenian citizens on the lands of allies revolted and reconquered—we may remark that they are not noticed as a grievance in this treatise of

Xenophon, nor in any of the anti-Athenian orations of Thucydides. They appear, however, as matters of crimination after the extinction of the empire, and at the moment when Athens was again rising into a position such as to inspire the hope of reviving it. For at the close of the Peloponnesian war, which was also the destruction of the empire, all the Kleruchs were driven home again, and deprived of their outlying property, which reverted to various insular proprietors. These latter were terrified at the idea that Athens might afterwards try to resume these lost rights: hence the subsequent outcry against the Kleruchies.

element of that confederacy, that the members should forego their right of private war among each other, and submit their differences to peaceable arbitration—a covenant introduced even into alliances much less intimate than this was, and absolutely essential to the efficient maintenance of any common action against Persia.¹ Of course many causes of dispute, public as well as private, must have arisen among these wide-spread islands and seaports of the Ægean, connected with each other by relations of fellow-feeling, of trade, and of common apprehensions. The synod of Delos, composed of the deputies of all, was the natural board of arbitration for such disputes. A habit must thus have been formed, of recognising a sort of federal tribunal,—to decide peaceably how far each ally had faithfully discharged its duties, both towards the confederacy collectively, and towards other allies with their individual citizens separately,—as well as to enforce its decisions and punish refractory members, pursuant to the right which Sparta and her confederacy also claimed and exercised.² Now from the beginning the Athenians were the guiding and enforcing presidents of this synod. When it gradually died away, they were found occupying its place as well as clothed with its functions. It was in this manner that their judicial authority over the allies appears first to have begun, as the confederacy became changed into an Athenian empire,—the judicial functions of the synod being transferred along with the common treasure to Athens, and doubtless

¹ See the expression in Thucydides (v. 27), describing the conditions required when Argos was about to extend her alliances in Peloponnesus. The conditions were two. 1. That the city should be autonomous. 2. Next, that it should be willing to submit its quarrels to equitable arbitrations—*ἥτις αὐτὸνομός τε ἐστὶ, καὶ δίκας ἴσας καὶ ὁμοίας δίδωσι*.

In the orations against the Athenians, delivered by the Syracusan Hermokratēs at Kamarina, Athens is accused of having enslaved her allies partly on the ground that they neglected to perform their military obligations, partly because they made war upon each other (Thucyd. vi. 76), partly also on other specious pretences. How far this charge against Athens is borne out by the fact,

we can hardly say; in all those particular examples which Thucydides mentions of subjugation of allies by Athens, there is a cause perfectly definite and sufficient—not a mere pretence devised by Athenian ambition.

² According to the principle laid down by the Corinthians shortly before the Peloponnesian war—*τοὺς προσήκοντας ξυμμάχους αὐτὸν τινα κολλάειν* (Thucyd. i. 40-43).

The Lacedæmonians, on preferring their accusation of treason against Themistoklēs, demanded that he should be tried at Sparta, before the common Hellenic synod which held its sitting there, and of which Athens was then a member; that is, the Spartan confederacy or alliance—*ἐπὶ τοῦ κοινοῦ συνεδρίου τῶν Ἑλλήνων* (Diodor. xi. 55).

much extended. And on the whole, these functions must have been productive of more good than evil to the allies themselves, especially to the weakest and most defenceless among them.

Among the thousand towns which paid tribute to Athens (taking this numerical statement of Aristophanés not in its exact meaning, but simply as a great number), if a small town, or one of its citizens, had cause of complaint against a larger, there was no channel except the synod of Delos, or the Athenian tribunal, through which it could have any reasonable assurance of fair trial or justice. It is not to be supposed that *all* the private complaints and suits between citizen and citizen, in each respective subject town, were carried up for trial to Athens: yet we do not know distinctly how the line was drawn, between matters carried up thither, and matters tried at home. The subject cities appear to have been interdicted from the power of capital punishment, which could only be inflicted after previous trial and condemnation at Athens:¹ so that the latter reserved to herself the cognizance of most of the grave crimes—or what may be called “the higher justice” generally. And the political accusations preferred by citizen against citizen, in any subject city, for alleged treason, corruption, non-fulfilment of public duty, &c., were doubtless carried to Athens for trial—perhaps the most important part of her jurisdiction.

But the maintenance of this judicial supremacy was not intended by Athens for the substantive object of amending the administration of justice in each separate allied city. It went rather to regulate the relations between city and city—between citizens of different cities—between Athenian citizens or officers, and any of these allied cities with which they had relations—between each city itself, as a dependent government with contending political parties, and the imperial head Athens. All these being problems which imperial Athens was called on to solve, the best way of solving them would have been through some common synod emanating from all the allies. Putting this

Productive of some disadvantage, but of preponderance of advantage to the subject-allies themselves.

Imperial Athens compared with Imperial Sparta.

¹ Antipho, De Cæde Herôdis, c. 7, p. 135. ὁ οὐδὲ πόλει ἔξεστιν, ἀνευ Ἀθηναίων, οὐδένα θανάτῳ ζημιώσαι.

aside, we shall find that the solution provided by Athens was perhaps the next best, and we shall be the more induced to think so when we compare it with the proceedings afterwards adopted by Sparta, when she had put down the Athenian empire. Under Sparta, the general rule was, to place each of the dependent cities under the government of a Dekarchy (or oligarchical council of ten) among its chief citizens, together with a Spartan harmost or governor having a small garrison under his orders. It will be found when we come to describe the Spartan maritime empire that the arrangements exposed each dependent city to very great violence and extortion, while, after all, they solved only a part of the problem. They served only to maintain each separate city under the dominion of Sparta without contributing to regulate the dealings between the citizens of one and those of another, or to bind together the empire as a whole. Now the Athenians did not, as a system, place in their dependent cities governors analogous to the harmosts, though they did so occasionally under special need. But their fleets and their officers were in frequent relation with these cities; and as the principal officers were noways indisposed to abuse their position, so the facility of complaint, constantly open, to the Athenian popular dikastery, served both as redress and guarantee against misrule of this description. It was a guarantee which the allies themselves sensibly felt and valued, as we know from Thucydides. The chief source from whence they had to apprehend evil was, the misconduct of the Athenian officials and principal citizens, who could misemploy the power of Athens for their own private purposes—but they looked up to the "Athenian Demos as a chastener of such evil-doers and as a harbour of refuge to themselves."¹ If the popular dikasteries at Athens

¹ Thucyd. viii. 48. Τοὺς τε καλοὺς ἀγαθοὺς ὀνομαζομένους οὐκ ἔλασσω αὐτοὺς (that is, the subject-allies) νομίζειν σφισὶ πράγματα παρίξειν τοῦ δήμου, ποριστὰς ὄντας καὶ ἐσσηγητὰς τῶν κακῶν τῷ δήμῳ, ἐξ ὧν τὰ πλείω αὐτοὺς ὠφελεῖσθαι καὶ τὸ μὲν ἐκ' ἐκείνων εἶναι, καὶ ἀκριτοὶ ἂν καὶ βιαίτερον ἀποθνήσκουσιν, τὸν τε δὴ μὲν σφῶν τε καταφυγὴν εἶναι καὶ ἐκείνων σωφροσύνην. Καὶ ταῦτα παρ' αὐτῶν τῶν ἔργων ἐπισταμένους τὰς πόλεις σαφῶς αὐτοὺς εἶδέναι, ὅτι οὕτω νομίζουσι. This is introduced as the deliberate judgement

of the Athenian commander, the oligarch Phrynichus, whom Thucydides greatly commends for his sagacity, and with whom he seems in this case to have concurred.

Xenophon (Rep. Ath. i. 14, 15) affirms that the Athenian officers on service passed many unjust sentences upon the oligarchical party in the allied cities—fines, sentences of banishment, capital punishments, and that the Athenian people, though they had a strong public interest in the prosperity of the allies

had not been thus open, the allied cities would have suffered much more severely from the captains and officials of Athens in their individual capacity. And the maintenance of political harmony, between the imperial city and the subject-ally, was ensured by Athens through the jurisdiction of her dikasteries with much less cost of injustice and violence than by Sparta. For though oligarchical leaders in these allied cities might sometimes be unjustly condemned at Athens, yet such accidental wrong was immensely overpassed by the enormities of the Spartan harmosts and Dekarchies, who put numbers to death without any trial at all.

So again, it is to be recollected that Athenian private citizens, not officially employed, were spread over the whole range of the empire as kleruchs, proprietors, or traders. Of course therefore disputes would arise between them and the natives of the subject cities, as well as among these latter themselves, in cases where both parties did not belong to the same city. Now in such cases the Spartan imperial authority was so exercised as to afford little or no remedy, since the action of the harmost or the Dekarchy was confined to one separate city; while the Athenian dikasteries, with universal competence and public trial, afforded the best redress which the contingency admitted. If a Thasian citizen believed himself aggrieved by the historian Thucydides, either as commander of the Athenian fleet on that station, or as proprietor of gold mines in Thrace,—he had his remedy against the latter by accusation before the Athenian dikasteries, to which the most powerful Athenian was amenable not less than the meanest Thasian. To a citizen of any allied city it might be an occasional hardship to be sued before the courts at Athens; but

in order that their tribute might be larger, nevertheless thought it better that any individual citizen of Athens should pocket what he could out of the plunder of the allies, and leave to the latter nothing more than was absolutely necessary for them to live and work, without any superfluity such as might tempt them to revolt.

That the Athenian officers on service may have succeeded too often in unjust peculation at the cost of allies, is pro-

bable enough: but that the Athenian people were pleased to see their own individual citizens so enriching themselves, is certainly not true. The large jurisdiction of the dikasteries was intended, among other effects, to open to the allies a legal redress against such misconduct on the part of the Athenian officers: and the passage above cited from Thucydides proves that it really produced such an effect.

Numerous Athenian citizens spread over the Ægean—the allies had no redress against them, except through the Athenian dikasteries.

it was also often a valuable privilege to him to be able to sue, before those courts, others whom else he could not have reached. He had his share of the benefit as well as of the hardship. Athens, if she robbed her subject-allies of their independence, at least gave them in exchange the advantage of a central and common judiciary authority; thus enabling each of them to enforce claims of justice against the rest, in a way which would not have been practicable (to the weaker at least) even in a state of general independence.

Now Sparta seems not even to have attempted anything of the kind with regard to her subject-allies, being content to keep them under the rule of a harmost and a partisan oligarchy. And we read anecdotes which show that no justice could be obtained at Sparta even for the grossest outrages committed by the harmost, or by private Spartans out of Laconia. The two daughters of a Bœotian named Skedasus (of Leuktra in Bœotia) had been first violated and then murdered by two Spartan citizens: the son of a citizen of Oreus in Eubœa had been also outraged and killed by the harmost Aristodêmus;¹ in both cases the fathers went to Sparta to lay the enormity before the ephors and other authorities, and in both cases a deaf ear was turned to their complaints. But such crimes, if committed by Athenian citizens or officers, might have been brought to a formal exposure before the public sitting of the dikastery, and there can be no doubt that both would have been severely punished.

The dikasteries afforded protection against misconduct both of Athenian citizens and Athenian officers.

We shall see hereafter that an enormity of this description, committed by the Athenian general Pachês at Mitylênê, cost him his life before the Athenian dikasts.² Xenophon, in the dark and one-sided representation which he gives of the Athenian democracy, remarks, that if the subject-allies had not been made amenable to justice at Athens, they would have cared little for the people of Athens, and would have paid court only to those individual Athenians, generals, trierarchs, or envoys, who visited the islands on service; but under the existing system, the subjects were compelled to visit Athens either as plaintiffs or defendants, and were thus under the necessity of paying court to the bulk of the people also—that is, to those humbler citizens out of whom the dikasteries were

¹ Plut. Pelop. c. 20; Plut. Am. Nar. c. 3, p. 773.

² See *infra*, chap. 49.

formed; they supplicated the dikasts in court for favour or lenient dealing.¹ But this is only an invidious manner of discrediting what was really a protection to the allies, both in purpose and in reality. For it was a lighter lot to be brought for trial before the dikastery, than to be condemned without redress by the general on service, or to be forced to buy off his condemnation by a bribe. Moreover the dikastery was open not merely to receive accusations against citizens of the allied cities, but also to entertain complaints which they preferred against others.

Assuming the dikasteries at Athens to be ever so defective as tribunals for administering justice, we must recollect that they were the same tribunals under which every Athenian citizen held his own fortune or reputation, and that the native of any subject city was admitted to the same chance of justice as the native of Athens. Accordingly we find the Athenian envoy at Sparta, immediately before the Peloponnesian war, taking peculiar credit to the imperial city on this ground, for equal dealing with her subject-allies. "If our power (he says) were to pass into other hands, the comparison would presently show how moderate we are in the use of it: but as regards us, our very moderation is unfairly turned to our disparagement rather than to our praise. For even though we put ourselves at disadvantage in matters litigated with our allies, and though we have appointed such matters to be judged among ourselves, and under laws equal to both parties, we are represented as animated by nothing better than a love of litigation."² "Our

The dikasteries, defective or not, were the same tribunals under which every Athenian held his own security.

¹ Xenophon, Rep. Athen. i. 18. Πρὸς δὲ ταῦτοις, εἰ μὴ ἐπὶ δίκας ᾤσαν οἱ σύμμαχοι, τοὺς ἐκπελόντας Ἀθηναίων ἐτίμων ἂν μόνους, τοὺς τε στρατηγούς καὶ τοὺς τριηράρχους καὶ πρέσβεις· νῦν δ' ἠνάγκασται τὸν δῆμον κολακεύειν τῶν Ἀθηναίων εἰς ἕκαστος τῶν συμμάχων, γινώσκων ὅτι δεῖ μὲν ἀφικόμενον Ἀθηναίᾳ δίκην δοῦναι καὶ λαβεῖν, οὐκ ἐν ἄλλοις τισὶν, ἀλλ' ἐν τῷ δήμῳ, ὅς ἐστι δὴ νόμος Ἀθηναίων. Καὶ ἀντιβολῆσαι ἀναγκάζεται ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις, καὶ εἰσιόντός του, ἐπιλαμβάνεσθαι τῆς χειρός. Διὰ τοῦτο οὖν οἱ σύμμαχοι δοῦλοι τοῦ δήμου τῶν Ἀθηναίων καθεστῶσι μᾶλλον.

² Thucyd. i. 76, 77. "Ἄλλους γ' ἂν οὐκ οἴμεθα τὰ ἡμέτερα λαβόντας δεῖξαι ἂν μάλιστα εἴ τι μετρίάζομεν· ἡμῖν δὲ καὶ

ἐκ τοῦ ἐπικεικούς ἀδοξία τὸ πλεον ἢ ἴσωνος οὐκ εἰκότως περιέσται. Καὶ ἱλασσομένοι γὰρ ἐν ταῖς ξυμβολαῖαις πρὸς τοὺς ξυμμάχους δίκαις, καὶ παρ' ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς ἐν τοῖς ὁμοίοις νόμοις ποιήσαντες τὰς κρίσεις, φιλοδικεῖν δοκοῦμεν, &c.

I construe ξυμβολαῖαις δίκαις as connected in meaning with ξυμβόλαια and not with ξύμβολα—following Duker and Bloomfield in preference to Poppe and Gölter: see the elaborate notes of the two latter editors. Δίκαι ἀπὸ ξυμβόλων indicated the arrangements concluded by special convention between two different cities, by consent of both, for the purpose of determining controversies between their respective citizens: they were something essentially apart

allies (he adds) would complain less if we made open use of our superior force with regard to them; but we discard such

from the ordinary judicial arrangements of either state. Now what the Athenian orator here insists upon is exactly the contrary of this idea: he says that the allies were admitted to the benefit of Athenian trial and Athenian laws, in like manner with the citizens themselves. The judicial arrangements by which the Athenian allies were brought before the Athenian dikasteries cannot with propriety be said to be *δικαι ἀπὸ ξυμβόλων*; unless the act of original incorporation into the confederacy of Delos is to be regarded as a *ξύμβολον* or agreement—which in a large sense it might be, though not in the proper sense in which *δικαι ἀπὸ ξυμβόλων* are commonly mentioned. Moreover I think that the passage of Antipho (De Cæde Herodis, p. 745) proves that it was the citizens of places not in *alliance with Athens* who litigated with Athenians according to *δικαι ἀπὸ ξυμβόλων*—not the allies of Athens while they resided in their own native cities; for I agree with the interpretation which Boeckh puts upon this passage, in opposition to Platner and Schömann (Boeckh, Public Econ. of Athens, book iii. ch. xvi. p. 403, Eng. transl.; Schömann, Der Attisch. Prozess, p. 778; Platner, Prozess und Klagen bei den Attikern, ch. iv. 2, p. 110-112, where the latter discusses both the passages of Antipho and Thucydides).

The passages in Demosthenes, Orat. de Halones. c. 3, pp. 98, 99; and Andokides cont. Alkibiad. c. 7, p. 121 (I quote this latter oration, though it is undoubtedly spurious, because we may well suppose the author of it to be conversant with the nature and contents of *ξύμβολα*), give us a sufficient idea of these judicial conventions, or *ξύμβολα*—special and liable to differ in each particular case. They seem to me essentially distinct from that systematic scheme of proceeding whereby the dikasteries of Athens were made cognizant of all, or most, important controversies among or between the allied cities, as well as of political accusations.

M. Boeckh draws a distinction between the *autonomous* allies (Chios and Lesbos, at the time immediately before the Peloponnesian war) and the *subject*-allies; "the former class (he says) re-

tained possession of unlimited jurisdiction, whereas the latter were compelled to try all their disputes in the courts of Athens." Doubtless this distinction would prevail to a certain degree, but how far it was pushed we can hardly say. Suppose that a dispute took place between Chios and one of the subject-islands—or between an individual Chian and an individual Thasian—would not the Chian plaintiff sue, or the Chian defendant be sued before the Athenian dikastery? Suppose that an Athenian citizen or officer became involved in dispute with a Chian, would not the Athenian dikastery be the competent court, whichever of the two were plaintiff or defendant? Suppose a Chian citizen or magistrate to be suspected of fomenting revolt, would it not be competent to any accuser, either Chian or Athenian, to indict him before the dikastery at Athens? Abuse of power, or peculation, committed by Athenian officers at Chios, must of course be brought before the Athenian dikasteries, just as much as if the crime had been committed at Thasos or Naxos. We have no evidence to help us in regard to these questions; but I incline to believe that the difference in respect to judicial arrangement, between the autonomous and the subject allies, was less in degree than M. Boeckh believes. We must recollect that the arrangement was not all pure hardship to the allies—the liability to be prosecuted was accompanied with the privilege of prosecuting for injuries received.

There is one remark however which appears to me of importance for understanding the testimonies on this subject. The Athenian empire, properly so called, which began by the confederacy of Delos after the Persian invasion, was completely destroyed at the close of the Peloponnesian war, when Athens was conquered and taken. But after some years had elapsed, towards the year 377 B.C., Athens again began to make maritime conquests, to acquire allies, to receive tribute, to assemble a synod, and to resume her footing of something like an imperial city. Now her power over her allies during this second period of empire was not near so great as it had been during the first, between the

maxims, and deal with them upon an equal footing: and they are so accustomed to this that they think themselves entitled to complain at every trifling disappointment of their expectations.¹ They suffered worse hardship under the Persians before our empire began, and they would suffer worse under you (the Spartans) if you were to succeed in conquering us and making our empire yours."

History bears out the boast of the Athenian orator, both as to the time preceding and following the empire of Athens.² And an Athenian citizen indeed might well regard it not as a hardship, but as a privilege to the subject-allies, that they should be allowed to sue him before the dikastery, and to defend themselves before the same tribunal either in case of wrong done to him, or in case of alleged treason to the imperial authority of Athens: they were thereby put upon a level with himself. Still more would he find reason to eulogise the universal competence of these dikasteries in providing a common legal authority for all disputes of the numerous distinct communities of the empire one with another, and for the safe navigation and general commerce of the Ægean. That complaints were raised against it among the subject-allies is noway surprising. For the empire of Athens generally was inconsistent with that separate autonomy to which every town thought itself entitled; and this central judicature was one of its prominent and constantly

Persian and Peloponnesian wars; nor can we be at all sure that what is true of the second is also true of the first. And I think it probable, that those statements of the grammarians, which represent the allies as carrying on *δικας ἀπὸ συμβόλων* in ordinary practice with the Athenians, may really be true about the second empire or alliance. Bekker, *Anecdota*, p. 436. *Ἀθηναῖοι ἀπὸ συμβόλων ἰδικάζον τοὺς ὑπηκόους οὕτως Ἀριστοτέλης*. Pollux, viii. 68. *Ἀπὸ συμβόλων δὲ δίκην ἔν, ὅτε οἱ σύμμαχοι ἰδικάζοντο*. Also Hesychius, i. 489. The statement here ascribed to Aristotle may very probably be true about the second alliance, though it cannot be held true for the first. In the second, the Athenians may really have had *σύμβολα*, or special conventions for judicial business, with many of their principal allies, instead of making

Athens the authoritative centre, and heir to the Delian synod, as they did during the first. It is to be remarked however that Harpokration, in the explanation which he gives of *σύμβολα*, treats them in a perfectly general way, as conventions for settlement of judicial controversy between city and city, without any particular allusion to Athens and her allies. Compare Heffter, *Athenaische Gerichtsverfassung*, iii. 1, 3, p. 91.

¹ Thucyd. i. 77. *Οἱ δὲ (the allies) εἰθισμένοι πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἀπὸ τοῦ ἴσου ὁμιλεῖν, &c.*

² Compare Isokratēs, *Or.* iv. *Panegyric*. p. 62, 66, sect. 116-138; and *Or.* xii. *Panathenaic*. p. 247-254, sect. 72-111; *Or.* viii. *De Pace*, p. 178, sect. 119 *seqq.*; Plutarch, *Lysand.* c. 13; Cornel. Nepos, *Lysand.* c. 2, 3.

operative institutions, as well as a striking mark of dependence to the subordinate communities. Yet we may safely affirm that if empire was to be maintained at all, no way of maintaining it could be found at once less oppressive and more beneficial than the superintending competence of the *dikasteries*—a system not taking its rise in the mere “love of litigation” (if indeed we are to reckon this a real feature in the Athenian character, which I shall take another opportunity of examining), much less in those petty collateral interests indicated by Xenophon,¹ such as the increased customs duty, rent of houses, and hire of slaves at Peiræus, and the larger profits of the heralds, arising from the influx of suitors. It was nothing but the power, originally inherent in the confederacy of Delos, of arbitration between members and enforcement of duties towards the whole—a power inherited by Athens from that synod, and enlarged to meet the political wants of her empire; to which end it was essential, even in the view of Xenophon himself.² It may be that the *dikastery* was not always impartial between Athenian citizens privately, or the Athenian commonwealth collectively, and the subject-allies,—and insofar the latter had good reason to complain. But on the other hand we have no ground for suspecting it of deliberative or standing unfairness, or of any other defects than such as were inseparable from its constitution and procedure, whoever might be the parties under trial.

We are now considering the Athenian empire as it stood before the Peloponnesian war; before the increased exactions and the multiplied revolts, to which that war gave rise—before the cruelties which accompanied the suppression of those revolts, and which so deeply stained the character of Athens—before that aggravated fierceness, mistrust, contempt of

¹ Xenophon, *Repub. Ath.* i. 17.

² Xenophon, *Repub. Ath.* i. 16. He states it as one of the advantageous consequences, which induced the Athenians to bring the suits and complaints of the allies to Athens for trial—that the *prytaneia*, or fees paid upon entering a cause for trial, became sufficiently large to furnish all the pay for the *dikasts* throughout the year.

But in another part of his treatise (iii. 2, 3) he represents the Athenian *dikasteries* as overloaded with judicial business, much more than they could possibly get through; insomuch that there were long delays before causes could be brought on for trial. It could hardly be any great object therefore to multiply complaints artificially, in order to make fees for the *dikasts*.

obligation, and rapacious violence, which Thucydides so emphatically indicates as having been infused into the Greek bosom by the fever of an all-pervading contest.¹ There had been before this time many revolts of the Athenian dependencies, from the earliest at Naxos down to the latest at Samos. All had been successfully suppressed, but in no case had Athens displayed the same unrelenting rigour as we shall find hereafter manifested towards Mitylênê, Skiônê, and Mêlos. The policy of Periklês, now in the plenitude of his power at Athens, was cautious and conservative, averse to forced extension of empire as well as to those increased burdens on the dependent allies which such schemes would have entailed, and tending to maintain that assured commerce in the Ægean by which all of them must have been gainers—not without a conviction that the contest must arise sooner or later between Athens and Sparta, and that the resources as well as the temper of the allies must be husbanded against that contingency. If we read in Thucydides the speech of the envoy from Mitylênê² at Olympia, delivered to the Lacedæmonians and their allies in the fourth year of the Peloponnesian war, on occasion of the revolt of the city from Athens—a speech imploring aid and setting forth the strongest impeachment against Athens which the facts could be made to furnish—we shall be surprised how weak the case is and how much the speaker is conscious of its weakness. He has nothing like practical grievances and oppressions to urge against the imperial city. He does not dwell upon enormity of tribute, unpunished misconduct of Athenian officers, hardship of bringing

Athenian empire was affected for the worse by the circumstances of the Peloponnesian war: more violence was introduced into it by that war, than had prevailed before.

The subject-allies of Athens had few practical grievances to complain of.

causes for trial to Athens, or other sufferings of the subjects generally. He has nothing to say except that they were defenceless and degraded subjects, and that Athens held authority over them without and against their own consent: and in the case of Mitylênê, not so much as this could be said, since she was on the footing of an equal, armed, and autonomous ally. Of course this state of forced dependence was one which the allies, or such

¹ See his well-known comments on the seditions at Korkyra, iii. 82, 83.

² Thucyd. iii. 11-14.

of them as could stand alone, would naturally and reasonably shake off whenever they had an opportunity.¹ But the negative evidence, derived from the speech of the Mitylenæan orator, goes far to make out the point contended for by the Athenian speaker at Sparta immediately before the war—that, beyond the fact of such forced dependence, the allies had little practically to complain of. A city like Mitylênê might be strong enough to protect itself and its own commerce without the help of Athens. But to the weaker allies, the breaking up of the Athenian empire would have greatly lessened the security both of individuals and of commerce, in the waters of the Ægean, and their freedom would thus have been purchased at the cost of considerable positive disadvantages.²

¹ So the Athenian orator Diodotus puts it in his speech deprecating the extreme punishment about to be inflicted on Mitylênê—*ἢν τινα ἐλεύθερον καὶ βίᾳ ἀρχόμενον εἰκότως πρὸς αὐτονομίαν ἀποστάντα χειρωσώμεθα*, &c. (Thucyd. iii. 46).

² It is to be recollected that the Athenian empire was essentially a *government of dependencies*; Athens as an imperial state exercising authority over subordinate governments. To maintain beneficial relation between two governments,—one supreme—the other subordinate—and to make the system work to the satisfaction of the people in the one as well as of the people in the other—has always been found a problem of great difficulty. Whoever reads the instructive volume of Sir G. C. Lewis (Essay on the Government of Dependencies), and the number of instances of practical misgovernment in this matter which are set forth therein—will be inclined to think that the empire of Athens over her allies makes comparatively a creditable figure. It will most certainly stand full comparison with the government of England over dependencies in the last century; as illustrated by the history of Ireland, with the penal laws against the Catholics—by the declaration of independence published in 1776 by the American colonies, setting forth the grounds of their separation—and by the pleadings of Mr. Burke against Warren Hastings.

A statement and legal trial alluded to by Sir George Lewis (p. 367) elucidates

farther two points not unimportant on the present occasion: 1. The illiberal and humiliating vein of sentiment which is apt to arise in citizens of the supreme government towards those of the subordinate. 2. The protection which English Jury-trial, nevertheless, afforded to the citizens of the dependency against oppression by English officers.

"An action was brought in the Court of Common Pleas, in 1773, by Mr. Anthony Fabrigas, a native of Minorca, against General Mostyn, the governor of the island. The facts proved at the trial were, that Governor Mostyn had arrested the plaintiff, imprisoned him, and transported him to Spain without any form of trial, on the ground that the plaintiff had presented to him a petition for redress of grievances in a manner which he deemed improper. Mr. Justice Gould left it to the jury to say, whether the plaintiff's behaviour was such as to afford a just conclusion that he was about to stir up sedition and mutiny in the garrison, or whether he meant no more than earnestly to press his suit and obtain a redress of grievances. If they thought the latter, the plaintiff was entitled to recover in the action. The jury gave a verdict for the plaintiff with £3000 damages. In the following term an application was made for a new trial, which was refused by the whole court.

"The following remarks of the counsel for Governor Mostyn on this trial contain a plain and naïve statement of the doctrine, *that a dependency is to be*

The Grecian world was now divided into two great systems: with a right supposed to be vested in each, of punishing its own refractory members.

Nearly the whole of the Grecian world (putting aside Italian, Sicilian, and African Greek) was at this time included either in the alliance of Lacedæmon or in that of Athens, so that the truce of thirty years ensured a suspension of hostilities everywhere. Moreover the Lacedæmonian confederates had determined by a majority of votes to refuse the request of Samos for aid in her revolt against Athens: whereby it seems established, as practical international law, that neither of these two great aggregate bodies should intermeddle with the other, and that each should restrain or punish its own disobedient members.¹

governed not for its own interest, but for that of the dominant state. 'Gentlemen of the jury (said the counsel), it will be time for me now to take notice of another circumstance, notorious to all the gentlemen who have been settled in the island, that the natives of Minorca are but ill-affected to the English and to the English government. It is not much to be wondered at. They are the descendants of Spaniards; and they consider Spain as the country to which they ought naturally to belong: it is not at all to be wondered at that they are indisposed to the English whom they consider as their conquerors.—Of all the Minorquins in the island, the plaintiff perhaps stands singularly and eminently the most seditious, turbulent, and dissatisfied subject to the crown of Great Britain that is to be found in Minorca. Gentlemen, *he is, or chooses to be, called the patriot of Minorca.* Now patriotism is a very pretty thing among ourselves, and we owe much to it: we owe our liberties to it; but we should have but little to value, and perhaps we should have but little of what we now enjoy, were it not for our trade. *And for the sake of our trade, it is not fit that we should encourage patriotism in Minorca:* for it is there destructive of our trade, and there is an end to our trade in the Mediterranean, if it goes there. But *here it is very well:* for the body of the people in this country will have it: they have demanded it—and in consequence of their demands, they have enjoyed liberties which they will transmit to their posterity—and it is not in the power of this government to deprive them of it. But they will take care of all our con-

quests abroad. If that spirit prevailed in Minorca, the consequence would be the loss of that country, and of course of our Mediterranean trade. We should be sorry to set all our slaves free in our plantations.'"

The prodigious sum of damages awarded by the jury shows the strength of their sympathy with this Minorquin plaintiff against the English officer. I doubt not that the feeling of the dikastery at Athens was much of the same kind, and often quite as strong; sincerely disposed to protect the subject-allies against misconduct of Athenian trierarchs or inspectors.

The feelings expressed in the speech above-cited would also often find utterance from Athenian orators in the assembly: and it would not be difficult to produce parallel passages, in which these orators imply discontent on the part of the allies to be the natural state of things, such as Athens could not hope to escape. The speech here given shows that such feelings arise, almost inevitably, out of the uncomfortable relation of two governments, one supreme, and the other subordinate. They are not the product of peculiar cruelty and oppression on the part of the Athenian democracy, as Mr. Mitford and so many others have sought to prove.

¹ See the important passage already adverted to in a prior note.

Thucyd. i. 40. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἡμεῖς Σαμίω ἀποστάντων ψῆφον προσεβίμεθα ἐναντίαν ὑμῖν, τῶν ἄλλων Πελοποννησίων διχα ἐψηφισμένων εἰ χρη αὐτοῖς ἀμύνειν, φανερώς δὲ ἀντείχομεν τοὺς προσήκοντας ἐυμμάχους αὐτόν τινα κολάζειν.

Of this refusal, which materially affected the course of events, the main advisers had been the Corinthians, in spite of that fear and dislike of Athens which prompted many of the allies to vote for war.¹ The position of the Corinthians was peculiar; for while Sparta and her other allies were chiefly land-powers, Corinth had been from early times maritime, commercial, and colonising. She had indeed once possessed the largest navy in Greece, along with Ægina; but either she had not increased it at all during the last forty years, or if she had, her comparative naval importance had been sunk by the gigantic expansion of Athens. The Corinthians had both commerce and colonies—Leukas, Anaktorium, Ambrakia, Korkyra, &c., along or near the coast of Epirus: they had also their colony Potidæa, situated on the isthmus of Pallênê in Thrace, and intimately connected with them: and the interest of their commerce made them averse to collision with the superior navy of the Athenians. It was this consideration which had induced them to resist the impulse of the Lacedæmonian allies towards war on behalf of Samos. For though their feelings both of jealousy and hatred against Athens were even now strong,² arising greatly out of the struggle a few years before the acquisition of Megara to the Athenian alliance—prudence indicated that in a war against the first naval power in Greece, they were sure to be the greatest losers.

Policy of
Corinth,
from being
peaceful,
becomes
warlike.

So long as the policy of Corinth pointed towards peace, there was every probability that war would be avoided, or at least accepted only in a case of grave necessity, by the Lacedæmonian alliance. But a contingency, distant as well as unexpected, which occurred about five years after the revolt of Samos, reversed all these chances, and not only extinguished the dispositions of Corinth towards peace, but even transformed her into the forward instigator of war.

Amidst the various colonies planted from Corinth along the coast of Epirus, the greater number acknowledged on her part an hegemony or supremacy.³ What extent of real power and interference this acknowledgement implied, in addition to the honorary

Disputes
arise
between
Corinth and
Korkyra—
case of Epi-
damnus.

¹ Thucyd. i. 33.

² Thucyd. i. 42.

³ Thucyd. i. 38. ἡγεμόνες τε εἶναι καὶ τὰ εἰκότα θαυμάζεσθαι.

dignity, we are not in a condition to say. But the Corinthians were popular, and had not carried their interference beyond the point which the colonists themselves found acceptable. To these amicable relations, however, the powerful Korkyra formed a glaring exception—having been generally at variance, sometimes in the most aggravated hostility, with its mother-city, and withholding from her even the accustomed tributes of honorary and filial respect. It was amidst such relations of habitual ill-will between Corinth and Korkyra that a dispute grew up respecting the city of Epidamnus (known afterwards in the Roman times as Dyrrhachium, hard by the modern Durazzo)—a colony founded by the Korkyræans on the coast of Illyria in the Ionic Gulf, considerably to the north of their own island. So strong was the sanctity of Grecian custom in respect to the foundation of colonies, that the Korkyræans, in spite of their enmity to Corinth, had been obliged to select the *Ækist* (or Founder-in-Chief) of Epidamnus from that city—a citizen of Herakleid descent named Phalius—along with whom there had also come some Corinthian settlers. And thus Epidamnus, though a Korkyræan colony, was nevertheless a recognised grand-daughter (if the expression may be allowed) of Corinth, the recollection of which was perpetuated by the solemnities periodically celebrated in honour of the *Ækist*.¹

Founded on the isthmus of an outlying peninsula on the sea coast of the Illyrian Taulantii, Epidamnus was at first prosperous, and acquired a considerable territory as well as a numerous population. But during the years immediately preceding the period which we have now reached, it had been exposed to great reverses. Internal sedition between the oligarchy and the people, aggravated by attacks from the neighbouring Illyrians, had crippled its power; and a recent revolution, in which the people put down the oligarchy, had reduced it still farther—since the oligarchical exiles, collecting a force and allying themselves with the Illyrians, harassed the city grievously both by sea and land. The Epidamnian democracy was in such straits as to be forced to send to Korkyra for aid. Their envoys sat down as suppliants at the temple

The Epidamnians apply for aid in their distress to Korkyra—they are refused—the Corinthians send aid to the place.

¹ Thucyd. i. 24, 25.

of Hêrê, cast themselves on the mercy of the Korkyræans, and besought them to act both as mediators with the exiled oligarchy, and as auxiliaries against the Illyrians. Though the Korkyræans, themselves democratically governed, might have been expected to sympathise with these suppliants and their prayers, yet their feeling was decidedly opposite. For it was the Epidamnian oligarchy who were principally connected with Korkyra, from whence their forefathers had emigrated, and where their family burial-places as well as their kinsmen were still to be found:¹ while the Demos, or small proprietors and tradesmen of Epidamnus, may perhaps have been of miscellaneous origin, and at any rate had no visible memorials of ancient lineage in the mother-island. Having been refused aid from Korkyra, and finding their distressed condition insupportable, the Epidamnians next thought of applying to Corinth. But as this was a step of questionable propriety, their envoys were directed first to take the opinion of the Delphian god. His oracle having given an unqualified sanction, they proceeded to Corinth with their mission; describing their distress as well as their unavailing application at Korkyra—tendering Epidamnus to the Corinthians as to its Ækists and chiefs, with the most urgent entreaties for immediate aid to preserve it from ruin—and not omitting to insist on the divine sanction just obtained. It was found easy to persuade the Corinthians, who, looking upon Epidamnus as a joint colony from Corinth and Korkyra, thought themselves not only authorised, but bound, to undertake its defence—a resolution much prompted by their ancient feud against Korkyra. They speedily organised an expedition, consisting partly of intended new settlers, partly of a protecting military force—Corinthian, Leukadian, and Ambra-kiôtic: which combined body, in order to avoid opposition from the powerful Korkyræan navy, was marched by land as far as Apollônia, and transported from thence by sea to Epidamnus.²

The arrival of such a reinforcement rescued the city for the moment, but drew upon it a formidable increase of peril from

¹ Thucyd. i. 26. ἤλθον γὰρ ἐς τὴν Κέρκυραν οἱ τῶν Ἐπιδαμνίων φυγάδες, τάφους τε ἀποδεικνύοντες καὶ συγγένειαν ἣν προῖσχύμενοι ἰδόντο σφῶς κατὰγειν.

² Thucyd. i. 26.

the Korkyræans; who looked upon the interference of Corinth as an infringement of their rights, and resented it in the strongest manner. Their feelings were farther inflamed by the Epidamnian oligarchical exiles, who, coming to the island with petitions for succour and appeals to the tombs of their Korkyræan ancestors, found a ready sympathy. They were placed on board a fleet of twenty-five triremes, afterwards strengthened by a farther reinforcement, which was sent to Epidamnus with the insulting requisition that they should be forthwith restored and the new-comers from Corinth dismissed. No attention being paid to such demands, the Korkyræans commenced the blockade of the city with forty ships and with an auxiliary land-force of Illyrians—making proclamation that any person within, citizen or not, might depart safely if he chose, but would be dealt with as an enemy if he remained. How many persons profited by this permission we do not know; but at least enough to convey to Corinth the news that their troops in Epidamnus were closely besieged. The Corinthians immediately hastened the equipment of a second expedition—sufficient not only for the rescue of the place, but to surmount that resistance which the Korkyræans were sure to offer. In addition to thirty triremes, and three thousand hoplites, of their own, they solicited aid both in ships and money from many of their allies. Eight ships fully manned were furnished by Megara, four by Palès in the island of Kephallenia, five by Epidaurus, two by Trœzen, one by Hermionê, ten by Leukas, and eight by Ambrakia—together with pecuniary contributions from Thebes, Phlius, and Elis. They farther proclaimed a public invitation for new settlers to Epidamnus, promising equal political rights to all; an option being allowed to any one, who wished to become a settler without being ready to depart at once, to ensure future admission by depositing the sum of fifty Corinthian drachmas. Though it might seem that the prospects of these new settlers were full of doubt and danger, yet such was the confidence entertained in the metropolitan protection of Corinth, that many were found as well to join the fleet, as to pay down the deposit for liberty of future junction.

The Korkyræans attack Epidamnus—armament sent thither by Corinth.

All these proceedings on the part of Corinth, though undertaken with intentional hostility towards Korkyra, had not been preceded by any formal proposition such as was customary among Grecian states—a harshness of dealing arising not merely from her hatred towards Korkyra, but also from the peculiar political position of that island, which stood alone and isolated, not enrolled either in the Athenian or in the Lacedæmonian alliance. The Korkyræans, well aware of the serious preparation now going on at Corinth and of the union among so many cities against them, felt themselves hardly a match for it alone, in spite of their wealth and their formidable naval force of 120 triremes, inferior only to that of Athens. They made an effort to avert the storm by peaceable means, prevailing upon some mediators from Sparta and Sikyon to accompany them to Corinth; where, while they required that the forces and settlers recently despatched to Epidamnus should be withdrawn, denying all right on the part of Corinth to interfere in that colony—they at the same time offered, if the point were disputed, to refer it for arbitration either to some impartial Peloponnesian city, or to the Delphian oracle; such arbiter to determine to which of the two cities Epidamnus as a colony really belonged—and the decision to be obeyed by both. They solemnly deprecated recourse to arms, which, if persisted in, would drive them as a matter of necessity to seek new allies such as they would not willingly apply to. To this the Corinthians answered that they could entertain no proposition until the Korkyræan besieging force was withdrawn from Epidamnus. Whereupon the Korkyræans rejoined that they would withdraw it at once, provided the new settlers and the troops sent by Corinth were removed at the same time. Either there ought to be this reciprocal retirement, or the Korkyræans would acquiesce in the *statu quo* on both sides, until the arbiters should have decided.¹

Although the Korkyræans had been unwarrantably harsh in rejecting the first supplication from Epidamnus, yet in their propositions made at Corinth, right and equity were on their side. But the Corinthians had gone too far, and assumed an attitude too decidedly

Remonstrance of the Korkyræans with Corinth and the Peloponnesians.

Hostilities between Corinth and Korkyra—naval victory of the latter.

¹ Thucyd. i. 28.

aggressive, to admit of listening to arbitration. Accordingly, so soon as their armament was equipped, they set sail for Epidamnus, despatching a herald to declare war formally against the Korkyræans. When the armament, consisting of seventy-five triremes under Aristeus, Kallikratês, and Timanor, with 2000 hoplites under Archetimus and Isarchidas, had reached Cape Aktium at the mouth of the Ambrakian Gulf, it was met by a Korkyræan herald in a little boat forbidding all farther advance—a summons of course unavailing, and quickly followed by the appearance of the Korkyræan fleet. Out of the 120 triremes which constituted the naval establishment of the island, forty were engaged in the siege of Epidamnus, but all the remaining eighty were now brought into service; the older ships being specially repaired for the occasion. In the action which ensued, they gained a complete victory, destroying fifteen Corinthian ships, and taking a considerable number of prisoners. And on the very day of the victory, Epidamnus surrendered to their besieging fleet, under covenant that the Corinthians within it should be held as prisoners, and that the other new-comers should be sold as slaves. The Corinthians and their allies did not long keep the sea after their defeat, but retired home, while the Korkyræans remained undisputed masters of the neighbouring sea. Having erected a trophy on Leukimmê, the adjoining promontory of their island, they proceeded, according to the melancholy practice of Grecian warfare, to kill all their prisoners¹—except the Corinthians, who were carried home and detained as prizes of great value for purposes of negotiation. They next began to take vengeance on those allies of Corinth who had lent assistance to the recent expedition: they ravaged the territory of Leukas, burnt Kyllênê the seaport of Elis, and inflicted so much damage that the Corinthians were compelled towards the end of the summer to send a second armament to

¹ To illustrate this treatment of prisoners of war among the ancient Greeks, I transcribe an incident from the more recent history of Europe. It is contained in Bassompierre's description of his campaign in Hungary in 1603, with the German and Hungarian army under Count de Rossworm, against the Turks:—

“Après cette victoire, nous repas-

sâmes toute l'armée de l'autre côté du Danube en notre camp. Le général commanda que l'on tuât tous les prisonniers du jour précédent, parcequ'ils embarrassoient l'armée; qui fut une chose bien cruelle, de voir tuer de sang-froid plus de huit cents hommes rendus.”—*Mémoires de Bassompierre*, p. 308: collect. Pétitot.

Cape Aktium, for the defence of Leukas, Anaktorium, and Ambrakia. The Korkyræan fleet was again assembled near Cape Leukimmê, but no farther action took place, and at the approach of winter both armaments were disbanded.¹

Deeply were the Corinthians humiliated by their defeat at sea, together with the dispersion of the settlers whom they had brought together: and though their original project was frustrated by the loss of Epidamnus, they were only the more bent on complete revenge against their old enemy Korkyra. They employed themselves for two entire years after the battle in building new ships and providing an armament adequate to their purposes: and in particular, they sent round not only to the Peloponnesian seaports, but also to the islands under the empire of Athens, in order to take into their pay the best class of seamen. By such prolonged efforts, ninety well-manned Corinthian ships were ready to set sail in the third year after the battle. The entire fleet, when reinforced by the allies, amounted to not less than 150 sail; twenty-seven triremes from Ambrakia, twelve from Megara, ten from Elis, as many from Leukas, and one from Anaktorium. Each of these allied squadrons had officers of its own, while the Corinthian Xenokleidês and four others were commanders-in-chief.²

n.c. 434-433.
Large preparations
made by
Corinth for
renewing the
war.

But the elaborate preparations going on at Corinth were no secret to the Korkyræans, who well knew, besides, the numerous allies which that city could command, and her extensive influence throughout Greece. So formidable an attack was more than they could venture to brave, alone and unaided. They had never yet enrolled themselves among the allies either of Athens or of Lacedæmon. It had been their pride and policy to maintain a separate line of action, which, by means of their wealth, their power, and their very peculiar position, they had hitherto been enabled to do with safety. That they had been able so to proceed with safety, however, was considered both by friends and enemies as a peculiarity belonging to their island; from whence we may draw an inference how little the islands in the Ægean, now under the Athenian empire, would have been able to maintain any real independence, if that

Application
of the Kor-
kyræans to
be received
among the
allies of
Athens.

¹ Thucyd. i. 29, 30.

² Thucyd. i. 31-46.

empire had been broken up. But though Korkyra had been secure in this policy of isolation up to the present moment, such had been the increase and consolidation of forces elsewhere throughout Greece, that even she could pursue it no longer. To apply for admission into the Lacedæmonian confederacy, wherein her immediate enemy exercised paramount influence, being out of the question, she had no choice except to seek alliance with Athens. That city had as yet no dependencies in the Ionic Gulf; she was not of kindred lineage, nor had she had any previous amicable relations with the Dorian Korkyra. But if there was thus no previous fact or feeling to lay the foundation of alliance, neither was there anything to forbid it; for in the truce between Athens and Sparta, it had been expressly stipulated, that any city, not actually enrolled in the alliance of either, might join the one or the other at pleasure.¹ While the proposition of alliance was thus formally open either for acceptance or refusal, the time and circumstances under which it was to be made rendered it full of grave contingencies to all parties. The Korkyræan envoys, who now for the first time visited Athens for the purpose of making it, came thither with doubtful hopes of success, though to their island the question was one of life or death.

According to the modern theories of government, to declare war, to make peace, and to contract alliances, are functions proper to be entrusted to the executive government apart from the representative assembly. According to ancient ideas, these were precisely the topics most essential to submit for the decision of the full assembly of the people: and in point of fact they were so submitted, even under governments only partially democratical; much more, of course, under the complete democracy of Athens. The Korkyræan envoys on reaching that city would first open their business to the *Stratēgi* or generals of the state, who would appoint a day for them to be heard before the public assembly, with full notice beforehand to the citizens. The mission was no secret, for the Korkyræans had themselves intimated their intention at Corinth, at the time when they proposed reference of the quarrel to arbitration. Even without such notice, the political necessity of the step

Address of the Korkyræan envoys to the Athenian public assembly.

¹ Thucyd. i. 35-40.

was obvious enough to make the Corinthians anticipate it. Lastly, their *proxeni* at Athens (Athenian citizens who watched over Corinthian interests public and private, in confidential correspondence with that government—and who, sometimes by appointment, sometimes as volunteers, discharged partly the functions of ambassadors in modern times) would communicate to them the arrival of the Korkyræan envoys. So that, on the day appointed for the latter to be heard before the public assembly, Corinthian envoys were also present to answer them and to oppose the granting of their prayer.

Thucydides has given in his history the speeches of both; that is, speeches of his own composition, but representing in all probability the substance of what was actually said, and of what he perhaps himself heard. Principal topics upon which it insists, as given in Thucydides. Though pervaded throughout by the peculiar style and harsh structure of the historian, these speeches are yet among the plainest and most business-like in his whole work; bringing before us thoroughly the existing situation; which was one of doubt and difficulty, presenting reasons of considerable force on each of the opposite sides.

The Korkyræans, after lamenting their previous improvidence which had induced them to defer seeking alliance until the hour of need arrived, presented themselves as claimants for the friendship of Athens on the strongest grounds of common-interest and reciprocal usefulness. Though their existing danger and need of Athenian support was now urgent, it had not been brought upon them in an unjust quarrel or by disgraceful conduct. They had proposed to Corinth a fair arbitration respecting Epidamnus, and their application had been refused—which showed where the right of the case lay: moreover they were now exposed single-handed, not to Corinth alone, whom they had already vanquished, but to a formidable confederacy organised under her auspices, including choice mariners hired even from the allies of Athens. In granting their prayer, Athens would in the first place neutralise this misemployment of her own mariners, and would at the same time confer an indelible obligation, protect the cause of right, and secure to herself an important reinforcement. For next to her own, the Korkyræan naval force was the most powerful in Greece, and this was now placed within her reach.

If by declining the present offer, she permitted Korkyra to be overcome, that naval force would pass to the side of her enemies: for such were Corinth and the Peloponnesian alliance—and such they would soon be openly declared. In the existing state of Greece, a collision between that alliance and Athens could not long be postponed. It was with a view to this contingency that the Corinthians were now seeking to seize Korkyra along with her naval force.¹ The policy of Athens therefore imperiously called upon her to frustrate such a design, by now assisting the Korkyræans. She was permitted to do this by the terms of the Thirty years' truce. And although some might contend that in the present critical conjuncture, acceptance of Korkyra was tantamount to a declaration of war with Corinth, yet the fact would falsify such predictions; for Athens would so strengthen herself that her enemies would be more than ever unwilling to attack her. She would not only render her naval force irresistibly powerful, but would become mistress of the communication between Sicily and Peloponnesus, and thus prevent the Sicilian Dorians from sending reinforcements to the Peloponnesians.²

To these representations on the part of the Korkyræans, the Corinthian speakers made reply. They denounced the selfish and iniquitous policy pursued by Korkyra, not less in the matter of Epidamnus than in all former time³—which was the real reason why she had ever been ashamed of honest allies. Above all things, she had always acted undutifully and wickedly towards Corinth her mother city, to whom she was bound by those ties of colonial allegiance which Grecian morality recognised, and which the other Corinthian colonies cheerfully obeyed.⁴

Envoys from Corinth address the Athenian assembly in reply.

¹ Thucyd. i. 33. Τὸν Λακεδαιμονίους φόβῳ τῷ βρετιέρῃ πολεμῆσεισθαι, καὶ τοὺς Κορινθίους δυναμένους παρ' αὐτοῖς καὶ ὅμιν ἐχθροὺς ὄντας καὶ προκαταλαμβάνοντας ἡμᾶς νῦν ἐς τὴν βρετιέραν ἐπιχειρήσιν, ἵνα μὴ τῷ κοινῷ ἔχθῃ κατ' αὐτῶν μετ' ἀλλήλων στῶμεν, &c.

² Thucyd. i. 32-36.

³ The description given by Herodotus (vii. 168: compare Diodor. xi. 15) of the duplicity of the Korkyræans when solicited to aid the Grecian cause at the time of the invasion of Xerxes, seems to imply that the unfavourable character of them given by the Corinthians coin-

cided with the general impression throughout Greece.

Respecting the prosperity and insolence of the Korkyræans, see Aristotle apud Zenob. Proverb. iv. 49.

⁴ Thucyd. i. 38. ἀποικοὶ δὲ ὄντες ἀφ' ἐστῶσι τε διὰ παντὸς καὶ νῦν πολέμοις, λέγοντες ὡς οὐκ ἐπὶ τῷ κακῷ πάσχειν ἐκπεφθίονσαν ἡμεῖς δὲ οὐδ' αὐτοὶ φάμεν ἐπὶ τῷ ὑπὸ τούτων ὑβρίζεσθαι κατοικίαις, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τῷ ἡγνύνεσθαι τε εἶναι καὶ τὰ εἰκότα θαυμάζεσθαι, αἱ γοῦν ἄλλαι ἀποικίαι τιμῶσιν ἡμᾶς, καὶ μάλιστα ὑπὸ ἀποίκων στεργόμεθα.

This is a remarkable passage in illus-

Epidamnus was not a Korkyræan, but a Corinthian colony. The Korkyræans, having committed wrong in besieging it, had proposed arbitration without being willing to withdraw their troops while arbitration was pending: they now impudently came to ask Athens to become accessory after the fact, in such injustice. The provision of the Thirty years' truce might seem indeed to allow Athens to receive them as allies: but that provision was not intended to permit the reception of cities already under the tie of colonial allegiance elsewhere—still less the reception of cities engaged in an active and pending quarrel, where any countenance to one party in the quarrel was necessarily a declaration of war against the opposite. If either party had a right to invoke the aid of Athens on this occasion, Corinth had a better right than Korkyra. For the latter had never had any transactions with the Athenians, while Corinth was not only still under covenant of amity with them, through the Thirty years' truce—but had also rendered material service to them by dissuading the Peloponnesian allies from assisting the revolted Samos. By such dissuasion, the Corinthians had upheld the principle of Grecian international law, that each alliance was entitled to punish its own refractory members. They now called upon Athens to respect this principle by not interfering between Corinth and her colonial allies,¹ especially as the violation of it would recoil inconveniently upon Athens herself with her numerous dependencies. As for the fear of an impending war between the Peloponnesian alliance and Athens, such a contingency was as yet uncertain—and might possibly never occur at all, if Athens dealt justly, and consented to conciliate Corinth on this critical occasion. But it would assuredly occur if she refused such conciliation, and the dangers thus entailed upon Athens would be far greater than the promised naval co-operation of Korkyra would compensate.²

tration of the position of a metropolis in regard to her colony. The relation was such as to be comprised under the general word *hegemony*: superiority and right to command on the one side, inferiority with duty of reverence and obedience on the other—limited in point of extent, though we do not know where the

limit was placed, and varying probably in each individual case. The Corinthians sent annual magistrates to Potidæa, called *Epidemiurgi* (Thucyd. i. 56).

¹ Thucyd. i. 40. *φανερῶς δὲ ἀντελπομένους τοὺς προσήκοντας ξυμμάχους αὐτὸν τίνα κολάζειν.*

² Thucyd. i. 37-43.

Decision of the Athenians—a qualified compliance with the request of Korkyra. The Athenian triremes sent to Korkyra.

Such was the substance of the arguments urged by the contending envoys before the Athenian public assembly, in this momentous debate. For two days did the debate continue, the assembly being adjourned over to the morrow; so considerable was the number of speakers, and probably also the divergence of their views. Unluckily Thucydidēs does not give us any of these Athenian discourses—not even that of Periklēs, who determined the ultimate result.

Epidamnus with its disputed question of metropolitan right occupied little the attention of the Athenian assembly. But the Korkyræan naval force was indeed an immense item, since the question was whether it should stand on their side or against them—an item which nothing could counterbalance except the dangers of a Peloponnesian war. "Let us avoid this last calamity (was the opinion of many) even at the sacrifice of seeing Korkyra conquered, and all her ships and seamen in the service of the Peloponnesian league." "You will not really avoid it, even by that great sacrifice (was the reply of others). The generating causes of war are at work—and it will infallibly come whatever you may determine respecting Korkyra: avail yourselves of the present opening, instead of being driven ultimately to undertake the war at great comparative disadvantage." Of these two views, the former was at first decidedly preponderant in the assembly;¹ but they gradually came round to the latter, which was conformably to the steady conviction of Periklēs. It was however resolved to take a sort of middle course, so as to save Korkyra, and yet, if possible, to escape violation of the existing truce and the consequent Peloponnesian war. To comply with the request of the Korkyræans, by adopting them unreservedly as allies, would have laid the Athenians under the necessity of accompanying them in an attack of Corinth, if required—which would have been a manifest infringement of the truce. Accordingly nothing more was concluded than an alliance for purposes strictly defensive, to preserve Korkyra and her possessions in case they were attacked: nor was any greater

¹ Thucyd. i. 44. Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ ἀκούσαντες ἀμφοτέρων, γενομένης καὶ δις ἐκκλησίας, τῇ μὲν προτέρᾳ οὐχ ἦσαν τῶν Κορινθίων ἀπεδέξαντο τοὺς λόγους, ἐν δὲ

τῇ ὑστεραίᾳ μετήγνωσαν, &c.

Οὐχ ἦσαν in the language of Thucydidēs usually has the positive meaning of *more*.

force equipped to back this resolve than a squadron of ten triremes, under Lacedæmonius son of Kimon. The smallness of this force would satisfy the Corinthians that no aggression was contemplated against their city, while it would save Korkyra from ruin, and would in fact feed the war so as to weaken and cripple the naval force of both parties¹—which was the best result that Athens could hope for. The instructions to Lacedæmonius and his two colleagues were express: not to engage in fight with the Corinthians unless they were actually approaching Korkyra or some Korkyræan possession with a view to attack; but in that case to do his best on the defensive.

The great Corinthian armament of 150 sail soon took its departure from the Gulf, and reached a harbour on the coast of Epirus at the Cape called Cheimerium, nearly opposite to the southern extremity of Korkyra. They there established a naval station and camp, summoning to their aid a considerable force from the friendly Epirotic tribes in the neighbourhood. The Korkyræan fleet of 110 sail, under Meikiadês and two others, together with the ten Athenian ships, took station at one of the adjoining islands called Sybotha, while the land force and 1000 Zakynthian hoplites were posted on the Korkyræan Cape Leukimmê. Both sides prepared for battle: the Corinthians, taking on board three days' provisions, sailed by night from Cheimerium, and encountered in the morning the Korkyræan fleet advancing towards them, distributed into three squadrons, one under each of the three generals, and having the ten Athenian ships at the extreme right. Opposed to them were ranged the choice vessels of the Corinthians, occupying the left of their aggregate fleet: next came the various allies, with Megarians and Ambrakiots on the extreme right. Never before had two such numerous fleets, both Grecian, engaged in battle. But the tactics and manœuvring were not commensurate to the numbers. The decks were crowded with hoplites and bowmen, while the rowers below, on the

Naval combat between the Corinthians and Korkyræans: rude tactics on both sides.

¹ Thucyd. i. 44. Plutarch (Periklês, c. 29) ascribes the smallness of the squadron despatched under Lacedæmonius to a petty spite of Periklês against that commander, as the son of his old

political antagonist Kimon. From whomsoever he copied this statement, the motive assigned seems quite unworthy of credit.

Korkyræan side at least, were in great part slaves. The ships on both sides, being rowed forward so as to drive in direct impact prow against prow, were grappled together, and a fierce hand-combat was then commenced between the troops on board of each, as if they were on land—or rather, like boarding-parties: all upon the old-fashioned system of Grecian sea-fight, without any of those improvements introduced into the Athenian navy during the last generation. In Athenian naval attack, the ship, the rowers, and the steersman, were of much greater importance than the armed soldiers on deck. By strength and exactness of rowing, by rapid and sudden change of direction, by feints calculated to deceive, the Athenian captain sought to drive the sharp beak of his vessel, not against the prow, but against the weaker and more vulnerable parts of his enemy—side, oars, or stern. The ship thus became in the hands of her crew the real weapon of attack, which was intended first to disable the enemy and leave him unmanageable on the water; and not until this was done did the armed men on deck begin their operations.¹ Lacedæmonius with his ten Athenian ships, though forbidden by his instructions to share in the battle, lent as much aid as he could by taking position at the extremity of the line and by making motions as if about to attack; while his seamen had full leisure to contemplate what they would despise as lubberly handling of the ships on both sides. All was confusion after the battle had been joined. The ships on both sides became entangled, the oars broken and unmanageable,—orders could neither be heard nor obeyed—and the individual valour of the hoplites and bowmen on deck became the decisive point on which victory turned.

On the right wing of the Corinthians, the left of the Korkyræans was victorious. Their twenty ships drove back the Ambrakiot allies of Corinth, and not only pursued them to the shore, but also landed and plundered the tents. Their rashness in thus keeping so

The Korkyræans are defeated.

¹ Περὶ τοῦ ἀνὰ πρῶν—*to turn the naval battle into a land-battle on ship-board*—was a practice altogether repugnant to Athenian feeling—as we see remarked also in Thucyd. iv. 14: compare also vii. 61.

The Corinthian and Syracusan ships

ultimately came to counteract the Athenian manœuvring by constructing their prows with increased solidity and strength, and forcing the Athenian vessel to a direct shock which its weaker prow was unable to bear (Thucyd. vii. 36).

long out of the battle proved incalculably mischievous, the rather as their total number was inferior; for their right wing, opposed to the best ships of Corinth, was after a hard struggle thoroughly beaten. Many of the ships were disabled, and the rest obliged to retreat as they could—a retreat which the victorious ships on the other wing might have protected, had there been any effective discipline in the fleet, but which now was only imperfectly aided by the ten Athenian ships under Lacedæmonius. Though at first they obeyed the instructions from home in abstaining from actual blows, yet—when the battle became doubtful, and still more, when the Corinthians were pressing their victory—the Athenians could no longer keep aloof, but attacked the pursuers in good earnest, and did much to save the defeated Korkyræans. As soon as the latter had been pursued as far as their own island, the victorious Corinthians returned to the scene of action, which was covered with crippled and waterlogged ships, of their own and their enemies, as well as with seamen, soldiers, and wounded men, either helpless aboard the wrecks or keeping above water as well as they could—among the number, many of their own citizens and allies, especially on their defeated right wing. Through these disabled vessels they sailed, not attempting to tow them off, but looking only to the crews aboard, and making some of them prisoners, but putting the greater number to death. Some even of their own allies were thus slain, not being easily distinguishable. The Corinthians, having picked up their own dead bodies as well as they could, transported them to Sybota, the nearest point of the coast of Epirus; after which they again mustered their fleet, and returned to resume the attack against the Korkyræans on their own coast. The latter got together as many of their ships as were seaworthy, together with the small reserve which had remained in harbour, in order to prevent at any rate a landing on the coast: and the Athenian ships, now within the strict letter of their instructions, prepared to co-operate with full energy in the defence. It was already late in the afternoon: but the Corinthian fleet, though their pæan had already been shouted for attack, were suddenly seen to back water instead of advancing; presently they pulled round, and steered direct for the Epirotic coast. The

Korkyræans did not comprehend the cause of this sudden retreat, until at length it was proclaimed that an unexpected relief of twenty fresh Athenian ships was approaching, under Glaukon and Andokidês; which the Corinthians had been the first to descry, and had even believed to be the fore-runners of a larger fleet. It was already dark when these fresh ships reached Cape Leukimmê, having traversed the waters covered with wrecks and dead bodies.¹ At first the Korkyræans even mistook them for enemies. The reinforcement had been sent from Athens, probably after more accurate information of the comparative force of Corinth and Korkyra, under the impression that the original ten ships would prove inadequate for the purpose of defence—an impression more than verified by the reality.

Though the twenty Athenian ships were not, as the Corinthians had imagined, the precursors of a larger fleet, they were found sufficient to change completely the face of affairs. In the preceding action the Korkyræans had had seventy ships sunk or disabled—the Corinthians only thirty—so that the superiority of numbers was still on the side of the latter, who were however encumbered with the care of 1000 prisoners (800 of them slaves) captured, not easy either to lodge or to guard in the narrow accommodations of an ancient trireme. Even apart from this embarrassment, the Corinthians were in no temper to hazard a second battle against thirty Athenian ships in addition to the remaining Korkyræan. And when their enemies sailed across to offer them battle on the Epirotic coast, they not only refused it, but thought of nothing but immediate retreat—with serious alarm lest the Athenians should now act aggressively, treating all amicable relations between Athens and Corinth as practically extinguished by the events of the day before. Having ranged their fleet in line not far from shore, they tested the dispositions of the Athenian commanders by sending forward a little boat with a few men to address to them the following remonstrance. The men carried no herald's staff (*we* should say, no flag of truce), and were therefore completely

Arrival of a reinforcement from Athens—the Corinthian fleet retires: carrying off numerous Korkyræan prisoners.

Hostilities not yet professedly begun between Athens and Corinth.

¹ Thucyd. i. 51. διὰ τῶν νεκρῶν καὶ ναυαγίων προσκομισθεῖσαι κατέπλειον ἐς τὸ στρατόπεδον.

without protection against an enemy. "Ye act wrongfully, Athenians (they exclaimed), in beginning the war and violating the truce ; for ye are using arms to oppose us in punishing our enemies. If it be really your intention to hinder us from sailing against Korkyra or anywhere else that we choose, in breach of the truce, take first of all us who now address you, and deal with us as enemies." It was not the fault of the Korkyræans that this last idea was not instantly realised : for such of them as were near enough to hear, instigated the Athenians by violent shouts to kill the men in the boat. But the latter, far from listening to such an appeal, dismissed them with the answer : " We neither begin the war nor break the truce, Peloponnesians : we have come simply to aid these Korkyræans our allies. If ye wish to sail anywhere else, we make no opposition : but if ye are about to sail against Korkyra or any of her possessions, we shall use our best means to prevent you." Both the answer, and the treatment of the men in the boat, satisfied the Corinthians that their retreat would be unopposed, and they accordingly commenced it as soon as they could get ready, staying however to erect a trophy at Sybota on the Epirotic coast, in commemoration of their advantage on the preceding day. In their voyage homeward they surprised Anaktorium at the mouth of the Ambrakiotic Gulf, which they had hitherto possessed jointly with the Korkyræans, planting in it a reinforcement of Corinthian settlers as guarantee for future fidelity. On reaching Corinth, the armament was dismissed, and the great majority of the prisoners taken, 800 slaves, were sold ; but the remainder, 250 in number, were detained, and treated with peculiar kindness. Many of them were of the first and richest families in Korkyra, and the Corinthians designed to gain them over, so as to make them instruments for effecting a revolution in the island. The calamitous incidents arising from their subsequent return will appear in another chapter.

Relieved now from all danger, the Korkyræans picked up the dead bodies and the wrecks which had floated during the night on to their island, and even found sufficient pretence to erect a trophy, chiefly in consequence of their partial success on the left wing. In truth, they had been only rescued from ruin by the unex-

Hatred conceived by the Corinthians towards Athens.

pected coming of the last Athenian ships: but the last result was as triumphant to them, as it was disastrous and humiliating to the Corinthians, who had incurred an immense cost, and taxed all their willing allies, only to leave their enemy stronger than she was before. From this time forward they considered the Thirty years' truce as broken, and conceived a hatred, alike deadly and undisguised, against Athens; so that the latter gained nothing by the moderation of her admirals in sparing the Corinthian fleet off the coast of Epirus. An opportunity was not long wanting for the Corinthians to strike a blow at their enemy through one of her wide-spread dependencies.

On the isthmus of that lesser peninsula called Pallênê, (which forms the westernmost of the three prongs of the greater Thracian peninsula called Chalkidikê, between the Thermaic and the Strymonic Gulfs,) was situated the Dorian town of Potidæa, one of the tributary allies of Athens, but originally colonised from Corinth and still maintaining a certain metropolitan allegiance towards the latter: insomuch that every year certain Corinthians were sent thither as magistrates under the title of Epidemiurgi. On various points of the neighbouring coast also there were several small towns belonging to the Chalkidians and Bottiæans, enrolled in like manner in the list of Athenian tributaries. The neighbouring inland territory, Mygdonia and Chalkidikê,¹ was held by the Macedonian king Perdikkas, son of that Alexander who had taken part fifty years before in the expedition of Xerxes. These two princes appear gradually to have extended their dominions, after the ruin of Persian power in Thrace by the exertions of Athens, until at length they acquired all the territory between the rivers Axios and Strymon. Now Perdikkas had been for some time the friend and ally of Athens; but there were other Macedonian princes, his brother Philip, and Derdas, holding independent principalities in the upper country² (apparently on the higher course of the Axios near

¹ See the geographical Commentary of Gatterer upon Thrace, embodied in Poppo, Prolegg. ad Thucyd. vol. ii. ch. 29.

The words τὰ ἐνὶ Θρᾷκης—τὰ ἐνὶ

Θρᾷκης χωρία (Thucyd. ii. 29) denote generally the towns in Chalkidikê—places in the direction or in the skirts of Thrace, rather than parts of Thrace itself. ² Thucyd. i. 57; ii. 100.

the Pæonian tribes), with whom he was in a state of dispute. These princes having been accepted as the allies of Athens, Perdikkas from that time became her active enemy, and it was from his intrigues that all the difficulties of Athens on that coast took their first origin. The Athenian empire was much less complete and secure over the seaports on the mainland than over the islands.¹ For the former were always more or less dependent on any powerful land neighbour, sometimes more dependent on him than upon the mistress of the sea; and we shall find Athens herself cultivating assiduously the favour of Sitalkes and other strong Thracian potentates, as an aid to her dominion over the seaports.² Perdikkas immediately began to incite and aid the Chalkidians and Bottiæans to revolt from Athens; and the violent enmity against the latter, kindled in the bosoms of the Corinthians by the recent events at Korkyra, enabled him to extend the same projects to Potidæa. Not only did he send envoys to Corinth in order to concert measures for provoking the revolt of Potidæa, but also to Sparta, instigating the Peloponnesian league to a general declaration of war against Athens.³ And he farther prevailed on many of the Chalkidian inhabitants to abandon their separate small town on the sea-coast, for the purpose of joint residence at Olynthus, which was several stadia from the sea. Thus that town, as well as the Chalkidian interest, became much strengthened, while Perdikkas farther assigned some territory near Lake Bolbê to contribute to the temporary maintenance of the concentrated population.

The Athenians were not ignorant both of his hostile preparations and of the dangers which awaited them from

Relations of Athens with Perdikkas king of Macedonia, his intrigues along with Corinth against her—he induces the Chalkidians to revolt from her—increased of Olynthus.

¹ See two remarkable passages illustrating this difference, Thucyd. iv. 120-122.

² Thucyd. ii. 29-98. Isokratês has a remarkable passage on this subject in the beginning of Or. v. ad Philippum, sect. 5-7. After pointing out the imprudence of founding a colony on the skirts of the territory of a powerful potentate and the excellent site which had been chosen for Kyrênê, as being near only to feeble tribes—he goes so far as to say that the possession of

Amphipolis would be injurious rather than beneficial to Athens, because it would render her dependent upon Philip, through his power of annoying her colonists—just as she had been dependent before upon Medokus the Thracian king in consequence of her colonists in the Chersonese—ἀναγκασθῆσόμεθα τὴν αὐτὴν εἶναι εἶναι τοῖς τοῖς πράγμασι διὰ τοὺς ἐνταῦθα (at Amphipolis) κατοικοῦντας ὅταν περ εἴχομεν Μηδόκῳ τῷ παλαιῷ διὰ τοὺς ἐν Χερσονήσῳ γεωργοῦντας. ³ Thucyd. i. 56, 57.

Corinth. Immediately after the Korkyræan sea-fight they sent to take precautions against the revolt of Potidæa ; requiring the inhabitants to take down their wall on the side of Pallênê, so as to leave the town open on the side of the peninsula, or on what may be called the sea-side, and fortified only towards the mainland—requiring them farther both to deliver hostages and to dismiss the annual magistrates who came to them from Corinth.

Revolt of Potidæa—armament sent thither from Athens.

An Athenian armament of thirty triremes and 1000 hoplites, under Archestratus and ten others, despatched to act against Perdikkas in the Thermaic Gulf, was directed at the same time to enforce these requisitions against Potidæa, and to repress any dispositions to revolt among the neighbouring Chalkidians. Immediately on receiving the requisitions, the Potidæans sent envoys both to Athens, for the purpose of evading and gaining time—and to Sparta, in conjunction with Corinth, in order to determine a Lacedæmonian invasion of Attica, in the event of Potidæa being attacked by Athens. From the Spartan authorities they obtained a distinct affirmative promise, in spite of the Thirty years' truce still subsisting. At Athens they had no success, and they accordingly openly revolted (seemingly about Midsummer 432 B.C.), at the same time that the armament under Archestratus sailed. The Chalkidians and Bottiæans revolted also, at the express instigation of Corinth, accompanied by solemn oaths and promises of assistance.¹ Archestratus with his fleet, on reaching the Thermaic Gulf, found them all in proclaimed enmity, but was obliged to confine himself to the attack of Perdikkas in Macedonia, not having numbers enough to admit of a division of his force. He accordingly laid siege to Therma, in co-operation with the Macedonian troops from the upper country under Philip and the brothers of Derdas ; after taking that place, he next proceeded to besiege Pydna. But it would probably have been wiser had he turned his whole force instantly to the blockade of Potidæa ; for during the period of more than six weeks that he spent in the operations against Therma, the Corinthians conveyed to Potidæa a reinforcement of 1600 hoplites and 400 light-armed, partly their own citizens, partly Peloponnesians hired

¹ Thucyd. v. 30.

for the occasion—under Aristeus son of Adeimantus, a man of such eminent popularity, both at Corinth and at Potidæa, that most of the soldiers volunteered on his personal account. Potidæa was thus put in a state of complete defence shortly after the news of its revolt reached Athens, and long before any second armament could be sent to attack it. A second armament however was speedily sent forth—forty triremes and 2000 Athenian hoplites under Kallias son of Kalliades,¹ with four other commanders—who on reaching the Thermaic Gulf, joined the former body at the siege of Pydna. After prosecuting the siege in vain for a short time, they found themselves obliged to patch up an accommodation on the best terms they could with Perdikkas, from the necessity of commencing immediate operations against Aristeus and Potidæa. They then quitted Macedonia, first crossing by sea from Pydna to the eastern coast of the Thermaic Gulf—next attacking, though without effect, the town of Berœa—and then marching by land along the eastern coast of the Gulf, in the direction of Potidæa. On the third day of easy march, they reached the seaport called Gigônus, near which they encamped.²

¹ Kallias was a young Athenian of noble family, who had paid the large sum of 100 minæ to Zeno of Elea the philosopher, for rhetorical, philosophical, and sophistical instruction (Plato, *Alkibiadês*, i. c. 31, p. 119).

² Thucyd. i. 61. The statement of Thucydides presents some geographical difficulties which the critics have not adequately estimated. Are we to assume as certain, that the *Berœa* here mentioned must be the Macedonian town of that name, afterwards so well known, distant from the sea westward 160 stadia, or nearly twenty English miles (see Tafel, *Historia Thessalonice*, p. 58), on a river which flows into the Haliakmon, and upon one of the lower ridges of Mount Bermius?

The words of Thucydides here are—*Ἐπειτα δὲ ξυμβασιν ποιησάμενοι καὶ συμμαχίαν ἀναγκαίαν πρὸς τὸν Περδίκκαν, ὡς αὐτοὺς κατήπειγεν ἡ Ποτίδαια καὶ ὁ Ἀριστεὺς παρεληλυθὺς, ἀπανίστανται ἐκ τῆς Μακεδονίας, καὶ ἀφικόμενοι ἐς Βέρροιν κἀκεῖθεν ἐπιστρέφοντες, καὶ περσάντες πρῶτον τοῦ χωρίου καὶ οὐχ ἔλόντες, ἐκπερεύοντο κατὰ γῆν πρὸς τὴν*

Ποτίδαιαν—ἅμα δὲ νῆες παρέπλεον ἐβζομήκοντα.

"The natural route from Pydna to Potidæa (observes Dr. Arnold in his note) lay along the coast; and Berœa was quite out of the way, at some distance to the westward, near the fort of the Bermian mountains. But the hope of surprising Berœa induced the Athenians to deviate from their direct line of march; then after the failure of this treacherous attempt, they returned again to the sea-coast, and continued to follow it till they arrived at Gigônus."

I would remark upon this—I. The words of Thucydides imply that Berœa was *not* in Macedonia, but *out* of it (see Poppo, *Proleg.* ad Thucyd. vol. ii. p. 408-418). 2. He uses no expression which in the least implies that the attempt on Berœa on the part of the Athenians was *treacherous*, that is, contrary to the convention just concluded; though had the fact been so, he would naturally have been led to notice it, seeing that the deliberate breach of the convention was the very first step which took place after it was concluded.

In spite of the convention concluded at Pydna, Perdikkas, whose character for faithlessness we shall have more than one

3. What can have induced the Athenians to leave their fleet and march near twenty miles inland to Mount Bermius and Berœa, to attack a Macedonian town which they could not possibly hold—when they cannot even stay to continue the attack on Pydna, a position maritime, useful, and tenable—in consequence of the pressing necessity of taking immediate measures against Potidæa? 4. If they were compelled by this latter necessity to patch up a peace on any terms with Perdikkas, would they immediately endanger this peace by going out of their way to attack one of his forts? Again, Thucydides says "that, proceeding by slow land-marches, they reached Gigônus, and encamped on the third day"—κατ' ὀλίγον δὲ προϊόντες τριταῖοι ἀφίκοντο ἐς Γίγωνον καὶ ἐστρατοπεδεύσαντο. The computation of time must here be made either from Pydna, or from Berœa; and the reader who examines the map will see that neither from the one nor the other (assuming the Berœa on Mount Bermius) would it be possible for an army to arrive at Gigônus on the third day, marching round the head of the Gulf with easy days' marches; the more so as they would have to cross the rivers Lydias, Axius, and Echeidôrus, all not far from their mouths—or if these rivers could not be crossed, to get on board the fleet and re-land on the other side.

This clear mark of time laid down by Thucydides (even apart from the objections which I have just urged in reference to Berœa on Mount Bermius) made me doubt whether Dr. Arnold and the other commentators have correctly conceived the operations of the Athenian troops between Pydna and Gigônus. The *Berœa* which Thucydides means cannot be more distant from Gigônus, at any rate, than a third day's easy march, and therefore cannot be the Berœa on Mount Bermius. But there was another town named Berœa either in Thrace or in Emathia, though we do not know its exact site (see Wasse ad Thucyd. i. 61; Steph. Byz. v. Βέρης; Tafel, Thessalonica, Index). This other Berœa, situated somewhere between Gigônus and Therma, and out of the limits of that Macedonia which

Perdikkas governed, may probably be the place which Thucydides here indicates. The Athenians, raising the siege of Pydna, crossed the Gulf *on shipboard* to Berœa, and after vainly trying to surprise that town, marched along *by land* to Gigônus. Whoever inspects the map will see that the Athenians would naturally employ their large fleet to transport the army by the short transit across the Gulf from Pydna (see Livy, xlv. 10), and thus avoid the fatiguing land-march round the head of the Gulf. Moreover the language of Thucydides would seem to make the land-march *begin at Berœa*, and not at Pydna—ἀπανίστανται ἐκ τῆς Μακεδονίας, καὶ ἀφικόμενοι ἐς Βέροιαν κἀκεῖθεν ἐπιστρέψαντες, καὶ πεύρασαντες πρῶτον τοῦ χωρίου καὶ οὐχ ἰδόντες, ἐπορεύοντο κατὰ γῆν πρὸς Ποτιδαίαν—ἔμα δὲ νῆες παράλκον ἐβδόμηκοντα. Κατ' ὀλίγον δὲ προϊόντες τριταῖοι ἀφίκοντο ἐς Γίγωνον καὶ ἐστρατοπεδεύσαντο. The change of tense between ἀπανίστανται and ἐπορεύοντο—and the connexion of the participle ἀφικόμενοι with the latter verb,—seems to divide the whole proceeding into two distinct parts; first, departure from Macedonia to Berœa, as it would seem, by sea—next, a land-march from Berœa to Gigônus, of three short days.

This is the best account, as it strikes me, of a passage, the real difficulties of which are imperfectly noticed by the commentators.

The site of Gigônus cannot be exactly determined, since all that we know of the towns on the coast between Potidæa and Æneia, is derived from their enumerated names in Herodotus (vii. 123); nor can we be absolutely certain that he has enumerated them all in the exact order in which they were placed. But I think that both Colonel Leake and Kiepert's map place Gigônus too far from Potidæa; for we see, from this passage of Thucydides, that it formed the camp from which the Athenians general went forth immediately to give battle to an enemy posted between Olynthus and Potidæa; and the Scholiast says of Gigônus—οὐ πολὺ ἀπέχον Ποτιδαίας; and Stephan. Byz. Γίγωνος, πόλις Θράκης προσεχὴς τῇ Παλ- λήνῃ.

occasion to notice, was now again on the side of the Chalkidians, and sent 200 horse to join them under the command of Iolaus. Aristeus posted his Corinthians and Potidæans on the isthmus near Potidæa, providing a market without the walls in order that they might not stray in quest of provisions. His position was on the side towards Olynthus—which was about seven miles off, but within sight, and in a lofty and conspicuous situation. He here awaited the approach of the Athenians, calculating that the Chalkidians from Olynthus would, upon the hoisting of a given signal, assail them in the rear when they attacked him. But Kallias was strong enough to place in reserve his Macedonian cavalry and other allies as a check against Olynthus; while with his Athenians and the main force he marched to the isthmus and took position in front of Aristeus. In the battle which ensued, Aristeus and the chosen band of Corinthians immediately about him were completely successful, breaking the troops opposed to them and pursuing for a considerable distance. But the remaining Potidæans and Peloponnesians were routed by the Athenians and driven within the walls. On returning from pursuit, Aristeus found the victorious Athenians between him and Potidæa, and was reduced to the alternative either of cutting his way through them into the latter town or of making a retreating march to Olynthus. He chose the former as the least of two hazards, and forced his way through the flank of the Athenians, wading into the sea in order to

Combat near Potidæa between the Athenian force, and the allied Corinthians, Potidæans, and Chalkidians. Victory of the Athenians.

See Colonel Leake, *Travels in Northern Greece*, vol. iii. ch. xxxi. p. 452. That excellent observer calculates the march from Berea on Mount Bermius to Potidæa, as being one of four days, about twenty miles each day. Judging by the map, this seems lower than the reality; but admitting it to be correct, Thucydides would never describe such a march as *κατ' ὀλίγον δὲ προΐοντες τριταῖς ἀφίκοντο εἰς Πύλον*: it would be a march rather rapid and fatiguing, especially as it would include the passage of the rivers. Nor is it likely, from the description of this battle in Thucydides (i. 62), that Gigonus could be anything like a full day's march from Potidæa. According to his description, the Athenian army

advance by three very easy marches; then arriving at Gigonus, they encamp, being now near the enemy, who on their side are already encamped expecting them—*προσδεχόμενοι τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἰσχυροὺς πεδεδέοντο πρὸς Ὀλύνθου ἐν τῷ ἰσθμῷ*: the imperfect tense indicates that they were already there at the time when the Athenians took camp at Gigonus; which would hardly be the case if the Athenians had come by three successive marches from Berea on Mount Bermius.

I would add, that it is no more wonderful that there should be one Berea in Thrace and another in Macedonia—than that there should be one Methone in Thrace and another in Macedonia (Steph. B. *Μεθώνη*).

turn the extremity of the Potidæan wall, which reached entirely across the isthmus with a mole running out at each end into the water. He effected this daring enterprise and saved his detachment, though not without considerable difficulty and some loss. Meanwhile the auxiliaries from Olynthus, though they had begun their march on seeing the concerted signal, had been kept in check by the Macedonian horse, so that the Potidæans had been beaten and the signal again withdrawn, before they could make any effective diversion; nor did the cavalry on either side come into action. The defeated Potidæans and Corinthians, having the town immediately in their rear, lost only 300 men, while the Athenians lost 150, together with the general Kallias.¹

The victory was, however, quite complete, and the Athenians, after having erected their trophy and given up the enemy's dead for burial, immediately built their blockading wall across the isthmus on the side of the mainland, so as to cut off Potidæa from all communication with Olynthus and the Chalkidians. To make the blockade complete, a second wall across the isthmus was necessary, on the other side towards Pallênê: but they had not force enough to detach a completely separate body for this purpose, until after some time they were joined by Phormio with 1600 fresh hoplites from Athens. That general, landing at Aphytis in the peninsula of Pallênê, marched slowly up to Potidæa, ravaging the territory in order to draw out the citizens to battle. But the challenge not being accepted, he undertook and finished without obstruction the blockading wall on the side of Pallênê, so that the town was now completely enclosed and the harbour watched by the Athenian fleet. The wall once finished, a portion of the force sufficed to guard it, leaving Phormio at liberty to undertake aggressive operations against the Chalkidic and Bottiæan townships. The capture of Potidæa being now only a question of more or less time, Aristeus, in order that the provisions might last longer, proposed to the citizens to choose a favourable wind, get on shipboard, and break out suddenly from the harbour, taking their chance of eluding the Athenian fleet, and leaving only 500 defenders behind. Though he offered himself to be among

Potidæa placed in blockade by the Athenians.

¹ Thucyd. i. 62, 63.


those left, he could not determine the citizens to so bold an enterprise, and therefore sallied forth, in the way proposed, with a small detachment, in order to try and procure relief from without—especially some aid or diversion from Peloponnesus. But he was able to accomplish nothing beyond some partial warlike operations among the Chalkidians,¹ and a successful ambuscade against the citizens of Sermylus, which did nothing for the relief of the blockaded town. It had however been so well-provisioned that it held out for two whole years—a period full of important events elsewhere.

From these two contests between Athens and Corinth, first indirectly at Korkyra, next distinctly and avowedly at Potidæa, sprang those important movements in the Lacedæmonian alliance which will be recounted in the next chapter.

¹ Thucyd. i. 65.

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Dipartimento di Teoria dello Stato	
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Inv.	5974
Coll.	



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